Part 30
_Answer._—“None; save and except, had the Commander-in-chief thought proper, from his situation, TO HAVE SENT IN VESSELS EARLIER THAN THEY WERE SENT, though there might be a great risk in so doing, there was a possibility of annoying the enemy more than they were annoyed.”
CAPTAIN GEORGE FRANCIS SEYMOUR (of the _Pallas_.)—“I saw the _Impérieuse_ inform the Commander-in-chief, by signal, that if allowed to remain he could destroy the enemy: there was every prospect of preventing them from getting off, as it would prevent their carrying out hawsers to heave off by. From what I afterwards saw, I think the ships might have floated in sooner—they might have come in with the last half of the flood-tide.”
PRESIDENT.—“How much sooner would that have been than the time they actually did join?”
_Answer._—“At _eleven o’clock_.”
_Question._—“What time did the line-of-battle ships join?”
_Answer._—“_Within a short time after two o’clock._”
_Question._—“Is your opinion formed from information obtained since the 12th of April, or on that day?”
_Answer._—“It was formed from the depth of water _we found_ ON GOING IN.”
This evidence, coming from an officer of Captain Seymour’s character and standing, was so decisive, that it was subjected to a severe cross-examination, of which the subjoined is the substance:—
“It is impossible for me to foretell the event of such an attack, it so much depending on fortuitous circumstances. I cannot say that the line-of-battle ships _should_ have gone in; I was not in possession of the Commander-in-chief’s information. _I state the fact, and leave the Court to judge._ I mean to say, _there would have been water enough for the line-of-battle ships to have floated in_. As to the opposition they would have met with, the Court has as much before them as I have.”
If the reader will refer to Lord Gambier’s expression, in his second despatch of the 10th of May (see page 407), it will be evident that no attack whatever was intended; “but observing the _Impérieuse_ to advance,” it became imperative to support her, _i.e._ when the _flood-tide “had nearly done running.”_ This is the true explanation of the British ships having been sent in _at all_. I repeat, that the advance of the _Impérieuse_ thus forced on the little that was done. Had an attack been seriously intended, the time at which the British fleet should have gone in was that pointed out by the preceding officers, viz. when the French ships were aground, and the whole within reach of destruction; instead of when the few, which were unable to get off by any exertions, were assailed. To have rested a case upon the danger to the British fleet from the fire of the ships _ashore_, with their guns thrown overboard to lighten them, was a course of defence which, for the honour of the British navy, is elsewhere unparalleled.
There is no necessity to adduce further extracts on this head; and I have purposely refrained from introducing my own evidence; but the _animus_ by which the Court was actuated in the case must not be lightly passed over.
One of the principal witnesses was, as a matter of course, the Captain of the Fleet, Sir Harry Neale. This officer, though thoroughly conversant with both the acts and intentions of the commander-in-chief, was directed by the President openly, _not to state the opinions he had given to Lord Gambier on public services_! By Admiral Young Sir Harry Neale was told _to say nothing but what he was directed to detail_! This would be incredible were it not printed in “Minutes of the Court-Martial, revised by Lord Gambier!”
Sir H. NEALE (Captain of the Fleet).—“There were continued conversations between the Commander-in-chief and me. I have given him my opinion _on different services_; some of those he may have approved, and _some he may not have approved_.”
PRESIDENT.—“I apprehend _these_ are _not_ to be stated!”
Yet Sir H. Neale carefully marked the distinction between private conversation and the _public service_, by using the term “different services;” he being evidently ready to tell all he knew as regarded the public service. He was, however, stopped by Admiral Young in one of the strangest injunctions which ever fell from the lips of a judge.
ADMIRAL YOUNG.—“If you are directed _to detail_ any circumstances, you are _then_ to say all you know of the circumstances you _are directed to detail_; but if you are asked a specific question, your oath, I imagine, will _only_ oblige you to answer SPECIFICALLY and directly, and as fully as you _can, the question which is proposed to you_!”
So that Sir Harry Neale was cautioned that, if he was _not_ directed to detail circumstances, he was not to relate them, however important they might be! And if asked only a specific question, he was merely to answer _specifically_; though the Court could know nothing of the facts, unless they permitted the witnesses to tell the truth, and the whole truth, in the very words of the oath.
But as Sir Harry Neale was known to be a man not likely to be thus peremptorily silenced, half a dozen insignificant questions were, therefore, only put to him by the Court, with the exception of one or two leading questions from Lord Gambier.
CHAP. XXIII.
LORD GAMBIER’S DESPATCH.
ITS OMISSIONS AND SUPPRESSIONS.—MOTIVE FOR LORD GAMBIER’s MISSTATEMENTS.—MR. FAIRFAX REPORTS THAT THE MEDIATOR WENT IN FIFTH, NOT FIRST.—REASON OF THE CONTRARY ASSERTION.—NAPOLEON ATTRIBUTES THE ESCAPE OF HIS FLEET TO THE IMBECILITY OF LORD GAMBIER.—MISMANAGEMENT OF THE FIRESHIPS.—LORD GAMBIER’s DELAY AND MISDIRECTION.—HIS PERVERSION OF FACT.—HIS MISPLACED PRAISE.—THE DESPATCH FAILS TO SATISFY THE PUBLIC.—CRITICISED BY THE PRESS.—ADMIRAL GRAVIÈRE’s ACCOUNT OF THE TERMINATION OF THE ACTION.
The despatch brought to England by Sir Harry Neale set out with the perversion, that the fireships, “arranged according to my plan,” were “led on in the most undaunted and determined manner by Captain Wooldridge in the _Mediator, preceded by some vessels filled with powder and shells, as proposed by Lord Cochrane, with a view to explosion_!”
The omission of the fact that before Captain Wooldridge “led the fireships” I had myself preceded them in the explosion vessel, and that, even before the _Mediator_ proceeded on service in obedience to the signals made by my order from the _Impérieuse_, the explosion vessel under my personal command was half-way towards the French fleet; the suppression of my name as having anything at all to do with the attack by means of the explosion vessels, notwithstanding that by going first I ran all the risk of being boarded by the French guard-boats, and myself and crew murdered, as would have been the case had we been captured, showed that the object of the commander-in-chief was to suppress all mention of me, my plans, or their execution, as entitled to any credit for the mischief done to the enemy.
The despatch leads the reader to infer that the success subsequently obtained arose from the “undaunted and determined manner in which Captain Wooldridge led the fireships,” from “Admiral Stopford’s zealous co-operation with the boats,” though not one of these ever stirred from alongside the _Cæsar_, anchored full four miles from the scene of action, and from the plans of the commander-in-chief himself.
That this suppression of all mention of the success of my plans in driving the whole enemy’s fleet ashore with the exception of two ships of the line, was deliberately intended by the commander-in-chief, is placed beyond question by the contemptuous manner in which he speaks of the means which really effected the mischief,—“_some vessels filled with powder and shells, with a view to explosion_.” That these means, conducted by myself, not Captain Wooldridge, _did_ drive the French ships ashore, has been admitted by every French and English historian since that period; and that this was done by my personal presence and instrumentality is a historical fact which nothing can shake or pervert. The only person ignoring the fact was the commander-in-chief of the British force, who not only gives me no credit for what had been done, but does not even mention my name, as having, by the above means, contributed to the result!
The sole conceivable motive for such a suppression of the success of my plans must have been that, having neglected to take advantage of the helpless condition of the French ships driven ashore, it was desirable to conceal the whole of the facts from the British public, by ascribing the success gained to other, and totally different causes, and thus to convert a deep discredit into a great victory!
The despatch goes on to state that, “the _Mediator, by breaking the boom!_” opened the way for the fireships, “but, owing to the darkness of the night, several mistook their course and failed.”
At the conclusion of the last chapter, such reasons have, I think, been given why the _Mediator_ could not have broken a double boom nearly a mile in extent as ought to have set the question for ever at rest. But as that statement, notwithstanding its impossibility, is endorsed by the commander-in-chief as the groundwork of his despatch, it will be necessary to refute his lordship’s statement also, and that from the evidence of an officer upon whose testimony he must necessarily rely, viz. Mr. Fairfax, the master of the fleet, who was deputed in the _Lyra_ to observe the effect produced by the fireships, and, as a matter of course, reported to the commander-in-chief the result of his observations, which were as follows:—
“When the explosion-vessel blew up, she was about two cables’ length from the _Lyra_. The _Lyra_, as well as the other explosion-vessel, is marked in the chart produced by me. When she blew up, the fire vessels _all_ seemed to steer for that point. _I hailed four of them, and the Mediator_, and desired the _Mediator_ to steer south-east, or else she would miss the _French fleet_.”—_Minutes_, p. 177.
In another place Mr. Fairfax states that the night was so dark that it was difficult to make out exact positions; but the testimony of Captain Proteau, of the _Indienne_, that the explosion took place _at the boom_, “_à l’estacade_,” is indisputable, as the _Indienne_, by Captain Proteau’s testimony, was lying so close to the boom and the explosion-vessel also, as only to escape the effect of the latter by her shells going over. The spot, therefore, where the explosion took place is historically beyond doubt.
The testimony of Mr. Fairfax, then—and it must be borne in mind that I had no worse enemy in the fleet than that person—is this:—1st, The explosion took place; 2ndly, _all_ the fireships steered for the point where it had taken place; 3rdly, Mr. Fairfax hailed _four_ of them; 4thly, the _Mediator_ then came up, _steering in a wrong direction_, so that in place of “leading the fireships in the most undaunted and determined manner,” as vouched for by the commander-in-chief, the master of the fleet, who was on the spot, vouches that she was the _fifth fireship which came up_, and that had he not set her right in her course she would have “missed the French fleet;” _i.e._ she was behind the other fireships, and _steering outside the boom, which lay in front of the French fleet!_
It would, I think, be superfluous to say another word about this extraordinary story of the boom, nor should I have condescended to notice it at all in connection with the despatch, but that the commander-in-chief makes it the groundwork of his report to the Government, for the unworthy purpose of altogether omitting my name as connected with the explosion-vessels, and for leading the public to infer that these produced _no effect whatever, either on the boom or the French fleet!_ which is indeed the main object of the despatch.
It was, however, necessary to give some reason why the French fleet ran ashore; and as it was not considered expedient to give me the credit of causing it to do so by the terror created from the explosion, the commander-in-chief, despite his own judgment as a seaman, appears to have caught at Captain Wooldridge’s story of breaking the boom, and other subsequent exploits just as unfounded; though the master of the fleet must have reported that some time after the explosion-vessel had done its work _he fell in with the Mediator, steering in a wrong direction, and set her right in her course!!!_
I forbear to speak of having myself encountered the _Mediator_ after passing several other fireships, as that would be assertion only. Of the effect produced, and by what means it was produced, the subjoined extract from the _Times_ newspaper of May 4th, 1809, will furnish some idea, as coming from French sources:—
“Some letters have been received from the French coast, which bear testimony to the destructive result of the late attack an the enemy’s fleet in Basque Roads. ‘Your _infernal machines_,’ says one of the letters, ‘have not only destroyed several of our ships, but they have rendered almost all the remainder unfit to put to sea again. They have proved the destruction of more than 2000 of our people, (?) and _petrified the rest with fear_. The mouth of the Charente river is completely blocked up with wreck.’”[55]
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Footnote 55:
That is, of the boom, for no ship had been wrecked at the mouth of the Charente.
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Yet two days after the departure of the _Impérieuse_, the commander-in-chief addressed another despatch to the Admiralty, from which the subjoined is an extract:—
“_Caledonia_, April 16, 1809.
“It has blown violently from the southward and westward ever since the departure of the _Impérieuse_, which has rendered it _impracticable to act in any way with the small vessels or boats of the fleet_ against the enemy. I have the satisfaction to observe this morning, that the enemy have set fire to their frigate _L’Indienne_, and that the ship of the line which is aground at the entrance of the river—supposed to be the _Regulus_—there is every reason to believe will be wrecked.”
The Emperor Napoleon himself is, moreover, an authority on the subject, not to be passed over.
“Some conversation now took place about Lord Cochrane, and the attempt which his lordship had made to capture or destroy the ships in the Charente.
“I said it was the opinion of a very distinguished officer, whom I named, and who was well known to him (Napoleon), that if Cochrane had been properly supported, he would have destroyed the whole of the French ships.
“‘He would not only have destroyed them,’ replied Napoleon, ‘but _he might and would have taken them out_, had your admiral supported him as he ought to have done. For, in consequence of the signal made by L’Allemand’ (I think he said) ‘to the ships to do the best in their power to save themselves—_sauve qui peut_, in fact—they became panic-struck, and cut their cables. The terror of the _brûlots_[56] was so great, that they _actually threw their powder overboard, so that they could have offered very little resistance_.’
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Footnote 56:
Napoleon, like other French writers, includes the explosion vessels under the general term _brûlot_.
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“‘The French admiral,’ continued Napoleon, ‘was an _imbecile_, but yours was just as bad. I assure you, that if Cochrane had been supported, he would have taken every one of the ships. They ought not to have been alarmed by your _brûlots_, but fear deprived them of their senses, and they no longer knew how to act in their own defence.’”—_O’Meara’s Napoleon_, vol. ii. p. 291.
Were it worth while, numerous testimonies of the like character could be gathered from French official sources, but it is necessary to mention some other points of the despatch.
The commander-in-chief’s assertion, that, “_owing to the darkness of the night, several fireships mistook their course and failed_,” was true enough, but not the _whole truth_, which was, that, from their clumsy management—neither going in the right direction, nor being kindled at the right time or place—_not one out of the twenty-three fireships took effect_!
The despatch goes on to state, that at daylight Lord Cochrane signaling that seven of the enemy’s ships were on shore, and might be destroyed, the commander-in-chief “_immediately_”[57] ordered the fleet to unmoor and weigh, _intending_ to proceed with it to their destruction; but the wind blowing fresh _from the northward_[58], and _the flood-tide running_[59], rendered it too hazardous to enter Aix Roads, wherefore the fleet again anchored about three miles from the forts on Isle d’Aix.
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Footnote 57:
Four hours afterwards.
Footnote 58:
And therefore a fair wind.
Footnote 59:
Consequently favourable for the fleet to enter Aix Roads.
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This was, indeed, all that the fleet collectively did, or that the commander-in-chief intended it to do. Seeing, however, the “_enemy warping off their ships_” and that, whilst the fleet was unmooring and anchoring again, “_they had succeeded in getting off all but five of the line!_” the commander-in-chief “gave orders to Capt. Bligh of the _Valiant_, with the _Revenge_, frigates, bombs, &c.,”—to attack those that remained aground? Nothing of the kind, but—“_to anchor near the Boyart Shoal, in readiness for an attack_!!” An odd way truly of preventing the five remaining enemy’s ships, then throwing their guns overboard for the purpose of lightening themselves, from warping off!!
“At twenty minutes past two, P.M.,” continues the commander-in-chief, “Lord Cochrane advanced in the _Impérieuse_, with his accustomed gallantry and spirit, and opened a well-directed fire on the _Calcutta_, which _struck her colours to the Impérieuse_.” Lord Gambier afterwards _denied this_, though almost the only part of the action which he was near enough to see with his own eyes! Indeed, the terms of the despatch are decisive of having been detailed from his own personal observations!
But now comes the monstrous part of the assertion; viz. “The ships and vessels above-mentioned _soon after_ joined in the attack on the _Ville de Varsovie_ and _Aquilon_, and obliged them to strike their colours,” &c. Instead of “_soon after_,” the _Valiant_, _Revenge_, &c., remained at anchor near the Boyart, till my signal “In want of assistance,” had been wrongly interpreted as a signal of “distress.” But for this, it is clear that not an anchor would have been weighed. Yet the commander-in-chief made the act of sending in these ships, _when it could no longer be avoided_, appear part of a previous plan to attack the _Ville de Varsovie_ and _Aquilon_, and that they were sent for this purpose _soon after_ my attack on the _Calcutta_ and them simultaneously!
This is not only a perversion of fact, but a suppression of it; for the commander-in-chief must have seen that the _Impérieuse_ was engaged with the _Aquilon_ and _Ville de Varsovie_, as well as with the _Calcutta_, before the _Valiant_, _Revenge_, &c., were ordered in to our assistance, as requested by my signal. And here it must be distinctly understood, that _had not a portion of the fleet been compelled by this justifiable device of my signaling “In want of assistance,” to come to our supposed aid, no attack would have been made_. To avert this disgrace, I resolved, if necessary, to sacrifice my ship.
Throughout the whole despatch, there is not a word to indicate that the terror caused by the explosion-vessels had anything to do with the success gained. On the contrary, the success is attributed to causes purely imaginary. Great credit is given to me “for the vigorous and gallant attack on the French line-of-battle ships ashore,” and for “my judicious manner of approaching them, and placing my ship in a position most advantageous to annoy the enemy, and _preserve my own ship!_ which,” continued his Lordship, “could not be exceeded by any feat of valour hitherto achieved by the British navy!”
The plain fact is, and it will by this time be evident to others besides nautical men, that the just quoted piece of claptrap was considered in the light of a sop to my supposed vanity, sufficient to insure my holding my peace on the subject of the fleet not having even contemplated an attack till forced into it by my signal being mistaken for being “in distress.”
Instead of being praised for what my plans really effected, I was praised for what was neither done nor intended to be done. Instead of adopting “a judicious manner of approaching the enemy, so as _to preserve my ship_,” I drifted the _Impérieuse_ in like a log with the tide, and stern foremost, for fear of being recalled, and then went at the enemy with a determination, not to preserve, but _to lose_ my ship, if the commander-in-chief did not relieve her before she was riddled with shot; this being my only hope of forcing on an attack of any kind. My motive was, no doubt, fathomed from seeing me attack three line-of-battle ships simultaneously. Not a moment was to be lost, and for the first time, since the French ran their ships ashore in terror, two British line-of-battle ships, and some frigates, approached the spot where the enemy’s vessels had been lying aground _ever since the previous midnight_, helpless, and, as every French authority admits, hopeless of escape, had the slightest effort been made to prevent it.
In place, then, of attacking these with a single frigate, in such a way as to “_preserve my ship_,” I here avow that I rushed at the enemy in the bitterness of despair, determined that if a portion of the fleet was not sent in, the _Impérieuse_ should never again float out; for rather than incur the stigma which would have awaited me in England, from no fault of mine, but because it was not expedient that plans which had been partially successful should be fully accomplished, she should have been destroyed.
This despatch, inexplicable as it was felt to be, naturally suggested to the public mind in England, that, despite its assumption of a great victory, the result of the victory was by no means commensurate with the tone of exultation assumed. The French fleet was _not_ destroyed; and it was equally manifest, that if but little had been effected, it was owing to the time which had been suffered to elapse between my first signals and the tardy aid reluctantly yielded in support of them. By that kind of intuitive perception characteristic of the British press, it was agreed that there had been mismanagement somewhere, but _where_ was not to be gathered from the commander-in-chief’s despatch, in which everything “by favour of the Almighty,”[60] as the despatch most reprehensibly set forth, had succeeded.
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Footnote 60:
There is something very revolting to a truly religious mind in these derogatory phrases, which couple the beneficent Author of our being with the butcheries of war. Under no circumstances are they defensible. But when the name of the great and merciful Creator is made subservient to an attempt to palm off as a great victory that which, in reality, was a great disgrace even to the human means available, there is something shocking in the perversion of language which should only be uttered with the profoundest reverence, and on occasions in strict coincidence with the attributes of the sacred name invoked. In this case _fireships_ had been denounced as horrible and antichristian, yet _explosion vessels_—engines of destruction tenfold more diabolical—had, “by favour of the Almighty,” succeeded!
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It is not surprising, then, that the press began to criticise the despatch on its own merits. The following remarks are extracted from a _Times_ leading article in the paper of April 25th, 1809, by way of specimen:—
“None felt more joy than ourselves at the destruction of four French vessels in Basque (Aix) Roads. We have, however, been given to understand that there are some people conversant in these things, whose satisfaction is not quite so complete as was our own on the result of the action.