Part 14

(_a_) “The first inconvenience is thus pressed. Those laws are unjust and tyrannical, which do prescribe things absolutely impossible in themselves to be done, and punish men for not doing of them.”

I have already, in the beginning, where I recite the inconveniences that follow the doctrine of necessity, made clear that the same inconveniences follow not the doctrine of necessity, any more than they follow this truth, _whatsoever shall be, shall be_, which all men must confess; the same also followeth upon this, that _whatsoever God foreknows, cannot but come to pass in such time and manner as he hath foreknown it_. It is therefore evident that these inconveniences are not rationally deduced from those tenets. Again, it is a truth manifest to all men, that it is not in a man’s power to-day, to choose what will he shall have to-morrow, or an hour, or any time after. Intervening occasions, business, which the Bishop calls trifles, (trifles of which the Bishop maketh here a great business), do change the will. No man can say what he will do to-morrow, unless he foreknow, which no man can, what shall happen before to-morrow. And this being the substance of my opinion, it must needs be that when he deduceth from it, that counsels, arts, arms, medicines, teachers, praise, prayer, and piety, are in vain, that his deduction is false, and his ratiocination fallacy. And though I need make no other answer to all that he can object against me, yet I shall here mark out the causes of his several paralogisms.

“Those laws,” he saith, “are unjust and tyrannical, which do prescribe things absolutely impossible to be done, and punish men for not doing of them.” In which words this is one absurdity, that _a law can be unjust_; for all laws are divine or civil, neither of which can be unjust. Of the first there is no doubt. And as for civil laws, they are made by every man that is subject to them; because every one of them consenteth to the placing of the legislative power. Another is this, in the same words, that he supposeth there may be laws that are tyrannical; for if he that maketh them have the sovereign power, they may be regal, but not tyrannical; if tyrant signify not King, as he thinks it doth not. Another is in the same words, “that a law may prescribe things absolutely impossible in themselves to be done.” When he says _impossible in themselves_, he understands not what himself means. _Impossible in themselves_ are contradictions only, as to be and not to be at the same time, which the divines say is not possible to God. All other things are possible at least in themselves. Raising from the dead, changing the course of nature, making of a new heaven, and a new earth, are things possible in themselves; for there is nothing in their nature able to resist the will of God. And if laws do not prescribe such things, why should I believe they prescribe other things that are more impossible. Did he ever read in Suarez of any tyrant that made a law commanding any man to do and not to do the same action, or to be and not to be at the same place in one and the same moment of time. But out of the doctrine of necessity, it followeth he says, that “all laws do prescribe absolute impossibilities to be done.” Here he has left out _in themselves_, which is a wilful fallacy.

He further says that “just laws are the ordinances of right reason;” which is an error that hath cost many thousands of men their lives. Was there ever a King, that made a law which in right reason had been better unmade? And shall those laws therefore not be obeyed? Shall we rather rebel? I think not, though I am not so great a divine as he. I think rather that the reason of him that hath the sovereign authority, and by whose sword we look to be protected both against war from abroad and injuries at home, whether it be right or erroneous in itself, ought to stand for right to us that have submitted ourselves thereunto by receiving the protection.

But the Bishop putteth his greatest confidence in this, that whether the things be impossible in themselves, or made impossible by some unseen accident, yet there is no reason that men should be _punished for not doing them_. It seems he taketh punishment for a kind of revenge, and can never therefore agree with me, that take it for nothing else but for a correction, or for an example, which hath for end the _framing_ and _necessitating of the will_ to virtue; and that he is no good man, that upon any provocation useth his power, though a power lawfully obtained, to afflict another man without this end, to reform the will of him or others. Nor can I comprehend, as having only humane ideas, that that punishment which neither intendeth the correction of the offender, nor the correction of others by example, doth proceed from God.

(_b_) “He saith that no law can possibly be unjust,” &c.

Against this he replies that the law of Pharaoh, to drown the male children of the Israelites; and of Nebuchadnezzar, to worship the golden image; and of Darius, against praying to any but him in thirty days; and of Ahasuerus, to destroy the Jews; and of the Pharisees, to excommunicate the confessors of Christ; were all unjust laws. The laws of these kings, as they were laws, have relation only to the men that were their subjects; and the _making_ of them, which was the action of every one of those kings, who were subjects to another king, namely, to God Almighty, had relation to the law of God. In the first relation, there could be no injustice in them; because all laws made by him to whom the people had given the legislative power, are the acts of every one of that people; and no man can do injustice to himself. But in relation to God, if God have by a law forbidden it, the making of such laws is injustice. Which law of God was to those heathen princes no other but _salus populi_, that is to say, the properest use of their natural reason for the preservation of their subjects. If therefore those laws were ordained out of wantonness, or cruelty, or envy, or for the pleasing of a favourite, or out of any other sinister end, as it seems they were, the making of those laws was unjust. But if in right reason they were necessary for the preservation of those people of whom they had undertaken the charge, then was it not unjust. And for the Pharisees, who had the same written law of God that we have, their excommunication of the Christians, proceeding, as it did, from envy, was an act of malicious injustice. If it had proceeded from misinterpretation of their own Scriptures, it had been a sin of ignorance. Nevertheless, as it was a law to their subjects (in case they had the legislative power, which I doubt of), the law was not unjust. But the making of it was an unjust action, of which they were to give account to none but God. I fear the Bishop will think this discourse too subtile; but the judgment is the reader’s.

(_c_) “The ground of this error,” &c., “is this: that every man makes by his consent the law which he is bound to keep,” &c.

The reason why he thinketh this an error, is because the positive law of God, contained in the Bible, is a law without our assent; the law of nature was written in our hearts by the finger of God without our assent; the laws of conquerors, who come in by the power of the sword, were made without our assent; and so were the laws of our ancestors, which were made before we were born. It is a strange thing that he that understands the nonsense of the Schoolmen, should not be able to perceive so easy a truth as this which he denieth. The Bible is a law. To whom? To all the world? He knows it is not. How came it then to be a law to us? Did God speak it _viva voce_ to us? Have we then any other warrant for it than the word of the prophets? Have we seen the miracles? Have we any other assurance of their certainty than the authority of the Church? And is the authority of the Church any other than the authority of the commonwealth, or that of the commonwealth any other than that of the head of the commonwealth, or hath the head of the commonwealth any other authority than that which hath been given him by the members? Else, why should not the Bible be canonical as well in Constantinople as in any other place? They that have the legislative power make nothing canon, which they make not law, nor law, which they make not canon. And because the legislative power is from the assent of the subjects, the Bible is made law by the assent of the subjects. It was not the Bishop of Rome that made the Scripture law without his own temporal dominions; nor is it the clergy that make it law in their dioceses and rectories. Nor can it be a law of itself without special and supernatural revelation. The Bishop thinks because the Bible is law, and he is appointed to teach it to the people in his diocese, that therefore it is law to whomsoever he teach it; which is somewhat gross, but not so gross as to say that conquerors who come in by the power of the sword, make their laws also without our assent. He thinks, belike, that if a conqueror can kill me if he please, I am presently obliged without more ado to obey all his laws. May not I rather die, if I think fit? The conqueror makes no law over the conquered by virtue of his power; but by virtue of their assent, that promised obedience for the saving of their lives. But how then is the assent of the children obtained to the laws of their ancestors? This also is from the desire of preserving their lives, which first the parents might take away, where the parents be free from all subjection; and where they are not, there the civil power might do the same, if they doubted of their obedience. The children therefore, when they be grown up to strength enough to do mischief, and to judgment enough to know that other men are kept from doing mischief to them by fear of the sword that protecteth them, in that very act of receiving that protection, and not renouncing it openly, do oblige themselves to obey the laws of their protectors; to which, in receiving such protection, they have assented. And whereas he saith, the law of nature is a law without our assent, it is absurd; for the law of nature is the assent itself that all men give to the means of their own preservation.

(_d_) “But his chiefest answer is, that an action forbidden, though it proceed from necessary causes, yet if it were done willingly, may be justly punished,” &c.

This the Bishop also understandeth not, and therefore denies it. He would have the judge condemn no man for a crime, if it were necessitated; as if the judge could know what acts are necessary, unless he knew all that hath anteceded, both visible and invisible, and what both every thing in itself, and altogether, can effect. It is enough to the judge, that the act he condemneth be voluntary. The punishment whereof may, if not capital, reform the will of the offender; if capital, the will of others by example. For heat in one body doth not more create heat in another, than the terror of an example createth fear in another, who otherwise were inclined to commit injustice.

Some few lines before, he hath said that I built upon a wrong foundation, namely, “that all magistrates were at first elective;” I had forgot to tell you, that I never said nor thought it. And therefore his reply, as to that point, is impertinent.

Not many lines after, for a reason why a man may not be justly punished when his crime is voluntary, he offereth this: “that law is unjust and tyrannical, which commands a man to will that which is impossible for him to will.” Whereby it appears, he is of opinion that a law may be made to command the will. The style of a law is _do this_, or _do not this_; or, _if thou do this, thou shalt suffer this_; but no law runs thus, _will this_, or _will not this_; or, _if thou have a will to this, thou shalt suffer this_. He objecteth further, that I beg the question, because no man’s will is necessitated. Wherein he mistakes; for I say no more in that place, but that he that doth evil willingly, whether he be necessarily willing, or not necessarily, may be justly punished. And upon this mistake he runneth over again his former and already answered nonsense, saying, “we ourselves, by our own negligence in not opposing our passions when we should and might, have freely given them a kind of dominion over us;” and again, _motus primo primi_, the first motions are not always in our power. Which _motus primo primi_, signifies nothing; and “our negligence in not opposing our passions,” is the same with “our want of will to oppose our will,” which is absurd; and “that we have given them a kind of dominion over us,” either signifies nothing, or that we have a dominion over our wills, or our wills a dominion over us, and consequently either we or our wills are not free.

(_e_) “He pleads moreover that the law is a cause of justice,” &c. “All this is most true, of a just law justly executed.”

But I have shown that all laws are just, as laws, and therefore not to be accused of injustice by those that owe subjection to them; and a just law is always justly executed. Seeing then that he confesseth that all that he replieth to here is true, it followeth that the reply itself, where it contradicteth me, is false.

(_f_) “He addeth that the sufferings imposed by the law upon delinquents, respect not the evil act passed, but the good to come; and that the putting of a delinquent to death by the magistrate for any crime whatsoever, cannot be justified before God, except there be a real intention to benefit others by his example.”

This he neither confirmeth nor denieth, and yet forbeareth not to discourse upon it to little purpose; and therefore I pass it over.

(_g_) “First he told us, that it was the irresistible power of God that justifies all his actions; though he command one thing openly, and plot another thing secretly; though he be the cause not only of the action, but also of the irregularity, &c.”

To all this, which hath been pressed before, I have answered before; but that he says I say, “having commanded one thing openly, he plots another thing secretly,” it is not mine, but one of his own ugly phrases. And the force it hath, proceeded out of an apprehension he hath, that affliction is not God’s correction, but his revenge upon the creatures of his own making; and from a reasoning he useth, “because it is not just in a man to kill one man for the amendment of another, therefore neither is it so in God;” not remembering that God hath, or shall have killed all the men in the world, both nocent and innocent.

My assertion, he saith, “is a dream, and the sum of it this; that where there is no law, there no killing or anything else can be unjust; that before the constitution of commonwealths, every man had power to kill another,” &c., and adds, that “this may well be called stringing of paradoxes.” To these my words he replies:

(_h_) “There was never any time when mankind was without governors, laws, and societies.”

It is very likely to be true, that since the creation there never was a time in which mankind was totally without society. If a part of it were without laws and governors, some other parts might be commonwealths. He saw there was paternal government in Adam; which he might do easily, as being no deep consideration. But in those places where there is a civil war at any time, at the same time there is neither laws, nor commonwealth, nor society, but only a temporal league, which every discontented soldier may depart from when he pleases, as being entered into by each man for his private interest, without any obligation of conscience: there are therefore almost at all times multitudes of lawless men. But this was a little too remote from his understanding to perceive. Again, he denies, that ever there was a time when one private man might lawfully kill another for his own preservation; and has forgotten that these words of his (No. II.), “this is the belief of all mankind, which we have not learned from our tutors, but is imprinted in our hearts by nature; we need not turn over any obscure books to find out this truth,” &c.; which are the words of Cicero in the defence of Milo, and translated by the Bishop to the defence of free-will, were used by Cicero to prove this very thing, that it is and hath been always lawful for one private man to kill another for his own preservation. But where he saith it is not lawful _ordinarily_, he should have shown some particular case wherein it is unlawful. For seeing it is a “belief imprinted in our hearts,” not only I, but many more are apt to think it is the law of nature, and consequently universal and eternal. And where he saith, this right of defence where it is, “is not a remainder of some greater power which they have resigned, but a privilege which God hath given them in case of extreme danger and invincible necessity,” &c.; I also say it is a privilege which God hath given them, but we differ in the manner how; which to me seems this, that God doth not account such killing sin. But the Bishop it seems would have it thus: God sends a bishop into the pulpit to tell the people it is lawful for a man to kill another man when it is necessary for the preservation of his own life; of which necessity, that is, whether it be _invincible_, or whether the danger be _extreme_, the bishop shall be the judge after the man is killed, as being a case of conscience. Against the resigning of this our general power of killing our enemies, he argues thus: “Nothing can give that which it never had; the people whilst they were a dispersed rabble, which in some odd cases might happen to be, never had justly the power of life and death, and therefore they could not give it by their election,” &c. Needs there much acuteness to understand, what number of men soever there be, though not united into government, that every one of them in particular having a right to destroy whatsoever he thinketh can annoy him, may not resign the same right, and give it to whom he please, when he thinks it conducible to his preservation? And yet it seems he has not understood it.