Chapter 63 of 137 · 3991 words · ~20 min read

Part 63

The small capitalist, therefore, enters the field of competition by no means equally matched against his more wealthy rival. What the little master wants in “substance,” however, he generally endeavours to make up in cunning. If he cannot buy his materials as cheap as a trader of larger means, he uses an inferior or cheaper article, and seeks by some trick or other to palm it off as equal to the superior and dearer kind. If the tools and appliances of the trade are expensive, he either transfers the cost of providing them to the workmen, or else he charges them a rent for their use; and so with the places of work, he mulcts their wages of a certain sum per week for the gas by which they labour, or he makes them do their work at home, and thus saves the expense of a workshop; and, lastly, he pays his men either a less sum than usual for the same quantity of labour, or exacts a greater quantity from them for the same sum of money. By one or other of these means does the man of limited capital seek to counterbalance the advantages which his more wealthy rival obtains by the possession of extensive “resources.” The large employer is enabled to work cheaper by the sheer force of his larger capital. He reduces the cost of production, not by employing a cheaper labour, but by “economizing the labour” that he does employ. The small employer, on the other hand, seeks to keep pace with his larger rival, and strives to work cheap, not by “the economy of labour” (for this is hardly possible in the small way of production), but by reducing the wages of his labourers. Hence the _rule_ in almost every trade is that the smaller capitalists pay a lower rate of wages. To this, however, there are many honourable exceptions among the small masters, and many as dishonourable among the larger ones in different trades. Messrs. Moses, Nicoll, and Hyams, for instance, are men who certainly cannot plead deficiency of means as an excuse for reducing the ordinary rate of wages among the tailors.

Those employers who seek to reduce the prices of a trade are known technologically as “_cutting employers_,” in contradistinction to the standard employers, or those who pay their workpeople and sell their goods at the ordinary rates.

Of “cutting employers” there are several kinds, differently designated, according to the different means by which they gain their ends. These are:--

1. “_Drivers_,” or those who compel the men in their employ to do more work for the same wages; of this kind there are two distinct varieties:--

_a._ _The long-hour masters_, or those who make the men work longer than the usual hours of labour.

_b._ _The strapping masters_, or those who make the men (by extra supervision) “strap” to their work, so as to do a greater quantity of labour in the usual time.

2. _Grinders_, or those who compel the workmen (through their necessities) to do the same amount of work for less than the ordinary wages.

The reduction of wages thus brought about may or may not be attended with a corresponding reduction in the price of the goods to the public; if the price of the goods be reduced in proportion to the reduction of wages, the consumer, of course, is benefited at the expense of the producer. When it is not followed by a like diminution in the selling price of the article, and the wages of which the men are mulct go to increase the profits of the capitalist, the employer alone is benefited, and is then known as a “_grasper_.”

Some cutting tradesmen, however, endeavour to undersell their more wealthy rivals, by reducing the ordinary rate of profit, and extending their business on the principle of small profits and quick returns, the “nimble ninepence” being considered “better than the slow shilling.” Such traders, of course, cannot be said to reduce wages directly--indirectly, however, they have the same effect, for in reducing prices, other traders, ever ready to compete with them, but, unwilling, or perhaps unable, to accept less than the ordinary rate of profit, seek to attain the same cheapness by diminishing the cost of production, and for this end the labourers’ wages are almost invariably reduced.

Such are the characteristics of the cheap employers in all trades. Let me now proceed to point out the peculiarities of what are called the scurf employers in the scavaging trade.

The insidious practices of capitalists in other callings, in reducing the hire of labour, are not unknown to the scavagers. The evils of which these workmen have to complain under scurf or slop masters are:--

1. _Driving_, or being compelled to do more work for the _same pay_.

2. _Grinding_, or being compelled to do the same or a greater amount of work for _less pay_.

1. Under the first head, if the employment be at all regular, I heard few complaints, for the men seemed to have learned to look upon it as an inevitable thing, that one way or other they _must_ submit, by the receipt of a reduced wage, or the exercise of a greater toil, to a deterioration in their means.

The system of driving, or, in other words, the means by which extra work is got out of the men for the same remuneration, in the scavagers’ trade is as follows:--some employers cause their scavagers after their day’s work in the streets, to load the barges with the street and house-collected manure, without any additional payment; whereas, among the more liberal employers, there are bargemen who are employed to attend to this department of the trade, and if their street scavagers _are_ so employed, which is not very often, it is computed as extra work or “over hours,” and paid for accordingly. This same indirect mode of reducing wages (by getting more work done for the same pay) is seen in many piece-work callings. The slop boot and shoe makers pay the same price as they did six or seven years ago, but they have “knocked off the extras,” as the additional allowance for greater than the ordinary height of heel, and the like. So the slop Mayor of Manchester, Sir Elkanah Armitage, within the last year or two, sought to obtain from his men a greater length of “cut” to each piece of woven for the same wages.

Some master scavagers or contractors, moreover, reduce wages by making their men do what is considered the work of “a man and a half” in a week, without the recompense due for the labour of the “half” man’s work; in other words, they require the men to condense eight or nine days’ labour into six, and to be paid for the six days only; this again is usual in the strapping shops of the carpenters’ trade.

Thus the class of street-sweepers do not differ materially in the circumstances of their position from other bodies of workers skilled and unskilled.

Let me, however, give a practical illustration of the loss accruing to the working scavagers by the _driving_ method of reducing wages.

A is a large contractor and a driver. He employs 16 men, and pays them the “regular wages” of the honourable trade; but, instead of limiting the hours of labour to 12, as is usual among the better class of employers, he compels each of his men to work at the least 16 hours per diem, which is one-third more, and for which the men should receive one-third more wages. Let us see, therefore, how much the men in his employ lose annually by these means.

---------------------------+--------------+-----------+----------- | Sum received | Sum they | | per | should | | Annum. | receive. |Difference. ---------------------------+--------------+-----------+----------- 4 Gangers, at 18_s._ a } | £ _s._ | £ _s._ | £ _s._ week, for 9 months } | 140 8 | 210 12 | 70 4 in the year } | | | 12 Sweepers, at 16_s._ a } | | | week, for 9 months } | 374 8 | 499 4 | 124 16 in the year } | | | ---------------------------+--------------+-----------+----------- Total wages per Ann. | 514 16 | 709 16 | 195 0

Here, then, we find the annual loss to these men through the system of “driving” to be 195_l._ per annum.

But A is not the only driver in the scavagers’ trade; out of the 19 masters having contracts for scavaging, as cited in the table given at pp. 213, 214, there are 4 who are regular drivers; and, making the same calculation as above, we have the following results:--

-------------------------+-------------+-----------+----------- |Sum received | Sum they | | per | should |Difference. | Annum. | receive. | -------------------------+-------------+-----------+----------- 26 Gangers, at 18_s._ a }| £ _s._ | £ _s._| £ _s._ week, for 9 months }| 912 12 | 1216 16 | 304 4 in the year }| | | 80 Sweepers, at 16_s._ a}| | | week, for 9 months }| 2496 0 | 3328 0 | 832 0 in the year }| | | -------------------------+-------------+-----------+----------- | 3308 12 | 4544 16 | 1136 4 -------------------------+-------------+-----------+-----------

Thus we find that the gross sum of which the men employed by these drivers are deprived, is no less than 1136_l._ per annum.

2. The second or indirect mode of reducing the wages of the men in the scavaging trade is by _Grinding_; that is to say, by making the men do the same amount of work for less pay. It requires nothing but a practical illustration to render the injury of this particular mode of reduction apparent to the public.

B is a master scavager (a small contractor, though the instances are not confined to this class), and a “_Grinder_.” He pays 1_s._ a week less than the “regular wages” of the honourable trade. He employs six men; hence the amount that the workmen in his pay are mulct of every year is as follows:--

Here the loss to the men is 11_l._ 14_s._ per annum, and there is but one such grinder among the 19 master scavagers who have contracts at present.

3. The third and last method of reducing the earnings of the men as above enumerated, is by a combination of both the systems before explained, viz., by _grinding_ and _driving_ united, that is to say, by not only paying the men a smaller wage than the more honourable masters, but by compelling them to work longer hours as well. Let me cite another illustration from the trade.

C is a large contractor, and both a grinder and driver. He employs 28 men, and not only pays them less wages, but makes them work longer hours than the better class of employers. The men in his pay, therefore, are annually mulct of the following sums.

SUMS THE MEN RECEIVE. | SUMS THEY SHOULD RECEIVE. £ _s._ _d._| £ _s._ _d._ | 7 Gangers, at 16_s._ | 7 Gangers, at 18_s._ a week, for 9 | a week, for 9 months in the | months in the year 218 8 0 | year 245 14 0 21 Sweepers, at | Over work, 4 15_s._ a week 614 5 0 | hours per day 61 8 6 ------------- | 21 Sweepers, at 832 13 0 | 16_s._ a week, 12 | hours a day 655 4 0 | Over work, 4 | hours a day 163 6 0 | -------------- | 1125 12 6

Here the annual loss to the men employed by this one master is 292_l._ 19_s._ 6_d._

Among the 19 master scavagers there are altogether 7 employers who are both grinders and drivers. These employ among them no less than 111 hands; hence, the gross amount of which their workmen are yearly defrau--no, let me adhere to the principles of political economy, and say deprived--is as under:--

SUM THE MEN ANNUALLY RECEIVE. | SUM THEY SHOULD ANNUALLY RECEIVE. £ _s._ _d._| £ _s._ _d._ 28 Gangers, at 16_s._ | 28 Gangers, at a week, employed | 18_s._ a week for 9 months | (12 hours a in the year 873 12 0 | day), for 9 | months in the 83 Sweepers, at | year 982 16 0 15_s._ a week, | Over work, 4 employed for | hours per day 245 14 0 9 months in | 83 Sweepers, at the year 2427 15 0 | 16_s._ a week, -------------- | 12 hours a day 2589 12 0 3301 7 0 | Over work, 4 | hours per day 647 8 0 | -------------- | 4465 10 0

Here we perceive the gross loss to the operatives from the system of combined grinding and driving to be no less than 1164_l._ 3_s._ per annum.

Now let us see what is the aggregate loss to the working men from the several modes of reducing their wages as above detailed.

£. _s._ _d._ Loss to the working scavagers by the “driving” of employers 1136 4 0 Ditto by the “grinding” 11 14 0 Ditto by the “grinding _and_ driving” of employers 1164 3 0 -------------- Total loss to the working scavagers per annum 2312 1 0

Now this is a large sum of money to be wrested annually out of the workmen--that it is so wrested is demonstrated by the fact cited at p. 174 in connection with the dust trade.

The wages of the dustmen employed by the large contractors, it is there stated, have been increased within the last seven years from 6_d._ to 8_d._ per load. This increase in the rate of remuneration was owing to complaints made by the men to the Commissioners of Sewers, that they were not able to live on their earnings; an inquiry took place, and the result was that the Commissioners decided upon letting the contracts only to such parties as would undertake to pay a fair price to their workmen. The contractors accordingly increased the remuneration of the labourers as mentioned.

Now political economy would tell us that the Commissioners _interfered_ with wages in a most reprehensible manner--preventing the natural operation of the law of Supply and Demand; but both justice and benevolence assure us that the Commissioners did perfectly right. The masters in the dust trade were forced to make good to the men what they had previously taken from them, and the same should be done in the scavaging trade--the contracts should be let only to these masters who will undertake to pay the regular rate of wages, and employ their men only the regular hours; for by such means, and by such means alone, can _justice_ be done to the operatives.

This brings me to the _cause of the reduction of wages in the scavaging trade_. The scurf trade, I am informed, has been carried on among the master scavagers upwards of 20 years, and arose partly from the contractors having _to pay_ the parishes for the house-dust and street-sweepings, brieze and street manure at that period often selling for 30_s._ the chaldron or load. The demand for this kind of manure 20 years ago was so great, that there was a competition carried on among the contractors themselves, each out-bidding the other, so as to obtain the right of collecting it; and in order not to lose anything by the large sums which they were induced to bid for the contracts, the employers began gradually to “grind down” their men from 17_s._ 6_d._ (the sum paid 20 years back) to 17_s._ a week, and eventually to 15_s._, and even 12_s._ weekly. This is a curious and instructive fact, as showing that even an increase of prices will, _under the contract system_, induce a reduction of wages. The greed of traders becomes, it appears, from the very height of the prices, proportionally intensified, and from the desire of each to reap the benefit, they are led to outbid one another to such an extent, and to offer such large premiums for the right of appropriation, as to necessitate a reduction of every possible expense in order to make any profit at all upon the transaction. Owing, moreover, to the surplus labour in the trade, the contractors were enabled to offer any premiums and reduce wages as they pleased; for the casually-employed men, when the wet season was over, and their services no longer required, were continually calling upon the contractors, and offering their services at 2_s._ and 3_s._ less per week than the regular hands were receiving. The consequence was, that five or six of the master scavagers began to reduce the wages of their labourers, and since that time the number has been gradually increasing, until now there are no less than 21 scurf masters (8 of whom have no contracts) out of the 34 contractors; so that nearly three-fifths of the entire trade belong to the _grinding_ class. Within the last seven or eight years, however, there has been an increase of wages in connection with the city operative scavagers. This was owing mainly to the operatives complaining to the Commissioners that they could not live upon the wages they were then receiving--12_s._ and 14_s._ a week. The circumstances inducing the change, I am informed, were as follows:--one of the gangers asked a tradesman in the city to give the street-sweepers “something for beer,” whereupon the tradesman inquired if the men could not find beer out of their wages, and on being assured that they were receiving only 12_s._ a week, he had the matter brought before the Board. The result was, that the wages of the operatives were increased from 12_s._ to 15_s._ and 16_s._ weekly, since which time there has been neither an increase nor a decrease in their pay. The cheapness of provisions seems to have caused no reduction with them.

Now there are but two “efficient causes” to account for the reduction of wages among the scurf employers in the scavagers’ trade:--(1) The employers may diminish the pay of their men from a disposition to “_grind_” out of them an inordinate rate of profit. (2) The price paid for the work may be so reduced that, consistent with the ordinary rate of profit on capital, and remuneration for superintendence, greater wages cannot be paid. If the first be the fact, then the employers are to blame, and the parishes should follow the example of the Commissioners of Sewers, and let the work to those contractors only who will undertake to pay the “regular wages” of the honourable trade; but if the latter be the case, as I strongly suspect it is, though some of the masters seem to be more “grasping” than the rest--but in the paucity of returns on this matter, it is difficult to state positively whether the price paid for the labour of the working scavager is in all the parishes proportional to the price paid to the employers for the work (a most important fact to be solved)--if, however, I repeat, the decrease of the wages be mainly due to the decrease in the sums given for the performance of the contract, then the parishes are to blame for seeking to get their work done _at the expense of the working men_.

The contract system of work, I find, necessarily tends to this diminution of the men’s earnings in a trade. Offer a certain quantity of work to the lowest bidder, and the competition will assuredly be maintained at _the operative’s expense_. It is idle to expect that, as a general rule, traders will take less than the ordinary rate of profit. Hence, he who underbids will usually be found to underpay. This, indeed, is almost a necessity of the system, and one which the parochial functionaries more than all others should be guarded against--seeing that a decrease of the operative’s wages can but be attended with an increase of the very paupers, and consequently of the parochial expenses, which they are striving to reduce.

A labourer, in order to be self-supporting and avoid becoming a “burden” on the parish, requires something more than bare subsistence-money in remuneration for his labour, and yet this is generally the mode by which we test the _sufficiency of wages_. “A man can live very comfortably upon that!” is the exclamation of those who have seldom thought upon what constitutes the _minimum_ of self-support in this country. A man’s wages, to prevent pauperism, should include, besides present subsistence, what Dr. Chalmers has called “his secondaries;” viz., a sufficiency to pay for his maintenance: 1st, during the slack season; 2nd, when out of employment; 3rd, when ill; 4th, when old[19]. If insufficient to do this, it is evident that the man at such times must seek parochial relief; and it is by the reduction of wages down to bare subsistence, that the cheap employers of the present day shift the burden of supporting their labourers when unemployed on to the parish; thus virtually perpetuating the allowance system or relief in aid of wages under the old Poor Law. Formerly the mode of hiring labourers was by the year, so that the employer was bound to maintain the men when unemployed. But now journey-work, or hiring by the day, prevails, and the labourers being paid--and that mere subsistence-money--only when wanted, are necessitated to become either paupers or thieves when their services are no longer required. It is, moreover, this change from yearly to daily hirings, and the consequent discarding of men when no longer required, that has partly caused the immense mass of surplus labourers, who are continually vagabondizing through the country begging or stealing as they go--men for whom there is but some two or three weeks’ work (harvesting, hop-picking, and the like) throughout the year.

That there is, however, a large system of _jobbing pursued by the contractors_ for the house-dust and cleansing of the streets, there cannot be the least doubt. The minute I have cited at page 210 gives us a slight insight into the system of combination existing among the employers, and the extraordinary fluctuations in the prices obtained by the contractors would lead to the notion that the business was more a system of gambling than trade. The following returns have been procured by Mr. Cochrane within the last few days:--

“Average yearly cost of cleansing the whole of the public ways within the City of London, including the removal of dust, ashes, &c., from the houses of the inhabitants, for eight years, terminating at Michaelmas in the year 1850 £4,643

Square yards of carriage-way, estimated at 430,000

Square yards of footway, estimated at 300,000

A more specific and later return is as follows:--

Received Paid for for Dust. cleansing, &c. £ _s._ _d._ £ _s._ _d._ { Streets not 1845 0 0 0 2833 2 0 { cleansed { daily. 1846 1354 5 0 6034 6 0 } 1847 4455 5 0 8014 2 0 } Streets 1848 1328 15 0 7226 1 6 } cleansed 1849 0 0 0 7486 11 6 } daily. 1850 0 0 0 6779 16 0 }

“From the above return,” says Mr. Cochrane, “it may be _inferred_ that the annual sums paid for cleansing in each year of 1844 and 1843 did not exceed 2281_l._, as this would make up the eight years’ average calculation of 4643_l._”

Since the streets have been cleansed daily, it will be seen that the average has been 7188_l._ The smallest amount, in 1846, was 6034_l._; and the largest, in 1847, 8014_l._; which was a sudden increase of 1980_l._