CHAPTER VII

THE BUTTE DE WARLENCOURT

OCTOBER 1916

After being withdrawn from the battle, the Division was allowed a reasonable interval in which to heal its wounds. The last few days in the Somme area brought a much-appreciated rest. All Picardy glowed under a mellow sun, and in the glorious summer weather it was no hardship to sleep in bivouacs. The forenoons were given over to training and the replacement of kit; the “Q” Branches and the Ordnance Staffs were kept busy making good the losses in equipment and material. In the broad lagoons of the Somme near Bray were magnificent bathing-places, to which the men were taken every day, and here there was an element of danger, for the current was strong, and a swimmer usually emerged from the river about a hundred yards from the spot at which he had entered.

Small drafts began to arrive to fill up gaps; all battalions were very weak in officers, and a company that had more than two was decidedly well off. Fortunately most of the commanding officers had escaped. In the 26th Brigade there were several changes; Lieut.-Colonel Tweedie of the Argylls had been wounded, and, though he remained at duty for some time, he was obliged finally to enter hospital, and he was succeeded by Lieut.-Colonel Kennedy of the Seaforths on the 3rd August. Lieut.-Colonel R. Horn was appointed C.O. of the Seaforths, and Lieut.-Colonel H. R. Brown of the Camerons. In the 27th Brigade the command of the 12th Royal Scots passed to Lieut.-Colonel H. N. S. Fargus on the 23rd July. Most of the changes occurred in the South African Brigade. The 2nd South African Infantry had lost all its senior officers, and Major Heal of the 1st assumed command until he was relieved at the end of August 1916 by Lieut.-Colonel Christian from England. Major D. M. MacLeod of the South African Scottish was wounded on the 17th July, and his place was taken by Major D. R. Hunt. Lieut.-Colonel Thackeray had been wounded, but happily not seriously enough to cause his removal to hospital.

On the 23rd July the Division left the Somme district, and moved to the IX. Corps area, with D.H.Q. at Pont Remy. Most of this long journey was performed on foot under a broiling sun and over dusty roads, so that the march was extremely fatiguing. Two days later the Ninth was transferred to the IV. Corps[50] of the First Army,[51] and this move brought it into the centre of industrial France. For a few days units were concentrated in the large mining town of Bruay, where an enjoyable time was spent. The men had luxurious hot-spray baths at the mines, and changes of clothing; there were also numerous first-rate concerts and other entertainments, where leisure could be passed easily and agreeably. In a short time, however, units were sent out to country billets in the neighbourhood, where greater facilities for training were available. The 27th Brigade was particularly fortunate, for its area included a deep quarry full of water near Beugin, where all could indulge in bathing and swimming.

The Division, though no unit was yet up to strength, had almost recovered from its severe handling, when the 26th Brigade took over the trenches on the Vimy Ridge from the Thirty-seventh Division on the evening of the 12th August. Two nights later, the 27th Brigade occupied the line on the left of the 26th. D.H.Q. were established at Camblain L’Abbé, where they remained during the period the Ninth was at Vimy Ridge. The entire country in the divisional area was hilly and undulating, the most prominent feature being the Vimy Ridge, running north and south. It had been the scene of ghastly fighting in the early summer of 1915, and though the German lines lay along the crest of the ridge, our men gleaned some idea of the splendid fighting qualities that had carried their brave ally through the demolished villages of Carency and Souchez, and far up the western slopes. The best blood of France had watered the whole area, and it was with great reluctance that the French handed over the sector to the British. One of the communication trenches had been named after a famous regiment that had then played a proud and honourable part in the attack, and, when rumours were afloat that the Germans had retaken the ridge, some men of that regiment visited the area to ascertain the position. They were undeniably cheered and relieved to learn that the rumours were false, and that their British comrades kept a firm hold on all that had been entrusted to them.

The line taken over was divided into the Berthonval sector on the right, and the Carency sector on the left. In the former, the opposing trenches lay far apart—at no point being closer than 70 yards—except for saps; in the latter, those on the far left were almost touching each other, and a man could throw a bomb into the enemy’s trench without difficulty. The whole front was fringed with craters, which on the left were so numerous that they practically merged into one another. Where the line cut them were the most critical posts; here were the gates for an enterprising foe eager to secure prisoners. The trenches were not too salubrious, since many of the French dead had been buried in their walls or floor, and the usual work had to be done nightly and daily by infantry, sappers, and pioneers to make them substantial. In one part the sand-bags, full of rough pieces of chalk, had been thrown up in such haphazard fashion that the parapets appeared likely to collapse if a man sneezed. However, after a few weeks’ hard toil there was a marked improvement. From our position a magnificent view extended towards the north, and it was significant of the tendency of the British Army at this time to work in water-tight compartments, that the division on the left never sent observers to our lines, and yet from there the best observation could be had.

[Illustration: ABLAIN ST. NAZAIRE, NOTRE DAME AND VIMY RIDGE]

Though all seemed to live on the edge of acute suspense because of the constant mining carried on by both sides, the stay at the Vimy was singularly uneventful. The approaches to the line were in very good order, and reliefs were carried out in daylight. A communication trench, cut right through the valley, emerged on the western slopes of the ridge out of sight of the enemy. Its official name was Cabaret Rouge, but “The Never-ending Road,” the title given to it by the men, was a better description, for it took one over two hours to traverse it from end to end. As there was practically no shelling of the communication trenches and back roads, the transport and carrying parties had a fairly easy and secure time.

Matters livened up in the sector after the Divisional Artillery[52] had registered, but the enemy appeared to be husbanding his ammunition, and contented himself with trench-mortar bombardments. He stuck to fixed periods. It was remarked that one could wander about peacefully in the sector during the day except between the hours of 2 and 4 P.M.—the time of the trench-mortar interlude. The type used was the “rum-jar”—a huge, unwieldy shell that was thrown high into the air—and a man was absolutely safe if he used his eyes and wits. Sentries with whistles kept a lookout, and when a mortar was on the way a whistle-blast gave warning. On such occasions it was easy to distinguish the newcomers from the old hands. On hearing the blast the latter placidly looked up, ascertained where the mortar was likely to land, and acted accordingly; but the former stampeded in a panic for any sort of shelter, content so long as it would cover their heads. After a few experiences, however, most men learned to trust to their eyes and their judgment; for no dug-out, unless it was exceptionally deep, was proof against a trench mortar. A shorter “strafe” took place in the evenings, between six and seven. The officers of one mess, compelled to have dinner in the open, owing to lack of accommodation, often had that meal interrupted, and it was not an uncommon sight to see them leave a course and rush for safety.

The disagreeable element during this period was furnished by the weather. From the end of August scarcely a day passed without much rain, and thus there was the usual constant struggle to keep the trenches from being flooded. There was a grave suspicion, too, that enemy mines were perilously close to our parapet. One curious incident happened. At 10.20 A.M. on the 19th August, the enemy exploded a small mine on the front of the 27th Brigade. Three sappers of the 90th Field Coy. were thrown into the crater caused by the explosion, two being killed, and one buried up to the neck in the débris. Some of the Germans were also buried, and an informal truce was observed while the stretcher-bearers of both sides dug out their comrades. The G.O.C., who was going round the line at the time, ran a narrow escape, as he had just passed the area affected by the explosion. There were however more alarms than events, and casualties were exceptionally low. The customary routine for a battalion was twelve days in the front system, six in brigade reserve, and six in billets in divisional reserve, when a good deal of training could be carried on. While the South Africans were at Frevillers on the 11th August, H.M. the King passed through the village, and dismounting from his car, walked along their ranks.

Apart from trench mortars, the chief thrills were provided by sniping and raids. The prince of snipers dwelt in the Carency sector, and was affectionately known amongst the men as “Cuthbert.” He was a deadly shot, and destroyed an enormous number of our periscopes. No man dared show a finger when Cuthbert was on duty; he was never known to miss, so naturally he was the chief object of our snipers’ efforts. Numerous posts were erected for his benefit, but no sooner were they ready than Cuthbert sent a few bullets through the loopholes. At last one was constructed that escaped his notice. Too much success had made him careless; he rose from his lair and stretched his arms. That was sufficient. With his disappearance our snipers had it all their own way.

The raids engineered in this sector met with fair success. On two occasions parties of the 12th Royal Scots and of the “Rifles” penetrated the hostile lines but failed to secure prisoners; the former had the satisfaction of killing a few Germans, but the latter found the trenches deserted by the garrison. The biggest capture of prisoners was made by the South Africans. At 4 A.M. on the 14th September, 2 officers and 60 men of the 2nd South African Infantry entered the enemy’s trenches under cover of an artillery barrage; they killed at least 12 and brought back 5 prisoners. The only casualties were 2 wounded, one of whom unfortunately had to be left in the German lines. On the evening of the 16th September a successful raid was carried out by the Black Watch and Camerons, and on this occasion the Highlanders satisfied the desire of the G.O.C. for an identification by bringing back a prisoner, but at least 50 had fallen victim to their blood-lust. This last raid was carried out under a Stokes barrage, so terrific that dozens of the enemy were killed, and the remainder paralysed with fright. All the Stokes Guns in the Division had been collected for the operation, and in forty-five minutes they fired 9000 shells, which completely obliterated the opposing front trenches. At one time the 26th Brigade was marked out for something more ambitious than a raid; for the First Army desired to push the enemy off the crest before winter set in, but the scheme was postponed, possibly because it would have used up troops that were needed for the Somme.

On leaving the Vimy Ridge on the 25th September the Division, after moving first to a training area under the Third Army, joined the III. Corps[53] of the Fourth Army, and on the 9th October the 26th and South African Brigades relieved the Forty-seventh Division in the line near Eaucourt L’Abbaye. The move was made chiefly by route march over wretched roads and in vile weather, but for a portion of the distance buses were available. The 27th Brigade had a trying experience. At 8 A.M. on a chill October morning, all the men were lined up on a road near Barly, waiting for the buses, which did not arrive until 3 o’clock in the afternoon, with the result that units reached the terminus in inky darkness, and some of them had then to march a long distance to their billets.

The Lewis Gunners had a most unenviable time. Battalions had now been supplied with 10 guns, each with its mounting and 44 magazines, each of which contained 49 cartridges. There were also bags with spare parts, gloves for firing the guns when they were hot, jackets[54] for carrying them, and hyposcopes, so that the gun could be fired without the firer being seen. For the carriage of all this material hand-carts had been provided in June, but they proved utterly useless except on good roads, and they imposed an intolerable strain on the men who pulled them. All the units altered these carts so that they could be drawn by mules, but even so they were unsatisfactory and broke down continually. When the Somme was reached, so was the limit of endurance. The whole drainage system of the country had been smashed by months of shelling, and the roads, poor at their best, seemed to have no bottom; the ruins of whole villages were thrown into them, but even that never appeared to make them any firmer. The battalions of the 27th Brigade will never forget the march from Lavièville to Mametz Wood. It was plain sailing as far as the vicinity of Fricourt Wood. At this point the path lay along the eastern edge of the wood, but the carts and mules sank deep in mud, and had to be hauled out and dragged along by the sweating and blasphemous teams. This harassing process continued until the carts were eventually parked in the transport lines on a tableland on the east side of Mametz Wood. One unit found the zigzag path to this tableland completely blocked by an artillery horse which had fallen and could not be persuaded to rise. The men were tired and hungry and not relishing the prospect of a lengthy wait, they hauled the carts and mules one by one up the face of a precipice and so reached the transport lines.

In other theatres the outstanding event was the entry of Roumania on the 27th August as a belligerent on the side of the Entente. This event, which was greeted with boisterous and undignified jubilation in France and Britain, was regarded as a decisive blow to the Central European Powers, but the tribulation that the immediate future brought upon Roumania seemed to indicate that an exaggerated estimate had been placed on its worth and services. The grievances of the Roumanians in Transylvania and Hungary, the ostensible cause of war, led logically to an invasion of the former province; and this campaign would have had a greater effect on the war than the narrow aims of Italy, had it not been for the gross ineptitude and short-sighted selfishness of Russia, whose overtures and representations had the most weight in bringing the little Balkan state into the field.

In 1915 Russia had been precluded from invading Bulgaria by the neutrality of Roumania, whose territory interposed an obstacle and whose declaration of war now gave her an opportunity of turning the situation in the Balkans in favour of the Entente. But Roumania was allowed to prosecute her campaign single-handed, and after a few initial successes had to meet powerful and well-equipped German forces under Von Falkenhayn and Von Mackensen. The ability of Germany to send a strong army to the Balkans was a disagreeable surprise to the Western Allies, and showed that our offensive on the Somme was not so menacing as official bulletins and press accounts had led us to believe, and that our calculations of German losses were probably greatly over-estimated. The effect of this intervention soon made itself felt; the Roumanians, opposed and outnumbered, were compelled to fall back, but their resistance was neither discreditable nor negligible, and belated help from Russia, if generously given and seriously intended, would have endangered the flanks of Von Falkenhayn and perhaps have exercised a decisive influence on the war. But only the most grudging and limited support was given, and though an offensive from Salonica under General Sarrail detained three Bulgarian divisions and eventually led to the recapture of Monastir, the Roumanians were pressed back by the 10th October to the borders of Moldavia.

More than two months had elapsed since the Division fought at Longueval, and in this period continuous hammering had brought the British forces far into the enemy’s territory. The greater part of the ridge from Thiepval to Combles was now in our hands, and the Germans had been pushed back to their fourth system of defences. With good weather the speedy fall of Bapaume might be reckoned on. On the front taken over by us, the principal feature was the Butte de Warlencourt, a mound of chalk about 50 feet high, which stood at the far end of the spur that ran from the main ridge through Flers, and was flanked by the tree-lined Albert-Bapaume road. North-east of this the ground sloped into a depression, which led into the valley of the Ancre, and beyond it lay a spur running from the road towards Morval, on which the enemy had his fourth position.

Behind the British front line lay the vast waste of wilderness created by three months of savage warfare. Its general colour scheme was a dull uniform grey, which changed to a dingy yellow when the sun shone. The whole area was covered with the débris of battle and of camps, but worst of all, from Mametz Wood to the front line were scattered fragments of corpses and a heavy fetid odour pervaded the atmosphere. The work of burying the dead was a slow process and even in Mametz Wood, which had been in our hands for two months, the 27th Brigade found a number of British and German dead still uninterred. The entire area was intersected by rutted roads, which even in fine weather could barely stand the stupendous amount of traffic that passed over them in a never-ending stream. Every available man of the 27th Brigade, which was in divisional reserve, worked daily repairing them, but all the labour served only to keep them passably decent, and when the weather broke down, almost superhuman efforts were required to keep them from collapsing altogether.

The line held by the 26th Brigade on the right, and the South Africans on the left, lay to the north of the Abbey of Eaucourt. On the 7th October the Forty-seventh Division had made an unsuccessful attack, but had established posts in front of its line. The Ninth joined up these posts and formed them into a new front line and a starting-point for fresh operations. These were notified on the 9th October, and the chief object of the attack, which was entrusted to the Ninth and Thirtieth Divisions, was to clear the Butte de Warlencourt. The objectives of the Ninth were two; first, Snag and Tail Trenches, and second, the trench lying to the far side of the Butte de Warlencourt, including the mound itself. Zero was fixed for 2.50 P.M., and the attack was to be covered by a creeping H.E. barrage, moving at the rate of 50 yards a minute.[55] The left flank was to be covered by a smoke-screen, which the Fifteenth Division was to put down between Le Sars and Warlencourt. To deceive the foe, a “Chinese Attack”[56] was arranged for the 11th October.

[Illustration: BUTTE DE WARLENCOURT]

Brig.-General Ritchie’s plan was to attack with the 7th Seaforths, supported by two companies of the Argylls and a section of the 26th L.T.M.B. The former, with two companies in line, each on a two-platoon front, was to advance in four waves. The assault was to be supported by Vickers Guns; one section was to follow the Seaforths, another the Argylls, and a third was to garrison the original front and support lines, the remaining section being in reserve. The arrangements of Brig.-General Lukin were on similar lines. The assault was to be made by the 2nd South African Infantry, supported by the South African Scottish. Each battalion was to form up in four waves, with two waves of carriers. On the afternoon of the 11th, the “Chinese Attack” caused several hostile machine-guns to unmask their positions and these were reported to the artillery.

Both brigades were formed up early in the afternoon of the 12th October, apparently without arousing the enemy’s suspicion. In a drizzle of rain the attack was launched. One minute after zero the enemy[57] replied with a heavy barrage, which cut all the telephone wires and broke off communication between Brigade H.Q. and the assaulting battalions. From that moment obscurity reigned, and for a long time the only reports received by the Division came from the Artillery and the Royal Flying Corps. At the early hour of 2.34 P.M. the former announced that our men had failed to reach the first objective, but a rumour at 3.20 P.M. that some of our men had been seen on the Butte and to the right of it raised hopes that the assailants had overcome their difficulties. Whatever truth there was in that report, it was certain at 8.50 P.M. that the attack on the front both of the Ninth and Thirtieth Divisions had failed, though it was not till later that definite information was received.

At the very start the Seaforths had suffered some casualties by occasional shells from our own guns, which fell into the assembly trenches, and when the barrage became intensive the number of “short” shells increased. The difficulties in the way of artillery observation were immense and as there were many scratches of trenches that were not marked on the map, it was not surprising that during the various actions fought near the Butte the infantry frequently complained that they were being shelled by their own artillery.[58] The first objective lay several hundreds of yards from our front line, and the ground, which rose from our position in a gentle slope, formed a magnificent field of fire for rifles and machine-guns. The leading waves of the Seaforths advanced in perfect order, but they were swept away by a blast of lead. The supporting companies of the Argylls became involved in the disaster and a mixed party of Argylls and Seaforths dug in on a line about 150 yards in front of our original line. The others struggled back to their own trenches in the course of the evening. The new line was held and strengthened, and the front trenches were taken over by the Argylls. The supporting sections from the machine-gun company and the L.T.M.B. were both knocked out by the enemy’s barrage before they could leave the trenches.

A similar series of misfortunes fell to the lot of the South Africans. The attack simply melted away before the enemy’s scathing fire and the South Africans were seriously disorganised. Not until the morning of the 13th was the situation fully cleared up, when it was discovered that a party of 60 with 2 officers had dug in close to Snag Trench. It was impossible to reach this force during daylight, but it was safely withdrawn under cover of darkness on the night of the 13th October.

The attack broke down, because the artillery had failed to demolish the enemy’s trenches and machine-guns; the barrage, though heavy, was inaccurate, as was proved by the air photographs received after the action. The whole operation was a rush, and was carried out in spite of a strong protest by General Furse to the Corps and Army Commanders. Since it was important that we should secure the Bapaume Ridge before winter set in, he urged that a premature attack which ended in failure would waste much more time than would be expended in preparations to insure success, and he suggested that the attack should be postponed for twenty-four or forty-eight hours to give his men the chance of really localising the enemy by reconnaissance, in order that the gunners might have no doubt whatever as to the position of our infantry and that of the enemy.

No further operation on a big scale took place until the 18th October. The intervening period was blessed with good weather, and more advanced positions were dug to form a new starting-point. In front of the South African lines, and on the left of the Snag Trench, was a small mound, called the Pimple, which was believed to be occupied by the enemy, as it appeared to be the key to the trench. Brig.-General Lukin was instructed to send out a strong patrol to seize this point, and on the night of the 13th October a party of the 3rd South African Infantry went out and reconnoitred it. It found the Pimple unoccupied, but returned so late that there was no time before dawn to send out a force to garrison it. However, on the evening of the 14th October, a strong force under Captain L. F. Sprenger, who later was wounded, went out and captured it. No serious endeavour was made to dispute our possession of the Pimple, but when the South Africans moved along from it and attempted to expel the enemy from the junction of Snag and Tail Trenches, which was known as the Nose, they were driven back by machine-gun fire. Later on in the evening the Germans tried in vain to recapture the Pimple, which was further strengthened by being linked up with the South African lines. The position, commanding an admirable view right up to the Butte, formed an ideal place for machine-guns and from it numerous losses were inflicted on enemy working-parties.

Orders for the operation on the 18th October were received from the Corps on the 14th, but the hope of taking the Butte at a stride was abandoned and the objective became the Snag Trench. On the right the attack was to be carried on by the Thirtieth Division. General Furse again entrusted the operation to the 26th and South African Brigades. The Camerons, with four companies in line, each on a platoon front, were to lead the 26th Brigade attack, supported by a company of the 8th Black Watch and a section of the machine-gun company. The Stokes mortars were to co-operate with the artillery in barraging the enemy’s front line. On the left front the leading battalion was the 1st South African Infantry, with three companies in line, each on a platoon front, the fourth being in support, and a company of the 3rd South African Infantry in reserve. The hour of zero was 3.40 A.M.

By this date the fine weather had broken down and the attack began in a deluge of rain. Early information was received from the Camerons that they had reached their objective, but great uncertainty prevailed for a time as to the fate of the South Africans. It soon became known that the left half of their attack had been repulsed, but no news came about the right half. At 9.30 A.M. it was learned that a few men of the right company of the 1st South African Infantry had joined hands with the Camerons, who were in touch with a battalion of the Thirtieth Division on the right. Elsewhere the assault had failed.

The Camerons, carrying out their part with great dash, kept close to the barrage and entered the German trench as soon as it lifted. Except for some machine-gun fire from the left, resistance was slight and the garrison of the trench fled precipitately to the Gird Line. Blocks were immediately constructed on the right and left and held by bombers. About fifteen minutes after the capture, the enemy counter-attacked with bombs and forced his way in on the right, but the Camerons, immediately retaliating, killed a large number of the assailants and drove the remainder off in confusion. During this action a Stokes Gun team rendered great assistance by putting down a barrage on the Germans.[59] On the left the Camerons got into touch with a Lewis Gun team of the 1st South African Infantry, but could obtain no information concerning the rest of the battalion. In the afternoon about 300 Saxons were seen to be massing as if for a counter-attack. At once the S.O.S. was sent up and the men in field-grey, peppered with bullets and shell-fire, broke up in disorder and scrambled for shelter. Early in the evening, about 5.30 P.M., the enemy made still another attempt. A party of them left the Gird Trench and, moving round to the left flank, endeavoured to expel the Camerons by a bombing attack, but the garrison had received due warning and easily checked the onset with a Lewis Gun. During the night a company of the 9th Seaforths arrived and dug a communication trench from the old front line to Snag Trench.

The Lewis Gun detachment of the South Africans on the left of the Camerons proved to be the only section of the brigade that secured the objective. The company on the left was held up by wire and came under a withering machine-gun fire. All the officers having been killed or wounded, the survivors were drawn back to their original line. The fate of the other two companies was wrapped in obscurity, and the bare fact is that, with the exception of the Lewis Gun post and a few wounded, none of them ever returned. A wounded South African reported that his comrades got into the German front trench, which was full of dead and wounded, and it is probable that they reached their objective, but, failing to recognise it as the trench had been completely wrecked, had pushed on, only to perish through machine-gun fire from the Butte.[60] A few stragglers made their way back later in the day, bringing with them 19 prisoners.

On learning what had occurred, General Furse sent instructions for another attack to be delivered at 5.45 P.M. The key of the German position was the Nose, which was to be bombarded. The South Africans were ordered to secure it and to establish a block about 500 yards up the Tail, and as the Camerons had already extended their line westwards they were in a position to assist the attack. Owing to continuous heavy rain conditions were appalling. All firmness had been soaked out of the ground, which became a sea of pewter-grey ooze, and even the lightly-equipped runners sank with each step beyond the knees in mud and took fully four hours to struggle over 1000 yards. The attack was entrusted to Lieut.-Colonel Dawson. He arranged for the fourth company of his own battalion to attack from the Pimple, while a company of the 3rd South African Infantry was to enter Snag Trench east of the Nose and attack westwards. The assault from the Pimple was made with bombs, but the trench leading to the Nose dipped into a hollow which was commanded by machine-guns from it. Beyond this point all advance was barred to the assailants. The second party entered Snag Trench without difficulty and reached a point within 25 yards of the Nose, but here the Germans were strongly posted with three machine-guns in action and the advance came to a halt. The South Africans then withdrew to their original trenches, but later were ordered to reoccupy the Snag. This was done early on the morning of the 19th and a block was established on the side of the Nose.

Thus in spite of considerable progress the Division had been unable to complete the whole of its job. The 26th Brigade had done magnificently, but the Nose had defied all the strenuous efforts of the South Africans, whose failure had been due to no lack of dash or determination but solely to the dreadful conditions. Never did the Division fight on a more grisly battlefield. The long muddy slope up to the Butte was thickly strewn with British and German dead, and in the more forward trenches corpses of all units lay sprawling, wedged in by the slime that coated them. In the open near the Snag, a long line of men of the London Division, each on his face, was grim evidence of a gallant charge and the accuracy of the enemy’s machine-gun fire. Here and there a body arrested attention by the peculiar contortion of its attitude and served as a landmark to guide runners on their way. The air was rank with the odour of death. To eye, ear, and nose the whole place was repellant and it required extraordinary strength of will even to appear cheerful amid such ghastly surroundings.

For ten days the Highland and South African Brigades had held the line and on the 18th October the G.O.C. instructed the 27th to take over the whole position on the night of the 19th. Before the relief commenced the mud-covered slope was again the scene of furious and bitter encounters. Dawn ushered in a miserable day with torrents of rain lashing down, and at 5.30 A.M. the Germans made a terrific assault, using flammenwerfer. The Black Watch,[61] who had relieved the Camerons during the night, met them in a desperate conflict. The only weapons fit for use were bombs; rifles and machine-guns were clogged with mud and could not be fired. The right company easily held its own and repulsed the invaders. The greatest danger came from the left, for on that flank the flammenwerfer caused much havoc amongst the South Africans, most of whom were driven out of Snag Trench, though a few moved eastwards and joined in with the Highlanders. At their backs followed German bombers who inflicted heavy casualties on the crowded troops, but a vigorous counter-attack by men of the “red hackle” stopped the assailants and forced them back for 40 yards. Captain Taylor of “B” Company hurried up from the support trench to the front line, and grasping the situation made arrangements for an attack. Bombing parties were organised and bombs brought up. Fortunately 2nd Lieut. Gibson of the L.T.M.B. had one Stokes Gun in good working order, and under its barrage the Black Watch regained all their trenches and had even penetrated into the South African sector by noon. The whole of the defences were then reorganised, but the enemy did not venture again to tackle the Black Watch.

The South Africans had been expelled from the Snag Trench by flammenwerfer, which had inflicted most dreadful wounds. But the Germans had not escaped without scathe; for in the operation they exposed themselves to the machine-guns at the Pimple, which quickly thinned out their ranks. After they were compelled by the Black Watch to retire many took refuge near the Nose, but this point was heavily bombarded by our gunners, and large numbers leaving the trench darted in the direction of the Butte. Few of them reached it; they were mowed down by the Vickers and Lewis Gun fire of the Pimple garrison, commanded by Major Ormiston. Early in the afternoon the South Africans sent forward a party to reoccupy the Snag and if possible to secure the Nose. The first part of the scheme was easily accomplished, but the tenacious machine-gunners ensconced in the latter stopped all further progress. For some inscrutable reason the wildest reports were sent back to D.H.Q. that the Nose had been taken and that if only more bombs could be sent up the Butte could be captured without difficulty. Such fallacious reports are extremely dangerous; they may lead to the useless sacrifice of many lives. When the relief of the South Africans began, General Furse was under the impression that the Nose had been taken and he instructed the 27th Brigade to exploit the success.

The relief on the night of the 19th October will never be forgotten by any officer or man of the Ninth who took part in it. In the forenoon under a soaking rain the units of the 27th Brigade marched first to High Wood, and even there a man sank up to his ankles in mud. The 6th K.O.S.B. and the 12th Royal Scots who were to take over the left and the right fronts had a terrible time. The trial came as soon as the communication trenches were entered. There seemed to be absolutely no bottom in them and the men struggled along waist-deep in mud. Darkness had fallen when they reached the trenches near Eaucourt L’Abbaye and an intense hostile barrage added to the horror. With devilish accuracy the shells pitched near the communication trenches and many plunged right into them. Unspeakable was the fate of any man who was badly wounded that night; he sank below the mire and the men in the rear pressed on all unconscious that the welcome firmness, which momentarily sustained them, was the body of a comrade. Progress could be made only with the greatest exhaustion; a yard seemed a mile. Every now and then the men had to halt for a brief space, resting their elbows on the sides of the trench to prevent their whole bodies being engulfed in the mud; without such support it was fatal to stand still. It was not surprising that the relief was not complete until 6 A.M. on the 20th October.

Many horrible tales were told about that relief, but no invention could beggar the reality. Men with rifles and haversacks could scarcely struggle on, but their lot was easy compared with that of Vickers and Lewis Gun teams, whose guns had to be carried up and also ammunition[62] for them. The magazines for the Lewis Guns were taken in buckets, like nosebags, each holding four. The usual weight for a man was two buckets, but that was a Herculean load on such a night. Tales of distress reached the battalion H.Q. and parties with ropes and spades set out to rescue stranded men. One Lewis gunner of the 6th K.O.S.B. was so firmly embedded beyond the waist in mud that when he was finally extricated with ropes both his ankles were broken. The agonies endured by the Highlanders and South Africans were indescribable. Parties of worn-out men coming down from the front line threw themselves into any shell-hole, too tired to care what happened to them, and it was a kind cruelty that drove them to their feet and forced them on to some safer place. Many Highlanders discarded their kilts as being too heavy, but indeed so glutinous was the abundant mud that it was difficult to tell whether a man wore a kilt or not. Some of the Black Watch dropped down exhausted at the door of a dressing-station near High Wood, and their tunics and equipment could not be removed in the ordinary way, but had to be hacked off them before they could be revived.

After their purgatorial march the men of the 27th Brigade were unfit to exploit any success, but the situation did not allow of any such attempt as the 6th K.O.S.B. found when they reached the front line. The enemy still held the Nose, and this was immediately reported by Lieut.-Colonel Connell to Brig.-General Scrase-Dickins, who immediately made arrangements for an attack to be delivered at 4 P.M. Until that time the Tail and the Nose were to be bombarded and at zero the 6th K.O.S.B. were to advance under cover of a barrage, which was to lift 50 yards every time the infantry fired a green light. The attack was to be from Snag Trench by bombing parties, but in the event of this being checked another was to be delivered across the open from the east by a support company an hour later. Lieut.-Colonel Connell supplemented these instructions by ordering the company at the Pimple to be ready to take advantage of these assaults. Both attacks from the east were repulsed by the machine-guns at the Nose. During these actions the garrison at the Pimple observing groups of the enemy retiring from the Tail towards the Butte, inflicted severe losses with machine-gun fire. At the same time, 2nd Lieut. Johnson and a few men rushed across the open, drove out the enemy and occupied the Nose. But the company commander, thinking that his men were too few to hold the whole trench from the Pimple to the Nose, evacuated the position. On hearing this, Brig.-General Scrase-Dickins ordered the 11th Royal Scots in support to send a company to retake the Nose and establish a post about 500 yards up the Tail, but before it arrived the Nose was reoccupied by the 6th K.O.S.B. Under the direction of Lieut.-Colonel Connell, who had gone to the Pimple on learning of the evacuation, a party of the K.O.S.B. retook the position and joined up with the company in Snag Trench. Later the company of the 11th Royal Scots arrived and passed up the Tail, where it established a post.

Thus on the night of the 20th October all the objectives of the attack of the 18th were secured. Till the evening of the 24th October the Division held the line and was busy strengthening its position and digging new assembly trenches for an attack on the Butte. It was the intention of the Corps to employ the Ninth in a battle that was arranged for the 25th October. On General Furse’s representations this arrangement was cancelled and the Division was relieved late on the 24th.[63] Another engagement was indeed beyond the capacity of the men. Though casualties were not so high, the nerve-strain and fatigue were even greater than in July. More men were lost from illness and exposure than from wounds and death, and the number of cases of trench feet was exceptionally large. Many men on being brought back from the mud of the line took off their boots to rub their feet, which swelled to such an extent that they could not be inserted in the boot again.

The work of the R.A.M.C., especially from the 18th October onwards, was evilly affected by the conditions. A man too seriously wounded to walk was in a piteous plight; he had to wait for several hours until men were available to carry him to a dressing-station. The usual number of men for a stretcher is two, but eight were scarcely sufficient at the Butte de Warlencourt. It was perhaps inevitable that in a place over which the tide of battle ebbed and flowed for days and nights, a number of wounded should have been missed. For several days after the Ninth took over the line not a few wounded men of the London Division, the ghastly aftermath of an unsuccessful attack, were brought in by patrols. Every man who could be spared was sent to help the R.A.M.C. and the utmost efforts were made by the Division to ensure that no wounded man was overlooked.

The action at the Butte de Warlencourt was the most dismal of all the operations carried out by the Division, but it was ennobled by the great qualities of endurance and heroism displayed by all who had a share in it. In that waste of mud and water the ground captured, though small in extent, represented no mean achievement. The Butte remained impregnable, guarded by slime and weather, and it was not till the enemy voluntarily evacuated the place that it was entered and held by British troops. It may be questionable if the ground gained was worth the cost, but the mud had proved a more powerful ally of the adversary than had been expected.