Part 21

I deny not but that it is a free act of the Romish priest to vow continence, not upon the supposition that he was a Romish priest, but because he had not done it unless he would; if he had not been a Romish priest, it had been all one to the freedom of his act. Nor is his priesthood anything to the necessity of his vow, saving that if he would not have vowed he should not have been made a priest. There was an antecedent necessity in the causes extrinsical; first, that he should have the will to be a priest, and then consequently that he should have the will to vow. Against this he allegeth nothing. Then for his cat, the man’s running from it is a free act, as being voluntary, and arising from a false apprehension (which nevertheless he cannot help) of some hurt or other the cat may do him. And therefore the act is as free as the act of him that throweth his goods into the sea. So likewise the act of Jacob in blessing his sons, and the act of Balaam in blessing Israel, are equally free and equally voluntary, yet equally determined by God, who is the author of all blessings, and framed the will of both of them to bless, and whose will, as St. Paul saith, cannot be resisted. Therefore both their actions were necessitated equally; and, because they were voluntary, equally free. As for Caiphas’ his prophecy, which the text saith _he spake not of himself_, it was necessary; first, because it was by the supernatural gift of God to the high-priests, as sovereigns of the commonwealth of the Jews, to speak to the people as from the mouth of God, that is to say, to prophecy; and secondly, whensoever he did speak not as from God, but as from himself, it was nevertheless necessary he should do so, not that he might not have been silent if he would, but because his will to speak was antecedently determined to what he should speak from all eternity, which he hath yet brought no argument to contradict.

He approveth my modesty in suspending my judgment concerning the manner how the good angels do work, necessarily or freely, because I find it not set down in the articles of our faith, nor in the decrees of our Church. But he useth not the same modesty himself. For whereas he can apprehend neither the nature of God nor of angels, nor conceive what kind of thing it is which in them he calleth will, he nevertheless takes upon him to attribute to them _liberty of exercise_, and to deny them _a liberty of specification_; to grant them a _more intensive_ liberty than we have, but not a _more extensive_; using, not incongruously, in the incomprehensibility of the subject incomprehensible terms, as _liberty of exercise_ and _liberty of specification_, and degrees of intension in liberty; as if one liberty, like heat, might be more intensive than another. It is true that there is greater liberty in a large than in a straight prison, but one of those liberties is not more intense than the other.

(_f_) “His second reason is, _he that can do what he will, hath all liberty, and he that cannot do what he will, hath no liberty_. If this be true, then there are no degrees of liberty indeed. But this which he calls liberty, is rather an omnipotence than a liberty.” It is one thing to say a man hath liberty to do what he will, and another thing to say he hath power to do what he will. A man that is bound, would say readily he hath not the liberty to walk; but he will not say he wants the power. But the sick man will say he wants the power to walk, but not the liberty. This is, as I conceive, to speak the English tongue: and consequently an Englishman will not say, the liberty to do what he will, but the power to do what he will, is omnipotence. And therefore either I or the Bishop understand not English. Whereas he adds that I mistake the meaning of the words _liberty of specification_, I am sure that in that way wherein I expound them, there is no absurdity. But if he say, I understand not what the Schoolmen mean by it, I will not contend with him; for I think they know not what they mean themselves.

(_g_) “And here he falls into another invective against distinctions and scholastical expressions, and the doctors of the Church, who by this means tyrannized over the understanding of other men. What a presumption is this, for one private man,” &c. That he may know I am no enemy to intelligible distinctions, I also will use a distinction in the defence of myself against this his accusation. I say therefore that some distinctions are _scholastical_ only, and some are _scholastical_ and _sapiential_ also. Against those that are _scholastical_ only, I do and may inveigh. But against those that are _scholastical_ and _sapiential_ also, I do not inveigh. Likewise some doctors of the Church, as Suarez, Johannes à Duns, and their imitators, to breed in men such opinions as the Church of Rome thought suitable to their interest, did write such things as neither other men nor themselves understood. These I confess I have a little slighted. Other doctors of the Church, as Martin Luther, Philip Melancthon, John Calvin, William Perkins, and others, that did write their sense clearly, I never slighted, but always very much reverenced and admired. Wherein, then, lieth my presumption? If it be because I am a private man, let the Bishop also take heed he contradict not some of those whom the world worthily esteems, lest he also (for he is a private man) be taxed of presumption.

(_h_) “What then, must the logicians lay aside their first and second intentions, their abstracts and concretes &c.: must the moral philosopher quit his means and extremes, his _principia congenita et acquisita_, his liberty of contradiction and contrariety, his necessity absolute and hypothetical, &c.: must the natural philosopher give over his intentional species, &c.: because they do not relish with T. H.’s palate?” I confess that among the logicians, Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio, &c. are terms of art. But if the Bishop think that words of _first and second intention_, that _abstract_ and _concrete_, that _subjects_ and _predicates_, _moods_ and _figures_, _method synthetic_ and _analytic_, _fallacies_ of _composition_ and _division_, be terms of art, I am not of his opinion. For these are no more terms of art in logic, than _lines_, _figures_, _squares_, _triangles_, &c. in the mathematics. Barbara, Celarent, and the rest that follow, are terms of art, invented for the easier apprehension of young men, and are by young men understood. But the terms of the School with which I have found fault, have been invented to blind the understanding, and cannot be understood by those that intend to learn divinity. And to his question whether the moral philosopher must quit his means and extremes, I answer, that though they are not terms of art, he ought to quit them when they cannot be understood; and when they can, to use them rightly. And therefore, though _means_ and _extremes_ be terms intelligible, yet I would have them quit the placing of virtue in the one, and of vice in the other. But for his _liberty of contradiction_ and _contrariety_, his _necessity absolute_ and _hypothetical_, if any moral philosopher ever used them, then away with them; they serve for nothing but to seduce young students. In like manner, let the natural philosopher no more mention his _intentional species_, his _understanding agent and patient_, his _receptive and eductive power of the matter_, his _qualities infusæ_ or _influxæ_, _symbolæ_ or _dissymbolæ_, his _temperament ad pondus_ and _ad justitiam_. He may keep his _parts homogeneous_ and _heterogeneous_; but his _sympathies_ and _antipathies_, his _antiperistasis_ and the like names of excuses rather than of causes, I would have him fling away. And for the astrologer, (unless he means astronomer), I would have him throw away his whole trade. But if he mean astronomer, then the terms of _apogæum_ and _perigæum_, artic, antartic, equator, zodiac, zenith, meridian, horizon, zones, &c. are no more terms of art in astronomy, than a saw or a hatchet in the art of a carpenter. He cites no terms of art for geometry; I was afraid he would have put _lines_, or perhaps _equality_ or _inequality_, for terms of art. So that now I know not what be those terms he thinks I would cast away in geometry. And lastly, for his metaphysician, I would have him quit both his terms and his profession, as being in truth (as Plutarch saith in the beginning of the life of Alexander the Great) not at all profitable to learning, but made only for an essay to the learner; and the divine to use no word in preaching but such as his auditors, nor in writing but such as a common reader, may understand. And all this, not for the pleasing of my palate, but for the promotion of truth.

(_i_) “T. H. hath forgotten what he said in his book, _De Cive_, cap. XII., that it is ‘a seditious opinion to teach that the knowledge of good and evil belongs to private persons’: and cap. XVII, that ‘in questions of faith the civil magistrates ought to consult with the ecclesiastical doctors, to whom God’s blessing is derived by imposition of hands, so as not to be deceived in necessary truths,’ &c. There he attributes too much to them, here he attributeth too little; both there and here he takes too much upon him. _The spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets._” He thinks he hath a great advantage against me from my own words in my book _De Cive_, which he would not have thought if he had understood them. The knowledge of good and evil is judicature, which in Latin is _cognitio causarum_, not _scientia_. Every private man may do his best to attain a knowledge of what is good and evil in the action he is to do; but to judge of what is good and evil in others, belongs not to him, but to those whom the sovereign power appointeth thereunto. But the Bishop not understanding, or forgetting, that _cognoscere_ is to judge, as Adam did of God’s commandment, hath cited this place to little purpose. And for the infallibility of the ecclesiastical doctors by me attributed to them, it is not that they cannot be deceived, but that a subject cannot be deceived in obeying them when they are our lawfully constituted doctors. For the supreme ecclesiastical doctor, is he that hath the supreme power: and in obeying him no subject can be deceived, because they are by God himself commanded to obey him. And what the ecclesiastical doctors, lawfully constituted, do tell us to be necessary in point of religion, the same is told us by the sovereign power. And therefore, though we may be deceived by them in the belief of an opinion, we cannot be deceived by them in the duty of our actions. And this is all that I ascribe to the ecclesiastical doctors. If they think it too much, let them take upon them less. Too little they cannot say it is, who take it, as it is, for a burthen. And for them who seek it as a worldly preferment, it is too much. I take, he says, too much upon me. Why so? Because _the spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets_. This is it that he finds fault with in me, when he says that I am a private man, that is to say, no prophet, that is to say, no bishop. By which it is manifest, that the Bishop subjecteth not his spirit but to the Convocation of bishops. I admit that every man ought to subject his spirit to the prophets. But a prophet is he that speaketh unto us from God; which I acknowledge none to do, but him that hath due authority so to do. And no man hath due authority so to do immediately, but he that hath the supreme authority of the commonwealth; nor mediately, but they that speak such things to the people, as he that hath the supreme authority alloweth of. And as it is true in this sense, that _the spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets_; so it is also true that _we ought not to believe every spirit, but to try the spirits, whether they are of God; because many false prophets are gone out into the world_ (1 John iv. 1). Therefore I that am a private man, may examine the prophets; which to do, I have no other means but to examine whether their doctrine be agreeable to the law; which theirs is not, who divide the commonwealth into two commonwealths, civil and ecclesiastical.

NO. XX.

[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.]

_J. D._ “Now to the distinction itself, I say, first, that the proper act of liberty is election, and election is opposed, not only to coaction, but also to coarctation, or determination to one. Necessitation or determination to one, may consist with spontaneity, but not with election or liberty; as hath been showed. The very Stoics did acknowledge a spontaneity. So our adversaries are not yet gone out of the confines of the Stoics.

“Secondly, to rip up the bottom of this business, this I take to be the clear resolution of the Schools. There is a double act of the will: the one more remote, called _imperatus_, that is, in truth the act of some inferior faculty, subject to the command of the will, as to open or shut one’s eyes; without doubt these actions may be compelled. The other act is nearer, called _actus elicitus_, an act drawn out of the will, as to will, to choose, to elect. This may be stopped or hindered by the intervening impediment of the understanding, as a stone lying on a table is kept from its natural motion; otherwise the will should have a kind of omnipotence. But the will cannot be compelled to an act repugnant to its inclination, as when a stone is thrown upwards into the air; for that is both to incline and not to incline to the same object at the same time, which implies a contradiction. Therefore to say the will is necessitated, is to say, the will is compelled so far as the will is capable of compulsion. If a strong man holding the hand of a weaker, should therewith kill a third person, _hæc quidem vis est_, this is violence; the weaker did not willingly perpetrate the fact, because he was compelled. But now suppose this strong man had the will of the weaker in his power as well as the hand, and should not only incline, but determine it secretly and insensibly to commit this act: is not the case the same? Whether one ravish Lucretia by force, as Tarquin, or by amatory potions and magical incantations not only allure her, but necessitate her to satisfy his lust, and incline her effectually, and draw her inevitably and irresistibly, to follow him spontaneously, Lucretia in both these conditions is to be pitied. But the latter person is more guilty, and deserves greater punishment, who endeavours also, so much as in him lies, to make Lucretia irresistibly partake of his crime. I dare not apply it, but thus only: take heed how we defend those secret and invincible necessitations to evil, though spontaneous and free from coaction.

“These are their fastnesses.”

_T. H._ In the next place, he bringeth two arguments against distinguishing between being free from compulsion, and free from necessitation. The first is, that election is opposite, not only to coaction or compulsion, but also to necessitation or determination to one. This is it he was to prove from the beginning, and therefore bringeth no new argument to prove it. And to those brought formerly, I have already answered; and in this place I deny again, that election is opposite to either. For when a man is compelled, for example, to subject himself to an enemy or to die, he hath still election left in him, and a deliberation to bethink which of these two he can better endure; and he that is led to prison by force, hath election, and may deliberate, whether he will be haled and trained on the ground, or make use of his feet.

Likewise when there is no compulsion, but the strength of temptation to do an evil action, being greater than the motives to abstain, necessarily determines him to the doing of it, yet he deliberates whilst sometimes the motives to do, sometimes the motives to forbear, are working on him, and consequently he electeth which he will. But commonly, when we see and know the strength that moves us, we acknowledge necessity; but when we see not, or mark not the force that moves us, we then think there is none, and that it is not causes, but liberty that produceth the action. Hence it is that they think he does not choose this, that of necessity chooseth it; but they might as well say fire does not burn, because it burns of necessity. The second argument is not so much an argument, as a distinction, to show in what sense it may be said that voluntary actions are necessitated, and in what sense not. And therefore he allegeth, as from the authority of the Schools and that which “rippeth up the bottom of the question”, that there is a double act of the will. The one, he says, is _actus imperatus_, an act done at the command of the will by some inferior faculty of the soul, as to open or shut one’s eyes: and this act may be compelled. The other, he says, is _actus elicitus_, an act allured, or an act drawn forth by allurement out of the will, as to will, to choose, to elect: this, he says, cannot be compelled. Wherein letting pass that metaphorical speech of attributing command and subjection to the faculties of the soul, as if they made a commonwealth or family among themselves, and could speak one to another, which is very improper in searching the truth of the question: you may observe first, that to compel a voluntary act is nothing else but to will it. For it is all one to say, my will commands the shutting of mine eyes or the doing of any other action, and to say, I have the will to shut mine eyes. So that _actus imperatus_ here, might as easily have been said in English, _a voluntary action_, but that they that invented the term understood not any thing it signified. Secondly you may observe, that _actus elicitus_ is exemplified by these words, to will, to elect, to choose, which are all one; and so to will is here made an act of the will; and indeed, as the will is a faculty or power of a man’s soul, so to will is an act of it according to that power. But as it is absurdly said, that to dance is an act allured or drawn by fair means out of the ability to dance; so it is also to say, that to will is an act allured or drawn out of the power to will, which power is commonly called the will. Howsoever it be, the sum of his distinction is, that a voluntary act may be done on compulsion, that is to say, by foul means; but to will that or any act cannot be but by allurement or fair means. Now, seeing fair means, allurements, and enticements, produce the action which they do produce as necessarily as threatening and foul means, it follows, that to will may be made as necessary as any thing that is done by compulsion. So that the distinction of _actus imperatus_, and _actus elicitus_, are but words, and of no effect against necessity.