Part 10

“Secondly, God is said to harden the heart occasionally and not causally, by doing good, (which incorrigible sinners make an occasion of growing worse and worse), and doing evil; as a master by often correcting of an untoward scholar, doth accidentally and occasionally harden his heart, and render him more obdurate, insomuch as he grows even to despise the rod. Or as an indulgent parent by his patience and gentleness doth encourage an obstinate son to become more rebellious. So, whether we look upon God’s frequent judgments upon Pharaoh, or God’s iterated favours in removing and withdrawing those judgments upon Pharaoh’s request, both of them in their several kinds were occasions of hardening Pharaoh’s heart, the one making him more presumptuous, the other more desperately rebellious. So that which was good in it was God’s; that which was evil was Pharaoh’s. God gave the occasion, but Pharaoh was the true cause of his own obduration. This is clearly confirmed, Exodus viii. 15: _When Pharaoh saw that there was respite, he hardened his heart_. And Exodus ix. 34: _When Pharaoh saw that the rain and the hail and the thunders were ceased, he sinned yet more, and hardened his heart, he and his servants_. So Psalm cv. 25: _He turned their hearts, so that they hated his people, and dealt subtly with them_. That is, God blessed the children of Israel, whereupon the Egyptians did take occasion to hate them, as is plain, Exodus i. 7, 8, 9, 10. So God hardened Pharaoh’s heart, and Pharaoh hardened his own heart. God hardened it by not shewing mercy to Pharaoh, as he did to Nebuchadnezzar, who was as great a sinner as he, or God hardened it occasionally; but still Pharaoh was the true cause of his own obduration, by determining his own will to evil, and confirming himself in his obstinacy. So are all presumptuous sinners, (Psalm xcv. 8): _Harden not your hearts as in the provocation, or as in the day of temptation in the wilderness_.

“Thirdly, God is said to harden the heart permissively, but not operatively, nor effectively, as he who only lets loose a greyhound out of the slip, is said to hound him at the hare. Will you see plainly what St. Paul intends by hardening? Read Rom. ix. 22, 23: _What if God, willing to shew his wrath and to make his power known_ (that is, by a consequent will, which in order of nature follows the prevision of sin), _endured with much long-suffering the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction. And that he might make known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy_, &c. There is much difference between _enduring_ and _impelling_, or inciting the vessels of wrath. He saith of the vessels of mercy, that _God prepared them unto glory_. But of the vessels of wrath, he saith only that they were _fitted to destruction_, that is, not by God, but by themselves. St. Paul saith, that God doth _endure the vessels of wrath with much long-suffering_. T. H. saith, that God wills and effects by the second causes all their actions good and bad, that he necessitateth them, and determineth them irresistibly to do those acts which he condemneth as evil, and for which he punisheth them. If _doing willingly_, and _enduring_, if _much long-suffering_, and _necessitating_, imply not a contrariety one to another, _reddat mihi minam Diogenes_, let him that taught me logic, give me my money again.

“But T. H. saith, that this distinction between the _operative_ and _permissive_ will of God, and that other between the action and the irregularity, do dazzle his understanding. Though he can find no difference between these two, yet others do; St. Paul himself did (Acts xiii. 18): _About the time of forty years suffered he their manners in the wilderness_. And (Acts xiv. 16): _Who in times past suffered all nations to walk in their own ways._ T. H. would make suffering to be inciting, their manners to be God’s manners, their ways to be God’s ways. And (Acts xvii. 30): _The times of this ignorance God winked at_. It was never heard that one was said to wink or connive at that which was his own act. And (1 Cor. x. 13): _God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that you are able_. To tempt is the devil’s act; therefore he is called the _tempter_. God tempts no man to sin, but he suffers them to be tempted. And so suffers, that he could hinder Satan, if he would. But by T. H.’s doctrine, to tempt to sin, and to suffer one to be tempted to sin when it is in his power to hinder it, is all one. And so he transforms God (I write it with horror) into the devil, and makes tempting to be God’s own work, and the devil to be but his instrument. And in that noted place, (Rom. ii. 4, 5): _Despisest thou the riches of his goodness and forbearance and long-suffering, not knowing that the goodness of God leadeth thee to repentance; but after thy hardness and impenitent heart treasurest up unto thyself wrath against the day of wrath, and revelation of the righteous judgment of God?_ Here are as many convincing arguments in this one text against the opinion of T. H. almost as there are words. Here we learn that God is _rich in goodness_, and will not punish his creatures for that which is his own act; secondly, that he _suffers_ and _forbears sinners long_, and doth not snatch them away by sudden death as they deserve. Thirdly, that the reason of God’s forbearance is to _bring men to repentance_. Fourthly, that _hardness of heart and impenitency_ is not causally from God, but from ourselves. Fifthly, that it is not the insufficient proposal of the means of their conversion on God’s part, which is the cause of men’s perdition, but their own contempt and despising of these means. Sixthly, that punishment is not an act of absolute dominion, but an act of righteous judgment, whereby God renders to every man according to his own deeds, wrath to them and only to them who _treasure up wrath unto themselves_, and eternal life to those who _continue patiently in well-doing_. If they deserve such punishment who only neglect the goodness and long-suffering of God, what do they who utterly deny it, and make God’s doing and his suffering to be all one? I do beseech T. H. to consider what a degree of wilfulness it is, out of one obscure text wholly misunderstood to contradict the clear current of the whole Scripture. Of the same mind with St. Paul was St. Peter, (1 Peter iii. 20): _The long-suffering of God waited once in the days of Noah_. And 2 Peter iii. 15: _Account that the long-suffering of the Lord is salvation_. This is the name God gives himself, (Exod. xxxiv. 6): _The Lord, the Lord God, merciful and gracious, long-suffering_, &c.

(_b_) “Yet I do acknowledge that which T. H. saith to be commonly true, that he who doth permit any thing to be done, which it is in his power to hinder, knowing that if he do not hinder it, it will be done, doth in some sort will it. I say in some sort, that is, either by an antecedent will, or by a consequent will, either by an operative will, or by a permissive will, or he is willing to let it be done, but not willing to do it. Sometimes an antecedent engagement doth cause a man to suffer that to be done, which otherwise he would not suffer. So Darius suffered Daniel to be cast into the lion’s den, to make good his rash decree; so Herod suffered John Baptist to be beheaded, to make good his rash oath. How much more may the immutable rule of justice in God, and his fidelity in keeping his word, draw from him the punishment of obstinate sinners, though antecedently he willeth their conversion? He loveth all his creatures well, but his own justice better. Again, sometimes a man suffereth that to be done, which he doth not will directly in itself, but indirectly for some other end, or for the producing of some greater good; as a man willeth that a putrid member be cut off from his body, to save the life of the whole. Or as a judge, being desirous to save a malefactor’s life, and having power to reprieve him, doth yet condemn him for example’s sake, that by the death of one he may save the lives of many. Marvel not then if God suffer some creatures to take such courses as tend to their own ruin, so long as their sufferings do make for the greater manifestation of his glory, and for the greater benefit of his faithful servants. This is a most certain truth, that God would not suffer evil to be in the world unless he knew how to draw good out of evil. Yet this ought not to be understood, as if we made any priority or posteriority of time in the acts of God, but only of nature. Nor do we make the antecedent and consequent will to be contrary one to another; because the one respects man pure and uncorrupted, the other respects him as he is lapsed. The objects are the same, but considered after a diverse manner. Nor yet do we make these wills to be distinct in God; for they are the same with the divine essence, which is one. But the distinction is in order to the objects or things willed. Nor, lastly, do we make this permission to be a naked or a mere permission. God causeth all good, permitteth all evil, disposeth all things, both good and evil.

(_c_) “T. H. demands how God should be the cause of the action and yet not be the cause of the irregularity of the action. I answer, because he concurs to the doing of evil by a general, but not by a special influence. As the earth gives nourishment to all kinds of plants, as well to hemlock as to wheat; but the reason why the one yields food to our sustenance, the other poison to our destruction, is not from the general nourishment of the earth, but from the special quality of the root. Even so the general power to act is from God. _In him we live, and move, and have our being._ This is good. But the specification, and determination of this general power to the doing of any evil, is from ourselves, and proceeds from the free-will of man. This is bad. And to speak properly, the free-will of man is not the efficient cause of sin, as the root of the hemlock is of poison, sin having no true entity or being in it, as poison hath; but rather the deficient cause. Now no defect can flow from him who is the highest perfection. (_d_) Wherefore T. H. is mightily mistaken, to make the particular and determinate act of killing Uriah to be from God. The general power to act is from God, but the specification of this general and good power to murder, or to any particular evil, is not from God, but from the free-will of man. So T. H. may see clearly if he will, how one may be the cause of the law, and likewise of the action in some sort, that is, by general influence; and yet another cause concurring, by special influence and determining this general and good power, may make itself the true cause of the anomy or the irregularity. And therefore he may keep his longer and shorter garments for some other occasion. Certainly, they will not fit this subject, unless he could make general and special influence to be all one.

“But T. H. presseth yet further, that the case is the same, and the objection used by the Jews, (verse 19): _Why doth he yet find fault; who hath resisted his will?_ is the very same with my argument; and St. Paul’s answer, (verse 20:) _O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say unto him that formed it, why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the potter power over his clay?_ &c., is the very same with his answer in this place, drawn from the irresistible power and absolute dominion of God, which justifieth all his actions. And that the apostle in his answer doth not deny that it was God’s will, nor that God’s decree was before Esau’s sin.

“To which I reply, first, that the case is not at all the same, but quite different, as may appear by these particulars; first, those words, _before they had done either good or evil_, are not, cannot be referred to those other words, _Esau have I hated_. Secondly, if they could, yet it is less than nothing, because before Esau had actually sinned, his future sins were known to God. Thirdly, by the potter’s clay, here is not to be understood the pure mass, but the corrupted mass of mankind. Fourthly, the hating here mentioned is only a comparative hatred, that is, a less degree of love. Fifthly, the hardening which St. Paul speaks of, is not a positive, but a negative obduration, or a not imparting of grace. Sixthly, St. Paul speaketh not of any positive reprobation to eternal punishment, much less doth he speak of the actual inflicting of punishment without sin, which is the question between us, and wherein T. H. differs from all that I remember to have read, who do all acknowledge that punishment is never actually inflicted but for sin. If the question be put, why God doth good to one more than to another, or why God imparteth more grace to one than to another, as it is there, the answer is just and fit, because it is his pleasure, and it is sauciness in a creature in this case to reply, (Matthew xx. 15): _May not God do what he will with his own?_ No man doubteth but God imparteth grace beyond man’s desert. (_e_) But if the case be put, why God doth punish one more than another, or why he throws one into hell-fire, and not another, which is the present case agitated between us; to say with T. H., that it is because God is omnipotent, or because his power is irresistible, or merely because it is his pleasure, is not only not warranted, but is plainly condemned by St. Paul in this place. So many differences there are between those two cases. It is not therefore against God that I reply, but against T. H. I do not call my Creator to the bar, but my fellow-creature; I ask no account of God’s counsels, but of man’s presumptions. It is the mode of these times to father their own fancies upon God, and when they cannot justify them by reason, to plead his omnipotence, or to cry, _O altitudo_, that the ways of God are unsearchable. If they may justify their drowsy dreams, because God’s power and dominion is absolute; much more may we reject such phantastical devices which are inconsistent with the truth and goodness and justice of God, and make him to be a tyrant, who is the Father of Mercies and the God of all consolation. The unsearchableness of God’s ways should be a bridle to restrain presumption, and not a sanctuary for spirits of error.

“Secondly, this objection contained ver. 19, to which the apostle answers ver. 20, is not made in the person of Esau or Pharaoh, as T. H. supposeth, but of the unbelieving Jews, who thought much at that grace and favour which God was pleased to vouchsafe unto the Gentiles, to acknowledge them for his people, which honour they would have appropriated to the posterity of Abraham. And the apostle’s answer is not only drawn from the sovereign dominion of God, to impart his grace to whom he pleaseth, as hath been shewed already, but also from the obstinacy and proper fault of the Jews, as appeareth verse 22: _What if God, willing_ (that is, by a consequent will) _to shew his wrath, and to make his power known, endureth with much long-suffering the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction_. They acted, God endured; they were tolerated by God, but fitted to destruction by themselves; for their much wrong-doing, here is God’s _much long-suffering_. And more plainly, verse 31, 32: _Israel hath not attained to the law of righteousness. Wherefore? Because they sought it not by faith, but as it were by the works of the law._ This reason is set down yet more emphatically in the next chapter (Rom. x. 3): _They_ (that is, the Israelites) _being ignorant of God’s righteousness_, (that is, by faith in Christ), _and going about to establish their own righteousness_, (that is, by the works of the law), _have not submitted themselves unto the righteousness of God_. And yet most expressly (chap. xi. 20): _Because of unbelief they were broken off, but thou standest by faith_. Neither was there any precedent binding decree of God, to necessitate them to unbelief, and consequently to punishment. It was in their own power by their concurrence with God’s grace to prevent these judgments, and to recover their former estate; verse 23: _If they_ (that is, the unbelieving Jews) _abide not still in unbelief they shall be grafted in_. The crown and the sword are immovable, (to use St. Anselm’s comparison), but it is we that move and change places. Sometimes the Jews were under the crown, and the Gentiles under the sword; sometimes the Jews under the sword, and the Gentiles under the crown.

“Thirdly, though I confess that human pacts are not the measure of God’s justice, but his justice is his own immutable will, whereby he is ready to give every man that which is his own, as rewards to the good, punishments to the bad; so nevertheless God may oblige himself freely to his creature. He made the covenant of works with mankind in Adam; and therefore he punisheth not man contrary to his own covenant, but for the transgression of his duty. And divine justice is not measured by omnipotence or by irresistible power, but by God’s will. God can do many things according to his absolute power, which he doth not. He could raise up children to Abraham of stones, but he never did so. It is a rule in theology, that God cannot do anything which argues any wickedness or imperfection: as God cannot deny himself (2 Timothy ii. 13); he cannot lie (Titus i. 2). These and the like are the fruits of impotence, not of power. So God cannot destroy the righteous with the wicked (Genesis xviii. 25.) He could not destroy Sodom whilst Lot was in it, (Genesis xix. 22); not for want of dominion or power, but because it was not agreeable to his justice, nor to that law which himself had constituted. The apostle saith (Hebrews vi. 10), _God is not unrighteous to forget your work_. As it is a good consequence to say, this is from God, therefore it is righteous; so is this also, this thing is unrighteous, therefore it cannot proceed from God. We see how all creatures by instinct of nature do love their young, as the hen her chickens; how they will expose themselves to death for them. And yet all these are but shadows of that love which is in God towards his creatures. How impious is it then to conceive, that God did create so many millions of souls to be tormented eternally in hell, without any fault of theirs except such as he himself did necessitate them unto, merely to shew his dominion, and because his power is irresistible? The same privilege which T. H. appropriates here to power absolutely irresistible, a friend of his, in his book _De Cive_, cap. VI., ascribes to power respectively irresistible, or to sovereign magistrates, whose power he makes to be as absolute as a man’s power is over himself; not to be limited by any thing, but only by their strength. The greatest propugners of sovereign power think it enough for princes to challenge an immunity from coercive power, but acknowledge that the law hath a directive power over them. But T. H. will have no limits but their strength. Whatsoever they do by power, they do justly.

“But, saith he, God objected no sin to Job, but justified his afflicting him by his power. First, this is an argument from authority negatively, that is to say, worth nothing. Secondly, the afflictions of Job were no vindicatory punishments to take vengeance of his sins, (whereof we dispute), but probatory chastisements to make trial of his graces. Thirdly, Job was not so pure, but that God might justly have laid greater punishments upon him, than those afflictions which he suffered. Witness his impatience, even to the cursing of the day of his nativity (Job iii. 3). Indeed God said to Job, (Job xxxviii. 4): _Where wast thou, when I laid the foundations of the earth?_ that is, how canst thou judge of the things that were done before thou wast born, or comprehend the secret causes of my judgments? And (Job xl. 9): _Hast thou an arm like God?_ As if he should say, why art thou impatient; dost thou think thyself able to strive with God? But that God should punish Job without desert, here is not a word.