Part 34
(_b_) “But let us view his argument: ‘If a man have liberty from necessitation, he may frustrate the decrees of God, and make his prescience false’. This is his decree, that man should be a free agent. If he did consider God as a most simple act, without priority or posteriority of time, or any composition, he would not conceive of his decrees as long since enacted, but as coexistent with ourselves”. Here again he would have me conceive eternity to be _nunc stans_, that is, an instant of time, and that instant of time to be God; which neither he nor I can conceive, nor can without impiety say, as he doth here, that the decrees of God are God. In which consisteth all the rest of his answer to this Number, saving that he putteth in sometimes, that “the foreknowledge of God produceth not necessity”, which is granted him; but that anything can be foreknown which shall not necessarily come to pass, which was not granted, he proveth no otherwise than by his assertion, “that every instant of time is God”; which is denied him.
NO. XXXVII.
_T. H._ This is all that hath come into my mind touching this question, since I last considered it. And I humbly beseech your Lordship to communicate it only to J. D. And so praying God to prosper your Lordship in all your designs, I take leave, and am, my most noble and obliging Lord,
Your most humble servant, T. H.
[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.]
_J. D._ “He is very careful to have this discourse kept secret, as appears in this section, and in the XIVth and XVth sections. If his answer had been kept private, I had saved the labour of a reply. But hearing that it was communicated, I thought myself obliged to vindicate both the truth and myself. I do not blame him to be cautious; for in truth, this assertion is of desperate consequence, and destructive to piety, policy, and morality. (_a_) If he had desired to have it kept secret, the way had been to have kept it secret himself. It will not suffice to say, as No. XIV, that ‘truth is truth’: This is the common plea of all men. Neither is it sufficient for him to say, as No. XV, that ‘it was desired by me’, long before that he had discovered his opinion by word of mouth. And my desire was to let some of my noble friends see the weakness of his grounds, and the pernicious consequences of that opinion. (_b_) But if he think that this ventilation of the question between us two may do hurt, truly I hope not. The edge of his discourse is so abated, that it cannot easily hurt any rational man, who is not too much possessed with prejudice.”
ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE ANSWER TO NO. XXXVII.
In this place I said nothing, but that I would have my Lord of Newcastle to communicate it only to the Bishop. And in his answer he says, (_a_) “if I had desired to have it kept secret, the way had been to have kept it secret myself”. My desire was, it should not be communicated by my Lord of Newcastle to all men indifferently. But I barred not myself from showing it privately to my friends; though to publish it was never my intention, till now provoked by the uncivil triumphing of the Bishop in his own errors to my disadvantage.
(_b_) “But if he think that this ventilation of the question may do hurt, truly I hope not. The edge of his discourse is so abated, that it cannot easily hurt any rational man, who is not too much possessed with prejudice.” It is confidently said; but not very pertinently to the hurt I thought might proceed from a discourse of this nature. For I never thought it could do hurt to a rational man, but only to such men as cannot reason in those points which are of difficult contemplation. For a rational man will say with himself, _they whom God will bring to a blessed and happy end, those he will put into an humble, pious, and righteous way; and of those whom he will destroy, he will harden the hearts_: and thereupon examining himself whether he be in such a way or not, the examination itself would, if elected, be a necessary cause of working out his salvation with fear and trembling. But the men who I thought might take hurt thereby, are such as reason erroneously, saying with themselves, _if I shall be saved, I shall be saved whether I walk uprightly or no_: and consequently thereunto, shall behave themselves negligently, and pursue the pleasant way of the sins they are in love with. Which inconvenience is not abated by this discourse of the Bishop; because they understand not the grounds he goeth on, of _nunc stans_, _motus primo primi_, _elicit acts_, _imperate acts_, and a great many other such unintelligible words.
NO. XXXVIII.
_T. H._ Postscript. Arguments seldom work on men of wit and learning, when they have once engaged themselves in a contrary opinion. If anything do it, it is the shewing of them the causes of their errors, which is this. Pious men attribute to God Almighty, for honour sake, whatsoever they see is honourable in the world, as seeing, hearing, willing, knowing, justice, wisdom, &c.: but deny him such poor things as eyes, ears, brains, and other organs, without which we worms neither have nor can conceive such faculties to be: and so far they do well. But when they dispute of God’s actions philosophically, then they consider them again as if he had such faculties, and in that manner as we have them. This is not well; and thence it is they fall into so many difficulties. We ought not to dispute of God’s nature; he is no fit subject of our philosophy. True religion consisteth in obedience to Christ’s lieutenants, and in giving God such honour, both in attributes and actions, as they in their several lieutenancies shall ordain.
[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.]
_J. D._ “Though sophistical captions do seldom work on men of wit and learning, because _by constant use they have their senses exercised to discern both good and evil_ (Heb. v. 14), yet (_a_) solid and substantial reasons work sooner upon them than upon weaker judgments. The more exact the balance is, the sooner it discovers the real weight that is put into it; especially if the proofs be proposed without passion or opposition. Let sophisters and seditious orators apply themselves to the many-headed multitude, because they despair of success with men of wit and learning. Those whose gold is true, are not afraid to have it tried by the touch. Since the former way hath not succeeded, T. H. hath another to shew as the causes of our errors, which he hopes will prove more successful. When he sees he can do no good by sight, he seeks to circumvent us under colour of courtesy: _Fistula dulce canit, volucrem dum decipit auceps_. As they who behold themselves in a glass, take the right hand for the left, and the left for the right (T. H. knows the comparison); so we take our own errors to be truths, and other men’s truths to be errors, (_b_) If we be in an error in this, it is such an error as we sucked from nature itself, such an error as is confirmed in us by reason and experience, such an error as God himself in his sacred Word hath revealed, such an error as the Fathers and Doctors of the Church in all ages have delivered, such an error wherein we have the concurrence of all the best philosophers, both natural and moral, such an error as bringeth to God the glory of justice, and wisdom, and goodness, and truth, such an error as renders men more devout, more pious, more industrious, more humble, more penitent for their sins. Would he have us resign up all these advantages, to dance blindfold after his pipe? No, he persuades us too much to our loss. But let us see what is the imaginary cause of our imaginary error. Forsooth, because ‘we attribute to God whatsoever is honourable in the world, as seeing, hearing, willing, knowing, justice, wisdom; but deny him such poor things as eyes, ears, brains’; and so far, he saith ‘we do well.’ He hath reason, for since we are not able to conceive of God as he is, the readiest way we have, is by removing all that imperfection from God, which is in the creatures; so we call him infinite, immortal, independent: or by attributing to him all those perfections which are in the creatures, after a most eminent manner; so we call him best, greatest, most wise, most just, most holy. (_c_) But saith he, ‘When they dispute of God’s actions philosophically, then they consider them again, as if he had such faculties, and in that manner as we have them’.
“And is this the cause of our error? That were strange indeed; for they who dispute philosophically of God, do neither ascribe faculties to him in that manner that we have them, nor yet do they attribute any proper faculties at all to God. God’s understanding and his will is his very essence, which, for the eminency of its infinite perfection, doth perform all those things alone in a most transcendant manner, which reasonable creatures do perform imperfectly by distinct faculties. Thus to dispute of God with modesty and reverence, and to clear the Deity from the imputation of tyranny, injustice, and dissimulation, which none do throw upon God with more presumption than those who are the patrons of absolute necessity, is both comely and Christian.
“It is not the desire to discover the original of a supposed error, which draws them ordinarily into these exclamations against those who dispute of the Deity. For some of themselves dare anatomize God, and publish his eternal decrees with as much confidence, as if they had been all their lives of his cabinet council. But it is for fear lest those pernicious consequences which flow from that doctrine essentially, and reflect in so high a degree upon the supreme goodness, should be laid open to the view of the world; just as the Turks do first establish a false religion of their own devising, and then forbid all men upon pain of death to dispute upon religion; or as the priests of Moloch, the abomination of the Ammonites, did make a noise with their timbrels all the while the poor infants were passing through the fire in Tophet, to keep their pitiful cries from the ears of their parents. So (_d_) they make a noise with their declamations against those who dare dispute of the nature of God, that is, who dare set forth his justice, and his goodness, and his truth, and his philanthropy, only to deaf the ears and dim the eyes of the Christian world, lest they should hear the lamentable ejulations and howlings, or see that rueful spectacle of millions of souls tormented for evermore (_e_) in the flames of the true Tophet, that is, hell, only for that which, according to T. H.’s doctrine, was never in their power to shun, but which they were ordered and inevitably necessitated to do, only to express the omnipotence and dominion, and to satisfy the pleasure of Him, who is in truth the Father of all mercies, and the God of all consolation. (_f_) _This is life eternal_ (saith our Saviour), _to know the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom he hath sent_ (John xvii. 3.). _Pure religion, and undefiled before God and the Father, is this, to visit the fatherless and widows in their affliction, and to keep himself unspotted from the world_, saith St. James (James i. 27.). _Fear God and keep his commandments; for this is the whole duty of man_, saith Solomon (Eccles. xii. 13.). But T. H. hath found out a more compendious way to heaven: ‘True religion’, saith he, ‘consisteth in obedience to Christ’s lieutenants, and giving God such honour, both in attributes and actions, as they in their several lieutenancies shall ordain’. That is to say, _be of the religion of every Christian country where you come_. To make the civil magistrate to be Christ’s lieutenant upon earth, for matters of religion, and to make him to be supreme judge in all controversies, whom all must obey, is a doctrine so strange, and such an uncouth phrase to Christian ears, that I should have missed his meaning, but that I consulted with his book, _De Cive_, c. XV. sect. 16, and c. XVII. sect. 28. What if the magistrate shall be no Christian himself? What if he shall command contrary to the law of God or nature? _Must we obey him rather than God?_ (Acts iv. 19.) Is the civil magistrate become now the only ground and pillar of truth? I demand then, why T. H. is of a different mind from his sovereign, and from the laws of the land, concerning the attributes of God and his decrees? This is a new paradox, and concerns not this question of liberty and necessity. Wherefore I forbear to prosecute it further, and so conclude my reply with the words of the Christian poet,
Jussum est Cæsaris ore Galieni, Quod princeps colit ut colamus omnes. Æternum colo Principem, dierum Factorem, Dominumque Galieni.[A]
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Footnote A:
Prudentius. περι στεφανων. Hymn. vi.
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ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE ANSWER TO THE POSTSCRIPT NO. XXXVIII.
He taketh it ill that I say that arguments do seldom work on men of wit and learning, when they have once engaged themselves in a contrary opinion. Nevertheless it is not only certain by experience, but also there is reason for it, and that grounded upon the natural disposition of mankind. For it is natural to all men to defend those opinions, which they have once publicly engaged themselves to maintain; because to have that detected for error, which they have publicly maintained for truth, is never without some dishonour, more or less; and to find in themselves that they have spent a great deal of time and labour in deceiving themselves, is so uncomfortable a thing, as it is no wonder if they employ their wit and learning, if they have any, to make good their errors. And, therefore, where he saith, (_a_) “solid and substantial reasons work sooner upon them, than upon weaker judgments; and that the more exact the balance is, the sooner it discovers the real weight that is put into it”: I confess, the more solid a man’s wit is, the better will solid reasons work upon him. But if he add to it that which he calls learning, that is to say, much reading of other men’s doctrines without weighing them with his own thoughts, then their judgments become weaker, and the balance less exact. And whereas he saith, “that they whose gold is true, are not afraid to have it tried by the touch”; he speaketh as if I had been afraid to have my doctrine tried by the touch of men of wit and learning; wherein he is not much mistaken, meaning by men of learning (as I said before) such as had read other men, but not themselves. For by reading others, men commonly obstruct the way to their own exact and natural judgment, and use their wit both to deceive themselves with fallacies, and to requite those, who endeavour at their own entreaty to instruct them, with revilings.
(_b_) “If we be in an error, it is such an error as is sucked from nature; as is confirmed by reason, by experience, and by Scripture; as the Fathers and Doctors of the Church of all ages have delivered; an error, wherein we have the concurrence of all the best philosophers, an error that bringeth to God the glory of justice, &c.; that renders men more devout, more pious, more humble, more industrious, more penitent for their sins.” All this is but said; and what heretofore hath been offered in proof for it, hath been sufficiently refuted, and the contrary proved; namely, that it is an error contrary to the nature of the will; repugnant to reason and experience; repugnant to the Scripture; repugnant to the doctrine of St. Paul, (and ’tis pity the Fathers and Doctors of the Church have not followed St. Paul therein); an error not maintained by the best philosophers, (for they are not the best philosophers, which the Bishop thinketh so); an error that taketh from God the glory of his prescience, nor bringeth to him the glory of his other attributes; an error that maketh men, by imagining they can repent when they will, neglect their duties; and that maketh men unthankful for God’s graces, by thinking them to proceed from the natural ability of their own will.
(_c_) “‘But,’ saith he, ‘when they dispute of God’s actions philosophically, then they consider them again as if he had such faculties, and in such manner as we have them.’ And is this the cause of our error? That were strange indeed; for they who dispute philosophically of God, do neither ascribe faculties to him, in that manner that we have them, nor yet do they attribute any proper faculties at all to God. God’s understanding and his will is his very essence, &c.” Methinks he should have known at these years, that to dispute philosophically is to dispute by natural reason, and from principles evident by the light of nature, and to dispute of the faculties and proprieties of the subject whereof they treat. It is therefore unskilfully said by him, that they who dispute philosophically of God, ascribe unto him no proper faculties. If no proper faculties, I would fain know of him what improper faculties he ascribes to God. I guess he will make the understanding and the will, and his other attributes, to be in God improper faculties, because he cannot properly call them faculties; that is to say, he knows not how to make it good that they are faculties, and yet he will have these words, “God’s understanding and his will are his very essence”, to pass for an axiom of philosophy. And whereas I had said, we ought not to dispute of God’s nature, and that He is no fit subject of our philosophy, he denies it not, but says I say it.
(_d_) “With a purpose to make a noise with declaiming against those who dare dispute of the nature of God, that is, who dare set forth his justice and his goodness, &c.” The Bishop will have much ado to make good, that to dispute of the nature of God, is all one with setting forth his justice and his goodness. He taketh no notice of these words of mine, ‘pious men attribute to God Almighty for honour’s sake, whatsoever they see is honourable in the world’; and yet this is setting forth God’s justice, goodness, &c, without disputing of God’s nature.
(_e_) “In the flames of the true Tophet, that is hell.” The true Tophet was a place not far from the walls of Jerusalem, and consequently on the earth. I cannot imagine what he will say to this in his answer to my _Leviathan_, if there he find the same, unless he say, that in this place by the _true_ Tophet, he meant a _not true_ Tophet.
(_f_) “_This is life eternal_ (saith our Saviour) _to know the only true God, and Jesus Christ_, &c.” This which followeth to the end of his answer and of the book, is a reprehension of me, for saying that ‘true religion consisteth in obedience to Christ’s lieutenants’. If it be lawful for Christians to institute amongst themselves a commonwealth and magistrates, whereby they may be able to live in peace one with another, and unite themselves in defence against a foreign enemy; it will certainly be necessary to make to themselves some supreme judge in all controversies, to whom they ought all to give obedience. And this is no such strange doctrine, nor so uncouth a phrase to Christian ears, as the Bishop makes it, whatsoever it be to them that would make themselves judges of the Supreme Judge himself. No; but, saith he, Christ is the Supreme Judge, and we are not to obey men rather than God. Is there any Christian man that does not acknowledge that we are to be judged by Christ, or that we ought not to obey him rather than any man that shall be his lieutenant upon earth? The question therefore is, not of who is to be obeyed, but of what be his commands. If the Scripture contain his commands, then may every Christian know by them what they are. And what has the Bishop to do with what God says to me when I read them, more than I have to do with what God says to him when he reads them, unless he have authority given him by him whom Christ hath constituted his lieutenant? This lieutenant upon earth, I say, is the supreme civil magistrate, to whom belongeth the care and charge of seeing that no doctrine may be taught the people, but such as may consist with the general peace of them all, and with the obedience that is due to the civil sovereign. In whom would the Bishop have the authority reside of prohibiting seditious opinions, when they are taught (as they are often) in divinity books and from the pulpit? I could hardly guess, but that I remember that there have been books written to entitle the bishops to a _divine right_, underived from the civil sovereign. But because he maketh it so heinous a matter, that the supreme civil magistrate should be Christ’s lieutenant upon earth, let us suppose that a bishop, or a synod of bishops, should be set up (which I hope never shall) for our civil sovereign; then that which he objecteth here, I could object in the same words against himself. For I could say in his own words, _This is life eternal, to know the only true God, and Jesus Christ_ (John xvii. 3.). _Pure religion, and undefiled before God is this, to visit the fatherless_, &c. (James i. 27.) _Fear God and keep his commandments_ (Eccles. xii. 13.). But the Bishop hath found a more compendious way to heaven, namely, that true religion consisteth in obedience to Christ’s lieutenants; that is (now by supposition), to the bishops. That is to say, that every Christian of what nation soever, coming into the country which the bishops govern, should be of their religion. He would make the civil magistrate to be Christ’s lieutenant upon earth for matters of religion, and supreme judge in all controversies, and say they ought to be obeyed by all; how strange soever and uncouth it seem to him now, the sovereignty being in others. And I may say to him, what if the magistrate himself (I mean by supposition the bishops) should be wicked men; what if they should command as much contrary to the law of God or nature, as ever any Christian king did, (which is very possible); must we obey them rather than God? Is the civil magistrate become now the only ground and pillar of truth? No:
Synedri jussum est voce episcoporum, Ipsum quod colit ut colamus omnes. Æternum colo Principem, dierum Factorem, Dominumque episcoporum.
And thus the Bishop may see, there is little difference between his Ode and my Parode to it; and that both of them are of equal force to conclude nothing.