CHAPTER II

FIRST EXPERIENCES IN FRANCE

MAY 1915 TO SEPTEMBER 1915

All units had practised entraining, and the move to France was accomplished without a hitch. The artillery were the first to go, the advance parties leaving Bordon on 8th May; the infantry brigades left in order of priority, beginning with the 26th on the 10th May. Vehicles, animals, and transport crossed from Southampton to Havre, and the infantry from Folkestone to Boulogne. By the 15th May the whole Division was concentrated around the pleasant and important little town of St Omer. It had the distinction of being the first division of the New Armies to reach France.

After spending two days near St Omer, the Division marched to billets south of Bailleul, the average march for each unit being 15 miles. G.H.Q. were established at the Château le Nieppe; the 26th Brigade was at Bailleul; the 27th at Noote Boom; and the 28th at Outtersteene. Arrangements were quickly made to train the various branches in trench warfare. All the field artillery brigades, except half of the 51st R.F.A., were attached to the Sixth Division for instruction. The 9th Heavy Battery went over to the III. Corps, and from this moment ceased to be a corporate part of the Division. Similarly the infantry received their first experiences of trench duties under the Sixth Division, and spent a spell in the line near Armentières by brigades at a time. The 27th Brigade moved into the front line on the evening of the 20th May; it was relieved on the 22nd by the 28th, and it in turn on the 24th by the 26th Brigade, which remained in the line till the 26th. Sappers were employed by the III. Corps in improving the second line defences near Armentières, and the infantry soon realised that they were expected to be as useful with the shovel as they were with the rifle. On the 27th May the 26th Brigade proceeded to Nieppe and Armentières “under the tactical orders of the Sixth Division”; this fine phrase simply meant that the men had to work on trenches and strong points.

Meantime the Division received constant instruction in bombing. When the opposing trenches lay near each other, it was dangerous for a man to show himself above the surface, and a method had to be discovered by which hostile positions could be attacked without the aggressors having to expose themselves to rifle or machine-gun fire. The only weapon that could fulfil this purpose was the bomb. In the hands of determined men it was a useful and valuable weapon, and against a vigilant and stubborn enemy it was sometimes the only means by which progress could be made. In 1915 and the early part of 1916 there were few men on either side who were not pugnacious, but the trouble was that when troops became stale with months of underground warfare, the bomb fight tended to result in a stationary conflict, no serious effort being made to gain any ground. In 1915, however, there was no staleness, the chief difficulties being the large variety of bombs and the multiplicity of names that each bomb possessed. Most of them were worked by a time fuse, but the stick hand-grenade exploded on percussion and was a weapon probably more dangerous to the thrower and his comrades than to the enemy. The Mills No. 5 Bomb, which afterwards became the standard one used by the British Army, was exploded by a time fuse of five seconds; but more common at that time was the Bethune Bomb, which was the one chiefly used by the Division at Loos. With all these varieties the average man could throw between 20 and 30 yards. For a longer distance, rifle-grenades, that is bombs fired from rifles, had a range up to about 200 yards. Heavier bombs could be thrown by trench mortars, of which there were at first numerous types, and several kinds of catapults were used. An imposing-looking engine was the West Spring Gun. It could hurl a bomb about 400 yards, but required eight men to work it, and needed an enormous emplacement, which a hostile aeroplane would have had little trouble in spotting. It threw up the bomb a tremendous height into the air; if a cricket ball were substituted for the bomb, that gun would form an excellent contrivance for giving cricketers practice in catching. The trench mortars in use at the time had all the same defect: they were cumbersome, and could not be quickly brought into action.

Many hours were devoted to the training of the men in the art of bomb-throwing, and factories for making bombs were started by the Sappers. Unfortunately on the 27th May a deplorable accident caused considerable loss of life. A factory at Nieppe Station was blown up, and Lieut.-Col. Uniacke, the A.A. and Q.M.G., who was riding past at the time, was killed. Six officers and 4 men were wounded, and 7 men killed. Every reasonable precaution had been taken by the Sappers in charge, and the explosion was probably due to the instability of the explosive.

While the Division was still near Bailleul, it was visited by Sir John French who inspected the 27th and 28th Brigades on the 29th May. Near the end of the month the 26th Brigade received a new Commander, Brig.-General Grogan[3] returning to England and his place being taken by Brig.-General A. B. Ritchie, C.M.G., on 30th May. By the 2nd June all detachments had received some slight experience of the trenches. On the 6th, the Division marched by night to training grounds near Busnes where D.H.Q. were installed, and till the 25th, training was carried on vigorously, particular attention being paid to bombing. On the 16th, speculations on the possibility of the Ninth taking part in a battle were aroused by it being placed under readiness to move at two hours’ notice. This order was due to an unsuccessful engagement carried out by the British Army near Festubert, but the Division was not required and training continued without interruption.

On the 26th June orders were received to relieve the Seventh Division in the line near Festubert, and accordingly the 26th and the 27th Brigades took over the front line on the nights of the 1st and 2nd July. The 28th was in reserve. This was the first occasion on which the Division was responsible for a section of the front line, which it held east of Festubert until 18th August, and during this period all ranks became acquainted with the trials of trench warfare.

The advantage of ground was with the enemy. Occupying the ridge east of Festubert the Germans were able to control their artillery-fire by direct observation. The weakest point in our line was “The Orchard,” a sharp salient, which was held at tremendous cost and risk; and it was here that the Division had most of its casualties, as the enemy kept it constantly under fire from artillery and trench mortars. Our artillery could do little at that time to help the infantry. For every shell that we had the Germans had ten, and each attempt to retaliate resulted in a fiercer and heavier bombardment. Until our gunners were supplied with enough material to enable them to compete with the enemy, the best policy was to refrain from annoying him. The infantry particularly disliked the feeble efforts at retaliation by our artillery because they alone felt the consequences. For a similar reason all trench mortar officers[4] were unpopular. When a mortar was fired that particular section of trench was drenched by the enemy with “Minnies.”[5] It was therefore natural for the garrison to treat trench mortars and their teams with disapproval if not hostility, and it was usually only by stealth that the T.M. officer was able to fire at all.

[Illustration: FESTUBERT]

Another part of our line to which the enemy paid considerable attention was an old trench lying between the front and support trenches, known as the “Old German Line.” We did not occupy it on account of its stench and filth, but the Germans believed that we did, and persistently shelled it. They were encouraged in their error. A few men were sent to light fires in this trench, and after they had performed their task they withdrew in haste; for as soon as the enemy observed the smoke rising, he commenced to shell vigorously. No one was known voluntarily to enter this trench except the Prince of Wales, who used to prowl round it in search of souvenirs. He paid a number of visits[6] to the line while we held it, and his natural daring must often have caused his escort the keenest anxiety. It was not safe to go up to the forward saps in daylight, but His Royal Highness insisted on doing so, and he also took a photograph of a wounded man who was being carried down from one of them.

In spite of the immense preponderance that the enemy enjoyed in artillery, the men found in the life more of interest than of peril. Patrolling was a new form of enterprise that appealed to the bolder spirits. 2nd Lieut. Bellamy of the 11th Royal Scots took over a patrol of three men in broad daylight on the 5th June, and on reconnoitring found that the enemy had constructed a new trench. On the 13th June, 2nd Lieut. Murray of the 12th Royal Scots stalked a German patrol and shot one man; and on the same night Corporal Morrison of the 6th Royal Scots Fusiliers frightened away a working-party and brought back a _chevaux de frise_. Even the commonplaces of trench life had at this time the spice of novelty, but an incident that happened to Sergeant J. M’Hardy, of the machine-gun section of the 8th Black Watch, was certainly unusual as well as whimsical. This N.C.O. had just hung up his kilt in the trenches to dry when the back blast of a shell blew it over the parapet towards the enemy’s lines. The unfortunate man had to go kiltless until dusk, when he hopped over and recovered his garment. On the 8th July, the Divisional area was visited by Lord Kitchener, who inspected the 26th Brigade, at that time in reserve, and detachments of the Ninth between Locon and Hinges.

On the 18th August the Division was relieved by the Seventh, and moved to the training area near Busnes, where D.H.Q. were established. On the next day it was again visited by Lord Kitchener, who inspected it in a big field, and he expressed himself as highly pleased. From this date till the end of the month training was carried on continuously, and the men were frequently practised in issuing rapidly from their own trenches and attacking another line. These manœuvres raised hopes that they would soon be tested in an important battle.

The whole Division was anxious for a fight. It had now been more than three months in France, and had become thoroughly acquainted with the ordinary routine of trench warfare. Life had turned out to be much less trying than most of the men had imagined, for casualties had been comparatively few, and there had been no thrills. It was always unpleasant, of course, when the trenches were pounded, but these periods were only occasional and seldom of long duration. It was not the danger, but the drabness of trench life that worried the men, who found that the outstanding features of this kind of warfare were hard work and discomfort. The latter however they were compelled to get rid of as soon as possible, and most of them quickly became skilled in constructing habitable and cosy dug-outs. The trivial round was one of constant toil, and cleanliness was insisted on more as a necessity than as a virtue. The chief strain was due to the interruption of sleep; for the exigencies of trench duties made it impossible for anyone to sleep for more than a few hours at a time.

Above all, the men felt that the reputation of the Ninth could not be solidly established without a battle. They yielded to none in their admiration of the magnificent feats accomplished by the grand regiments of the line, which had borne the first shock of the German hordes; but they were anxious to show that they were both fit and ready to take their place with the regulars. The fierce test of action was needed to reveal the worth of the Division, and every man hoped that it would not be long delayed.

It soon came. When on the 2nd September the Ninth took over from the First Division the trenches east of Vermelles, the men had reached the scene of their first battle.

The plan of a large operation had been adumbrated at the beginning of August, but had it depended on the situation on the Western Front it is doubtful if any important enterprise would have been attempted. The costly failure of the joint British and French offensive in May proved that the Western Allies had not yet accumulated the preponderance in artillery necessary to secure the superiority of fire that was essential for success. Both in numbers and in quality the allied infantry surpassed that of the enemy, but the German defences were skilfully selected, strongly fortified, and powerfully supported by artillery.

Events on the Eastern Front, however, rendered it imperative to create a diversion. The summer was a period of disaster for the Russian Armies; they had been out-generalled and were retiring rapidly before the vast German and Austrian forces, which, focussing on Warsaw, had made those gigantic outflanking movements that had ended in the capture of that city. It was feared that the fate of Petrograd hung in the balance. The Western Allies therefore decided to help the hard-pressed Russians by an attack on a large scale, which might bring some tangible gains, and would at least compel Germany to transfer forces to the West and thus weaken her offensive in the East.

The general scheme drawn up by the High Commands of the Allied Forces reflected their hopes rather than their expectations. The French Tenth Army and the I. and IV. Corps of the British Army were to advance due east in the direction of Valenciennes; at the same time the French main attack was to be made from Champagne on Maubeuge. If these enterprises were successful, the victorious forces would join hands about Valenciennes and Maubeuge, thus cutting off all the enemy within the salient, Rheims-Royon and Arras.

The plan was too ambitious. The reluctance of the British leaders to undertake a premature operation was perfectly justified, and when they committed themselves to an attack, they ought to have limited themselves to a scheme proportionate to their resources. It is therefore impossible to condone the reckless optimism that shaped the plans for the Battle of Loos. They revealed a disposition to underrate the adversary. The lessons of the German failures at Ypres, of the battles at Hill 60, and of the Allied offensive in May were ignored. If an attack had to be made, it should have been confined to the capture of tactical points within a limited objective. A break-through was then impossible. The experience of the war and the resources at the disposal of Sir John French did not justify the attempt in 1915, and the presumptions of the Higher Command were shattered by the facts of the battle.

The task of the First Army was to pierce the first and second lines of the German defences from Haisnes in the north to Hulluch in the south; then, after capturing Meurchin and Pont à Vendin, to move rapidly on Carvin, and so protect the left flank of the French Army. The northern part of the operation was to be carried out by the I. Corps, the southern part by the IV. Corps. In order to give this enterprise every chance of success, subsidiary attacks were to be made on other parts of the British front to prevent the enemy from reinforcing the main point of attack.

Conscious of its weakness in artillery material, the British Command hoped to compass the demoralisation of the foe by a discharge of gas along the front of the principal onslaught. This was the first occasion on which the British Army used gas,[7] and it was hoped that its effect would so paralyse the defenders that the assaulting troops would be able to secure with little resistance the German second line in spite of the wire that was too far distant for the artillery to cut.

The task of forming the northern defensive flank[8] of this attack was entrusted to the Ninth Division, which, after carrying the line Railway Work—Fosse No. 8—to Haisnes, was to push on to Douvrin. Similarly, the southern division of the IV. Corps was to form a defensive flank facing south near Loos. If these flanks were secured and consolidated, it was expected that the intermediate divisions of the I. and IV. Corps, supported by the XI., would be able to force their way between these flanks as far as the Deule Canal, and even farther if the resistance of the enemy was negligible.

There was a gap between the right of the British forces and the left of the Tenth French Army. In this area lay the colliery district of Lens, consisting of masses of miners’ cottages, pits, and slag-heaps, admirably adapted for an obstinate and protracted defence. During the French offensive north of Arras in May and June advance had been slow and losses heavy, owing to the stubborn opposition of the Germans posted in the villages of Carency, Givenchy, and Souchez. The Lens area afforded even greater advantages to the defenders, and it was decided that the French and British forces should work round the south and north of the town and join hands to the east of it.

An operation of importance involves an enormous amount of hard work and anxiety for all branches of the Staff, from G.H.Q. down to brigades. The Staff[9] is the brain of the Army, and its function is to supply everything—from bombs to operation orders. It consists of two distinct branches: the A. and Q. branch, which is responsible for discipline, procuring supplies, and making arrangements for the comfort of the troops in such matters as billets and baths; and the G. branch, which is concerned with training and operations. For success, the best devised plan depends greatly upon the care with which details are worked out. The actual attack is made by the infantry. Upon the dash and gallantry of the soldiers and the initiative and resource of the subordinate commanders, the Higher Command has to rely for the consummation of its hopes; but the arduous task of the infantry is considerably eased if the preliminary preparations are the best possible from the resources at the disposal of the Staff. Good Staff work consists in eliminating chance and hazard and in strengthening assurance of success.

The frontage on which the Ninth Division was to assault was 1600 yards. On the 16th August, the G.O.C., Major-General Landon, held a conference, when the proposed operations were discussed. It was decided to assault with two brigades, each with two battalions in the front line, the 26th on the right and the 28th on the left, with the 27th in reserve.

The objectives of the 26th Brigade were, first, the Hohenzollern Redoubt, Fosse Trench and Dump Trench; and second, a line on the east side of Fosse 8 through the Three Cabarets to the Corons de Pekin (first objective). Should this task be accomplished, the brigade was to go on to the neighbourhood of Pekin Trench (second objective). If at this stage the line was prolonged to the north by the 28th Brigade and the Second Division, the 26th and 28th were to advance east on Douvrin. Should, however, the Second Division fail, these brigades were to attack Haisnes and form a defensive flank facing north-east.

On the left, the 28th Brigade had first to secure the Railway line from the Corons de Marons to the junction of Les Briques and Train Alley (first objective), and then advance to its second objective in the neighbourhood of Pekin Trench. The further action of the brigade depended upon the progress of the Second Division.

The 27th Brigade was to be in reserve some 2000 and 2800 yards in rear of the front line. Its rôle was either to support the attempt on Fosse 8, or if that was successful, to move on to Haisnes and Douvrin. Battalion commanders were given a free hand as to the formations to be adopted, subject to the proviso that each unit was to be in three lines.

The date of battle, after several postponements, was eventually fixed for the 25th September.

The task of the Division in its first important engagement was not an easy one. In the excitement of battle even the best of soldiers are liable to go astray if they are required to change direction at any time during the advance. For this reason it is desirable that objectives should be allotted so that it is possible for the assailing troops to advance at right angles to their position of assembly. In the present case the advance in a north-easterly direction up to the line of the Fosse fulfilled these conditions, but from this point the Ninth was required to swing east and converge on a narrower front. Fortunately the difficulties of this operation were diminished by the presence of such conspicuous landmarks as the villages of Haisnes, Cité St Elie and Douvrin, but it was nevertheless an extremely complicated one for an untried division to undertake.

The Ninth took over the line east of Vermelles on the 2nd September, and arrangements had to be made at once so that all preparations would be completed before the battle. The front trenches, as taken over from the First Division, were too far from the German line to be suitable for the forward assembly trenches. The First Division had projected an attack on the Hohenzollern Redoubt, and for that purpose had pushed forward a number of blind saps. Our first intention was to join up the blinded sap-heads by a parallel, and open them up just before the onset; but as gas was to be used, the saps were opened up at once and then joined by new fire trenches. This was accomplished in one night, each battalion digging 350 yards, thus bringing our front trenches within 150 yards of the German line. In addition, a support line was made in the rear, with numerous short communication trenches running back to the old front line, with the result that it was possible to accommodate the whole Division in the trench system.

As it was imperative to regulate the traffic with a view to preventing congestion on the day of attack, special communication trenches were prepared for the wounded. For each of the attacking brigades two communication trenches were allotted, one to be used for “up” traffic, the other for “down,” and to diminish the chance of confusion, each was labelled and marked. On the capture of the enemy front line, these communication trenches were to be connected with it; and, to save time and labour, blinded saps were run forward 50 yards and more. In all, about 12,000 yards of trenches were dug before the battle.

The chances of success largely depended upon the ability of the artillery to demolish the enemy’s defences. Until the moment of the assault the artillery were under the orders of the Corps. Unfortunately the heavy guns at the disposal of the Corps were few in number, there being only twenty 6-inch Howitzers and twelve of higher calibre.

The infantry attack was to be preceded by a four days’ bombardment. The 18-pounders had to cut the wire along the enemy’s front. Known and suspected strong points were to be shelled; and during night, paths, roads, communication trenches, houses, and all places where the enemy was likely to collect, were to be kept under fire. In the work of sweeping approaches, machine-guns were to co-operate with the artillery. The preliminary bombardment was arranged for the 21st September, its object being to pulverise the German fortifications and to demoralise the defenders. Only in this way could the neutralisation of the hostile rifle and machine-gun fire necessary for an attack by infantry be secured. In order to keep the Germans uncertain of the exact time of the assault, two feint attacks were arranged. At noon on the 21st September, the 26th Brigade was to induce the garrison of the Hohenzollern Redoubt to man its parapets by preparations that seemed to indicate an immediate attack; thereupon the German trenches were to be shelled with shrapnel. A similar operation against Madagascar Trench was to be undertaken by the 28th Brigade on the third day of the bombardment.

The orders for the artillery were issued on the 20th September. On the morning of the battle, first the enemy front line system, then Pekin Trench, and the Three Cabarets were to be shelled for ten minutes. In the following ten minutes the artillery-fire was to be brought back to the front line for five minutes; it was then to move east and remain for thirty minutes in the vicinity of Pekin Trench between Haisnes and Cité St Elie. The great proportion of shell used was shrapnel; H.E. was limited and was used chiefly by the heavy artillery.

The control of its own artillery reverted to the Division at the moment of the assault. In order that no opportunity might be lost in the event of a rapid success, two batteries were earmarked to follow up the infantry. These were to be taken out of their emplacements on the night of the 24th, and kept limbered-up ready to advance at a moment’s notice. Forward positions for these guns and observation posts were reconnoitred from a study of the map and of the country from Annequin Fosse; and three roads were prepared and bridged where they crossed the trenches. Other bridges were to be carried by the batteries to enable them to cross captured trenches. One brigade of artillery was affiliated to each of the assaulting infantry brigades and the remainder was kept under the immediate control of Brig.-General Armitage.

The effect of machine-guns and trench mortars depends chiefly on the resource of the team commanders. Each of the infantry battalions had four machine-guns, while fourteen were distributed in rear of the front line to co-operate with the artillery. Five minutes after the commencement of the bombardment, these guns were to open intensive fire on hostile communication trenches for thirty minutes. During night they were to play on enemy communication trenches, and on the wire to prevent the Germans repairing the gaps cut by the artillery-fire. On the day of the attack they were to open intensive fire five minutes after the beginning of the bombardment for fifteen minutes; they were then to fire deliberately for ten minutes, thereafter resuming intensive fire for other ten.

On the right of the Division an important rôle was assigned to the trench mortars. Between the Ninth and the Seventh Divisions was an interval of 200 yards; and to cover this gap 2-inch trench mortars and 2-inch Stokes mortars were to fire smoke-bombs to prevent the enemy in Big Willie from enfilading the left of the Seventh. It was realised that the most formidable task had been allotted to the 26th Brigade and arrangements were made for one 2-inch mortar, one battery of 1½-inch mortars, and one Stokes gun to go forward with it.

The discharge of gas formed an essential part of the scheme of the British Army; and its effects were expected to make up for deficiency in artillery material.[10] The Germans were known to have safeguards against gas, but it was hoped that they would be taken by surprise, and that the fumes would be rolling over their lines before they had time to don their helmets. At the worst, it was expected that the discomfort of wearing the helmets would impair the efficiency of their troops and partly demoralise them.

The gas was to be discharged from cylinders, each weighing from 130 to 160 lbs., and emplacements were made to accommodate twelve at intervals of 25 yards along the front of the Division. The work of carrying up and fixing the cylinders in position was a heavy business. They were brought by train to a siding east of Bethune, where the road ran alongside the railway, and at night they were transferred to lorries, each of which carried about thirty. The lorries were then driven to Cambrai and Vermelles, where they were met by carrying parties, which conveyed the cylinders to the front line.

These parties were organised in groups of thirty-six men for every twelve cylinders, and each group was commanded by an officer. The work was unpopular as well as arduous, for the men had little liking for gas and none cared to handle anything connected with it. The cylinders had to be carried for more than 2000 yards up long and winding communication trenches, and when the weather was wet the heavy burden of the men was aggravated by the difficulty of maintaining their balance on the slippery duckboards. Occasionally shelled areas had to be traversed, an anxious period for any party with cylinders. To ease the work as far as possible, the communication trenches up which the men had to travel were marked by white arrows, and kept clear of unnecessary traffic. Fortunately the weather was favourable. If it had been otherwise, this weight could scarcely have been managed by three men. Altogether 4000 men were employed in the transference of 1200 cylinders. When these were fixed in their emplacements the infantry had no further responsibility concerning them, for they were then under the care of the Special Gas Company, R.E., which was to discharge the gas on the day of the assault.

In addition to the cylinders, each emplacement had four triple and eight single smoke-candles. These were to be lit by the infantry, and used alternatively with the gas, so that the period of discharge for smoke and gas would extend to forty minutes, as it was known that the enemy had, as a protection against gas, oxygen cylinders which lasted for only thirty minutes. Two minutes before the infantry left the front line, all gas was to be turned off and the smoke thickened by means of triple candles to form a screen behind which the infantry could form up and advance.

One Field Company, R.E., and one company of the 9th Seaforths (Pioneers) were attached to each brigade for the rapid consolidation of captured positions, and the digging of new communication trenches. Thus, the 90th Field Company, R.E. and “B” Company, 9th Seaforth Highlanders, were attached to the 26th Brigade, the 63rd R.E. and “D” Company, 9th Seaforth Highlanders, to the 28th, and the 64th R.E. and “C” Company, 9th Seaforth Highlanders, to the 27th. Supplies of ammunition, stores, and tools were placed at intervals along the whole front and, as far as possible, these dumps were made at the junction of the “up traffic” communication trenches, and the support line. As the bomb was to be the principal weapon of the infantry after the first stages of the attack, numbers of special bomb depots were formed. In addition to S.A.A., picks and shovels, water, medical stores, and rations were placed in the forward dumps.

Medical Aid Posts were arranged at convenient points. In order to effect the evacuation of the wounded from the forward areas with the utmost speed, each brigade dug one communication trench for wounded only. These trenches were wider than the usual communication trench, the corners being rounded off, so that stretchers could be carried with comparatively little inconvenience. A loop was made leading off them, about 2000 yards in rear, and in each loop was a dressing-station in a dug-out about the size of an ordinary room. Serious cases were to be brought round the loop, dressed, and then passed out at the farther end into the communication trench. Walking cases were expected to go straight on without passing through the loop.

The maintenance of communication was a most important matter, and every conceivable means, ranging from the pigeon to the human being, was to be used. The ordinary connection by telephone was to be established as far as possible, and visual stations, from which messages could be transmitted by flag or lamp, were to be set up as well as pigeon stations. Between the battalion commander and his company commanders the medium was the runner, the most reliable of all means of communication. The Division had one wireless set, which was worked by four men, and this was attached to the 26th Brigade H.Q.

The question of the men’s equipment for battle was important. A heavy weight would retard progress and exhaust their strength, yet it was necessary to supply them with sufficient material to consolidate their gains and to enable them to beat off enemy counter-attacks. Accordingly packs were dumped, the men going into action with haversacks only, and each one carrying two empty sand-bags, and all, except bombers, signallers, and runners, were to be supplied with 200 rounds of ammunition. Owing to the use of gas, the men on the morning of the attack were to wear their gas helmets like a cap.

All these preparations were satisfactorily accomplished by the evening of the 24th September. During this period of strain, the health of Major-General Landon broke down, and on the 8th September he returned to England and was succeeded by Major-General G. H. Thesiger, C.B., C.M.G. The G.S.O.I. was Lieut.-Col. S. E. Hollond, who joined the Division at the beginning of September, and the A.A. and Q.M.G. was Lieut.-Col. A. A. M’Hardy.