Part 12

In my letter to Lord St. Vincent, the following incautious observations were made, viz. that “his reasons for not promoting Lieutenant Parker, because there were only three men killed on board the _Speedy_, were in opposition _to his lordship’s own promotion to an earldom_, as well as that of his flag-captain to knighthood, and his other officers to increased rank and honours: for that in the battle from which his lordship derived his title there was only _one man_ killed on board his own flagship, so that there were more casualties in my sloop than in his line-of-battle ship.”

From the receipt of that letter Lord St. Vincent became my bitter enemy, and not he only, but his successors thought it incumbent on them to perpetuate his lordship’s displeasure. My reply was no doubt keenly felt at the time, when it was a common remark in the Navy that the battle of St. Vincent was gained by the inshore squadron, under Nelson, the commander-in-chief being merely a spectator, at a distance which involved only the loss of one man in his own ship.

Notwithstanding this refusal of the First Lord to promote my lieutenant, my determination was to persevere with the Board collectively, and accordingly I addressed an official letter to the Secretary of the Admiralty, Mr. Nepean, embodying Lord St. Vincent’s reply, and concluding, that “if their Lordships judge by the small number killed, I have only to say that it was fortunate the enemy did not point their guns better:” indeed, had I not taken care to place the _Speedy_ in a position where the Spanish guns went over her, many would have swelled the list whom it was my happiness to have saved.

This letter was dated May 12th, 1802, and, receiving no reply, the annexed official letter was addressed to their Lordships on the same subject:—

“14 Old Cavendish-street, May 17, 1802.

“MY LORDS,—The anxiety I feel for the promotion of a meritorious officer, Lieutenant Parker, late of the _Speedy_, whose name I have not seen in the recent list of commanders, even though a very extensive promotion has taken place, induces me to address your Lordships.

“Lieutenant Parker served as sole lieutenant of the _Speedy_ at the capture of the _Gamo_, of 32 guns and 319 men, carried by boarding, after an action of upwards of an hour; during the greatest part of which time the yards and rigging of the vessels were locked together. In boarding and carrying the Spanish vessel he was severely wounded by a sword, run through his thigh, and a musket-ball lodged in his chest.

“I have always understood it to be an invariable rule with the Board of Admiralty, to promote officers of unimpeachable character who have distinguished themselves in action, or who have been first lieutenants of His Majesty’s ships of war at the capture of vessels of superior force—especially of a force so very superior as that of the _Gamo_ to the _Speedy_; the latter, as your Lordships know, mounting 14 4-pounders, having on board only 54 men, whilst the force of the _Gamo_ was 32 guns, with a complement of men six times greater than that of the _Speedy_.

“When these circumstances are brought to your Lordships’ recollection, I am fully convinced that you will see proper to reward Lieutenant Parker by appointing him to the rank of commander in His Majesty’s service, which will tend to cherish and promote that spirit of exertion among the lieutenants, subordinate officers, and crew, without whose zealous co-operation the endeavours of the captain alone would prove of small avail.

“I have the honour to be, &c. &c. (Signed) “COCHRANE.

“To the Right Hon. the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.”

On the 26th of May the following reply was received from the Secretary:—

“Admiralty Office, 26th May, 1802.

“MY LORD,—I have received and read to my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty your Lordship’s letter to me of the 17th inst., and the representation which accompanied it, and am commanded by their Lordships to acquaint you that your application to me is perfectly regular, _but that it is not so for officers to correspond with the Board_.

“I am, &c. &c. “E. NEPEAN.

“Captain Lord Cochrane.”

Determined not to be foiled in what I conceived to be the right of Lieutenant Parker, I replied to the Secretary as follows:—

“Old Cavendish-street, May 27th, 1802.

“SIR,—I have been favoured with your letter acknowledging that you had received and read to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty my letter of the 17th inst., and that you are commanded by their Lordships to acquaint me that my application to you was perfectly regular, but that it is not so for officers to correspond with the Board.

“I have, therefore, to request that you will inform the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, that, although I have received your letter, still I wait in expectation to be favoured with an answer to the representation which, through you, I had the honour to transmit to their Lordships.

“I am, &c. &c. “COCHRANE.

“E. Nepean, Esq., Sec. to the Admiralty.”

The reply to this necessarily cut short all further correspondence.

“Admiralty Office, 29th May, 1802.

“MY LORD,—I have received and read to my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty your letter of the 27th inst., and have nothing in command from their Lordships to communicate to you.

“I am, &c. &c. “EVAN NEPEAN.

“Captain Lord Cochrane.”

In spite of this rebuff, I nevertheless continued to persevere, but it was not till some years afterwards that the promotion of Lieutenant Parker was obtained, with a result to that able and gallant officer which proved his ruin, and eventually caused his death.

The circumstances under which this took place were positively diabolical. Despairing of promotion, Lieutenant Parker had retired to a little farm near Kinsale, by the cultivation of which, in addition to his half-pay, he was realising an existence for his family. From my determined perseverance on his behalf, he was at length made commander, and ordered to join the _Rainbow_ sloop, represented to be stationed in the West Indies. Selling off everything, even to his household furniture, he proceeded to Barbadoes, and reported himself to Sir Alexander Cochrane; but, as the vessel could not be found, Sir Alexander furnished him with a passage to look for her at the Bermudas, where he supposed she might be fitting for sea. Not finding her there, Lieutenant Parker returned to Barbadoes, when _it became evident that no such vessel was on the North American station_.

On ascertaining this, poor Parker returned to England a ruined man. Lord Melville, who had succeeded as First Lord, expressed his surprise and regret that such a circumstance should have occurred, and promised the unhappy man that he should not only be amply compensated for the loss and expense attending his outfit and fruitless voyage to the West Indies, but that he should have another command on the first opportunity. This generous intention was however counteracted, for _he never received either the one or the other_.

Lieutenant Parker’s loss, consequent to the sale of his property, the expense attendant on settling his family, together with his outfit and voyage, amounted to upwards of 1000_l._ His prospects ruined, his domestic arrangements destroyed, and his pride wounded, his spirit and constitution gradually gave way, and at length overwhelmed with sorrow he sank into a premature grave, leaving a wife and four daughters to deplore the loss of their only protector.

I never could find out who had thus imposed on one of the most gallant officers in the Navy this infamous deception, concocted, doubtless, out of pure malevolence to myself. Be he whom he may, I am very sorry that it is not in my power to hold up his name to the execration of posterity. It is even at the present day the duty of the Admiralty to remedy the injury inflicted on his destitute family—for he had left four daughters unprovided for, who had no opportunity to escape from indigence.

CHAP. VIII.

NAVAL ADMINISTRATION SIXTY YEARS AGO.

POLITICAL FAVOURITISM.—REFUSAL OF FURTHER EMPLOYMENT.—NAVAL CORRUPTION.—DOCKYARD PRACTICES.—SHAMEFUL TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR.—ECONOMY THE REMEDY.—RESULTS OF MEDICAL ECONOMY.—EMPTY PHYSIC BOTTLES.—SEAMEN’S AVERSION TO THE SERVICE.—A POST CAPTAIN AT COLLEGE.

It will be evident on a perusal of the previous chapter, that there was no fixed principle for the promotion of officers who had distinguished themselves, but that however desirous the Board might be to reward their services, it was in the power of persons holding inferior offices to thwart the intentions of the Board itself.

Were such a principle admitted, nothing could be more detrimental to the service. Let every officer know the regulated reward for a national service, with the certainty that he cannot be deprived of it, and rely upon it, that whenever opportunity presents itself, the service will be performed. There is nothing mercenary, or even selfish about this; but, on the contrary, an ambition which should be carefully fostered.

In my own case, I can conscientiously avow my leading motive to have been that of exerting myself to the utmost in the hope of thereby attaining promotion in my profession, to which promotion the capture of an enemy’s frigate, as well as of a large number of privateers and other vessels, had entitled me, according to a judicious rule for the encouragement of efforts useful to the nation—to a place on the list, from which I conceived myself unjustly excluded by the promotion of a younger man, a junior commander too, for no great apparent reason than that of his father being a personal and political friend of the First Lord of the Admiralty.

To those who may think my conduct towards the First Lord and the Board disrespectful, I can only say, that were my life to begin anew, with my present experience of consequences, I would again pursue the same course. I cannot imagine anything more detrimental to the interests of the Navy and the nation, than political favouritism on the part of the Admiralty—of itself sufficient to damp that ardour which should form one of the first requisites for future command. I would rather say to the young officer—“If you have, in the exercise of your profession, acquired a right which is wrongfully withheld—demand it, stick to it with unshaken pertinacity;—none but a corrupt body can possibly think the worse of you for it; even though you may be treated like myself—you are doing your country good service by exposing favouritism, which is only another term for corruption.”

Favouritism on the part of the Admiralty must ever be the bane of the Navy, and may prove its ruin. Either let it be understood that the institution is a parliamentary vote market, or that it is what it ought to be—an institution for the promotion of zeal by the reward of merit. Only let it not sustain both characters, or between the two stools the country may one day go to the ground.

Such was the offence taken by the authorities at my persistence in my own right, and in that of the officers under my command, that an application to the Board for another ship met with refusal; and as it was clear that Lord St. Vincent’s administration did not again intend to employ me, the time on my hands was devoted to an investigation of those abuses which were paralysing the Navy; not that this was entered upon from any spirit of retaliation on the Admiralty, but as preparatory to the more ambitious aim of getting into Parliament, and exposing them.

One of the most crying evils of our then naval administration had fallen heavily upon me, though so young in command—viz. the Admiralty Courts; but for the peculations consequent on which, the cruise of the _Speedy_ ought to have sent home myself, officers, and crew, with competence. As it was, we got all the fighting, whilst the Admiralty Court and its hungry parasites monopolised the greater portion of our hard-won prize-money. In many cases they took the whole! and in one case brought me in debt, though the prize was worth several thousand pounds!

Hitherto no naval officer had ventured to expose, in Parliament or out of it, this or indeed any other gross abuse of the naval service; and having nothing better to do, want of employment appeared to offer a fitting opportunity for constituting myself the Quixote of the profession; sparing no pains to qualify for the task, though well aware of its arduous, if not hopeless nature—as directed against a mass of corruption, such as—it is to be hoped—may never again strike at the noblest arm of our national safety a blow worse than any enemy can inflict.

After what has been stated with regard to my unpleasant relations with Lord St. Vincent and his Board of Admiralty, it will perhaps be better not personally to enter on the subject of then existing naval abuses, lest I might be suspected of exaggerating their extent. Some such explanation is necessary in justification of the course which I subsequently thought it my duty to pursue, but it will answer every purpose to have recourse to the experience of a contemporary officer—Captain Brenton, the biographer of Lord St. Vincent—in justification of my self-imposed task:—

“In the first edition of the Naval History, I have commented on the profligate system of hired vessels and transports. In this—borough influence reigned paramount, and the most solid information was disregarded when the perpetrator of the greatest frauds was a supporter of Government.”—(BRENTON’S _Life of Lord St. Vincent_, p. 167.)

“A ship purchased by a man of influence was a certain fortune to him. He cleared his money in the first year at the rate of 400_l._ per month, and if the ship were coppered at 7500_l._ per annum. About twenty copper-bottomed transports were lying for three years in the harbour of Messina, without being employed in any duty.”—(p. 169.)

The expense of these alone, no doubt all owned by “men of influence” as Captain Brenton terms them, was for the three years 270,000_l._ As these transports formed only a trifling illustration of the system, there is little wonder at the enormous accumulation of the national debt, for results so inadequate.

Captain Brenton might have gone farther, and stated with great truth, that not only were transports hired from men of influence, but that vessels utterly worthless were purchased by the Government from their political supporters, and then patched up into ships of war! It was my misfortune to be subsequently appointed to _a collier_ so converted—with what result will appear in the sequel.

From the ships let us follow Captain Brenton into the dockyards:—

“When Mr. Colquhoun, in his celebrated police reports, stated that the Government was plundered from the dockyards at the rate of _a million a year_, he was supposed to have exceeded all probability. I am satisfied he was under the mark, and if the _consequences_ of these frauds are added to the amount of peculation, the aggregate will be frightful. The manner in which the villany was carried on was dreadful indeed. _Whole ships’ crews were destroyed at one fell swoop._ Every ship was supposed to have a certain number of bolts driven to secure her fabric. The tops and points of the bolts only were driven, and the rest was carried away. It is probable that the loss of the _York_ of 64 guns, and the _Blenheim_ of 74 guns, was the consequence. The _Albion_, 74, we know to have been nearly lost by this hellish fraud.”—(BRENTON, pp. 159, 160.)

“I can remember what our slop clothing was, for which the poor seamen were charged an extravagant price; the contract being _always given as a matter of favour for electioneering purposes_.”—(p. 156.)

“Not only were the grossest impositions practised in the supply of the most important stores, by sending in damaged goods, but even the raw materials were _again sold_ before they reached their destination.”—(p. 157.)

“At the cooperage of Deptford, 1020_l._ 10_s._ 5_d._ was charged for work proved to be worth only 37_l._ 2_s._ 3_d._ At the cooperage at Plymouth, the king’s casks were stolen, and sixty-four of them were found in one brewery.”—(p. 183.)

“It was a common expression with the receiving clerks that they ‘_had not been hampered_,—’ when they refused to receive articles into store. The ‘hampering’ meant a bribe in the shape of wine or other articles, as the price of their certificates.”—(p. 155.)

“It would scarcely be believed to what extent peculation was carried on in every department.”—(p. 155.)

“Hampers of wine and ale were liberally supplied to the inspectors of timber, and I conclude that the same treatment was applied to the measuring clerks of the dockyard.”—(p. 179.)

“From the foregoing it may be inferred that the dockyards were the most fruitful sources of plunder and national ruin.”—(p. 180.)

“Report No. 6 relates to the dockyards, wherein a shameful system of plunder had long existed.”

“Reports 10 and 11 state other abuses to an enormous extent, so that Lord St. Vincent used the elegant expression that ‘_our dockyards stank of corruption_.’”—(p. 190.)

From this disgraceful picture let us pass on to another still more revolting:—

“The victualling establishment at home was not less corrupt. The charge for the supply of prisoners of war was ample, but three-fourths of the amount was pilfered. The same nefarious system pursued in the hospitals abroad was followed at home in a more guarded manner, and _fortunes were made_ by cheating the sick and wounded seamen out of the comforts and necessaries allowed them by a grateful country. Lord Cochrane endeavoured to procure better rations and treatment for the French prisoners, but the charge of sick and wounded prisoners of war fell in its administration into the hands of a set of villains whose seared consciences were proof against the silent but eloquent pleadings of their fellow-creatures.”—(p. 165.)

“Report No. 7 relates to the hospitals, beginning with Stonehouse at Devonport. Here was discovered waste, corruption, fraud, extravagance, and villany to a disgusting extent. Four thousand gallons of porter were consumed in six months, being more than four times the proportion used in Haslar. On board the _Calne_ hulk, appropriated to sick prisoners of war, the surgeon’s chief assistant kept a table for the officers at the cost of 1500_l._ or 2000_l._ a year. He could afford the purser a large salary, in lieu of his share of the profit of the concern. The worst and most scandalous feature was, that when the wretches in the wardroom were rioting in luxury they were consuming the necessaries which the Government had liberally supplied for the use of the sick prisoners of war.

“I hope there is sufficient virtue in Parliament to punish _great delinquents_, if not the country will not stagger long under the practice of these blood-sucking leeches.”—(_Letter of Lord St. Vincent, quoted by Brenton._)

Abroad the condition of affairs was infinitely worse, both as regarded the navy and army. The following extract from the “Annual Register,” at a period when the press hardly dared to speak truth, will serve as a sample of the practices prevailing wherever an official staff was to be found:—

“The abuses committed in the West Indies are said to exceed everything that was ever stated in romance. The commissioners are stated to have discovered that forged bills and receipts, for articles never purchased, and bills drawn on Government indorsed under forged and fictitious names, were common and notorious. They found a most base collusion between the officers of Government and the merchants and contractors, by which the latter were allowed to charge stores at a much higher rate than they might have been obtained for in the market. In one instance it was discovered, that to conceal this iniquity, a bribe of 18,000_l._ had been given; in another a bribe of 35,000_l._ Vessels, houses, stores, &c. were usually hired at most extravagant rates, in consequence of fraudulent contracts, where others might have been obtained much cheaper. But worse than either of these iniquities was the diabolical fraud of suffering the merchants and contractors to furnish His Majesty’s troops with inferior and bad rum, and other articles, at an extravagant rate, by which the lives of the troops were endangered, as well as the country defrauded. And, for the purpose of committing these practices, all free competition for the supply of articles was prevented; and every obstacle was put in the way, even of the purchase of bills on the Treasury. They were dated in one island and negotiated in another; and they were sold at a much more advantageous exchange than that at which the officers debited themselves in their accounts.”

There is no doubt but that Lord St. Vincent was desirous of putting a stop to this national plunder, and the wholesale destruction of sick, wounded, and prisoners, which was its direct consequence; but the means he took were inadequate. His lordship’s remedy was “_economy!_” leaving the influential delinquents in quiet possession of their places. The most extravagant contracts and profuse expenditure of the public money were thus to be cured by no expenditure at all on necessary objects.

One of Lord St. Vincent’s agents in this notable scheme, was a Dr. Baird, who possessed his lordship’s highest confidence. To this person was confided the task of regenerating the hospitals. As may be supposed, from his profession, economy in medicine was the first step. An order was issued that blue ointment and pills, requisite only for complaints that might be avoided, were doled out in _minimum_ quantity. The consequence was, that the captains and surgeons of ships of war had to purchase these essential medicines out of their own pockets! more especially as a subsequent order was issued that no such complaints, should be treated in the hospitals!

A more barbarous regulation was enforced, viz, that from the expense of _lint_ in dressing wounds, _sponge_ should be substituted, as it might be used over again! The result was that even slight cases became infected by the application of sponges which had been used on putrescent sores, and this shameful practice cost the lives or limbs of many. I was myself on a survey at the Devonport hospital, where seven persons had lost limbs from this cause! and proposed to the other surveying captains to draw up a representation to the Admiralty on the consequences of applying infected sponge; but the advice was not followed for fear of giving offence.

One of the unfortunate sufferers, amongst others, was a son of the boatswain or gunner of the then flagship, the _Salvador del Mundo_. The poor boy had bruised his shin, to which an infected sponge was applied, and he lost his leg! Persons so mutilated had no claim on the service for pension or reward. It was this very hospital to which Captain Brenton, in the preceding extracts, applied the terms “waste, corruption, fraud, extravagance, and villany to a disgusting extent.” The remedy was the application of infected sponge!!

Dr. Baird had the oddest possible notions of the mission with which he was entrusted. As to striking at the root of an evil he had not the most remote conception, otherwise than by saving. He one day said to me; “The extravagance of this place is incredible. I have to-day found what will save one thousand pounds.” “Ah, Doctor,” said I, “what is that?” “Why,” replied he, “would you believe it, in the cellars under the hospital I have found tens of thousands of empty physic bottles! Did you ever hear of such waste!” And the doctor set busily to work to dispose of the empty bottles in order to pay for his medicines,—this being his idea of correcting the most crying evil of the hospital.