Chapter 21 of 31 · 3903 words · ~20 min read

Part 21

On the 8th the _Spartan_ and _Impérieuse_ stood towards the Gulf of Foz, where, seeing a number of troops placed for the defence of a signal telegraph, both ships manned boats, and in addition to the seamen, the marines of the _Impérieuse_ were sent with a nine-pounder field piece—one of our prizes from Duhesme’s army. On effecting a landing, the enemy’s troops retired to the interior, when, firing two volleys after them, the telegraph named Tignes was taken and blown up, the signals being secured as before.

On the 9th we passed close to Port Vendre, _Spartan_ in company, and anchored about a mile from the shore; but an alarm having been raised, and the troops on shore having got our range, we were at 3 A.M. on the 10th, compelled to shift our position.

Before daylight the boats of both ships were manned, and pulled on shore, a battery firing at us, but as the shot went over, no mischief was done. Our seamen and marines having landed to the right of the battery, the enemy’s troops fled, and we took possession, spiking the guns, destroying their carriages, and blowing up the barracks. These operations were scarcely completed, when a considerable body of troops made their appearance in the distance, and by the time we returned on board, a number of cavalry and artillery had assembled on the site of their demolished battery.

We now passed close to a small fishing town, where other guns were observed in position, both on the right and on the left, these being manned by regular troops and backed by hundreds of armed peasantry, who showed a bolder front than had the garrison of the battery recently destroyed. By way of feint, to draw off the attention of the cavalry, both _Spartan_ and _Impérieuse_ manned their small boats and the rocket boats with the ships’ boys, dressed in marines’ scarlet jackets, despatching these at some distance towards the right, as though an attack were there intended. The device was successful, and a body of cavalry, as we anticipated, promptly set off to receive them.

Meanwhile the ships stood towards the town, under a smart fire from the batteries, the shot from which several times took effect. When close in, the _Impérieuse_ opened her broadside, and the _Spartan_ following, an incessant fire was kept up for an hour, at the expiration of which the marines of both ships were landed. As soon as the boats touched the shore, the enemy fled from the battery, the guns of which were immediately spiked.

The cavalry, which had gone off to repel the sham attack to the right, having found out the trick which had been played upon them, were now seen galloping back to save the battery, which had just been rendered useless, and from which our marines were now re-embarking. So intent were they on rescuing their guns, that they did not appear to have noticed the altered position of the ships, which, as soon as the horsemen approached within musket shot, opened upon them with grape so effectually, that all who were not knocked out of their saddles rode off as fast as they could, and the marines leisurely returned to their respective ships.

As the French troops had now taken shelter in the town, and the people were everywhere armed, I returned to the _Impérieuse_ for the large boats, in each of which a gun was mounted, with the object of clearing the beach and silencing the other battery. By 6 o’clock this was accomplished, not only the battery, but many of the houses and vessels being destroyed. As our boats neared the town, a numerous body of troops again began a brisk fire with musketry; and by the time one of the largest vessels, which yet remained undemolished, could be blown up, the fire became so warm that it was advisable to cease from further operations, and we returned to the frigate.

In this affair a considerable number of people must have been killed ashore during the five hours and a half continued firing; the cavalry and infantry engaged amounting to several hundreds, whilst the armed inhabitants mustered in equal, if not superior numbers. Neither _Spartan_ nor _Impérieuse_ had any killed, and only a few wounded, though, from their proximity to the shore, the rigging of both ships was a good deal cut up, and several shots passed through their hulls. Besides the seamen, we had only fifty marines engaged, thirty from the _Impérieuse_, and twenty from the _Spartan_.

On the 11th at 8 P.M. we anchored off the town of Cette, just out of gunshot, the batteries on shore however maintaining a brisk fire, which was consequently thrown away.

At midnight two boats were despatched from the _Impérieuse_ and one from the _Spartan_, to throw rockets into the town, the batteries continuing their fire in all directions till daylight, but doing no damage.

At 4 A.M. on the 12th we got under weigh, and when within a mile of the shore, between Cette and Montpellier, sent the boats to burn two large pontoons, close to the signal station, which the _Impérieuse_ had attempted to destroy on the 18th _ultimo_. One of the pontoons was burned, and the other blown up without opposition, together with the signal station and other public buildings which we had not been able to destroy on the former occasion. A number of troops showed themselves, but were contented with firing at a harmless distance. As nothing more remained to be done, we again made sail.

On the morning of the 13th a convoy was discovered in shore. As soon as they saw us, the vessels composing it altered their course, and by 12 o’clock had taken refuge in a deep bay in the vicinity, it being, no doubt, calculated that we should not venture to pass over an extensive shoal, which almost closed up the entrance of the bay. By careful sounding we, however, managed to effect a passage, and three of the smaller vessels perceiving that we should attain our object, passed over the opposite end of the shoal and got away.

About midday it blew a hurricane, and both ships were rapidly driving towards shore, but by letting go another anchor they were brought up. In about a couple of hours the wind abated, when we weighed and anchored close to the remaining vessels, taking possession of the whole that remained, viz. a ship, two brigs, a bombard, a xebec, and a settee, but all aground. We, however, succeeded in getting off the ship, one brig, the bombard, and settee. The remainder were burned. During these operations a body of French troops lined the beach; we did not, however, attempt to molest them, as it was still blowing so hard that the prizes were with difficulty got off.

On the 16th we despatched some of the prizes to Gibraltar, and the remainder to Rosas. The _Spartan_ now parted company with us to rejoin the Toulon fleet, and the _Impérieuse_ held on her course for Rosas with the prize brig in tow, she having been so much damaged by beating on the shoals before she was captured, as to require the greatest exertion to keep her afloat.

On the 18th we came to an anchor off Rosas, and on the 23rd, having patched up our prize, she was sent to Gibraltar in charge of Lieutenant Mapleton.

On the 24th the _Impérieuse_ again sailed for the French coast, and passing Cette, stood into the Gulf of Foz.

In these cruises our greatest difficulty was to procure fresh water, which was only to be obtained on the enemy’s coast, so that the men had frequently to be placed on short allowance. As we were now destitute of this necessary, I determined to run for the entrance of the Rhone, and fill up with water by a novel expedient. Our foretopmast studding-sails were sewn up and converted into huge bags nearly watertight, these—as the water at the river’s mouth was brackish—were sent in the boats higher up the stream where it was pure. The bags being there filled, were towed alongside the ship, and the water pumped as quickly as possible into the hold by means of the fire engine, the operation being repeated till we had obtained a sufficient supply.

Having thus replenished our water, we made an attempt to obtain fresh meat also at the enemy’s expense. Whilst engaged in watering, a number of cattle had been observed grazing on the banks of the river, and a party was taken on shore to secure some. But this time circumstances were against us. The lowlands on the banks of the river having been flooded, we found on landing a complete morass; the men nevertheless gave chase to the cattle, but they were so wild, that after a run of three miles, often up to the middle in water, nothing was caught but the herdsman, a poor wretch, who no doubt believing, according to current report in France, that the English killed all their prisoners, began to prepare for death in the most exemplary manner, scarcely crediting the evidence of his senses on being liberated.

In this excursion we had perceived a new telegraph station, about three miles from Foz, the building being complete with the exception of the machine. We set fire to the building, but the destruction not being fully accomplished, the boats were again sent on shore to blow it up, which was done in the presence of about a hundred troops assembled for its protection. A shot from the ship was so well aimed that it fell right amongst the party, killing one man and wounding several. A few more shots completely dispersed them in such haste as to compel them to relinquish their dead comrade.

On inspecting the abandoned body through a glass, it evidently appeared to be that of an officer, and hence it occurred to me that he might have papers about him which would prove useful. In order to secure them, if there were any, the frigate’s barge was again despatched on shore, but before the men could land, a horse was brought from the interior, and the body being laid across him, a shot was fired from the ship over the heads of the party in charge of the horse, which becoming restive, the body was again abandoned. The boat’s crew having by this time landed, found it to be that of an officer, as I had conjectured, the poor fellow having been nearly cut in two by a round shot. As no papers of any consequence were found, our men wrapped him in a sheet which the troops had brought with the horse, and again returned on board.

The _Impérieuse_ continued her course along the coast, and on the 3Oth, seeing some small vessels at anchor near Boni, the boats were sent to destroy them. This being effected in the face of a detachment of troops and the armed population of a small fishing town, the latter also shared the same fate. Passing close to Boni, we saw several vessels at anchor, and made preparations to attack them, but it coming on to blow hard from the westward, we held on our course towards Marseilles, off which a large polacca-rigged ship passed astern of the _Impérieuse_, out of gunshot. The boats were lowered, but the wind increasing, they had to be taken on board again, and the polacca got into Marseilles, which was then distant about eight miles.

On the 1st of October we again passed close to Ciotat, but saw nothing to attract our attention. On the 2nd some French ships were discovered at anchor near the land to the westward of Toulon, and several guns were fired at us from four batteries on the coast, but without damage, as we were not within reach of shot.

Seeing a frigate to leeward, we exchanged numbers, and found her to be our former consort the _Spartan_, which had been engaged in reconnoitring the enemy’s port. Shortly afterwards she bore up and made all sail, the French line-of-battle ships quitting port in pursuit. When within about four miles of these we came to the wind, and the _Spartan_ signalled that, since the previous evening, five of the enemy’s frigates and a storeship had sailed from Toulon.

As the _Spartan_ again signalled for us to pass within hail, I went on board, and from the information communicated, bore up in search of the admiral. Not finding him where we expected to fall in with him, we ran with a fair wind for Minorca, arriving off Port Mahon on the 5th.

As there was only a Spanish ship of the line in harbour, we again proceeded in quest of the flagship, and soon after midday fell in with her on her way to Minorca. On communicating to Lord Collingwood intelligence of the escape of the five frigates from Toulon, his lordship ordered the _Impérieuse_ to Gibraltar with despatches. We therefore wore ship and made sail for that port, where we arrived without further incident.

For these operations on the coast of France I never received the slightest acknowledgment from the Admiralty, though, regardless of prize-money, I had completely disorganised the telegraphic communication of the enemy, from the seat of war in Catalonia to one of the principal naval arsenals of France; and had created an amount of terrorism on the French coast, which, from inculcating the belief that it was intended to be followed up, prevented the French Government from further attempts at throwing a military force on the Mediterranean coast of Spain. This, as has been said, was my object, as the Spaniards were now in alliance with us. For the panic thus created on the French coast, and its consequences, French writers have given me credit, but the British Government none!

By people of narrow views it has been said that such operations formed no business of mine, and that my zeal exceeded my discretion, which I deny. The commander-in-chief, Lord Collingwood—confiding in my discretion—had sent me to do what I could to assist the Spaniards and annoy the French—and I am proud to say that both objects were effected to his lordship’s satisfaction, as will appear from his letters. What damage can I do to the enemy? was my guiding principle, and the excitement of accomplishing the mischief was my only reward,—for I got no other.

To the disgrace of the then corrupt British administration, which withheld not only reward, but praise, because I had connected myself with a radical constituency, and had set up as a reformer of naval abuses, nothing was manifested in return for these services but hatred. I am proud, however, to make known the subjoined testimony of Lord Collingwood, who gave me the credit of paralysing the enemy’s operations by the panic which the _Impérieuse_ created on the coast of France; thus neutralising military expeditions intended to act against Catalonia, or, in other words, preventing, by means of a single frigate, the march of an army into the Mediterranean provinces of Spain, where it could at the time have operated with complete effect. Posterity may not believe the effect of these exertions as narrated by myself. To Lord Collingwood they _must_ give credit.

“Admiralty Office, Jan. 7th, 1809.

“_Copy of a Letter from_ Vice-Admiral LORD COLLINGWOOD, _Commander-in-Chief of His Majesty’s ships and vessels in the Mediterranean, to the_ Hon. WELLESLEY POLE, _dated on board the_ Ocean, _off Toulon, the 19th of October, 1808_.

“SIR,—I enclose a letter which I have just received from the Right Honourable Lord Cochrane, captain of the _Impérieuse_, stating the services in which he has been employed on the coast of Languedoc. Nothing can exceed the zeal and activity with which his lordship pursues the enemy. The success which attends his enterprises clearly indicates with what skill and ability they are conducted, besides keeping the coast in constant alarm—causing a general suspension of the trade, and harassing a body of troops employed in opposing him. He has probably prevented _these troops which were intended for Figueras from advancing into Spain, by giving them employment in the defence of their own coasts_.

* * * * * * * *

“I have the honour to be, &c. “COLLINGWOOD.”

(Enclosure.)

“_Impérieuse_, Gulf of Lyons, 28th Sept. 1808.

“MY LORD,—With varying opposition, but with unvaried success, the newly constructed semaphoric telegraphs—which are of the utmost consequence to the safety of the numerous convoys that pass along the coast of France—at Bourdique, La Pinede, St. Maguire, Frontignan, Canet, and Fay, have been blown up and completely demolished, together with their telegraph houses, fourteen barracks of _gens d’armes_, one battery, and the strong tower on the lake of Frontignan.

“Mr. Mapleton, first lieutenant, had command of these expeditions. Lieutenant Johnson had charge of the field pieces, and Lieutenant Hore of the Royal Marines. To them, and to Mr. Gilbert, assistant-surgeon, Mr. Burney, gunner, Messrs. Houston Stewart[40] and Stoven, midshipmen, is due whatever credit may arise from such mischief, and for having, with so small a force, drawn about 2000 troops from the important fortress of Figueras in Spain, for the defence of their own coasts.

“The conduct of Lieutenants Mapleton, Johnston, and Hore, deserves my praise, as well as that of the other officers, Royal Marines, and seamen.

“I have the honour to be, my Lord, “Your obedient servant, &c. “COCHRANE.

“Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood.”

_Impérieuse._—None killed, none wounded, one singed in blowing up the battery.

_French._—One commanding officer of troops killed. How many others unknown.

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Footnote 40:

The present gallant Admiral Sir Houston Stewart, commanding Her Britannic Majesty’s squadron on the North American station.

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CHAP. XVII.

CRUISE OF THE _IMPÉRIEUSE_ CONTINUED.

CAPTURE A SETTEE.—GET UNDER SAIL.—FIGHT BETWEEN THE PATRIOTS AND FRENCH.—MAKE SAIL FOR ROSAS.—FORT TRINIDAD.—GALLANTRY OF CAPTAIN WEST.—BRAVERY OF THE CATALAN.—REPULSE OF THE FRENCH.—ATTACK OF THE IMPÉRIEUSE.—THE FRENCH REDOUBLE THEIR EFFORTS.—OCCUPATION OF CATALONIA.—THE CASTLE OF TRINIDAD.—NATURE OF OUR POSITION.—NATURE OF OUR OPERATIONS.—MANUFACTURE OF A MAN-TRAP.—LOSE MY NOSE.—THE FRENCH ASSAULT ROSAS.—PRACTICE OF THE FRENCH.—PRESENTIMENT.—THE FRENCH ATTACK.—THE ATTACK REPULSED.—BRAVERY OF A FRENCH SOLDIER.—HEAVY GALE OF WIND.—UNFORTUNATE ACCIDENT.—EVACUATE THE FORTRESS.—STAND TOWARDS LA ESCALA.—LETTER FROM LORD COLLINGWOOD.—DESPATCH TO LORD COLLINGWOOD.—LETTER TO THE ADMIRALTY.—TESTIMONY OF THE SPANIARDS.—SIR WALTER SCOTT.—OFFICIAL GRATITUDE.

On the 19th of October we again quitted Gibraltar for the eastward, having learned that the French frigates which had succeeded in getting out of Toulon were at anchor in St. Fiorenzo bay, in the island of Corsica. After leaving Gibraltar, we stood over towards the Spanish possessions on the Barbary coast, and finding everything right there, passed on to the Zaffarine Islands, inside of which we anchored for the purpose of painting and refitting the ship, which stood much in need of renovation.

This being accomplished, we again sailed on the 29th, and on the 31st arrived in the harbour of Carthagena, where we found the Russian ambassador to Austria on his way to Trieste. No English man-of-war having been here since our former visit, we were received with great hospitality and attention by the authorities and inhabitants, who unanimously expressed their delight at being at peace with England; though, as a Spanish fleet lay dismantled in the harbour, it struck me that they might aid England to better purpose by looking after the enemy. Even their convoys had to be protected by English ships, for whilst we lay at Carthagena, the _Myrtle_ arrived from Tarragona, with twelve sail of transports which she had convoyed thither with Spanish troops from Lisbon, and again returned for more.

The _Impérieuse_ left Carthagena on the 10th of November, and rounding Cape Palos, passed between Majorca and the mainland, where, on the 11th, we captured a settee. On the 12th we anchored off Barcelona, which place was still in possession of the French. The _Cambrian_ was at anchor in the roads.

At night we sent the boats of the _Impérieuse_ to throw rockets into the fort, and at daylight on the following morning got under weigh, but perceiving two boats full of men in chase of some Spanish settees, we lowered ours, and pulled for the boats, which on seeing our intention, abandoned their prey, and ran in under the forts for protection.

On our arrival at Barcelona the _Cambrian_ went out for a run, leaving the _Impérieuse_ to watch the enemy. On her return we again out boats, and proceeded to blow up a fort close to the entrance of Llogrebat river, and succeeded in so far shattering its foundations, as to render it useless. On the 14th the _Impérieuse_ anchored near the mouth of this river for the purpose of watering, sending at the same time a boat to throw rockets into the barracks, in order to divert the attention of the Barcelona garrison.

Having completed watering on the 15th, we again got under sail, and resumed our position before the town, shortly after which we observed about 2000 of the French army march out and ascend the hills, where they soon became engaged with a large body of Spanish peasantry. The ships followed, keeping as far as practicable in shore; but still at too great a distance to render any material assistance to the patriots, who were at last forced from their position. As soon as this action was over, the batteries commenced firing shells at us. In place of replying to this, both ships opened a heavy fire on the portion of the town occupied by French troops, amongst whom, as we afterwards learned from the Spaniards, our shot told with great effect.

Irritated by this unexpected movement, the whole of the batteries ashore began to ply us with shot and shell, the latter of which were thrown with excellent precision as regarded their direction, but fell either over or short of us, two only bursting near the _Impérieuse_, but without doing us any harm. The _Cambrian_, lying a little farther out, escaped with similar impunity. With round shot the batteries were in our case more lucky, one of these passing through the barge and galley, and another striking the muzzle of a brass 32-pounder on the forecastle, in such a way as to render it useless, though without injury to the men who were at the time working the guns.

The circumstances under which the destruction of this gun was effected, are too curious to be passed over.

By an extraordinary coincidence the enemy’s shot entered the muzzle at the moment our men were firing it, so that the two shots met in the bore! The consequence was, that the gun was blown up nearly in the middle, the exterior being forced into a globular form—to our great annoyance, for this gun was one of our most useful weapons.

On the 17th another action took place between the mountaineers and a French force on the hills, the object of the patriots being to get possession of the heights, where the French had established a battery, but which on every side annoyed the _cordon_ of irregular troops employed in intercepting provisions, from which the Spaniards could not dislodge them, though they appeared to make their attacks with so much judgment and vigour as to compel the enemy to remain on the defensive. In the present case the attack was unsuccessful, the patriots being compelled to retire without accomplishing their object.