Part 22
After this affair was concluded, several Spanish officers came on board the _Impérieuse_, and spoke confidently of being able to drive in the French advanced force as soon as General Reding’s force joined. They informed me that the presence of the _Impérieuse_ and _Cambrian_ had been of great use, by compelling the French to keep a considerable portion of their troops in the town, and to employ others in manning the coast batteries, so that few were available for operations elsewhere; but beyond this we had no opportunity of assisting the patriots, as the heights to which the enemy clung so tenaciously were beyond the reach of shot or shell from the ships.
On the 19th I received information of the French having invested Rosas, and knowing that Lord Collingwood attached considerable importance to this place, I considered it my duty, in accordance with his lordship’s instructions, to proceed in that direction, hoping that the _Impérieuse_ might there render substantial service; we therefore left the _Cambrian_ before Barcelona, and made sail for Rosas, where we arrived on the following day. As it fell calm, the ship was compelled to anchor ten miles from the fortress.
On our arrival a heavy cannonade was going on between the ships and a French battery thrown up on the cliff above Fort Trinidad. The _Impérieuse_, as has been said, being out of range, I took the gig and landed in the town, to ascertain how we might best employ ourselves. Having satisfied myself on this point, I sent back the gig with orders for the frigate to make every effort to get within range of the French troops surrounding the town, so as to enfilade them. As the calm continued, she was, however, unable to approach till the following day, I meanwhile remaining in Rosas, to encourage the Spanish troops, whose spirit was beginning to give way.
Previous to our arrival the marines of the _Excellent_, together with some Spanish troops, had occupied the citadel. Many of these having been wounded, the _Excellent_ took upwards of forty on board and sailed, leaving the _Fame_ to watch the place, and her commander withdrew some thirty marines, who, with sixty or seventy Spaniards, occupied Fort Trinidad. The departure of the _Excellent_ in the first place, and the withdrawal of the marines in the second, greatly dispirited the Spaniards, who on the evening of the 21st began to quit the town in boats.
A brief outline of what had occurred previous to my arrival in the _Impérieuse_, will here be requisite, in order to comprehend the events which followed. On the 6th of November a body of 6000 French, or rather Italians, coming from Figueras, had taken possession of the town and the heights commanding the roads. The inhabitants forthwith fled; but the _Excellent_ and _Meteor_, then lying in the harbour, speedily drove out the invaders.
On the assault of the town some of the inhabitants had fled to the citadel, which was in a wretched condition, one of its bastions having been blown down during the last war; and such had been the negligence of the Spanish military authorities, that it had received no better repair than a few planks and loose stones; whilst the stores were even in a more wretched condition than the works. It was, however, necessary to put it, as far as possible, in a defensible condition, and to this Captain West, of the _Excellent_, energetically applied himself.
To the eastward of the town, on an eminence commanding the harbour, stood Fort Trinidad, of which a description will presently be given. In this fortress Captain West placed five-and-twenty of the _Excellent’s_ marines, in addition to the Spaniards who manned the fort; and, at the same time, sent fifty seamen into the citadel to support the garrison.
The Spanish governor, O’Daly, now sent a request to the Junta of Gerona for reinforcements; but the French, managing to intercept his despatches, caused it to be reported to the Junta that the English had taken forcible possession of the fortress, and deposed the governor; whereupon, in place of sending reinforcements, the Junta wrote to Captain West, demanding an explanation of conduct so extraordinary, and, till this explanation revealed the trick, it remained undiscovered.
On the 9th the citadel was attacked by General Reille, and a breach effected; but Captain West, placing the _Meteor_ in a position to flank the breach, and sending some boats to enfilade the shore, prevented the assault, and despatching more seamen to the citadel, the next day it was again in a tolerably defensive state, so much so that Captain West had sallied out with the seamen and effected the rescue of a party of Catalonian militia.
The French commander, thus foiled by the gallantry and judgment of Captain West, now deemed it necessary to proceed against Rosas by regular siege, but first made an attempt to storm Fort Trinidad, in which he was repulsed with considerable loss; but the fort was so much in danger that, in order to prevent surprise, Captain West reinforced it with thirty additional marines, who entered by means of rope ladders.
The French now, despite opposition from the ships, began to erect batteries on the heights for the demolition of Fort Trinidad, and threw up an entrenchment 300 yards from the citadel, for the purpose of breaching that also. A 3-gun battery opened against the town walls, and the joint effect of these being occasionally directed against the ships compelled them to retire out of range.
Captain West was now superseded by Captain Bennett of the _Fame_, and, as a breach had nearly been effected in the lower bomb proof of Fort Trinidad, Captain Bennett withdrew the marines. At this juncture I arrived at Rosas in the _Impérieuse_, having, indeed, come there to render what assistance I could to the Spaniards, and, knowing the endurance, as well as indomitable bravery of the Catalan or _Michelet_[41] character; feeling, moreover, assured that the Junta of Gerona would supply early assistance, I determined to replace the marines which Captain Bennett had withdrawn, with others from my own frigate. As it was generally known amongst vessels on the Mediterranean station that I was acting under discretionary orders from Lord Collingwood, Captain Bennett, though he had withdrawn his own men, and notwithstanding that he was my senior officer, did not attempt to thwart my resolution, probably because he considered that by so doing he might be interfering with the instructions given me by Lord Collingwood.
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Footnote 41:
A name given at this period to the irregular Catalonian troops, as well as to other Spaniards embodied with them, from one of their old leaders, Michelet de Prato, the companion of Cæsar Borgia, and the principal agent in many of his atrocities. In the old wars of Arragon, they were called Almogavares, and at the period of which I write had lost little of their traditional daring, or that ready ingenuity in difficulties, which supplied the want of a more efficient warlike equipment.
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On the 22nd, after having given further instructions on board the _Impérieuse_ for annoying the enemy during my absence, I again went on shore to the citadel, into which the French were incessantly throwing shells, but without much effect; for although every shell fell within the place, the shelter was excellent, and no great damage was done.
Having ascertained the position of the enemy’s entrenchments, I returned on board, and despatched a party from the frigate to fire upon them at the distance of about 600 yards, as well as to harass the batteries in course of construction. The work was so well performed by our men as to embarrass the troops in the batteries, and thus lessen their fire on the citadel, the preservation of which, till further assistance should arrive, was my principal object. A battery of 24-pounders on the top of a cliff, and therefore inaccessible to our fire, kept up, however, an unremitting fire on Fort Trinidad, every shot striking; but the fort being bomb-proof, without injury to the little garrison, which, like that of the citadel, was well sheltered, but had no means of returning the fire except occasionally by musketry.
After pounding away at the fort for several days, the French made up their minds to storm, but on coming within range of musket-shot, they got such a reception from the garrison as to render a hasty retreat imperative. As their discomfiture was visible from the ship, we fired a salute of twenty-one guns by way of sarcastic compliment, but the enemy had not the politeness to return the courtesy.
The _Impérieuse_ now got under weigh, and cleared for action, taking up a position to the left of the citadel, and within musket-shot of the French lines, into which we poured such a storm of shot as to drive out the enemy. Satisfied with the success, I went on shore at Rosas, and got 700 Spaniards to embark in the boats, afterwards putting them on board a light vessel, with the intention of landing them at the back of Fort Trinidad, so as to dislodge the troops from the battery on the cliff, and throw the guns over. The movement was, however, detected by the French commander, and a force which had just been engaged at a distance was hastily recalled, and rushed on, driving the Spaniards and some Germans before them. Manning the batteries, the French instantly turned their attention to the _Impérieuse_, against which they directed such a well-aimed shower of shells as rendered it imperative to get under sail and anchor out of range.
The firing between the batteries and the citadel was kept up during the night without intermission, and at daylight the Spaniards we had landed for the attack on the cliff battery appeared in such confusion, that it became necessary to despatch the boats to bring off a party of marines, who had been put on shore with them. Our men reported that the Spaniards had unaccountably refused to follow them to the attack, and, as is usual in such cases, had suffered far more severely than they would have done had they persevered in the attempt to capture the battery. On sending boats to bring off the Spaniards we only got 300 out of the 700, the remainder being either killed or made prisoners.
On the 23rd we again ran in under Fort Trinidad, but this time on the opposite side to the battery on the cliff, where we could effect considerable mischief, without receiving much in return. It now fell dead calm, so that it was lucky we had not taken up our former position, where we might have been terribly annoyed.
The French, without paying much attention to us, now appeared to redouble their efforts against both castle and citadel, whilst their troops mustered strongly on the hills, with the evident intention of an attack on both, the moment a breach became practicable.
Finding this to be the case, the _Fame_ withdrew her marines from Fort Trinidad, upon which I went ashore, and after careful inspection of the breach in course of formation, considering it still capable of prolonged defence, begged the commandant to hold out till next day, when he should be reinforced with marines from the _Impérieuse_, promising at the same time to remain myself in the fortress with the men. With some difficulty he was induced to consent to this arrangement, after telling me that it had been his intention to capitulate on the same evening.
Nor was the Spanish governor at all to blame for his intention to surrender the fortress. Captain Bennett had withdrawn his men, thinking, no doubt, that it was untenable, and that therefore nothing was to be gained by their exposure; so that the Spanish governor might fairly plead that further resistance had been deemed unavailing by the English themselves.
Lord Collingwood had, however, entrusted me with discretionary orders to assist the Spaniards, and it appeared to me that the present was an instance where those orders might be carried into effect, for I had no doubt, if assistance arrived promptly, that the French would be compelled to raise the siege of Rosas, as they had done that of Gerona. In which case they would find themselves isolated at Barcelona; and being cut off, as they already were by land, and exposed to bombardment by sea, must surrender. The occupation of Catalonia, in short, turned on two points; 1st, whether the Junta of Gerona supplied an adequate reinforcement; and, 2ndly, whether I could hold Fort Trinidad till it arrived. Neither do I blame Captain Bennett for withdrawing his men. It was simply matter of opinion, his being that neither fort nor citadel would long hold out—mine, formed on actual inspection of the fort, that it was still in a condition to maintain itself, and being so, that its retention was essential for the preservation of the town and citadel. And had there been a little more alacrity on the part of the Gerona Junta in supplying reinforcements, that opinion would have been justified. Captain Bennett perhaps knew the dilatory habits of the Spaniards better than I did; but although my senior officer, he was disinterested enough not in any way to interfere with my plans.
Before daylight on the 24th we landed fifty men, ordering all the marines to follow after sunset. Our first object was to effect such repairs as would put the fort in a better state of defence, and this was accomplished without any great difficulty, as the French were confining their attention to one particular spot, where, by a constant succession of quick firing, they hoped to make a practicable breach. This we could not prevent, having no artillery to reply to theirs.
My principal ground for a belief in the practicability of holding the fort arose from the peculiar form and thickness of the walls, to penetrate which was no easy matter, if resolutely defended. Even if eventually successful, it would not be difficult to evacuate the fort by the lower portion, before the enemy could establish themselves in the upper, whilst a well constructed mine would involve both them and the castle in one common ruin.
The Castle of Trinidad stood on the side of a hill, having by no means a difficult descent to the sea, but this hill was again commanded by a higher and more precipitous cliff, which would have enabled an enemy to drive out the occupants with ease, but for the peculiar construction of the fortress.
Next to the sea was a fort constructed with strong walls some 50 feet high. Behind this and joined to it, rose another fort to the height of 30 or 40 feet more, and behind this again was a tower rising some 20 or 30 feet still higher, the whole presenting the appearance of a large church with a tower 110 feet high, a nave 90 feet high, and a chancel 50 feet. The tower, having its back to the cliff, as a matter of course sheltered the middle and lower portions of the fortress from a fire of the battery above it. Nothing, in short, for a fortress commanded by adjacent heights could have been better adapted for holding out against offensive operations, or worse adapted for replying to them; this on our part being out of the question, as the French battery was too much elevated on the cliff for artillery to reach, whilst the tower which prevented their shot from annoying us, would also have prevented our firing at them, even had we possessed artillery.
It was to this tower therefore that the French chiefly directed their attention, as a practicable breach therein, followed by a successful assault, would in their estimation place the fortress at their mercy, so that we must either be driven out or forced to surrender. In consequence of the elevated position of the enemy’s battery on the cliff, they could however only breach the central portion of the tower, the lowest part of the breach being nearly sixty feet above its base, so that when practicable, it could only be reached by long scaling ladders.
A pretty correct idea of our relative positions may be formed if the unnautical reader will imagine our small force to be placed in the nave of Westminster Abbey, with the enemy attacking the great western tower from the summit of a cliff 100 feet higher than the tower, so that the breach in course of formation nearly corresponded to the great west window of the abbey. It will hence be clear that, in the face of a determined opposition, it would be no easy matter to scale the external wall of the tower up to the great west window, and more difficult still to overcome impediments presently to be mentioned, so as to get down into the body of the church. These were the points I had to provide against, for we could neither prevent the French from breaching nor storming.
It so happened, that just at the spot where the breach was in process of formation, there was a lofty bomb proof interior arch, upwards of fifty feet in height. This arch, reaching from the lower part of the breach to the interior base of the tower, was without much difficulty converted into an obstacle, of which the French little dreamed; viz. into a chasm, down which they must have plunged headlong had they attempted to penetrate an inch beyond the outer wall, even after they had gained it.
The only operation necessary was to break in the crown of the arch, so that all who on an assault ventured on penetrating farther than the outer wall of the breach, must of necessity be hurled to the bottom. But as the fall of a portion of the enemy might not deter the rest from holding possession of the outer wall till they were provided with the means of overcoming the obstacle, I got together all the timber at hand, and constructed a huge wooden case, exactly resembling the hopper of a mill—the upper part being kept well greased with cooks’ slush from the _Impérieuse_, so that to retain a hold upon it was impossible. Down this, with the slightest pressure from behind, the storming party must have fallen to a depth of fifty feet, and all they could have done, if not killed, would have been to remain prisoners at the bottom of the bomb proof.
The mantrap being thus completed,—and to do the Spaniards justice, they entered with ardour into the work,—the next object was to prepare trains for the explosion of the magazines, in case evacuation of the fort became compulsory. This was done in two places; the first deposit of powder being placed underneath the breach, with the portfire so arranged, as to go off in about ten minutes; the other beneath the remaining part of the fortress, with a portfire calculated to burn until we ourselves were safe on board the frigate.
The French were highly exasperated on finding that the castle had been reinforced from the _Impérieuse_, of which ship they had by this time not a few unpleasant reminiscences; they therefore adopted additional measures to put a stop to our co-operation.
In addition to the previously mentioned battery, another was erected on the cliff commanding the fortress; and on the 25th, upwards of 300 shots were directed at the tower, the result being a hole, which speedily widened into a tolerable breach. Our men were now engaged in blocking it up as fast as it was made, and working as they did under cover, no loss was sustained, though every shot brought down large masses of stone within the fortress; the French thus supplying us with materials for repair, though rendering a sharp look-out against splinters necessary.
On this day I received a wound, which caused me intolerable agony. Being anxious, during an ominous pause, to see what the enemy were about, I incautiously looked round an angle of the tower towards the battery overhead, and was struck by a stone splinter in the face; the splinter flattening my nose and then penetrating my mouth. By the skill of our excellent doctor, Mr. Guthrie, my nose was after a time rendered serviceable.
Whilst the enemy were breaching the tower, the boats of the _Impérieuse_ inflicted on them such severe chastisement, that detachments of infantry were stationed on the hills to drive off the boats with musketry; but our people managed to keep out of harm’s way, whilst directing a destructive fire upon the nearer portion of our opponents.
On the 26th the French renewed their fire; but as during the previous night we had filled up the breach with loose rubble, their progress was by no means rapid, the rubble forming almost as great an obstacle as did the wall itself. It was, however, evident that the breach must sooner or later become practicable, so that we turned our attention to the erection of interior barricades, in case of a sudden attempt to storm. In addition to these barricades festoons of top chains were brought from the ship, and suspended over the hopper and elsewhere; the chains being moreover armed with large fishhooks, so securely fastened, that there was little danger of those who were caught, getting away before they were shot.
The barricades constituted what may be termed a rampart within the breach, constructed of palisades, barrels, bags of earth, &c., these supplying the place of walls, whilst the descent from the crown of the bombproof to the bottom, constituted a formidable substitute for a ditch.
We got to-day a trifling though welcome reinforcement of sixty regular Spanish, or rather Irish troops in the Spanish service, and sent an equal number of peasants to Rosas; for though these men were brave, as are all Catalans, and ready enough, yet their want of military skill rendered them ill adapted to the work in hand. As soon as the Irish comprehended our means of defence, and the reception prepared for the enemy, their delight at the prospective mischief was highly characteristic, and could not have been exceeded had they been preparing for a “scrimmage” in their native country.
At midnight the French made a general assault on the town of Rosas, and after several hours’ hard fighting obtained possession. The _Impérieuse_ and _Fame_ now approached, and commenced a fire which must have caused great loss to the besiegers, but which failed to dispossess them. Towards morning—when too late—a detachment of 2000 Spanish troops arrived from Gerona! Six hours earlier would have saved the town, the preservation of which was the only object in retaining the fortress.
The practice of the French when breaching the walls of Rosas, was beautiful. So skilfully was their artillery conducted, that, to use a schoolboy similitude, every discharge “ruled a straight line” along the lower part of the walls; this being repeated till the upper portion was without support, as a matter of course, the whole fell in the ditch, forming a breach of easy ascent. This operation constituted an object of great interest to us in the fortress, from which the whole proceedings were clearly visible.
Having secured the town, the French redoubled their efforts against the castle, and had they continued with the same vigour, we must have been driven out. Two of our marines were killed by shot, as was a third by a stone splinter, so that with all my desire to hold out, I began to doubt the propriety of sacrificing men to the preservation of a place which could not be long tenable.