CHAPTER VI

LONGUEVAL AND DELVILLE WOOD

JULY 1916

Not the least anxious part of the forthcoming battle was the assembly of the troops during the night of the 13th/14th July, for it was an audacious enterprise to form up in the darkness a large body of men within easy distance of the German lines, since the least suspicion of the manœuvre by the enemy was bound to lead to a dreadful catastrophe. The deepest silence was essential, and the operation was partly cloaked by the artillery, which throughout the night bombarded the village and the wood. The assembly was a great triumph of organisation for the Staff of the two brigades, and a proof of the high discipline of the men. The arrangements of the brigades differed slightly, but were equally successful in their results.

The 26th Brigade assembled on the northern slopes of Caterpillar Valley, with its left resting on the path leading from Montauban to Longueval. After the covering party, consisting of four platoons with two Lewis Guns, had taken post on the crest of the plateau, the brigade major, Major Drew, with the adjutants of the Black Watch and Argylls and forty markers, went out to mark off the ground. The plan was to work from the left of each battalion. The left markers of the Black Watch moved up the Bernafay-Longueval road, and the left of the Argylls up the Montauban-Longueval path. Sixteen markers of the former, commencing from the rear, were posted in pairs at 70 yards’ distance along the first of these roads. When this was accomplished, the front couple had reached a point about 500 yards from the enemy’s front line. As each pair was posted, one man moved off at right angles with a tape about 150 yards long, and thus fixed the right of his wave or platoon. In the same fashion those of the Argylls were placed in position. Then at 12.25 A.M. the battalions, by companies in single file, moved out to line up on the markers, and as each platoon reached its left marker it wheeled to the right and fixed bayonets. The assembly of the brigade was effected without sound or hitch by 3 A.M. While the markers were being posted there was considerable shelling of the assembly area, but fortunately it died down before the arrival of the battalions. Owing to shelling, however, and sniping from Trones Wood it was found necessary slightly to contract the right of the Black Watch.

[Illustration: DELVILLE WOOD]

The assembly area of the 27th Brigade was on the immediate left of that of the 26th. About 10 P.M. the platoon that formed the covering party pushed forward to the northern slopes of Caterpillar Valley, and an hour later Major Teacher, the brigade major, with one officer and two N.C.Os. of the 90th Field Coy. R.E. moved out to place the tapes for the battalions. In this case the plan was to work from the centre. On a compass-bearing, previously taken by Major Teacher, the first tape, 50 yards long, was laid, and others were placed in prolongation of the first. When completed the centre tape extended to a distance of 1000 yards, the work having taken forty-five minutes. Then the front tape was laid off at right angles, the flanks of each battalion being thus fixed. This was checked by an officer from each of the attacking battalions, who paced for 1000 yards along the roads that marked the flanks of the brigade. When the tapes were in position, the right and left markers for each unit were posted.

The battalions assembled in the southern portion of the valley at 12.30 A.M., each being in mass, in single rank, on a front of 225 yards. At 1.45 A.M. the 11th Royal Scots moved along the centre tape to their final position, and were followed by the 9th Scottish Rifles and the 12th Royal Scots. Though there was intermittent shelling, there were only five casualties, but these included Lieut.-Colonel H. L. Budge of the 12th Royal Scots, who was killed by a shell fragment as his battalion was passing through the west side of Montauban; the command of the battalion was then taken over by Captain J. E. MacPherson. The assembly was completed at 2.45 A.M.

The Division, by the satisfactory conclusion of this difficult operation deserved all the high praise[44] that it received from the G.O.C. and General Congreve.

At 3.20 A.M., when the light was just sufficient for one to distinguish friend from foe, the first barrage opened, and the leading waves moved as close to it as they could safely go. Five minutes later, on the hour of zero, the whole line moved forward to the attack.

On the right, Brig.-General Ritchie’s men made on the whole very satisfactory progress. Most trouble was experienced by the Black Watch, whose right company encountered a stubborn resistance from a machine-gun nest on the south-east corner of Longueval. This post was covered by the fire of two field-guns in the south-west corner of Delville Wood, which were later withdrawn, and owing to the confined space in which they had to manœuvre the Black Watch were unable to get to grips with the garrison of the post, which held out until late in the afternoon. With this exception the objectives allotted to the battalion were taken by 10 A.M. At one time the leading men took up a position along Buchanan Street, a ride branching off Princes Street at right angles to the south of the wood, but this line could not be maintained as the left flank was in the air. At noon the line held by the battalion ran from the main square of the village north of the church and then south-east to within 100 yards of the west corner of South Street, the path skirting the southern edge of Delville Wood. Patrols were immediately pushed forward, but during the afternoon stiff resistance was experienced, and the patrols became standing picquets on the edge of the wood.

The Argylls, on the left of the Black Watch, met with complete success. The leading companies kept close to the barrage, leaving the supporting companies to clear the enemy’s front trenches. The 11th Royal Scots on the left being delayed by uncut wire, “C” Company of the Argylls in left support came to their assistance by bombing to the north. This company killed at least 100 of the foe, and drove others along the front of the 27th Brigade. In this lively action a machine-gun was captured, a well-aimed bomb accounting for the whole team. The other companies of the Argylls in their impetuous eagerness ran into our barrage and suffered some casualties. Then until the barrage lifted the men lay down in shell-holes, while a piper played the regimental march. When the advance was resumed Clarges Street was reached without much resistance, and the battalion, having cleared the houses on the west side of the main street, commenced to consolidate.

Waterlot Farm and its defences had still to be taken before the job of the brigade was accomplished.

The left brigade was equally successful in securing its first objective. The first task, the capture of the enemy’s front defences, was straightforward. Unfortunately on the front of the 11th Royal Scots delay was caused by wire, and gaps were cut by hand with very great difficulty, owing to machine-gun fire; but the battalion’s Lewis Guns rendered great service by keeping down the enemy’s fire, while a platoon of “A” Company, finding a gap in the right flank, went through and bombed down the opposite trenches. Lieut.-Colonel Croft’s men rapidly effected the capture of this objective, though they had much stern fighting, and a party of 63 Germans was rounded up and taken prisoner by 2nd Lieuts. Turner and Fleming after a combined bombing attack, in which the battalion Lewis Guns, skilfully handled by Lieut. Winchester, played a noteworthy part.

Lieut.-Colonel Fulton[45] with the “Rifles” had an easier passage. The proffered resistance was rapidly overcome, and a company of the battalion, by bombing along the German trenches to the north, assisted the progress of the right battalion of the Third Division, which had been stopped by uncut wire. Many of the enemy were killed, and 80 were captured.

Thus by 4.15 A.M. the brigade had gained the whole of the first objective, but the second phase was more complicated. The 11th Royal Scots, which had been the right battalion, at this point became the left, and were to take Duke Street from its junction with Piccadilly to its junction with Pont Street. The 12th Royal Scots passed through the 11th on the first objective, and, wheeling to the east, advanced against the village. The death of Lieut.-Colonel Budge proved a great misfortune; for the task of the battalion, to secure Longueval from the corner of Duke Street and Piccadilly to a point on Princes Street on the fringe of Delville Wood, was one of extraordinary difficulty. The left battalion made good progress, and dug in on a line south of Duke Street; but the right battalion, coming under very heavy machine-gun fire and accurate sniping from a post in the orchards and from Piccadilly, was compelled to dig in on a line facing east, with its right flank on Clarges Street in touch with the Argylls, and its left in touch with the right of the 11th Royal Scots.

Thus the advance of the 27th Brigade was brought to a standstill before the second objective had been reached.

At first the working of the communications between D.H.Q. and the leading infantry was all that could be desired. In spite of the incessant shelling, messages came in quickly, and General Furse was able to keep in close touch with his attacking brigades. Thus, on learning that the 11th Royal Scots and the right battalion of the Third Division had been checked by undamaged wire, he sent out directions for the 26th Brigade to assist the 27th, which in turn was to help the Third Division. As a consequence, the advance was maintained practically without a halt. At 5.50 A.M. the G.O.C. learned that Brig.-General Ritchie’s brigade had secured its first two objectives, and an hour later that the left brigade had captured everything except the north of Longueval. When at 6.29 A.M. he was informed that the whole of the village was held by the 27th Brigade, he had every reason to be jubilant.

Unfortunately the information was inaccurate, as a message at 7.20 A.M. made clear. General Furse knew that the check to the 12th Royal Scots was a most serious matter. The possession of the Longueval plateau was the key to the operations against High Wood in the north, and if the village was not taken, the plans of Sir Douglas Haig would be thrown out of gear. Moreover, it was from Longueval that the attack on Delville Wood was to be launched; without it the operation would be more intricate. The crisis demanded decisive action, and the G.O.C. placed the 1st South African Regiment under the orders of Brig.-General Scrase-Dickins, who was instructed to make every effort to clear the village. General Furse was also keenly concerned about Waterlot Farm, which had yet to be taken by the Highland Brigade, since its capture was the necessary preliminary to an attack on Guillemont. Realising that the 26th and 27th Brigades had been heavily punished, he warned Brig.-General Lukin that his brigade would be required to take Delville Wood.

When the advance of the 12th Royal Scots was checked, 2nd Lieut. A. Noble, now the most senior officer on the spot, held a conference of the surviving officers. It was decided to make another attempt with two companies, and they moved forward at 7 A.M., but did not get beyond Piccadilly. At 8.30 A.M. another effort was made by the battalion from the line of Clarges Street. Three sections with a Lewis Gun tried to force their way up North Street by rushing from house to house, but, after progressing fifty yards, they were brought to a halt by machine-gun fire and withdrew to the shelter of a barricade, which had been erected at the junction of North Street and Clarges Street.

At 8.48 A.M. Brig.-General Scrase-Dickins received orders from General Furse. These were that the village was to be bombarded, and that the brigade was to make another attack at 10.30 A.M. But the communications in front were not so satisfactory, and, owing to the delay in the transmission of instructions, the attack was not launched until 11 A.M. To supplement the artillery, Stokes Guns bombarded the orchard area, concentrating on suspected machine-gun posts, but the assault from the line of Clarges Street was again defeated.

It was clear that the northern part of Longueval could not be cleared by a casual or haphazard attack. The enclosed nature of the oblong of orchards made it difficult to locate the enemy’s posts with certainty, and the artillery were handicapped by the want of a post from which to observe the fire. The problem was in fact more intricate than was realised at the time. The battering that the village had received from our guns had only been sufficient to convert it into a stronghold of immense strength. Amidst the jagged and tumbled masonry the defenders had numerous well-protected corners from which they could fire without being detected, and the oblong was full of shelters where the garrison could take refuge from the fire of field-guns. The whole area needed to be pulverised by heavy shells, as General Furse soon realised. Against infantry alone the place was virtually impregnable, since the scope for manœuvring was limited and all approaches were swept by the fire of the defenders. Such was the task that Brig.-General Scrase-Dickins was asked to accomplish.

The 1st South African Infantry bore the brunt of the next attack. Lieut.-Colonel Dawson’s men had moved up to the line of Clarges Street through heavy shell-fire without a casualty. From noon till 2 P.M. the northern part of the village was bombarded, but, as it was believed that isolated parties of the 12th Royal Scots were in the village, the shelling was directed chiefly on the wood to the east of it. Then followed a great deal of confused fighting in which, by the nature of the ground, the South Africans were split into a number of detached groups. Such reports as reached Brigade H.Q. were so vague that it was impossible to act upon them, and it was not till 10.44 P.M. that the position of the South Africans was known. At that time one company was in Piccadilly, immediately south of Duke Street; another was trying to work round from Piccadilly to North Street; a third was in reserve at the south-east corner of the village; and nothing certain was known of the remaining company, which was believed to be on the east side of North Street. That night at 10.50 P.M. Brig.-General Scrase-Dickins urged Lieut.-Colonel Dawson not to relax his efforts and to endeavour to clear the whole of the village before dawn, in order that the attack on Delville Wood might be delivered from it.

While the left brigade was engaged in sanguinary conflicts among the orchards of Longueval, the Highland Brigade was endeavouring to capture Waterlot Farm. This work had been allotted to the 7th Seaforths, who were in Montauban Alley when the battle commenced. As Lieut.-Colonel Kennedy expected the enemy’s counter-barrage to fall on Montauban Alley, he arranged that his men should follow as close as possible behind the Black Watch in order to escape it, and thus the whole battalion avoided the shelling except one platoon, which suffered severely. Advancing on the heels of the Black Watch the leading company entered the German front line and passed along behind the wire in a north-easterly direction. The next two companies consolidated the enemy’s front line and a support line, while the fourth followed in support of the leading company. The Seaforths, finding the Black Watch held up by the machine-gun post at the south-east corner of Longueval, attempted to outflank it by working along Dover Street and Down Street on the south of the village, but they were stopped by hostile fire from Waterlot Farm. In spite of repeated efforts the post held out, for the ground was all in favour of the defenders.

At 2 P.M. Brig.-General Ritchie ordered the Camerons to move up from Montauban. They were to assist in clearing the village, co-operate in the assault on the post that was holding up the Black Watch and Seaforths, and push on to Waterlot Farm. Under drenching shell-fire the Camerons marched up by companies to the village, the outskirts of which they reached at 4 P.M. Before dark one company cleared the houses just north of Clarges Street and a building immediately north of Princes Street, known as the Hospice; another company, in co-operation with the Black Watch and Seaforths, at last accounted for the post on the south-east of the village, which fell to a converging attack, the garrison being bayoneted and three machine-guns being captured. A third company and a company of Seaforths then pressed on towards Waterlot Farm, and in spite of severe machine-gun fire and accurate sniping a good deal of progress was made. The main body took up a position just west of the farm, while a party of the Seaforths advanced down Longueval Alley until they came in touch with the Eighteenth Division, which had done great work that day by capturing the whole of Trones Wood.

After a day of strenuous fighting, in which many losses had been sustained, the Division had just failed to win complete success. The enemy still held the north of Longueval and Waterlot Farm, and Delville Wood still remained to be taken. At midnight the position was as follows: The Argylls held all the south and south-west of Longueval, with lines established in Clarges Street, Sloane Street, and the old German front line from the Windmill to Pall Mall; the Black Watch were in a semicircle round the north-east corner of the central square, and occupied also a line 300 yards long, parallel to and 50 yards south of Princes Street; three companies of the Seaforths held the old German front line on the right of the Argylls; the remaining company and three companies of the Camerons were in Longueval Alley as far as Trones Wood, just west of Waterlot Farm. On the left the 12th Royal Scots were consolidating along the line of Piccadilly, the 11th Royal Scots occupied Duke Street up to Pont Street, and the 9th Scottish Rifles were in the old German support line on the left of the 11th Royal Scots. The 6th K.O.S.B. had not been involved in the fighting, but their work in carrying up stores of all kinds under continuous shell-fire had been of the greatest value.

That evening the G.O.C. met his brigadiers in Montauban, and discussed with them the operations to be carried out on the following day. The 27th Brigade was to continue its attack on Longueval, and the 26th on Waterlot Farm. Delville Wood was to be assaulted by the South African Brigade under cover of a creeping H.E. barrage. This attack was arranged for 5 A.M., and, should the 27th fail to secure the village during the night, was to be delivered from the south-west.

Delville Wood, in the shape of a rough pentagonal, overshadowed the village of Longueval. It was divided into a northern and southern portion by the grassy ride known as Princes Street. From this ride towards the north, and at right angles to it, ran auxiliary paths named Strand, Regent Street, and Bond Street; in the opposite direction similar pathways, Buchanan Street, Campbell Street, and King Street, led to the southern margin. About 200 yards south of Princes Street and parallel to it was the ride called Rotten Row.

The execution of the attack was entrusted by Brig.-General Lukin to Lieut.-Colonel Tanner. The forces available were the 2nd and 3rd and two companies of the 4th South African Infantry. Of the remainder of the brigade the 1st Regiment was involved in the fighting in Longueval, and two companies of the 4th were to assist the 26th Brigade against Waterlot Farm.

The assailants moved up from Montauban before dawn. Patrols having reported the enemy to be still in possession of the village, the South Africans assembled in a trench on the south-west corner of Delville. All the wood south of Princes Street was cleared in two hours, the only strong resistance coming from isolated snipers. In the eastern portion 138 prisoners, including 3 officers, and one machine-gun were captured, but the most difficult part remained to be accomplished. Owing to the situation in Longueval, Lieut.-Colonel Tanner decided to clear the northern portion from the east as far as the Strand, and this work was entrusted to three companies of the 2nd South African Infantry. The resistance was surprisingly weak, the garrison having been thinned-out on account of the shelling to which the wood was persistently subjected. The chief obstacle was the wood itself. The profligate undergrowth and the tangle of trees and branches brought down by our artillery-fire rendered the laborious work of penetrating it most exhausting. When at length the perspiring and breathless South Africans reached the margin, the enemy’s artillery opened a fierce bombardment on the whole place, and rifle and machine-gun fire prevented progress beyond the perimeter.

Shortly after 2 P.M. that afternoon Lieut.-Colonel Tanner was able to report that he had taken the whole of Delville Wood except the north-west corner. The problem now was how to hold our gains. In ordinary circumstances small posts with machine-guns would have been the least costly and the most effective method; for Bernafay had shown that for large bodies of men a wood is only a death-trap. But it was impossible to do this. The wood was 159 acres in extent, and part of it was held by the enemy. Moreover, the Germans were exceptionally well situated for a counter-attack. They were able to direct an accurate fire on the wood from their batteries in the north, east, and south-east; their trenches lay round its perimeter and commanded all its approaches; and the possession of Longueval ensured them a covered approach whenever they chose to deliver their stroke. Under these circumstances a strong garrison and constant vigilance were essential.

After the posts were established along the perimeter, the most urgent matter was the provision of shelter for the troops. A plentiful supply of tools had been carried up by the South Africans, and it was impressed upon the men that notwithstanding their weariness there could be no rest until trenches had been dug. But they had grasped the situation; it was only too obvious that their lives depended upon the speed with which they could dig themselves in. But the spendthrift undergrowth and tangled roots that crawled profusely in the soil of Delville Wood were hard to cut, and while the men toiled they were harried unceasingly by shell and machine-gun fire. An attempt to wire the edge of the wood was frustrated by a counter-attack, which men of the 10th Bavarian Division delivered against the north-east corner about 3 P.M. This attack was easily repulsed by rifle-fire, but the situation was critical, and between 12.45 P.M. and 1.15 P.M. reports from the 26th Brigade and the 52nd Brigade R.F.A. having stated that the Germans were massing on the north-west of the wood, the artillery put a protective barrage round it. In spite of this the foe made persistent attempts to drive the South Africans from the perimeter, but all attacks were defeated with loss by the 2nd South African Infantry, and by 4.40 P.M. the enemy drew off. The heavy casualty list of the South Africans was due mainly to shell-fire.

General Furse gave instructions that the utmost efforts should be made to strengthen the defences during the night, and a company of the Seaforths (Pioneers) was sent up to wire the wood. In a remarkably short time numerous trenches were dug by the garrison, for a man works with a will when his life is at stake. Arrangements were also made to send up large supplies of stores and ammunition. Six and a half companies were posted round the perimeter with three in support. The western portion of Princes Street was held by a half company of the 2nd South African Infantry, and two companies of the 1st formed a defensive flank on the side of the village. The H.Q. of Lieut.-Colonel Tanner were at the junction of Princes Street and Buchanan Street.

Meanwhile Longueval defied all assaults. Throughout the night of the 14th/15th the 1st South African Infantry had been engaged in a grim house-to-house combat without making headway, and the 12th Royal Scots were called on to make another attack. After a preliminary bombardment of the oblong by the artillery and the Stokes mortars, they moved forward at 8 A.M., when a desperate and plucky effort was made to clear the village. For a time progress was made, and word reached D.H.Q. that the whole of the village was in our hands. The report was wrong. Two sections of the Royal Scots worked up North Street, moving from house to house, each of which was secured only after a stern bombing fight. Small garrisons were left in three houses, and the party reached more than midway to Duke Street. At the same time another section tried to penetrate the orchards from the west, but failed to get beyond Piccadilly. The first party on venturing into the open was subjected to heavy fire from concealed machine-guns and compelled to retire to the shelter of the houses; even the posts that had been established in the houses could not be maintained, for the garrisons were shelled out and forced to withdraw. If doggedness and grit could have won Longueval, the 12th Royal Scots would have had it. Undaunted by their previous reverses, they made another attack in the evening at 7.30. Three sections advanced from Clarges Street, but could not get beyond 50 yards; two other sections pressing on up North Street found the enemy alert and strongly reinforced, and were forced back to the point from which they had started, after inflicting severe losses by Lewis Gun fire. The men, utterly exhausted, could do no more.

On the 15th encouraging progress was made by the 26th Brigade, though it failed to secure Waterlot Farm. As soon as day broke, parties of the Seaforths and Camerons dashed forward and succeeded in establishing themselves in enemy trenches to the east of the farm; but, before they were able to consolidate these positions, they were compelled to withdraw to the northern end of Longueval Alley, owing to intense shelling from both our own and the enemy’s artillery. As the brigade had suffered many casualties and was holding a widely extended line, reinforcements consisting of two companies of the 4th South African Infantry were sent to its assistance. With the support of these two companies, two platoons of the Camerons again attacked the farm and reached the trenches to the east of it before noon. The captured trenches were then taken over by the South Africans, who commenced to consolidate, but were driven out by the concentrated artillery-fire of the enemy. As we could not occupy the farm, we determined to prevent the Germans gaining access to it, and machine-guns were posted by the 26th Brigade and by the South Africans in Delville Wood so as to command all its approaches.

Thus at the close of the 15th the task of the Division had not been completed. Continuous fighting, involving serious losses, had resulted in the capture of all Delville Wood except the north-west corner. The men not actually engaged in fighting were busy consolidating positions and erecting strong points and keeps in the southern portion of Longueval, and all work had to be done under accurate and galling artillery-fire. The position occupied by the Division was peculiarly exposed to the enemy’s artillery; it formed an elbow beyond the British line and was open to fire from the north, south, and east. On the night of the 15th there was a marked increase in the enemy’s shelling; a hurricane of fire swept Delville Wood, and a fierce bombardment was concentrated on the southern and south-western portions of Longueval. In addition, hostile artillery searched the whole region from our front line to the back areas, causing trouble to our batteries and seriously interrupting the work of the transport and of carrying parties.

Each moment as it passed increased the difficulty of the task still to be accomplished by the Division. It was now very weak, not only on account of its casualties, but through exhaustion, strain, and exposure. General Furse had not a fresh battalion under his command. On the other hand, the foe was gaining in strength, and he was known to be bringing up other troops. But an attitude of passive defence was impossible; there was no security in our position until the Germans had been driven out of every part of Longueval and Delville Wood. These two places formed part and parcel of the same problem; with the clearing of the village, the enemy could not maintain his position in the north-west corner of the wood, and as soon as the whole of Delville was in our hands, the garrison of northern Longueval would be exposed to an attack from three sides.

But neither operation was easy of accomplishment. What the G.O.C. wanted—time—he could not have. The fighting of the last two days had clearly shown that the northern defences of the village could not be rushed. The surest and most economical method of clearing Longueval was to bombard it with heavy artillery before the infantry advanced, and this had been suggested on the 15th. The heavy artillery, however, was not under the control of the G.O.C., and the insistence of the Corps and Army Commanders on the need for securing the hamlet without delay prevented the suggestion being carried into effect. Consequently, General Furse resolved to make use of the ground that he had gained in Delville Wood, and he ordered a combined attack on the village and north-west corner of the wood to be made by the 27th and South African Brigades. The latter, after completing the capture of the northern perimeter was to press westwards to North Street, where it should join hands with the former, which was to advance north and east. This attack was to take place at 10 A.M. on the 16th, after a preliminary bombardment by the 2-inch trench mortars, which had been sent up to Longueval on the night of the 14th/15th.

The assaulting forces consisted of two companies of the 1st South African Infantry and two of the 11th Royal Scots. The assault was made from the line of Princes Street-Clarges Street, and was wholly repulsed. It was notable, nevertheless, for several acts of outstanding gallantry. During the South African attack, a bombing party attempted to rush an enemy post about 40 yards from our trenches. The assailants were beaten back, and the officer in command fell wounded between the two lines. Then Private W. F. Faulds with two comrades, ignoring the hail of bullets from the enemy’s machine-guns, left our trench and rescued the officer. Almost by a miracle the party got back unscathed, except one man who was severely wounded. Faulds, who received a V.C., performed a similar feat two days later, when he went out for a wounded man, picked him up, and carried him to a dressing-station under a fire so intense that it was believed to be impossible to bring in the wounded. Equally shining as an example of heroism was the work of 2nd Lieut. Turner and C.S.M. Allwright of the 11th Royal Scots. Both crept out to some wounded men, dressed them under a withering fire, and crawled in with the wounded on their backs. Though desultory fighting went on in the village all day, its only effect was to add to the length of our casualty list.

On the 16th July the 26th Brigade was occupied chiefly in consolidating and strengthening its defences and in establishing posts on the west of Waterlot Farm. Bombers and snipers crept close up to the farm and kept the garrison continually on the alert. Though it was held by their own snipers, the Germans persistently shelled it throughout the day. During the night the Seaforths were relieved in Longueval Alley by the Eighteenth Division.

The South Africans in Delville Wood had been woefully reduced by the furious bombardment to which they had been subjected, and in consequence the work of consolidation could not be carried on as far as safety demanded. During the 16th the firing on the wood continued, and considerable trouble was experienced from bold enemy snipers who had remained concealed amongst the shrubbery and undergrowth, but these were accounted for later in the day. The most worrying feature of the situation was the extent of the gaps between the posts round the perimeter, and the task of a runner in carrying messages along the line was nerve-racking and perilous. The garrison was reinforced by a company of the 4th Regiment, which was sent to the east and north-east of the wood. All the officers and men showed very obvious traces of strain and fatigue, and Brig.-General Lukin asked the G.O.C. if his men could be relieved. There were no troops in the Division who were not exhausted, but General Furse promised that when the whole of the village and the wood had been captured, the South Africans in the southern portion of Delville Wood would be relieved by the 26th Brigade.

With regard to Longueval, he decided that it must be pounded into dust before another attack was made, so he asked the Corps to arrange for the fire of heavy guns, controlled by observation, to be concentrated on the northern part of the village. The original intention was to commence the bombardment at 4 A.M. on the 17th July.

But this scheme was frustrated by peremptory orders from General Rawlinson, directing that the village had to be cleared at all costs before dawn. Urgent orders were sent to Brig.-General Scrase-Dickins on the night of the 16th for the 6th K.O.S.B. and two companies of the 11th Royal Scots, supported by two companies of the 1st South African Infantry, to attack Longueval at 2 A.M. He was also instructed to withdraw his men from the front trenches to allow the oblong to be shelled by the heavy guns. This bombardment was to begin at 11 P.M. on the 16th, but had to be postponed until 12.30 A.M. on the 17th, owing to the difficulty and delay in withdrawing our infantry to a safe distance. In spite of the greatest gallantry, the attack was beaten off. The whole virtue of the project was lost when the heavy bombardment lasted only for an hour and was unobserved. This was the last effort of the 27th Brigade to capture Longueval. During the night, the 6th K.O.S.B. and 11th Royal Scots were withdrawn to Talus Boise, the “Rifles,” who had been relieved on the night of the 15th by the 8th Brigade (Third Division), taking over the trenches of the latter.

At 9 A.M. on the 17th, Waterlot Farm was at length captured by the 26th Brigade. After a preliminary bombardment by artillery, the Camerons, supported by two companies of the 4th South African Infantry, rushed the farm, slaughtered the garrison, and proceeded to consolidate the buildings.

At the end of the day the whole Division was completely worn out. The nights were even more trying than the days on account of the intensity of the German shelling, and the strain on the South Africans, who were certain to receive the first shock of a counter-attack, was particularly severe. During the evening of the 17th July, Lieut.-Colonel Tanner was wounded, and the command of the garrison passed to Lieut.-Colonel Thackeray. That night General Furse decided to relieve the South Africans in the northern part of Delville, but both brigades requested the relief to be postponed on hearing of the operation against Longueval, which was to be carried out by the 76th Brigade of the Third Division on the morning of the 18th. During the hours of darkness, in addition to their usual artillery-fire, the Germans poured thousands of gas shells into the battery positions and back areas. A determined counter-stroke was delivered against Delville Wood from the north-west, and the enemy penetrated as far as Buchanan Street and Princes Street before he was driven back with heavy loss. Other assaults were made on the perimeter, but all were repulsed.

Longueval was attacked at 3.45 A.M. on 18th July by the 76th Brigade. At first, rapid progress was made, and shortly after 8 A.M. a report was received from the Third Division stating that it had captured all its objectives. A company of the Seaforths and a company of the Camerons co-operated with the Third Division in clearing houses in the north of the village. The enemy however still clung tenaciously to some of his posts; when parties of the 26th and 27th Brigades moved up to consolidate strong points in Longueval, they were stopped by machine-gun fire from German pockets.

The day was destined to be the most critical of the battle. At 8 A.M. the enemy opened a tremendous bombardment on Delville Wood and the village with guns of all calibres, and until 7 P.M. there was no diminution of the cannonade, which was probably the heaviest that the Division ever experienced. The whole earth vibrated and trembled from the impact of thousands of “crumps.” All communications were broken down, and for a long time General Furse was ignorant of what was happening. Officers of his staff, particularly Major MacNamara, took great risks in going up to Longueval to ascertain the situation, but no definite information as to the fate of the South Africans could be gathered. About 2 P.M. the shelling increased in fury. Our front trenches were obliterated, whole sections of their occupants were annihilated, and the Germans launched a terrific attack. For this supreme effort they had brought up picked troops, consisting of the 7th and 8th Divisions of the famous Magdeburg Corps,[46] commanded by Sixt von Armin.

After 2 P.M. the S.O.S. signal was seen in the wood and the village, and some of our men were noticed dribbling back from these places. Practically all the South Africans on the perimeter had perished, and the few survivors, stupefied by the ferocity of the shelling, fell back on Lieut.-Colonel Thackeray’s H.Q. in Princes Street. At 3 P.M. waves of Germans poured through the wood and the northern part of Longueval, but now seizing their opportunity our machine-gunners took heavy toll of the men in field-grey. Lieut.-Colonel Thackeray’s troops performed prodigies of valour, and in a sustained and delirious struggle the heroic defenders baffled every effort of the foe to break their ranks. In this grisly combat the Germans lost much valuable time, and when they pressed on, the gallant South Africans were still holding out.

General Furse was at Montauban when he heard of the counter-attack. It was not a time for hesitation, and he ordered the Argylls to advance at once and reoccupy all the ground north and west of Regent Street that had been evacuated. But the enemy’s barrage along the line of Clarges Street was so thick that it was impossible to take the men through it.

Later, at 3.30 in the afternoon, Lieut.-Colonel Dawson received orders to collect all available men of the 1st and 4th South African Infantry, and take them up to the Strand and northern boundary of the wood. With about 160 men he set off on his desperate errand shortly after 4 P.M. On the way he met some officers, who reported that the whole of the garrison had been virtually annihilated. Accordingly he left his men in the old German trenches south-west of Longueval, and went off to find out how matters stood. Disorganised parties of men, their nerves sorely jangled by the bombardment, were streaming southwards through the village. When Lieut.-Colonel Dawson discovered that some of the South Africans were still holding out near Buchanan Street, he took his men into the village, and put them in trenches just north of Dover Street on the right of the 26th Brigade.

The crisis occurred about 6 P.M. By that time all Longueval north of Clarges Street was lost except for a few keeps garrisoned by Highlanders, but the gallant resistance of these posts proved of the greatest possible value. The enemy held all the wood outside the area occupied by Lieut.-Colonel Thackeray and his men, and the line of Buchanan Street which was held by the Camerons. All day the majority of the troops of the 26th Brigade had sheltered in the trenches south of Clarges Street from the fiendish shelling. During the worst spells, when nothing could be heard above the hideous din of the screaming and crashing shells, the men cowered into the sides of their trenches; but though wearied and exhausted they were full of fight, and when a short lull came they peered eagerly over the parapet hoping for a glimpse of the enemy on whom they might wreak vengeance for the horror of the bombardment. If any man stood out from his fellows that day, it was Lieut.-Colonel Gordon of the Black Watch. By the sheer force of his masterful personality he controlled the situation. After a brief consultation he and Lieut.-Colonel Kennedy of the Seaforths decided that the time was ripe for a counter-attack. A new line had been thrown forward along the railway that ran from Guillemont into Longueval. Shortly before 6 P.M. this line was reinforced by every available man from the Highland Brigade, and the whole pressed forward towards Delville Wood; at the same time, led by Lieut.-Colonel Duff, the Camerons swept westwards from Buchanan Street. On clearing the main square, the Highlanders saw the field-grey ranks of the enemy emerging from the south-west corner of the wood. For all who took part in that attack this was the most thrilling moment of the war. For the space of a single second both sides hesitated, so dramatic was the meeting, and then from the left of the 26th line came the rousing command, “Forward, boys!” and the Highlanders surged on like an irresistible wave. The Germans wavered, fired a few shots, and bolted into the shelter of Delville, refusing to face a force that was less than a fourth of their own strength. Carried away by the impetuosity of this magnificent charge, many of the Highlanders heedlessly followed the enemy far into the thicket, where many a brave man, marked on the casualty lists as “missing,” met his fate in a lonely scuffle with the Germans.

It was then that the quality of control and discipline was most needed. The whole value of the counter-attack would have been lost if the small force had pressed on into the wood; it would have been surrounded and cut off by the overwhelming numbers of the foe. Between them, Lieut.-Colonels Gordon and Kennedy rallied and reformed the men. Already they were in danger of being outflanked and a machine-gun, which had been missed during the rush, was taking heavy toll of their numbers from the rear. The Camerons, whose C.O., Lieut.-Colonel Duff, had been severely wounded during the _mêlée_, fell back on Buchanan Street, and the remainder was brought back to the line of Clarges Street and a trench to the immediate north of the Church. This position was firmly held, and a supporting line on the railway was formed. The attack so carefully planned by the enemy had been broken, and though the Highlanders had been too few to recapture Delville Wood, their timely charge had certainly maintained our grasp on the village.

All this time the South Africans had maintained their position against prodigious odds at the corner of Princes Street and Buchanan Street. Lieut.-Colonel Dawson did all that was possible to assist them; he sent up reinforcements, ammunition, rations, and stores, and towards midnight he went up to Lieut.-Colonel Thackeray’s H.Q. Every yard of the mangled wood bore plain traces of the desperate fighting that it had witnessed. “Devil’s Wood” it was called by our men, and that was the correct name. The South African H.Q. were full of wounded, and there were no men available to take them away. During the evening the remnants of the South Africans took over Buchanan Street from the Camerons, who were required to reinforce the Clarges Street line. That night was a trying and anxious time for Lieut.-Colonel Thackeray; his forces were small in number and were utterly spent. Three times the Germans came on in force, but were repulsed with heavy losses.

Our hold on southern Longueval was strengthened during the night by battalions of the 27th Brigade. After the relief was complete, the Clarges Street line on the left was held by the 9th Scottish Rifles, a company of the 18th H.L.I., and a company of the 6th K.O.S.B.; three companies of the Borderers formed a flank along Pall Mall, and the 12th Royal Scots occupied the old German front line from Pall Mall to the west.

By the evening of the 18th July, General Furse had drawn up his plans for a counter-attack. The force to be employed consisted of the 53rd Brigade, which had been placed under his command. After 7.30 P.M., as it was clear that the Germans occupied all the wood east of Buchanan Street and north of Princes Street, a barrage was placed on it east and north of these rides. The 19th Durham Light Infantry were placed under the orders of Brig.-General Ritchie, and were instructed to secure the southern portion of the wood at 12.30 A.M. on the 19th July, but owing to the shelling, the darkness, and the unfamiliarity of the D.L.I. with the main features of the village, this operation was postponed until 6.15 in the morning, when the attack was delivered by the 53rd Brigade under a H.E. barrage. Owing to delays, the infantry did not begin to advance until 7.30 A.M., but they succeeded in clearing the wood south of Princes Street. In this operation the 53rd was effectively assisted by Lieut.-Colonel Thackeray’s men, who kept up a destructive fire on the Germans. For some unknown reason the 53rd Brigade failed to relieve the South Africans, though it was asked to do so by the 26th Brigade.

This was the last operation directed by General Furse against Delville Wood, and on the night of the 19th July the relief of the Division commenced. The remnants of the 26th on relief by the 8th Brigade (Third Division) withdrew to Carnoy, and next day marched farther back to the sand-pits near Meaulte. The 27th was relieved by the 95th Brigade (Fifth Division), and moved first to Talus Boise and then to the Citadel. On the night of the 18th all the South Africans, except those under Lieut.-Colonel Thackeray’s command, were withdrawn to Happy Valley. Not until the evening of the 20th was this valiant little detachment relieved, when Lieut.-Colonel Thackeray with two wounded officers and 140 men moved out to Talus Boise, rejoining next day the fragments of the brigade at Happy Valley. With the exception of the artillery,[47] the whole of the Division was relieved on the morning of the 20th July, on which date General Furse handed over the command of the sector to the G.O.C., Third Division.

The work of all the R.A.M.C. personnel and the regimental stretcher-bearers during the battle was worthy of the highest commendation. The conditions, especially from the 14th, were appalling, perpetual and ghastly shell-fire, an unceasing stream of wounded, and atrocious roads. In spite of all these difficulties the casualties were evacuated with wonderful rapidity, while the heroism and endurance of doctors and stretcher-bearers were almost beyond belief. Instances of the former squatting in shell-holes and dressing their patients under a murderous fire were innumerable. But, indeed, in the work of all men wearing the Red Cross the spirit of self-sacrifice shone at its brightest. The succouring of the wounded is an instinct with the British soldier, and there is no case known in the whole Army of a stretcher-bearer ever shirking his duty. More than once in the course of the cruel struggle, the shelling was so intense that it seemed impossible to rescue the wounded, but men were always ready to risk their lives (and in many cases they lost them) to bring their comrades in. When all were most exhausted, the work became most severe. From the 18th July, the arduous labour of dressing and evacuating the cases was a continuous strain, everyone working at the highest tension. The wounded who were left behind, when the Division moved out, it was beyond the power of anyone to reach; they lay in the area recaptured by the enemy in his counter-blow.

Throughout the action the work of the Sappers and Pioneers reached its usual standard; no higher praise than this could be desired. Apart from assisting the infantry to consolidate the captured positions and construct strong points, they had to keep roads in repair. Even in the summer of 1916 the roadways in the Somme area could scarcely cope with the enormous traffic that passed over them. For instance, the Maricourt-Montauban road, which was constantly used, was only fit for horse transport, though twenty tons of road metal were put on it daily by the Division. In the forward areas, the imperturbable manner in which Sappers and Pioneers worked under the heaviest fire aroused the sincere admiration of the infantry; they seemed to be men without nerves. Their losses were extremely heavy, a serious matter, as skilled men were not too numerous. The C.R.E., Lieut.-Colonel Barnardiston, was wounded on the 17th July and his place was taken by Major G. R. Hearn of the 64th Field Company.

The ordinary duties of the A.S.C. and the transport were attended with considerable risk, as the few roads were continually searched by artillery-fire. Not a night passed without its story of narrow escapes or of losses suffered. From the moment that the First Line Transport left its lines with stores and rations, the men knew that for several hours they had to run the gauntlet. The rugged, weird beauty of the shell-torn country, lit up fantastically by the gleam of the belching guns, escaped the eyes of men guiding their limbers round the edge of shell-holes and listening uneasily for the first signs of a hostile “strafe.” In spite of the greatest skill in timing a dash through the worst areas, the transport of most of the battalions suffered grievously, especially on the nights of the 17th and 18th. The Argylls were particularly unlucky, for on the latter date their Quartermaster, Lieut. W. R. Weller, and their Transport Officer, 2nd Lieut. K. D. Thomson, were killed. Throughout the whole period, however, no battalion failed to receive its rations and stores—a very creditable fact, considering the severity of the fighting.

The attack on Longueval and Delville Wood will rank as one of the greatest examples of the fine fighting qualities of the Division. The operation was undertaken against a brave and alert foe, and had for its object positions that formed the pivot of the enemy’s defensive system. The element of surprise, that made the capture of Montauban a comparatively easy matter, was lacking on the 14th July; the Germans expected an onset and were prepared for it. When all these things are considered, the marvel is that the Division was able to accomplish as much as it did. And the full magnitude of the achievement was probably not realised for some time; for not till more than a month later were the Germans driven from their last defences in Longueval and Delville Wood. Where failure was recorded, as in the case of the attacks on the northern part of the village, the melancholy roll of the killed and wounded was the monument of the devotion with which the men had attempted to do more than men could do. Out of a total of barely 3000, the 27th Brigade lost 81 officers and 2033 men, and the great majority of the killed and missing, 569 in all, left their bones in the blood-soaked undergrowth of the orchards of Longueval.

But even more remarkable than the dour resolution, with which the battle was carried on, was the extraordinary capacity for endurance displayed by the men in holding on to their gains. In France, the most difficult part of an attack was not the winning of an objective but the keeping of it after it was gained. The Germans knew all about the art of war. Their counter-stroke on the 18th July was admirably planned and skilfully carried out, and it was made when the Division was at its weakest. Never did the Ninth rise to greater heights. Here and there under a hellish bombardment a few dazed men straggled back, but the great majority of them stood their ground. The defence of Delville Wood by Lieut.-Colonel Thackeray’s small band rightly takes its place as one of the classic feats of the war. But though less well known, the charge of the Highlanders that saved Longueval when a serious disaster seemed inevitable, is an achievement that ought to secure a lasting place in our military annals. Not merely does it illustrate the unflinching courage of the Highlanders of the 26th Brigade, but it is a brilliant example of the value of a prompt counter-attack boldly carried out by even a few men against a resolute and numerous enemy.

Throughout the battle the unflagging support of the artillery had been of the greatest assistance. The ideas of Brig.-General Tudor had been triumphantly vindicated by the events of the action, and the enthusiasm of the infantry for the H.E. barrage was the best justification of his methods.

In the three weeks’ fighting the Division lost 314 officers and 7303 other ranks. The figures represent about 50 per cent. of its strength and considerably more than that of the infantry. But it had not fought in vain; it had retained nearly all that it had captured, and when it was withdrawn from the battle, it had established its name as one of the hardest fighting divisions in France.

For its work it was generously commended by General Sir H. Rawlinson.[48] But most of all the men cherished the tribute of their own leader, General Furse, on 21st July:—“The Ninth Division is being withdrawn from the battle line. It has played a conspicuous and honourable part in one of the greatest battles in the world’s history. We may all of us with justice be proud of having served in the Division during the past three weeks.

“From the bottom of my heart I want to thank you all—officers, N.C.Os. and men, for all you have done during these weeks of strenuous fighting.

“The demands made on all branches of the Division have been great, and right well have they been answered.

“The infantry, Highlanders, Lowlanders, and South Africans, have as usual had to bear the most continuous strain. To sustain appalling and continuous shell-fire, to try to dig for themselves trenches amongst the fallen trees and through the roots of Bernafay and Delville Woods, to suffer heavy casualties amongst their comrades and friends, to go on day and night for a week or more without any relief and with only snatches of disturbed sleep, to bear all the time the stern responsibility of being the guardians of the very pivot of the Commander-in-Chief’s manœuvre, and to maintain throughout, as they have done, an uncomplaining resolution, a cheerful bearing—for all this, we who have had other work to do offer the infantry our wholehearted admiration and thanks.

“And the infantry, I am sure, will be the first to recognise the continuous assistance they have received from the artillery, who have been working at the highest pressure day and night since the 24th June, and are still in the line, as also from the Engineers and from the Pioneers, whose skilful help has always been at hand.

“Equally deserving our gratitude are the Surgeons and their untiring assistants, including the Chaplains, for the care they have given to the wounded without thought for their own safety; and none of us will easily forget all the difficulties overcome by the Supply and Transport Services.

“Lastly, I would thank the brigadiers and their staffs—and the various members of my own staff—for their zealous and efficient work, which has had so much to say to the successes we have gained. Nor do I forget the Signal Service—that invaluable and hard-worked channel of orders and reports.

“We shall miss with lasting regret the many comrades and friends we have lost, but they with you, thank God, have won fresh honours for the Ninth Division and success for our arms.”

When the Division left the battle line it was only the skeleton of what it had been on the 1st July, but as the enemy had employed no fewer than three first-rate divisions against it, one may assume[49] that his losses had been more numerous. This seemed to indicate that the intentions of Sir Douglas Haig were being fulfilled. Episodes such as the costly fighting in Longueval were inevitable in a battle of this magnitude, but in this case more might have been achieved with a greater economy of lives had it not been for the anxiety of the Fourth Army to prevent the programme of the British Commander-in-Chief being affected by delay. Its insistence on the necessity of securing Longueval at once did not allow General Furse a free hand to deal with the situation, and as it turned out, the attempt to rush matters was a spendthrift policy, and actually resulted in losing instead of saving time.

With the opening of the Battle of the Somme there was a noticeable change in the attitude of the men. They now realised the full seriousness and gravity of the business that they had undertaken, and they no longer entered into battle with the exuberant optimism that had filled the men at Loos with the belief that they could sweep away the defences of Germany at one blow. Their confidence was unshaken and their belief in ultimate victory assured, but if the Somme became for the enemy a Gehenna, it was also a supreme trial and test for the soldiers of the British Empire.