CHAPTER XIV

METEREN AND HOEGENACKER RIDGE

MAY TO SEPTEMBER 1918

The moral of our troops was a subject of frequent notice in the Press during March and April, and it was so persistently stated that it had not been affected by reverses and disasters that suspicions were aroused about the value of a moral which required so much loquacity to convince people of its soundness. As a matter of fact the men in France were calmer and less nervous than our “Home Front,” as the Germans would call it. It is true that both in March and April there had been instances of unseemly panic, but this was inevitable in an army numbering many thousands. But though here and there a few weaklings succumbing to exhaustion and despair lost heart, the vast majority of the men of the Fifth, Third, and Second Armies never faltered; they fully realised that on their devotion and sacrifice depended the fate of civilisation. Greater nervousness was in fact apparent after the crisis had passed, and during the summer of 1918 there was a regular epidemic of self-inflicted wounds, but it was very noticeable that practically all the culprits were fresh soldiers who had never been in any fighting, and a few weeks’ careful training in the trenches led to a rapid diminution of this feeble-hearted device.

A clear gain early in 1918 was the greater reliability of our official communiqués. The garbled and misleading accounts of the battles since the time of Loos were not calculated to elevate the moral of those fighting in France, and men who had taken part in such an action as the “3rd May” 1917 were exasperated to find it reported in the Press as a great British victory. “British official,” formerly the hall-mark of truth, became a dubious phrase, and the practice of soothing the timid by toning down reverses was more than counter-balanced by a loss of faith in the veracity of the British Government. The method now adopted of publishing full accounts of events was as wholesome as it was satisfactory, and undoubtedly helped to improve the moral of the Army.

The Germans in two offensives had seized a vast extent of territory, and made huge captures in prisoners and material, but they had failed to overwhelm the British forces and to break our liaison with the French. During the panic in March and April the British Government extended the scope of the Military Service Act, and sought, without adequate consideration, to introduce conscription into Ireland. From these measures no real gain was to be expected; for the men in Britain now drawn into the Army were more necessary for the upkeep of industry at home, and were too old to be of much service as soldiers, while the attempt to bring Ireland under conscription delivered the country to the Sinn Feiners, and compelled the Government to divert to that island large forces which could have found more useful employment on the Western Front. A more solid compensation was derived from the energy and celerity with which America came to the assistance of the Entente, and the rapid and continuous transportation of its soldiers across the Atlantic to France was the most signal illustration of the failure of the German submarine campaign. Unless Germany could intercept American reinforcements her position was hopeless; and her capacity for interference was at least curtailed by the dashing naval operations which blocked the harbours of Ostend and Zeebrugge.

Even success on land added to her embarrassments; for her length of front had been greatly augmented and portions of her line, especially in the north, were difficult and costly positions to defend. Moreover, the attack had taxed her strength to the utmost, and it was not till the end of May that she was able to strike a fresh blow. The new offensive directed against the Chemin des Dames with the object of widening the German front towards Paris, marked the final abandonment of the strategical conception with which Ludendorff had commenced the campaign, though our front near Amiens probably remained for the enemy the most profitable point of attack. The rush on the 27th May, which chiefly affected the French, at first swept everything before it, and by the end of the month the enemy had reached the Marne between Château Thierry and Dormans. Near that point the line became stabilised, and the resistance of the French was supported by British and American troops.

During the greater part of May, the Ninth after leaving Poperinghe was resting and reorganising near St Omer. D.H.Q. were at Blaringhem, and the brigades were in neighbouring villages except the 27th, which was in a camp at Lumbres. After three weeks of constant training and good weather, the Division, now largely composed of youths little more than eighteen years of age, was ready to return to the line, and on the night of the 25th May the 26th Brigade with the 9th Scottish Rifles attached, relieved the Thirty-first Division near Meteren. On the following day the South African Brigade took over the right sector from the 26th.

The position held by the Ninth was essential for the safety of the important railway centres of Hazebrouck and St Omer, and had therefore to be maintained at all costs. The main feature was the narrow isolated ridge of the Meteren Hill running north and south from Fontaine Hoek towards Meteren; on the east it overlooked the French and German lines towards St Jans Cappel and Bailleul, and on the west the valley of the Meteren Becque as far as the Flêtre-Roukloshille Ridge which lay behind the Hill. The enemy was in possession of the village, which, standing on high ground, afforded him observation of all approaches to the west of Meteren Hill and almost all the ground in our area east of the Flêtre-Roukloshille Ridge, thus preventing any movement on the part of our men in daylight.

In the early summer the initiative still remained with the enemy, and there was anxious speculation as to the place where his next blow would fall. Prince Rupprecht was known to have large forces in reserve and the Mont des Cats and Hazebrouck seemed to offer tempting prizes. Our aeroplane observation showed that extensive preparations for an attack had already been made, and throughout May and June our vigilance was never suffered to relax. Rows of trenches were dug back to St Omer; in the forward area a continuous front trench was excavated, covered by isolated advance posts, while there was a strong support line hinging on Phineboom and a reserve position near Flêtre. On the 27th May the “Rifles” secured a wounded prisoner, who informed us that the enemy was going to make a big attack on the 29th, but that day passed without any untoward occurrence. The German operations near the Chemin des Dames were now in full swing, but the foe on our front continued to form dumps and depots, and not until the end of June was it clear that his projected offensive on the Mont des Cats and Hazebrouck had been given up.

On the whole, the Ninth found the sector a very pleasant one to hold and our casualties from the enemy’s artillery-fire were not very high. The landscape was typically agricultural and consisted of wide fields of long waving corn, coloured in patches by the bright red of the poppy, with a few substantial farmhouses interspersed here and there. So hurried had been the flight of the civilians from the district that at many of the farms some live-stock had been left, and in one portion of the line two cows were regularly handed over on reliefs as part of the trench stores.

The attitude of the Division was one of active defence. Patrolling was assiduous; screened by the tall corn, small parties left our lines every day to examine the enemy’s positions. Raids for the purpose of securing identifications were constantly carried out, and as the youngsters of the Division gained experience and learned the lie of the country they became adepts in the art of surprising posts. Abortive attempts to take prisoners were made by the K.O.S.B.[118] on the night of the 2nd/3rd June, the 12th Royal Scots[119] on the 10th, and the Black Watch on the night of the 14th/15th, but during these forays several Germans were killed and wounded. On the 15th, however, the “Rifles” captured a prisoner, and on the 20th a party of the 11th Royal Scots under Lieutenant Keen took three Germans of the 81st Reserve Division. Two days later, a smart piece of stalking by Sergeant Smith of the K.O.S.B. realised a bag of three prisoners belonging to the same division.

In June alarm was caused by a distressing outbreak of trench fever which affected the whole Division; numerous officers and men were removed to hospital, but the attack proved to be as short as it was sharp, and in the majority of cases the patients were able to rejoin their units after a fortnight’s absence. In the same month several officers and N.C.Os. from the American forces were attached to the Ninth for instruction in trench warfare; they were agreeable companions and enthusiastic workers and willingly joined in enterprises carried out by the units to which they were attached.

[Illustration: METEREN]

Our neighbours at this time were the French on the left and the Australians (First Australian Division) on the right. The latter had won a big reputation by their success in stalking Germans, and there was scarcely a Corps Intelligence Summary which did not record some Australian captures. On the night of the 2nd June a minor operation surprised the enemy in the middle of a relief and the Australian haul consisted of 5 officers and 250 other ranks. At 12.30 A.M. on the 24th a joint enterprise by two companies of the South Africans and two companies of the 1st Australian Brigade advanced our line on a front of 2000 yards to a maximum depth of 500 yards. The attack took place astride the Meteren Becque under cover of an artillery and trench-mortar barrage, and the South African share of the spoils amounted to 29 prisoners and 4 machine-guns.

From the end of June the Germans were daily harassed by Scotsmen, South Africans, and Australians. The captures on the front of the Ninth were smaller than on the right, but our difficulties were greater, the country in our sector being thickly streaked with dense hedges often profusely wired. On the night of the 11th/12th July three successful raids bringing in 7 prisoners were made by the 12th Royal Scots to the north-east of Meteren, and by the Royal Scots Fusiliers and the South Africans to the south of the village. Two nights later, a German N.C.O. was surprised and surrendered to the K.O.S.B.

On the 19th July Meteren was attacked. The commanding ground on which the village stood and its proximity to the line, for the protection of which the Ninth was responsible, rendered it desirable that our front should be advanced beyond the village. During May and June when the enemy was expected to strike, it was inadvisable to attempt the operation but preparations for it were made. Our experience of Longueval suggested the necessity of thoroughly demolishing Meteren; it was therefore systematically bombarded to prevent the consolidation of the position by the enemy and to level the walls and so allow a creeping barrage to go through the village without danger to the assailants. For a fortnight previous to the attack, “heavies,” field-guns, and trench mortars poured a never-ending stream of missiles into Meteren and completely flattened it.

As it had been decided that the infantry would attack under a smoke-barrage, bombardments with H.E. and smoke, accompanied by the discharge of gas from projectors, took place from time to time with a view to leading the enemy to associate our use of smoke with gas. It was originally intended to wait for a wind favourable for smoke, but later it seemed politic to carry the operation into effect as soon as possible in order to ascertain the enemy’s designs and to delay his preparations for an offensive if one was contemplated. Arrangements had therefore to be made to attack without too much dependence on a favourable wind, and batteries were moved into positions more directly in rear of their tasks. In calculating the amount of smoke and the placing of it on or beyond the barrage line, the velocity and direction of the wind were to be taken into account. The artillery barrage was to be reinforced by the action of trench mortars and machine-guns.

Zero was arranged for 7.55 A.M., as that was an unusually late hour for an attack and the enemy might therefore be expected to be off his guard. The assault was entrusted to the South African and 26th Brigades, the former attacking with the South Africans and the Royal Scots Fusiliers, and the latter with the Camerons and Black Watch. The “Rifles” and Seaforths were in support. The infantry were in their assembly positions before dawn, and in order to avoid detection before zero, the trenches were covered with cocoanut fibre matting, along which a black streak eighteen inches wide had been painted so as to simulate the appearance from the air of an empty trench. As the enemy’s centre formed a prominent salient, the men in our centre were to advance at zero, but those in the wings had to remain in their trenches for a few minutes until the middle portion of the barrage came on an alignment with the flanks.

The assault began under the most inauspicious circumstances. On the previous day the battle stores of the South African Brigade were destroyed when the farm in which they had been dumped was burned to the ground, and fresh stores were obtained only in time to be issued to the men when in their assembly positions. Then a Stokes mortar detachment moving to the left brigade sector strayed into the enemy’s lines five hours before zero, and one man was captured. The wind was unsteady and unfavourable for smoke. Finally, some guns on both flanks opened five minutes too soon, and while this mistake proved to have no bad consequences on the right flank, it probably served to put the enemy on the alert on our left.

In spite of these mishaps the operation met with almost complete success. The South African Brigade easily subdued all opposition except on its extreme left, where a pocket of Germans in a shallow trench behind a wired hedge offered a stout resistance, but this was adroitly overcome by the Royal Scots Fusiliers. The whole objective on the right was secured to time, numerous losses being inflicted on the enemy, especially behind the hedges running north and south on the west side of Meteren. Fortunately the course of the advance took the hedges in flank and discounted the protection which the Germans hoped to obtain from these obstacles. When the protective barrage ceased a company of South Africans advanced and captured an enemy trench running north-east from the Meteren Becque towards Alwyn Farm.

The Highland Brigade had a more strenuous time. The Camerons clearing the German front passed on through the ruins of Meteren, where the enemy was found holding a hedge in considerable force. After a brisk combat they seized the hedge and reached their objective in time. But the Black Watch on the left were not so happy. A portion of the right company won its objective along with the Camerons, but the remainder of the battalion was at once checked by a thick hedge on the left flank. Previously a successful raid had been effected at this place, but the enemy had since then appreciably strengthened the defences, and now there was a belt of wire behind as well as in front of the hedge covering the hostile infantry and machine-guns. Lying too near our lines to be bombarded by the gunners, it had been dealt with by Stokes mortars, but these had failed to cut the wire. Dogged pluck and persistent efforts were of no avail against this strong point, and after serious losses the left half of the Black Watch retired sullenly to their original trenches. The gap between the two portions of the Black Watch was filled by two platoons of the Seaforths, who on the following day turned the enemy’s defences by advancing from the west and drove him from the hedge.

After the capture of the objective, patrols moved forward as soon as the protective barrage ceased. Near Alwyn Farm and the hedges north and east of it there was some spasmodic resistance, but our patrols during the 19th and 20th succeeded in establishing a line on a slight ridge south of the Brahmin Bridge-Gaza Cross Roads. The battlefield was rapidly cleared, but the stretcher-bearers had great difficulty in finding the wounded, who were hidden by the corn. In the days following the attack, the 26th Brigade gained all its objectives, and came into line with the advanced troops of the South African Brigade.

The operation of the 19th July was a brilliant triumph, and increased immensely the enthusiasm and confidence of the young soldiers, to whose dashing fearlessness the victory was mainly due. Our losses, with the exception of the Black Watch, were small compared with our gains; many of the enemy had been killed, while 6 officers and 348 men, with a considerable amount of material,[120] fell into our hands. The Germans had been taken entirely by surprise. They had become so accustomed to bombardments of H.E. and smoke accompanied by gas that they regarded our barrage of the 19th July as another of the same, and a great many of the prisoners were wearing their gas-masks when captured. The unusual hour of zero was another factor in the surprise, and prisoners stated that all expectation of an attack that day had been abandoned after “stand-to.” Our enterprise apparently anticipated a hostile offensive on our front; the enormous quantity of trench-mortar ammunition which was found close in rear of the enemy’s front positions clearly indicated that the Germans were preparing to deliver an attack in this sector.

The capture of Meteren was the last operation of the Highland Brigade conducted by Brig.-General Kennedy. He had led the brigade through some of the stormiest and most critical fighting of the war, and of his many fine achievements perhaps the most outstanding was his daring and skilful handling of his men during the very trying days of the Somme retreat. After three years of continuous strife he had well earned the rest which an appointment in England now secured for him. His successor was Brig.-General the Hon. A. G. A. Hore Ruthven, V.C., who came from the Staff of the VII. Corps with a reputation already established, and assumed command on the 27th July.

The right sector was now taken over by the Lowland Brigade. Before daybreak on the 25th the enemy sought to gain some compensation for his recent reverse by raiding our lines. At 2 A.M., under cover of a trench-mortar and artillery bombardment, hostile parties attacked trenches held by the K.O.S.B. and 11th Royal Scots. The raid was utterly repulsed, and the enemy left behind two corpses and two unwounded prisoners. From the identifications we learned that the Germans had relieved the battered and demoralised 81st Reserve by the 12th Division, which had a good fighting record. An even more formidable raid was made in the early hours of the 26th. But the Germans were driven off by the K.O.S.B., and though on the right they succeeded in entering a trench held by the 11th Royal Scots, they were expelled by an immediate counter-attack, nine prisoners being taken.

The period from the 26th July till the 18th August was marked by raid and counter-raid. On the 30th July the Australians took Merris. On the 31st a raid by the K.O.S.B. just failed to secure prisoners, but Lieut. C. Campbell and Sergeant Smith killed nearly a dozen of the enemy in a fierce hand-to-hand encounter. Next day the Germans made a strong effort to seize a post held by the 12th Royal Scots, but were easily repulsed. On the 3rd August Captain Grant and a party of Camerons rushed a hostile post, and after killing six and wounding one other, returned without loss to our lines. On the 5th and 14th other raids made by the Germans were driven off.

Since the fear of a hostile offensive was fading away battalions out of the line enjoyed quite a comfortable time. Training, especially of officers, carried on diligently and uninterruptedly, produced a marked improvement in efficiency and discipline. Occasionally, however, the ordinary routine was broken. On Sunday the 4th August, the fifth anniversary of the entry of Britain into the war, a Parade Service, attended by detachments of all divisions in the Second Army, was held at Terdeghem, the detachments of the XV. Corps being under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Smyth of the 6th K.O.S.B. At this time the Ninth adopted the practice, generally followed by most divisions in France, of distinguishing its personnel by a special mark. This consisted of a white metal thistle on a small circular disc of royal blue cloth worn on the upper part of both arms, and the first unit to be completed with the sign was the 6th K.O.S.B., who had the honour of marching past His Majesty the King near La Brearde on the 6th August. Most fortunately this ceremony saved the Lowland Brigade some casualties; for while a company of the 12th Royal Scots lined the road a shell passed through its vacant billets.

Hoegenacker Ridge, lying beyond Meteren, was clearly the next task of the Division, and instructions for its seizure were received from the XV. Corps on the 10th August. A general plan of attack had been drawn up previously, and was in fact being practised by the Lowland Brigade then in reserve. Since the Meteren Becque was an awkward obstacle to an advance from the west it was decided, while simulating preparations for an attack from this direction, to make the assault from the north. The Ninth was to take the ridge and all the ground east of the Becque as far south as Terrapin House; but as this would give it a frontage of 3000 yards on the objective, while the space for forming-up amounted to only 1500 yards, two companies of the Twenty-ninth Division were to follow in rear of the right flank of the Ninth and take over the front from the Becque to Terrapin House as soon as it had been captured. The Twenty-ninth Division by means of patrols was to follow up any success gained, and if possible secure the village of Outtersteene.

The attack was to be supported by machine-guns and trench mortars and was to be covered by the favourite Ninth barrage. A German document had been captured in which the enemy, attributing our success at Meteren to the use of smoke, instructed his machine-gunners to open fire at once on our parapets when a smoke-barrage came down. It was therefore necessary to give the foe as little time as possible to bring his machine-guns into action, and our barrage was to be put down at one minute after instead of one minute before zero, as originally intended, while the infantry were to count ten after the barrage came down before leaving their trenches.

The assault was to be carried out by the Lowland Brigade with the K.O.S.B., 11th Royal Scots, and “Rifles,” each attacking on a two-company front, the first wave in skirmishing order and all succeeding waves in file. In the hope of effecting a tactical surprise, 11 A.M. on the 18th was fixed as zero, and the camouflage device so successfully employed at Meteren was adopted to screen the assembled troops. To ensure that none of the enemy were lurking within our barrage line the 12th Royal Scots established four new posts in six days, and held them against all efforts of the Germans to eject them. These posts were withdrawn before dawn on the morning of the attack.

The operation met with gratifying success. On the right the K.O.S.B. suffered losses from a heavy counter-barrage put down by the enemy between his outposts and his line on the ridge; near the Becque, too, there were some obstinate encounters in which a German machine-gun was knocked out by a Lewis Gun fired from the hip. On the left little opposition was experienced, the enemy being utterly surprised. In their impetuous eagerness our men more than once overran the barrage, some casualties being incurred in consequence. The whole objective of the Division was gained in fine style, and one company of the K.O.S.B. pressing on as far as Outtersteene returned with two heavy machine-guns.

So demoralised was the enemy that a great deal more ground could have been won, but though the men were impatiently anxious to go on, it was not considered advisable to leave the ridge for the low swampy ground beyond. The enterprise had been exceedingly satisfactory, no hitch having occurred at all. Ten officers and 287 other ranks had been captured along with a quantity of material.[121] The ground secured was of real importance as it dominated the whole sector, and unless the enemy had abandoned all hope of an offensive in this district he was bound to counter-attack. But nothing happened; the Germans had their hands too full with our counter-offensive in front of Amiens to contemplate ambitious projects in other parts of the war zone. Four days after the capture of Hoegenacker Ridge the Germans commenced a retreat on this front which did not close until they had abandoned the whole of the Lys salient. This step was probably chiefly due to events farther south, but the loss of the ridge, which afforded wonderful facilities for observation, undoubtedly precipitated the enemy’s retirement.

The Ninth remained in the line until the 24th. Terrapin Farm was not taken over by the troops of the Twenty-ninth Division until the 19th, probably because the amount of ground gained by exploitation was greater than had been expected. On the 22nd the Black Watch, in conjunction with a brigade of the Thirty-sixth Division which was now on our left, advanced their line about 150 yards without opposition. On the same date a patrol of the Camerons encountered a hostile post, which it summarily wiped out; it was then attacked from different directions and retired after shooting two officers who were leading enemy parties. On the 24th and 25th Hoegenacker Ridge was taken over by the Thirty-first Division and the Ninth was withdrawn to rest near Wardrecques.

At the end of August the South African Composite Battalion moved to the Lumbres area preparatory to leaving the Division, its connection with which officially ceased on the 13th September. Heavily engaged throughout 1918 it had once been practically demolished, and it was clear that there was no chance of bringing it up to the strength of a brigade until it was withdrawn from the line. It was only fitting that the Union of South Africa should be represented in France by a force stronger than a battalion; but the severance of the connection thus rendered necessary was a great blow to everyone in the Ninth. The trials and hardships borne by Scots and South Africans at the Somme, Arras, Passchendaele, and the fierce ordeal of the German offensives in March and April had forged a bond, consecrated by common sufferings and triumphs, that will ever link in sympathy such distant parts of the Empire as the misty land of Scotland and the Dominion that extends from the Cape of Good Hope to the Zambesi. The departure took place without fuss or ceremony in the same fashion as tried friends say farewell when duty bids them part. The final greeting[122] of General Tudor to the men who had played such an eminent and distinguished rôle in the Division reflected the sincere feelings of the Scots.

There was some consolation in the report that the place of the South Africans was to be filled by Ian Hay’s battalion, the 10th Argylls; but it was not immediately available, and another battalion of Colonial troops, the Newfoundlanders, tough fighters and good comrades, joined the Ninth under the command of Lieut.-Colonel T. G. Matthias. The 28th Brigade thus reconstituted was placed under the command of Brig.-General J. L. Jack.

Before the end of August the war had taken a turn that was as unexpected as it was gratifying. The German offensive in May and June towards Paris had been foiled by the doughty resistance of French and American troops, and Ludendorff, seeking an easier quest, dealt on the 15th July his final and hazardous blow against Rheims. Marshal Foch’s skilfully excogitated tactics were more than a match for the storm-troops who, lying in a sharp salient near Soissons, Château Thierry, Epernay, and Rheims, experienced a jarring shock when attacked on the 18th July by a French force under General Mangin who had collected it under cover of the forests of Compiègne and Villers-Cotterêts. The Germans were driven from the salient, Soissons was recaptured by the French, and on the 3rd August the enemy was pushed back across the River Vesle.

General Mangin’s stroke on the 18th July was the turning-point in the campaign. Ludendorff’s hope of victory was broken, and the ultimate triumph of the Entente was definitely assured. But few people were prepared for the sequence of brilliant victories that attended the Allies’ arms, and the autumn of glorious hope that succeeded the gloomiest spring of the war. On the 8th August the British Fourth Army struck so shrewd a blow that it disengaged the city of Amiens, and reduced Ludendorff to despair. The resistance of Germany began to crumble, and her forces were driven back in a retreat, which was rapidly developing into a rout, when the Armistice put an end to hostilities. The line of battle extended to the north when, on the 21st August, the British Third Army attacked between Albert and Arras. On the 29th Bapaume fell to the Third, and on the 31st Péronne to the Fourth Army. The First Army, joining in, stormed the formidable Drocourt-Queant line. These events emasculated opposition farther north, and Bailleul, Mount Kemmel, Ploegsteert Wood, and Lens were evacuated. Before the end of September the Germans had lost all their conquests of the spring, and were endeavouring to gain time behind the entrenchments of the Hindenburg Line.

With Germany in the toils all pith and sting dropped from her allies. In the Balkans, General Franchet d’Espercy, now in command of the Entente forces in that area, commenced on the 15th September an attack which in ten days forced the Bulgarians to sue for peace. With the collapse of Bulgaria the Central Powers lost their grasp on the Balkans, and there was no force of any consequence to make even a fight for Serbia. Turkey was now isolated, and suffered a series of catastrophic reverses from the armies of General Allenby, whose cavalry campaign mopped up the greater part of the Turkish soldiery, and eventually with the co-operation of General Marshall from Mesopotamia compelled the Sultan to accept our Armistice terms on the 30th October.

In France the admirable discipline of the enemy’s troops had so far prevented anything like a rout, but every day increased the embarrassments of the German General Staff. Reserves had to be thrown in hastily to stem our advance with no time to consider how they might be employed most usefully. Within Germany itself the rigours of our naval blockade caused acute discomfort, and the failure of the military effort raised murmurs ominous of the Revolution that was to sweep the Hohenzollerns from the Imperial Throne.

Thus the general situation towards the end of September was full of promise for the Allies, and Marshal Foch and Sir Douglas Haig, realising that a continuation of our pressure was bound to overwhelm the armies of the adversary, arranged for four simultaneous and convergent attacks against his sagging line.

The first was to be delivered by the Americans, who had already flattened out the St Mihiel salient, and was to be in the Woeuvre in the general direction of Mezières; the second by the French west of the Argonne with the same general goal as the Americans; the third on the Cambrai-St Quentin front by the Fourth, Third, and First British Armies in the direction of Maubeuge; and the fourth on the 28th September by the Belgian and Second British Armies in the direction of Ghent.

The Ninth, being in the Second Army, was thus to take part in the Flanders campaign. In billets, first near Wardrecques and later in the neighbourhood of Esquelbec, the men for over three weeks were resting and training, but the elation caused by their triumphs near Meteren and the daily reports of fresh victories made them burn to join in the final onset. On the 11th September the Division was transferred from the XV. to the II. Corps, and the 26th Brigade took over the front between the Ypres-Menin and Ypres-Zonnebeke roads from the Fourteenth Division on the 20th September.

Our front line ran approximately from Hell-fire Corner on the right to Mill Cot, rather more than a mile east of Ypres. East of this line the ground was low-lying and marshy, but rose gradually on the right to Bellewarde Ridge, and thence to the Westhoek-Frezenberg Ridge, which extended across the divisional front from south to north. From Stirling Castle, a mile south of Westhoek, the main Passchendaele Ridge ran north of Broodseinde to the village of Passchendaele. Between the Frezenberg Ridge and the Noordemdhoek-Broodseinde sector of the main ridge, two small but important underfeatures ran north-west; these were known as Anzac Ridge and Glasgow Spur, the former being separated from the Frezenberg Ridge by the tiny stream of the Hanebeek in a very boggy valley, which had been heavily wired. Since the desperate battles of 1917, the sector had experienced unusual repose, and the wilderness of shell-holes was now covered by long rank grass.

The Ninth being on the left flank of the Second Army was in close liaison with the Belgians. The co-ordination of artillery arrangements naturally presented complications, but ultimately it was decided that while the Belgians should open with a three hours’ preliminary bombardment before zero, the Ninth would attack under cover of its customary creeping barrage, commencing at zero. There was less difficulty as regards the Twenty-ninth Division on our right, though a pause of fifteen minutes after the capture of Bellewarde Ridge was necessary to allow that division after passing through Sanctuary Wood to reorganise, preparatory to storming Stirling Castle.

The final objective of the Ninth for the first day extended from the southern end of Polygone de Zonnebeke to a point about 500 yards south of Broodseinde. Before this line was reached a series of ridges had to be secured, Frezenberg, Anzac, and Glasgow Spur. Batteries of artillery were to move forward as each height was taken, so that an effective barrage might be maintained throughout the advance. The assailing troops were the 28th Brigade on the right and the 26th on the left, the former with the “Rifles” and the Royal Scots Fusiliers in line, and the latter with the Seaforths and Black Watch[123]; the Newfoundlanders and Camerons were in reserve. Lieut.-Colonel Lumsden of the “Rifles” was ill and had a very high temperature on the eve of the battle, but this officer, who had never missed an action since he crossed to France with the Division in 1915, refused to go sick. The 27th Brigade was to follow in support, and its rôle was to depend on the situation at the close of the day. Each brigade had a company of the Ninth Machine-Gun Battalion attached to it, the remaining company being in divisional reserve. Zero was at 5.25 A.M.

A big victory was expected and with good reason. Defeats in the south had caused the enemy to thin the garrison in front of Ypres, but the nature of the ground with frequent “Pill-boxes” and scattered belts of wire was likely to retard our advance. The Germans who opposed us were the 11th and 12th Bavarian and the 10th Saxon Divisions; they were alert but nervous, and numerous low flying aircraft carried out reconnaissances over our front system. There was a regrettable mishap on the 26th. A stray shell hit the H.Q. of the Camerons; Lieut.-Colonel Inglis was wounded, and Major Cameron, Captain Fraser, the adjutant, and six others of Battalion H.Q. were killed. Lieut.-Colonel A. W. Angus then joined the Division, and was sent up to command the Camerons. Since the 9th April 1917 our men had never been in better spirit, and when the troops assembled for the attack on the night of the 27th/28th September, they were full of confidence.