CHAPTER XIII

THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE IN FLANDERS

APRIL 1918

In spite of their success in forcing the passage of the Somme on the 27th March, the Germans had shot their bolt, and though they had secured the most extensive acreage ever taken in any one offensive since trench warfare began, they had failed in their strategical design—the capture of Amiens and the severance of the French and British forces. Their front had been worn to a fine point by the 27th, and an attempt to widen it by a stroke against Arras was shattered by the glorious defence of the northern wing of the Third Army on the 28th March. No effort on their part could prevent our thin line in front of Amiens gaining in strength and stability. Throughout the retreat General Gough had shown sound generalship and admirable control, but the strain on him and his staff had been so constant and severe, that Sir Douglas Haig replaced the Fifth Army Staff by that of the Fourth under General Rawlinson. This arrangement unfortunately appeared to strengthen the impression created by the Prime Minister’s unjust remarks in the House of Commons on the 9th April, implying that General Gough was responsible for our disasters at the Somme. These were primarily due to the failure of the home authorities to keep our line in France adequately supplied with men. About this time, the conference at Doullens arrived at the vastly important decision which led to the appointment of Marshal Foch on the 26th March as the Generalissimo of all the forces on the Western Front.

After the relief of the Ninth, General Blacklock was transferred to another division, and he was succeeded by Major-General H. H. Tudor. There could have been no more popular promotion. The new commander, since he joined the Division in February 1916, had exercised an important influence in its councils, and his conduct of the operations from the 21st to the 24th March had marked him as a leader of outstanding skill. Brig.-General H. R. Wainwright succeeded General Tudor as C.R.A.

During the retreat from Gouzeaucourt to the Ancre, our losses exceeded 50 per cent. of the infantry, but the rest were in good heart. In the fighting of the last few days there had been an element of sport which appealed to the men, and though they were the hunted they had killed an enormous number of the pursuers. Consequently the Division was exhilarated rather than disheartened by its recent experiences, and its moral was all that could be desired, when, on the 1st April, it entrained for the north, where it expected to take over a quiet sector on the front of the IX. Corps in the Second Army. On the 2nd and 3rd April it detrained at Abeele and Hopoutre, D.H.Q. being established at Scherpenberg.

On the night of the 3rd/4th April, the Highland and Lowland Brigades relieved the 3rd Brigade of the 1st Australian Division in the area extending from Hollebeke (inclusive) across the Ypres-Comines Canal to the south end of Bulgar Wood, a stretch of some 3000 yards. Here there were no indications of an impending attack, and General Tudor was told that his first duty was to prepare his command as speedily as possible for the “second round of the Third Somme Battle,” which, it was generally believed, would be continued. This involved a great deal of preparation. Although individual soldiers recovered remarkably quickly from exhaustion, units could not recover with equal rapidity, as there was a lamentable dearth of trained leaders and instructors. Very large drafts, consisting chiefly of youths of eighteen and nineteen years of age, were received almost daily by the 26th and 27th Brigades, but they could not be brought speedily to the same level of efficiency as that exhibited by the veterans of the Somme, while the process of absorbing so many new officers and men, which would have been slow at any time, was rendered even more difficult by the fact that both brigades were in the line. The physique of the drafts that joined the Division at this time was excellent. They were largely composed of lads who had been taken at the age of seventeen, and were splendid examples of the beneficial effect of good feeding, regular exercise, and military discipline on young Scotsmen. The South African Brigade[111] about 1300 strong, and now under the command of Brig.-General Tanner, appeared to have no immediate prospects of obtaining reinforcements, and while the several regiments meanwhile maintained their identity the question of forming it into one battalion was under consideration. Too weak to man a brigade front, it was stationed in divisional reserve in the vicinity of Ridge Wood, 1000 yards north of Vierstraat.

In order to hasten reorganisation as much as possible General Tudor decided to hold the whole of his line with the 27th Brigade, while the 26th was withdrawn to absorb its numerous reinforcements. This arrangement however was upset by Corps orders to take over from the Nineteenth Division 500 yards of line to the south of Hollebeke on the night of the 10th/11th. The Highland Brigade was instructed to do this, but on the morning of the 9th, the enemy made his surprise attack against the XV. and Portuguese Corps, which for some time jeopardised our grip on the Channel Ports, and the Division was required to carry out the relief on the night of the 9th/10th, and take over the remainder of the Nineteenth Division front on the night of the 10th/11th. Accordingly, the Lowland Brigade was ordered to relieve the 26th and garrison also the 500 yards of front in the Nineteenth Division’s sector on the night of the 9th/10th. The new area was a featureless and desolate waste of shell-holes, where it was hard enough to locate one’s position in broad daylight and with the aid of a map, and was therefore all but impossible in darkness. Yet in spite of the impossibility of reconnaissance through lack of time, and a heavy bombardment of the trench system and battery area with H.E. and gas, the relief was duly carried out, though it was after daybreak on the 10th before our outposts were in position. The satisfactory accomplishment of this relief was a very fine feat on the part of the 27th Brigade. To move in the dark over the most barren country in Europe under a really heavy bombardment, without losing cohesion, was an achievement that would have done credit to the finest soldiers of “The Contemptibles.”

Brig.-General Croft’s Brigade had a span of 4000 yards astride the Ypres-Comines Canal, with its right about 800 yards south-west of Hollebeke, and its left approximately 1200 yards east of Klein Zillebeke. As this sector formed the extreme right flank of the Passchendaele salient, the general direction of the lines of defence ran from south-west to north-east. The whole front was covered by a line of posts, some of which were in “Pill-boxes,” and 300 to 800 yards behind this and overlooking it was a continuous trench from the northern divisional boundary to 500 yards from the Canal, where the ground was swampy. From 300 yards south of the Canal another continuous trench ran as far as the Hollebeke road. In the part taken over from the Nineteenth Division there were no defences immediately in rear of the posts, except some 100 yards of trench leaning in a northerly direction.

Our position north of the Canal appeared the part most likely to be attacked, since it formed the hinge of the Passchendaele salient, while the Klein Zillebeke Spur and Hill 60 offered tempting objectives to the enemy, who could make his arrangements and concentrate his forces under cover of the Zandvoorde Ridge. South of the Canal the reserve line defences consisted of a strongly-wired line of posts stretching in a south-westerly direction to the Stables, and supported by the defences of White Château, a former residence of Leopold of Belgium, which, as it occupied a commanding position, was now tunnelled with dug-outs and held a permanent garrison. From the Stables two massive belts of wire extended south-south-east and south-west. Behind these were a few posts which it was impossible to man adequately, owing to the length of the brigade front and the necessity of holding in strength Hill 60, The Bluff, and White Château. No switch protected the right flank of the Division, but a section of machine-guns covered the space between the right of the support line and the Stables.

The front was covered by the 50th and 51st Brigades R.F.A. In divisional reserve were the 26th Brigade, south-west and north-west of Vierstraat, the South African Brigade between La Clytte and Scherpenberg, and the 9th Machine-gun Battalion (less two companies) about 1000 yards east of Ridge Wood.

The heavy cannonade, which had commenced at 1 A.M., slackened about two hours later. On this morning the tide of battle flowed north, and the right flank of the IX. Corps being hotly engaged, the South Africans were sent by the Corps to positions of assembly south of Neuve Eglise, there to be in Corps reserve. Brig.-General Kennedy was instructed to be ready to move his brigade at thirty minutes’ notice, and the line along the eastern slopes of the Messines-Wytschaete Ridge was to be held at all costs. Early in the afternoon the situation near Wytschaete, which was held by the Nineteenth Division, was very obscure, and Brig.-General Kennedy sent a patrol of Camerons to ascertain the relative positions of the enemy and of our troops.

Between 1 and 2 P.M. the Ninth entered the battle. After a terrific bombardment the Germans rushed our outpost positions south of the Canal held by the 11th Royal Scots, and attacked the support position, but the enemy’s ranks were swept away by rifle and machine-gun fire, and by the accurate fire put down by the 27th L.T.M.B. under the direction of Captain Drummond Shiels. Unfortunately success farther south enabled the Germans to threaten our flank, and the next assault, developing from the south and extending as far west as the Stables, would have broken our defences but for the timely arrival of two companies of the 12th Royal Scots, who prolonged the defensive flank formed by the 11th Royal Scots. Considering the exceptionally fatiguing relief, the fine resistance of the 27th Brigade was a magnificent effort. Nevertheless the situation was decidedly alarming. All touch with the troops to the south had been lost, and as the Highland Brigade had been placed under the Nineteenth Division, the 9th Seaforths, now the only infantry General Tudor had in reserve, were despatched to reinforce the Lowland Brigade and were posted on the Dammstrasse, echeloned in rear of the right flank of the Lowlanders.

About 3 P.M. the order placing the 26th Brigade under the Nineteenth Division was cancelled, and the 58th Brigade (the left of the Nineteenth Division) together with its front was transferred to the Ninth. It was uncertain what ground was held by that brigade, but some of its troops were believed to be in Wytschaete, which was also occupied by the Cameron patrol, and so the Highland Brigade was sent up to establish a line between the left of the 58th and the right of the 27th Brigade. At 5.30 P.M. the situation was believed to be as follows: The 58th Brigade was holding the line L’Enfer-Pick House-Torreken Corner; the Black Watch were in Grand Bois, the Seaforths moving on Dammstrasse, and the Camerons in reserve south-west of Vierstraat, while the 9th Seaforths and a detachment of Sappers were in the Dammstrasse; the 27th Brigade was holding the line from the Stables to Hollebeke, thence along the support position to the Canal and its original line north of the Canal.

[Illustration: WYTSCHAETE FROM VIERSTRAAT]

At 8 P.M. the 26th Brigade, which had established itself on the line Stables-Delbske Farm-Ravine Wood-southern edge of Denys Wood-Guedezeune Farm, reported that Wytschaete had been evacuated by our troops. Having received as reinforcements the 62nd Brigade (less one battalion but with one battalion of the 146th Brigade attached), General Tudor sent two battalions to strengthen his line, and these passing through the Cameron detachment, which had already reoccupied the village, established a line east and south-east of Wytschaete. The Black Watch also advanced and held a line along the eastern edge of Onraet and the western margin of Oosttaverne Wood, connecting the left of the 62nd Brigade with the right of the 7th Seaforths[112] and the 9th Seaforths in the Dammstrasse. The 4th and 11th M.M.G. Batteries, being sent to the Ninth, were retained in reserve near Scherpenberg.

South of our positions the Germans made disquieting progress during the day; they compelled our troops to evacuate Armentières, and crossing the Lys in strength occupied Estaires, Steenwerck, and Ploegsteert, and threatened the Messines Ridge. So very grave was the crisis that the weak South African Brigade was thrown hurriedly into the battle. On the front of the Nineteenth Division the Germans had penetrated our defences between Messines and Pick House on the Wytschaete road, and the South Africans along with the 57th and 58th Brigades of the Nineteenth Division were ordered to retake this portion of the ridge. With the 1st and 2nd Regiments leading and the 4th in support, the South Africans moved forward to the attack at 5.45 P.M. On their right was the 57th Brigade. Only two F.A. Brigades were available for artillery support, and the enemy’s riflemen and machine-gunners in shell-holes and “Pill-boxes” were able to inflict numerous casualties on the assailing troops, but in spite of the difficulty of keeping touch in the mist, the South Africans pressed on, expelled the enemy from his shell-holes and “Pill-boxes,” and established a line along the western outskirts of Messines-Middle Farm-Four Huns Farm-Lumm Farm, with a defensive flank thrown back to L’Enfer. The 1st Regiment, dashing through Messines, by a fine bayonet charge drove the enemy down the eastern slopes of the ridge, but the village was an awkward place to hold, and though in a series of stubborn hand-to-hand combats the 1st Regiment kept its ground, the village was eventually abandoned and a line was established just west of it.

In the small hours of the 11th the Germans resumed their efforts, and strong forces attempted to break through our defences on the Dammstrasse and the right flank of the Lowland Brigade from the Stables to the southern end of the support position, but the hostile concentration had been observed and our rifle, machine-gun, and artillery-fire, cutting deep lanes in the dense field-grey hordes, beat back the foe in tumultuous and terror-stricken disorder. The Seaforths, taking full advantage of the panic, counter-attacked with a small party under Sergeants Tait and Jeffries, and rounded up 17 Germans and 3 machine-guns. The young soldiers who had joined the Division behaved with admirable courage and coolness, and our gunners earned the gratitude of the infantry by the rapidity and precision with which they engaged every favourable target.

On the front of the Ninth the enemy had been too severely punished to risk another enterprise, and no incident interrupted the rest of the day. A counter-attack was even contemplated with a view to clearing the high ground west and north of Oosttaverne, but the project was given up on account of German inroads farther south. Advantage of the lull was taken to reorganise the line, the 62nd Brigade now holding from Pick House to Somer Farm, the 26th to the Hollebeke-St Eloi road, and the 27th in its original sector, the total frontage amounting to nearly 9000 yards. During the evening the Division and its sector were transferred from the IX. to the XXII. Corps.

On the same day Messines Ridge was wrested from our grasp. During the night of the 10th/11th the South Africans tried to gain touch with the Ninth near Pick House, but this place consisting of three “Pill-boxes” was found to be strongly manned by the enemy and defied every attempt to overpower it. At daybreak the 108th Brigade moved up in support of the South Africans, and the forenoon passed without event. Early in the afternoon, however, the Germans, attacking the left wing of the South Africans in great strength, expelled the 2nd Regiment from the crest, and though a resolute counter-stroke, led by Captain L. Greene, regained the lost ground, the enemy’s turning movement on our left flank forced the South Africans to retire to a line some 200 yards east of Hell Farm. This position was maintained in face of heavy losses and incessant attacks throughout the remaining hours of daylight.

Owing to German penetration in the south the right flank of the Second Army, pivoting on Wytschaete, was obliged to withdraw in the night to a line passing through Kruisstraat Cabaret and a point east of Wulverghem. When this movement was completed the right wing of the 62nd Brigade rested on the Bogaert Farm-Pick Wood Spur, and a defensive flank was formed along the Wytschaete-Peckham road.

The retirement was naturally more pronounced in the case of the Nineteenth Division, and in conformity with the rest of that formation the South Africans were drawn back to a line N. Midland Farm-Kruisstraat Cabaret-Spanbroekmolen-Maedelstede Farm.

From the 12th to the 15th there was a lull in the fighting on the front of the Ninth, but merciless artillery-fire caused many casualties. During this period of comparative peacefulness General Tudor made several rearrangements. The 64th Brigade (less one battalion) took over the front from Somer Farm to Dome House in relief of the 26th, which continued to hold the Dammstrasse, and the 9th Seaforths and the 58th Brigade were withdrawn from the front trenches, the latter rejoining its own Division on the 13th. Meantime reinforcements were gathering in the rear; the South Africans returned to the Ninth on the night of the 13th/14th and two battalions of the 39th Composite Brigade (late Thirty-ninth Division) were moved by the Twenty-first Division to Ridge Wood to be available if required. All our defences were strengthened and the Sappers and 9th Seaforths laboured steadily on the Vierstraat line, which the 62nd and 26th Brigades were ordered to garrison, each with a battalion. A prolongation of front on the evening of the 15th obliged the 62nd Brigade to take over the front of the Nineteenth Division as far as Spanbroekmolen. The success of the enemy also forced us to surrender our dearly-bought gains of the Passchendaele campaign, and in conformity with the withdrawal round Ypres, the left flank of the Ninth from the north-east end of the Dammstrasse to the northern divisional boundary was brought back to the Corps line.

This line, leaving the Dammstrasse, east of Eikhof Farm, crossed the Canal just east of The Bluff, where, turning east-north-east, it passed over the Klein Zillebeke Spur, 500 yards north-west of the hamlet of the same name. The White Château and Klein Zillebeke were thus given up, but The Bluff and Hill 60 were retained. With a view to shortening our front, and so economising troops, a more extensive retirement—to the Vierstraat line—was contemplated; but on General Tudor urging that this position, besides offering inadequate protection against artillery-fire, was completely overlooked from the Spanbroekmolen-Wytschaete Ridge, and was a poor substitute for the valuable observation afforded by our present position, the idea was abandoned.

The stretch, for which the Ninth with its attached troops was responsible, amounted to 9000 yards. The portion of the Corps line, occupied by the Lowland Brigade, consisted of a string of cleverly camouflaged posts protected by heavy and continuous belts of wire, and had previously been reconnoitred by Brig.-General Croft and Captain Duke, his brigade major. The retreat was skilfully carried out on the night of the 15th/16th under cover of patrols, which, going out as usual after dusk, were so enterprising that the enemy failed to realise that a withdrawal was in progress. All next day the Germans violently shelled the vicinity of the Corps line, but the posts were so well concealed that little damage was done, and even low flying aeroplanes were unable to detect our new positions. Our far-reaching observation served us handsomely; the enemy frequently presented excellent targets as he advanced, and the accurate and galling fire of our Stokes mortars and machine-guns stationed on The Bluff shattered a hostile concentration near the Canal.

On the 16th a huge enemy effort was directed against Wytschaete. About 5 A.M., after a hurricane bombardment which broke down all communications in the sector, the Germans, screened by a mist, carried the battered site on which had stood Spanbroekmolen Mill, the 64th Brigade being forced to throw out a defensive flank 500 yards north of the former on the line Somer Farm-North House-Black Cot, whence it was continued to the Vierstraat line by two companies of the Black Watch. The South Africans were hastily brought up, and manned the southern sector of the Vierstraat from La Polka to Desinet Farm, while the Lowland Brigade occupied the northern sector from the Vierstraat-Wytschaete road to Snipers’ Barn.

About noon a furious attack developed against the Camerons in the Dammstrasse, but was repulsed by rifle and machine-gun fire, and the Germans withdrew to Pheasant Wood, leaving their wounded where they fell. An hour later an attempt of the enemy to debouch from the wood was easily frustrated.

The loss of Wytschaete was no light matter, and an operation for its recapture was quickly planned. French reserves having been sent up, one division was to attack with its left flank parallel to and 500 yards north of the Kemmel-Spanbroekmolen road, and the Ninth was to co-operate by retaking Wytschaete. Our available forces consisted of two battalions of the 62nd Brigade, the 7th Seaforths, and two companies of the 39th Composite Brigade, and the objective was the line Pick Wood-Bogaert Farm, the cutting 300 yards south of Wytschaete-Staenyzer Cabaret-Somer Farm. The French however were unable to complete their preparations, and at 7.30 P.M. the Ninth attacked alone under cover of a creeping barrage. Just as the German barrage began our troops moved forward. The dash of the Seaforths was superb. An irresistible charge carried them right through Wytschaete village, and during a combat where many feats of valour were performed, Captain Reid and C.S.M. Jeffries singled themselves out by the daring with which they rushed a “Pill-box” on the ridge and captured 14 prisoners and 5 machine-guns. But the extreme left of the attack was checked by machine-gun fire from North House, and though on the right the men of the 62nd Brigade reached the line Petit Bois-Maedelstede, they failed to capture the craters at the two latter places owing to machine-gun fire from Spanbroekmolen and Peckham, which the French were to have attacked. The result of the operation was that success on the left had been gained on a narrow front, while on the right a line had been established which could not be held by daylight unless Spanbroekmolen were taken.

The French therefore agreed to assault the village at 5 A.M. on the 17th, when the 62nd Brigade was to co-operate by attacking Wytschaete Wood. To support the Seaforths in Wytschaete village the South Africans were placed under the orders of Brig.-General Kennedy, and the 4th Regiment, followed by the 1st, moved up to the village. By dawn the line occupied ran from Somer Farm through North House and the Hospice to Black Cot. The French effort against Spanbroekmolen was unexpectedly feeble, only one company being used, and nothing was achieved, with the result that the 62nd Brigade had to withdraw to the line La Gache Farm-eastern edge of Petit Bois.

From the 17th to the 24th no infantry attacks took place, but relentless artillery-fire persistently swept our trench system and back areas. On the 18th an unlucky shell struck the 26th Brigade H.Q., causing the deaths of Lieut.-Colonel Horn, on his way to rejoin the Seaforths, Major Rose, the B.M. of the artillery, Captain Somers Cocks, the Staff Captain, and the Rev. C. G. Meister. The German advance, which had given the enemy possession of Wytschaete, Wulverghem, Neuve Eglise, Bailleul, and Meteren, had now brought him close to the Kemmel-Mont des Cats Ridge, the retention of which was vital to the security of our grip on Ypres and Poperinghe. A weighty blow had been dealt against the British forces, whose organisation had been gravely affected by the necessity of throwing piecemeal all available reserves into the battle line, and Ludendorff might have realised his dreams if he had returned to the main strategical design with which he began the year. But his gains at the Lys had so far exceeded his expectations that he was tempted to carry on in the north in the hope of securing the Channel Ports, and the two schemes, by offering conflicting prizes, began to lose all measure of co-ordination in the German plans.

During this period the French, relieving the Nineteenth Division, joined up with the Ninth on the right, and on the night of the 19th/20th our front north of Eikhof Farm was handed over to the Twenty-first Division. This included the whole of the front originally held by the Ninth Division, and, although the portion south of the Canal had been heavily attacked time after time, no part of the ground had been lost, except that portion in front of the Corps line which was evacuated in conformity with the army plan. On the 19th the 62nd Brigade was relieved and joined its own division, while the H.Q. and two half battalions of the 146th Brigade came under the orders of General Tudor. The remaining two halves arrived on the 21st and 22nd, and two battalions of the 39th Composite Brigade were transferred to the Twenty-first Division. Other reinforcements arrived; the 4th Tank Brigade (less one battalion and without tanks), consisting of the 5th Battalion, with 30 Lewis Gun detachments, and the 13th Battalion with 47. On the 22nd the South African Brigade, for lack of drafts, became a battalion styled the South African Composite Battalion,[113] and the remaining units of the brigade, which retained its distinctive name under Brig.-General Tanner, were made up of the 9th Scottish Rifles and the 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers. The former battalion was thus retransferred to its old division from the Fourteenth, while the latter, a Regular battalion originally in the famous Seventh Division, came from the Thirtieth Division, in which it had served since December 1915.

Another stroke against Wytschaete in co-operation with the French was planned for the 26th, but was anticipated by a great German thrust on the 25th. As was not unusual with the Ninth, its line formed a pronounced salient, and on the evening of the 24th was held from right to left by the 27th Brigade from La Gache Farm to Black Cot, by the 146th Brigade to North House, and the 64th to Dome House, and thence by the 26th (with the “Rifles” attached) to the northern divisional boundary at Eikhof Farm. The 27th Brigade was practically facing south. The Vierstraat line and another from 800 to 1000 yards in rear of it, known as “The Cheapside line,” had been assiduously strengthened, and they were divided into three sectors, of which the right was allotted to the 27th, the centre to the 146th, and the left to the 26th Brigade. Each sector was held by one battalion, deployed in depth in and between the two lines, two companies of each battalion being earmarked as garrison, and the remaining two being at the disposal of brigade commanders for counter-attack. On the right the 12th Royal Scots held the line with the K.O.S.B.[114] in close support and the 11th Royal Scots in reserve. Thirteen Lewis Gun detachments of the 5th Battalion (Tank Brigade) were stationed by Brig.-General Croft on supporting positions on Vandamme Hill. The South African Brigade, now in process of reorganisation, and the remainder of the 4th Tank Brigade were in divisional reserve, the former about Hopoutre and the latter half-way between Reninghelst and Poperinghe. The XXII. Corps H.Q. company, also under General Tudor, was composed mostly of men unfit for active operations, and was in reserve.

Our boundary on the south gave to the French the low ridge running east from Mount Kemmel to Spanbroekmolen, without leaving to them sufficient space in which to deploy troops for its defence. It was unfortunate that this ridge was not in the area of the Ninth; for while it was of little account as regards the defence of Kemmel, it was essential for the protection of our right flank. During the week 18th to 26th, although no serious attack developed, the troops were subjected to great strain owing to incessant and severe shell-fire, and the casualties amongst those in and behind the Vierstraat line were numerous.

[Illustration: KEMMEL AND YPRES FROM THE FREZENBERG RIDGE]

Between midnight and 1 A.M. on the 25th a prisoner captured by the French stated that a big onslaught was imminent and would probably take place on the 25th. Before daybreak a thick mist straddled the ground, and at 2.30 A.M. a violent hostile bombardment of gas and H.E. opened along the whole front. Telephonic communication between General Tudor and Brig.-General Croft was sundered at the outset, and the S.O.S. was seen to go up on the French front. At 3.20 A.M. the 4th Tank Brigade was ordered to send up immediately two companies to the Cheapside line, and the South Africans were instructed to be ready to move at fifteen minutes’ notice.

At 4.50 A.M. news came from the French that the enemy’s infantry were attacking, and half an hour later the S.O.S. signal was reported from the front of Wytschaete. Kemmel was wreathed in smoke and large numbers of enemy aircraft circled over both it and Wytschaete, but no definite information reached D.H.Q. until 6.40 A.M., when a belated message arrived from the 64th Brigade to the effect that up to 5.15 A.M. no infantry attack had developed on its front. A few minutes later the C.R.A. reported that the enemy’s barrage had moved forward considerably, and that one of our aeroplanes had dropped word that it extended along the whole front from Ludenhoek to the south-west end of the Dammstrasse. At 7.15 A.M. another message from the C.R.A. stated that the Germans were within 300 yards of Siege Farm, about 2000 yards north-west of our right flank troops at La Gache Farm. This information came as a complete surprise, since no news of an infantry attack on our front had yet reached D.H.Q.

The enemy’s onset in the first instance was directed about 3 A.M. against the Twenty-eighth French Division, and the right of the Ninth held by the 12th Royal Scots. At 5 A.M. there was a determined frontal assault on the 12th Royal Scots, and at one time a lodgment was effected between the centre and right companies, but after bitter fighting the Royal Scots drove off the assailants. About 7 A.M. the K.O.S.B. in the Vierstraat line received word from the Royal Scots that their front was intact, and this information was the more amazing in as much as the K.O.S.B. were themselves hotly engaged with the enemy, while French prisoners under escort were observed in their rear. The Germans had been foiled in their frontal attack, but their onrush had pierced the French on our right and enabled them to turn our flank from the south.

The 12th Royal Scots were entirely cut off, and about 8.30 A.M. the battalion fighting desperately to the end was engulfed by a flood of Germans, here and there a whirling eddy testifying to the fury of a last stand. Only a few isolated groups escaped the clutch of the foe and fought their way through many perils to the Cheapside line. On the left of the Royal Scots, the 1st East Yorks Regiment (64th Brigade) was forced back to Grand Bois, where, encircled by hordes of Germans, it put up a gallant fight. The K.O.S.B. also suffered seriously from the enemy’s turning movement; the two forward companies were virtually annihilated after a fierce resistance, and the battalion H.Q. were surrounded and captured. The remainder of the battalion took up a position on the Cheapside line, which was also held by the 9th K.O.Y.L.I. (64th Brigade), and by Lewis Gun detachments of the 4th Tank Brigade. Two companies of the 11th Royal Scots, the Black Watch, and the 9th D.L.I. were sent up in succession to support and continue this line back towards La Clytte.

In this manner the dangerous thrust was parried. The Black Watch, moving up from Ouderdom, crossed the Cheapside line, and engaging the enemy captured 67 prisoners at small cost to themselves. The K.O.S.B. in a brilliant counter-attack directed by Captain Cundle, now in command of the battalion, inflicted severe losses and secured 58 prisoners.

Throughout the action our machine-gunners earned noteworthy distinction by the doggedness with which they kept their guns in action till the last possible moment. Most of the company with the 27th Brigade shared the fate of the 12th Royal Scots, but made the enemy pay a heavy price for his victory. One gun directed on the Steenbeek valley, fired 1500 rounds before it was put out of action; other two were silent until the Germans reached the wire in front of them, when the crews suddenly opened fire and mowed them down. Only after one gun was knocked out, and the other withdrawn through lack of ammunition, did the enemy succeed in penetrating the wire. Of the teams at Vandamme no man returned; at Vandenberghe the guns were kept in action until the last belt was fired and were then destroyed, since it was impossible to withdraw them. In the Vierstraat line, a whole section became casualties. Two sections of another machine-gun company supporting the 1st East Yorks opened fire on the valley of the Wytschaete Beck with three guns between 5 and 6 A.M., and continued firing at intervals, until 9 A.M., when two of the guns were withdrawn to cover the right flank of the infantry, and remained in action for two hours without tripods. Of these sections there were only six unwounded men at the end of the day.

On the left of our line the storm beat violently against the Dammstrasse, but failed to break the defence of the Highlanders, who held the position with the Camerons and the Seaforths. Up to half an hour before noon all hostile attacks were repulsed, our infantry, machine-gunners and the personnel of the 26th L.T.M.B. co-operating most effectively. When ammunition began to run short, several of the men dashed forward to deserted dumps in full view of the enemy, and brought back bandoliers of cartridges. Between 11.30 and 1.30 P.M. shells fell without ceasing, and the Camerons in the forward posts were practically wiped out, but our position through Piccadilly Farm-The Mound proved invulnerable to every attack for the remaining part of the day. Under Captain H. E. Bennet the men of the 26th L.T.M.B. fired off all their Stokes ammunition into the dense masses of the Germans, and after destroying the mortars used their rifles with deadly effect against the hostile infantry and transport. The machine-gunners with the Highlanders handled their weapons with such skill and enterprise that the infantry voluntarily collected ammunition and kept up the supply, while parties of the “Rifles” in the Vierstraat-Snipers’ Barn line were organised for belt filling.

After darkness fell, a line in rear of the Highlanders having been established and manned by fresh troops of the Twenty-first Division, the Camerons and Seaforths with the other detachments extricated themselves and were drawn back to a camp 700 yards north-east of Ouderdom. The stone-wall defence of the Highlanders had put a final stop to the enemy’s northern onrush, which had rolled up the front and immediate supports of three brigades, and threatened our hold on Ypres.

The shattered fragments of the Ninth, with the exception of the South African Brigade and the artillery, were relieved by the Forty-ninth Division at 11 A.M. on the 26th. The brigade remained in the sector until the night of the 5th/6th May, and all three battalions, though constantly harassed by artillery-fire, inflicted enormous casualties on the enemy when on the 29th he strove to take advantage of his possession of Mount Kemmel. Rarely has heavier artillery-fire heralded an attack. On that day, the Royal Scots Fusiliers signally distinguished themselves. They were deployed in, in front of, and behind the Cheapside line, and suffered horribly from the bombardment; but of their eight Lewis Guns, which were out in front of their position, only one was knocked out, so that when the enemy’s infantry advanced they were immediately checked, and then our barrage came down on the top of them. First a few rose up and bolted, and then the remainder fled in panic, whereupon the Royal Scots Fusiliers fairly took toll of them with their rifles and Lewis Guns. The enemy’s attack was utterly defeated.

That date marks the failure of the German designs in Flanders. The value of Kemmel proved to be less vital than had been anticipated; the enemy failed to carry the valleys that separated it from Scherpenberg, and here, as in front of Amiens, the battle line became stabilised. The diversion had caused anxious tremors at G.H.Q., and for some time our organisation showed signs of giving way. The situation was too critical to be glossed over by misleading communiqués, and Sir Douglas Haig’s famous “Backs to the Wall” Order,[115] issued to all ranks on the 12th April, was a bracing and salutary warning to the British Army of what had to be done to deprive the Germans of victory. But Ludendorff, by using too much strength to exploit his initial success, had converted the diversion into a major operation, and had been unable to turn it into account in front of Amiens. The Flanders offensive instead of supplementing had supplanted the enemy’s main scheme of the year, and from this moment the projects of the German Higher Command show both uncertainty and nervousness.

Considering how sadly the Ninth had been depleted as a result of the Somme retreat, the unwavering resistance it offered in April is little short of marvellous. Since the 21st March it had enjoyed virtually no rest, and yet it had retained all its high fighting qualities unimpaired; this was largely due to the excellent spirit shown by the young boys who formed a large proportion of each unit. The Ninth’s protracted defence of Wytschaete had not merely added another glorious record to its lengthy list, but had helped almost as much as the retention of Givenchy by the Fifty-fifth Division to set a limit to the German gains in Flanders, and earned for it another “mention”[116] from G.H.Q. It is worth noting that here, as during the Somme retreat, the enemy never succeeded in wresting any ground from the Ninth by a frontal attack, and it was only when its flanks were turned that any territory was surrendered. The infantry had shown throughout incomparable tenacity and endurance, and the work of the trench-mortar batteries and the machine-gun battalion was invaluable. It is doubtful if the 26th L.T.M.B. ever did finer work than on the 25th April, while no reputation was more thoroughly established than that of the 9th Machine-gun Battalion, and the prestige won in these turbulent April days gave a tremendous stimulus to the _esprit_ of this recently formed unit.

The successful resistance of the Ninth was due to sound generalship as well as the valour of its troops. On the critical 25th April the Highland Brigade being on the inner flank had time to send two companies up from the reserve to form a defensive flank facing south, and it was this measure that stopped the spread northward of the German turning movement until the troops along the Dammstrasse could be withdrawn to the Piccadilly Farm-Mound position, and then at night behind the Vierstraat-Snipers’ Barn line. In holding up the onslaught on the Cheapside line and eventually in consolidating themselves in it, when Mount Kemmel, which looked right along it, was in the hands of the enemy, the men of the Ninth accomplished an almost incredible performance. The action is a conspicuous example of the value of defence deployed in depth; for the fact that the Germans never broke through the Division, although their first attack completely outflanked the front and support lines and even the front reserve line (Vierstraat line), was due, apart from the courage of the troops, to the great depth of the original deployment of the Division.

By its prowess in March and April the Ninth thoroughly earned the flattering message[117] received later from Sir Douglas Haig. It was now widely known even beyond Scotland, and shared with the Fifty-first Highland Territorial Division, the rare distinction of appearing in a leading article of _The Times_. This publicity was the theme of an amusing conversation between the popular Padre Brown and a Padre of another division.

“Oh, you belong to the Ninth Division, do you?”

“I do.”

“You seem to have a very good Press.” (This, of course, nettled Padre Brown.)

“Yes, we have.”

“How do you manage it; have you got a special correspondent?”

“Oh yes.”

“Really; and he seems to accompany you wherever you go.”

“Yes, he does.”

“I say, do tell me who he is.”

“Oh, his name is Haig!”