Part 20

_J. D._ “He who will speak with some of our great undertakers about the grounds of learning, had need either to speak by an interpreter, or to learn a new language (I dare not call it jargon or canting) lately devised, not to set forth the truth, but to conceal falsehood. He must learn a new liberty, a new necessity, a new contingency, a new sufficiency, a new spontaneity, a new kind of deliberation, a new kind of election, a new eternity, a new compulsion, and in conclusion, a new nothing. (_a_) This proposition, _the will is free_, may be understood in two senses; either that the will is not compelled, or that the will is not always necessitated; for if it be ordinarily, or at any time free from necessitation, my assertion is true, that there is freedom from necessity. The former sense, that the will is not compelled, is acknowledged by all the world as a truth undeniable: _voluntas non cogitur_. For if the will may be compelled, then it may both will and not will the same thing at the same time, under the same notion; but this implies a contradiction. Yet this author, like the good woman whom her husband sought up the stream when she was drowned upon pretence that when she was living she used to go contrary courses to all other people, holds, that true compulsion and fear may make a man will that which he doth not will, that is, in his sense may compel the will: “as when a man willingly throws his goods into the sea to save himself, or submits to his enemy for fear of being killed”. I answer, that T. H. mistakes sundry ways in this discourse.

(_b_) “First, he erreth in this, to think that actions proceeding from fear are properly compulsory actions: which in truth are not only voluntary, but free actions; neither compelled, nor so much as physically necessitated. Another man, at the same time, in the same ship, in the same storm, may choose, and the same individual man otherwise advised might choose not, to throw his goods overboard. It is the man himself, who chooseth freely this means to preserve his life. It is true, that if he were not in such a condition, or if he were freed from the grounds of his present fears, he would not choose neither the casting of his goods into the sea, nor the submitting to his enemy. But considering the present exigence of his affairs, reason dictates to him, that of two inconveniences the less is to be chosen, as a comparative good. Neither doth he will this course as the end or direct object of his desires, but as the means to attain his end. And what fear doth in these cases, love, hope, hatred, &c. may do in other cases; that is, may occasion a man to elect those means to obtain his willed end, which otherwise he would not elect. As Jacob, to serve seven years more, rather than not to enjoy his beloved Rachel. The merchant, to hazard himself upon the rough seas in hope of profit. Passions may be so violent, that they may necessitate the will, that is, when they prevent deliberations; but this is rarely, and then the will is not free. But they never properly compel it. That which is compelled, is against the will; and that which is against the will, is not willed.

(_c_) “Secondly, T. H. errs in this also, where he saith, that ‘a man is then only said to be compelled, when fear makes him willing to an action’: as if force were not more prevalent with a man, than fear. We must know therefore, that this word _compelled_ is taken two ways: sometimes improperly, that is, when a man is moved or occasioned by threats or fear, or any passion, to do that which he would not have done, if those threats or that passion had not been. Sometimes it is taken properly; when we do any thing against our own inclination, moved by an external cause, the will not consenting nor concurring, but resisting as much as it can. As in a rape, or when a Christian is drawn or carried by violence to the idol’s temple. Or as in the case of St. Peter (John xxi. 18): _Another shall gird thee, and carry thee whither thou wouldest not_. This is that compulsion, which is understood when we say, the will may be letted, or changed, or necessitated, or that the imperate actions of the will, that is the actions of the inferior faculties which are ordinarily moved by the will, may be compelled: but that the immanent actions of the will, that is, to will, to choose, cannot be compelled; because it is the nature of an action properly compelled, to be done by an extrinsical cause, without the concurrence of the will.

(_d_) “Thirdly, the question is not, whether all the actions of a man be free, but whether they be ordinarily free. Suppose some passions are so sudden and violent, that they surprise a man, and betray the succours of the soul, and prevent deliberation; as we see in some _motus primo primi_, or antipathies, how some men will run upon the most dangerous objects, upon the first view of a loathed creature, without any power to contain themselves. Such actions as these, as they are not ordinary, so they are not free; because there is no deliberation nor election. But where deliberation and election are, as when a man throws his goods overboard to save the ship, or submits to his enemy to save his life, there is always true liberty.

“Though T. H. slight the two reasons which I produce in favour of his cause, yet they who urged them deserved not to be slighted, unless it were because they were School-men. The former reason is thus framed: a necessity of supposition may consist with true liberty. But that necessity which flows from the natural and extrinsical determination of the will, is a necessity of supposition. To this, my answer is in effect, that (_e_) a necessity of supposition is of two kinds. Sometimes the thing supposed is in the power of the agent to do, or not to do. As for a Romish priest to vow continence, upon supposition that he be a Romish priest, is necessary; but because it was in his power to be a priest or not to be a priest, therefore his vow is a free act. So supposing a man to have taken physic, it is necessary that he keep at home; yet because it was in his power to take a medicine or not to take it, therefore his keeping at home is free. Again, sometimes the thing supposed is not in the power of the agent to do, or not to do. Supposing a man to be extremely sick, it is necessary that he keep at home; or supposing that a man hath a natural antipathy against a cat, he runs necessarily away so soon as he sees her: because this antipathy, and this sickness, are not in the power of the party affected, therefore these acts are not free. Jacob blessed his sons, Balaam blessed Israel; these two acts being done, are both necessary upon supposition. But it was in Jacob’s power, not to have blessed his sons; so was it not in Balaam’s power, not to have blessed Israel (Numb. xxii. 38). Jacob’s will was determined by himself; Balaam’s will was physically determined by God. Therefore Jacob’s benediction proceeded from his own free election; and Balaam’s from God’s determination. So was Caiphas’ prophecy (John xi. 51): therefore the text saith, _he spake not of himself_. To this T. H. saith nothing; but only declareth by an impertinent instance, what _hypothetical_ signifies; and then adviseth your Lordship, to take notice how errors and ignorance may be cloaked under grave scholastic terms. And I do likewise intreat your Lordship to take notice, that the greatest fraud and cheating lurks commonly under the pretence of plain dealing. We see jugglers commonly strip up their sleeves, and promise extraordinary fair dealing, before they begin to play their tricks.

“Concerning the second argument drawn from the liberty of God and the good angels; as I cannot but approve his modesty, in ‘suspending his judgment concerning the manner how God and the good angels do work necessarily or freely, because he finds it not set down in the Articles of our faith, or the decrees of our Church’, especially in this age, which is so full of atheism, and of those scoffers which St. Peter prophesied of, (2 Pet. iii. 3), who neither believe that there is God or angels, or that they have a soul, but only as salt, to keep their bodies from putrifaction; so I can by no means assent unto him in that which follows, that is to say, that he hath proved that liberty and necessity of the same kind may consist together, that is, a liberty of exercise with a necessity of exercise, or a liberty of specification with a necessity of specification. Those actions which he saith are necessitated by passion, are for the most part dictated by reason, either truly or apparently right, and resolved by the will itself. But it troubles him, that I say that God and the good angels are more free than men, intensively in the degree of freedom, but not extensively in the latitude of the object, according to a liberty of exercise, but not of specification: which he saith are no distinctions, but terms invented to cover ignorance. Good words. Doth he only see? Are all other men stark blind? By his favour, they are true and necessary distinctions; and if he alone do not conceive them, it is because distinctions, as all other things, have their fates, according to the capacities or prejudices of their readers. But he urgeth two reasons. ‘One heat,’ saith he, ‘may be more intensive than another, but not one liberty than another.’ Why not, I wonder? Nothing is more proper to a man than reason; yet a man is more rational than a child, and one man more rational than another, that is, in respect of the use and exercise of reason. As there are degrees of understanding, so there are of liberty. The good angels have clearer understandings than we, and they are not hindered with passions as we, and by consequence they have more use of liberty than we. (_f_) His second reason is: ‘he that can do what he will, hath all liberty, and he that cannot do what he will, hath no liberty’. If this be true, then there are no degrees of liberty indeed. But this which he calls liberty, is rather an omnipotence than a liberty to do whatsoever he will. A man is free to shoot, or not to shoot, although he cannot hit the white whensoever he would. We do good freely, but with more difficulty and reluctance than the good spirits. The more rational, and the less sensual the will is, the greater is the degree of liberty. His other exception against liberty of exercise, and liberty of specification, is a mere mistake, which grows merely from not rightly understanding what liberty of specification, or contrariety is. A liberty of specification, saith he, is a liberty to do or not to do this or that in particular. Upon better advice he will find, that this which he calls a liberty of specification, is a liberty of contradiction, and not of specification, nor of contrariety. To be free to do or not to do this or that particular good, is a liberty of contradiction; so likewise, to be free to do or not to do this or that particular evil. But to be free to do both good and evil, is a liberty of contrariety, which extends to contrary objects or to diverse kind of things. So his reason to prove that a liberty of exercise cannot be without a liberty of specification, falls flat to the ground: and he may lay aside his lenten licence for another occasion. I am ashamed to insist upon these things, which are so evident that no man can question them who doth understand them.

(_g_) “And here he falls into another invective against distinctions and scholastical expressions, and the ‘doctors of the Church, who by this means tyrannized over the understandings of other men.’ What a presumption is this, for one private man, who will not allow human liberty to others, to assume to himself such a licence to control so magistrally, and to censure of gross ignorance and tyrannising over men’s judgments, yea, as causes of the troubles and tumults which are in the world, the doctors of the Church in general, who have flourished in all ages and all places, only for a few necessary and innocent distinctions. Truly, said Plutarch, that a sore eye is offended with the light of the sun. (_h_) What then, must the logicians lay aside their first and second intentions, their abstracts and concretes, their subjects and predicates, their modes and figures, their method synthetic and analytic, their fallacies of composition and division, &c.? Must the moral philosopher quit his means and extremes, his _principia congenita et acquisita_, his liberty of contradiction and contrariety, his necessity absolute and hypothetical, &c.? Must the natural philosopher give over his intentional species, his understanding agent and patient, his receptive and eductive power of the matter, his qualities _infusæ_ or _influxæ_, _symbolæ_ or _dissymbolæ_, his temperament _ad pondus_ and _ad justitiam_, his parts homogeneous and heterogeneous, his sympathies and antipathies, his antiperistasis, &c.? Must the astrologer and the geographer leave their _apogæum_ and _perigæum_, their artic and antartic poles, their equator, zodiac, zenith, meridian, horizon, zones, &c.? Must the mathematician, the metaphysician, and the divine, relinquish all their terms of art and proper idiotisms, because they do not relish with T. H.’s palate? But he will say, they are obscure expressions. What marvel is it, when the things themselves are more obscure? Let him put them into as plain English as he can, and they shall be never a whit the better understood by those who want all grounds of learning. Nothing is clearer than mathematical demonstration: yet let one who is altogether ignorant in mathematics hear it, and he will hold it to be as T. H. terms these distinctions, plain fustian or jargon. Every art or profession hath its proper mysteries and expressions, which are well known to the sons of art, not so to strangers. Let him consult with military men, with physicians, with navigators; and he shall find this true by experience. Let him go on shipboard, and the mariners will not leave their _starboard_ and _larboard_, because they please not him, or because he accounts it gibberish. No, no: it is not the School divines, but innovators and seditious orators, who are the true causes of the present troubles of Europe. (_i_) T. H. hath forgotten what he said in his book, _De Cive_, cap. XII.: ‘_that it is a seditious opinion, to teach that the knowledge of good and evil belongs to private persons_’: and cap. XVII. ‘that in questions of faith, the civil magistrates ought to consult with ecclesiastical doctors, to whom God’s blessing is derived by imposition of hands so as not to be deceived in necessary truths, to whom our Saviour hath promised infallibility.’ These are the very men whom he traduceth here. There he ascribes infallibility to them; here he accuseth them of gross superstitious ignorance. There he attributes too much to them; here he attributes too little. Both there and here he takes too much upon him; (1 Cor. xiv. 32): _The spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets_.”

ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY NO. XIX.

(_a_) “This proposition, _the will is free_, may be understood in two senses; either that the will is not compelled, or that the will is not always necessitated, &c. The former sense, that the will is not compelled, is acknowledged by all the world as a truth undeniable.” I never said the will is _compelled_, but do agree with the rest of the world in granting that it is _not compelled_. It is an absurd speech to say it is compelled, but not to say it is necessitated, or a necessary effect of some cause. When the fire heateth, it doth not compel heat; so likewise when some cause maketh the will to anything, it doth not compel it. Many things may compel a man to do an action, in producing the will; but that is not a compelling of the _will_, but of the _man_. That which I call necessitation, is the effecting and creating of that will which was not before, not a compelling of a will already existent. The necessitation or creation of the will, is the same thing with the compulsion of the man, saving that we commonly use the word compulsion, in those actions which proceed from terror. And therefore this distinction is of no use; and that raving which followeth immediately after it, is nothing to the question, _whether the will be free_, though it be to the question, _whether the man be free_.

(_b_) “First he erreth in this, to think that actions proceeding from fear are properly compulsory actions; which in truth are not only voluntary, but free actions.” I never said nor doubted, but such actions were both voluntary and free; for he that doth any thing for fear, though he say truly he was compelled to it, yet we deny not that he had election to do or not to do, and consequently that he was a voluntary and free agent. But this hinders not, but that the terror might be a necessary cause of his election of that which otherwise he would not have elected, unless some other potent cause made it necessary he should elect the contrary. And therefore, in the same ship, in the same storm, one man may be necessitated to throw his goods overboard, and another man to keep them within the ship; and the same man in a like storm be otherwise advised, if all the causes be not like. But that the same individual man, as the Bishop says, that chose to throw his goods overboard, might chose not to throw his goods overboard, I cannot conceive; unless a man can choose to throw overboard and not to throw overboard, or be so advised and otherwise advised, all at once.

(_c_) “Secondly, T. H. errs in this also, where he saith, that ‘a man is then only said to be compelled, when fear makes him willing to an action.’ As if force were not more prevalent with a man than fear,” &c. When I said _fear_, I think no man can doubt but the fear of force was understood. I cannot see therefore what quarrel he could justly take, at saying that a man is compelled by fear only; unless he think it may be called compulsion when a man by force, seizing on another man’s limbs, moveth them as himself, not as the other man pleaseth. But this is not the meaning of compulsion: neither is the action so done, the action of him that suffereth, but of him that useth the force. But this, as if it were a question of the propriety of the English tongue, the Bishop denies; and says when a man is moved by fear, it is _improperly_ said he is compelled. But when a man is moved by an external cause, the will resisting as much as it can, then he says, he is _properly_ said to be compelled; as in a rape, or when a Christian is drawn or carried by violence to the idol’s temple. Insomuch as by this distinction it were very proper English to say, that a stone were compelled when it is thrown, or a man when he is carried in a cart. For my part, I understand compulsion to be used rightly of living creatures only, which are moved only by their own animal motion, in such manner as they would not be moved without the fear. But of this dispute the English and well-bred reader is the proper judge.

(_d_) “Thirdly, the question is not, whether all the actions of a man be free, but whether they be ordinarily free.” Is it impossible for the Bishop to remember the question, which is _whether a man be free to will?_ Did I ever say, that no actions of a man are free? On the contrary, I say that all his voluntary actions are free, even those also to which he is compelled by fear. But it does not therefore follow but that the will, from whence those actions and their election proceed, may have necessary causes, against which he hath never yet said anything. That which followeth immediately, is not offered as a proof, but as explication, how the passions of a man surprise him; therefore I let it pass, noting only that he expoundeth _motus primo primi_, which I understood not before, by the word _antipathy_.

(_e_) “A necessity of supposition is of two kinds; sometimes a thing supposed, is in the power of the agent to do or not to do, &c.; sometimes a thing supposed, is not in the power of the agent to do or not to do,” &c.

When the necessity is of the former kind of supposition, then, he says, freedom may consist with this necessity, in the latter sense that it cannot. And to use his own instances, to vow continence in a Romish priest, upon supposition that he is a Romish priest, is a necessary act, because it was in his power to be a priest or not. On the other side, supposing a man having a natural antipathy against a cat; because this antipathy is not in the power of the party affected, therefore the running away from the cat is no free act.