Part 25

“There is an undertaking of great moment in agitation against Rochefort, and the Board thinks that your local knowledge and services on the occasion might be of the utmost consequence, and, I believe, it is intended to send you there with all expedition; I have ventured to say, that if you are in health, you will readily give your aid on this business.

“Before you can answer this I shall be out of office, and on my way to Scotland, as I found I could not continue here and keep my health. But if you will write to Sir R. Brotherton in reply, and state your sentiments on the getting at the enemy at Rochefort, I am sure it will be kindly taken.

“I am, my dear Lord, your’s faithfully, “W. JOHNSTONE HOPE.

“Captain Lord Cochrane.”

On the receipt of this letter hope appeared to dawn. The St. Vincent or any other official _animus_ against me had evidently been satisfied with the punishments with which I had in one shape or other been visited. I was now to be consulted and employed on matters in which my experience and services were to be fully recognised, and my ambition of being ranked amongst those brave defenders of my country, to whose example I had looked up, was about to be fulfilled! Alas, for the simplicity of my ideas! Nothing could be further from the intention of those who wanted to consult me!

Scarcely had the letter reached me, when a telegraphic message was transmitted from the Admiralty, requiring my immediate presence at Whitehall. A brief narrative of recent events will show the reason for the summons.

Early in the year Lord Gambier had been appointed to blockade the French fleet at Brest. Towards the end of February they, however, contrived to elude his vigilance, and got out without leaving a trace as to the direction taken. Despatching Admiral Duckworth in pursuit, his lordship returned to Plymouth. Admiral Duckworth meanwhile reached Cadiz, where he ascertained that the Brest fleet had not entered the Mediterranean. He then ran for Madeira, in the hope of obtaining intelligence of them, should they, as was feared in England, have made for the West Indies.

The fact was that the French squadron, consisting of eight sail of the line and two frigates, had gone to L’Orient, and liberated the ships there blockaded. They next made for Isle d’Aix, intending further to reinforce themselves with the ships at that anchorage, and thence proceed to harass our West India colonies. By the vigilance of Admiral Stopford they were, however, discovered and thwarted as to their ultimate purpose, though successful in forming a junction with the Rochefort squadron. On finding Admiral Stopford in their vicinity, though with four ships of the line only, they put into Basque Roads, subsequently withdrawing into Aix Roads, where Admiral Stopford having been reinforced, blockaded them with seven ships of the line. On the 7th of March Lord Gambier arrived in Basque Roads with an additional five sail, several frigates and small vessels, the British squadron being now numerically superior to that of the enemy.

On presenting myself at the Admiralty, the First Lord (Mulgrave) did me the honour to consult me confidentially as to the practicability of destroying or disabling the French squadron as it lay at anchor under the protection of the batteries of Isle d’Aix, where, as his lordship told me, the commander-in-chief did not consider it prudent to attack them. Lord Mulgrave further stated that the Board of Admiralty, fearing that “the French fleet might again slip out, as it had done at Brest, were extremely desirous that it should forthwith be destroyed. With that view they had already consulted various naval officers on the practicability of accomplishing the object by means of fire-ships; but that their opinions were discouraging.”

“Now,” added his lordship, “you were some years ago employed on the Rochefort station, and must, to a great extent, be practically acquainted with the difficulties to be surmounted. Besides which, I am told that you then pointed out to Admiral Thornborough some plan of attack, which in your estimation would be successful. Will you be good enough again to detail that or any other plan, which your further experience may suggest. But first let me tell you what Lord Gambier has written to the Admiralty on the subject.”

Lord Mulgrave then read me an extract from Lord Gambier’s letter, to the following effect, that “an attack by means of fire-ships was hazardous, if not desperate;” but that “if the Board of Admiralty wished to order such an attack, it should be done secretly and quickly.”

I respectfully reminded his lordship that he was asking me to suggest means for an attack which the admiral commanding considered “hazardous, if not desperate;” and which other naval officers, no doubt my seniors in the service, had pronounced impracticable. On both these accounts there was reason to fear that if means suggested by me were adopted, the consequence would be an amount of ill-feeling on the part of those officers, which any naval officer in my position should feel reluctant to provoke.

Lord Mulgrave replied that “the present was no time for professional etiquette. The Board was, if possible, bent on striking some decisive blow before the French squadron had an opportunity of slipping out; for if their sailing were not prevented they might get off to the West Indies, and do our commerce an immense amount of mischief. However,” added his lordship, “there is Lord Gambier’s letter. Give me your opinion on it.”

As this letter was afterwards made public, there can be no reason for withholding it.

“_Caledonia_, off the Nertuis d’Antioche, “11th March, 1809.

“MY DEAR LORD,—The advanced work between the Isles of Aix and Oleron, which I mentioned in my last letter, I find was injured in its foundation, and is in no state of progress; it is, therefore, no obstacle to our bombarding the enemy’s fleet, if you should be disposed to attempt to destroy it.

“A trial was made six years ago, when a Spanish squadron lay at the same anchorage, but without effect. The report of it you will find in the Admiralty. It was made by Sir C. Pole.

“The enemy’s ships lie much exposed to the operation of fire-ships, _it is a horrible mode of warfare, and the attempt hazardous, if not desperate_; but we should have plenty of volunteers for the service. If you mean to do anything of the kind, it should be with secrecy and quickly, and the ships used should not be less than those built for the purpose—at least a dozen, and some smaller ones.

“Yours, my dear Lord, most faithfully, “GAMBIER..nf-

“The Right Hon. Lord Mulgrave.”

“You see,” said Lord Mulgrave, “that Lord Gambier will not take upon himself the responsibility of attack, and the Admiralty is not disposed to bear the _onus_ of failure by means of an attack by fire-ships, however desirous they may be that such attack should be made.”

It was now clear to me why I had been sent for to the Admiralty, where not a word of approbation of my previous services was uttered. The Channel fleet had been doing worse than nothing. The nation was dissatisfied, and even the existence of the ministry was at stake. They wanted a victory, and the admiral commanding plainly told them he would not willingly risk a defeat. Other naval officers had been consulted, who had disapproved of the use of fire-ships, and, as a last resource, I had been sent for, in the hope that I would undertake the enterprise. If this were successful, the fleet would get the credit, which would be thus reflected on the ministry; and if it failed, the consequence would be the loss of my individual reputation, as both ministry and commander-in-chief would lay the blame on me.

I had, however, no fear of failure in the plans at that moment uppermost in my mind, but from the way in which my co-operation was asked, I determined to have nothing to do with the execution of the plans, believing that I should have to deal with some who would rather rejoice at their failure than their success.

My reply to Lord Mulgrave, therefore, was, that, “the opinion of Lord Gambier, and the naval officers consulted by the Admiralty, as to the use of fire-ships, coincided with my own; for if any such attempt were made upon the enemy’s squadron, the result would in all probability be, that the fire-ships would be boarded by the numerous row-boats on guard,—the crews murdered,—and the vessels turned in a harmless direction. But that if, together with the fire-ships, a plan were combined which I would propose for his Lordship’s consideration, it would not be difficult to sink or scatter the guard-boats, and afterwards destroy the enemy’s squadron, despite any amount of opposition that might be offered. I further told Lord Mulgrave that my opinion agreed with the expression of Lord Gambier, that the fortifications on Isle d’Aix were “no obstacle;” though this opinion on my part was expressed for different reasons to the one assigned by his lordship, my own previous knowledge of the anchorage satisfying me that the channel was of sufficient breadth to enable an attacking force to interpose the enemy’s fleet between itself and Isle d’Aix, as well as to keep out of reach of the fortifications on Aix, even though those fortifications might be in a state of efficiency, in place of being “no obstacle,” from their dilapidated condition, as Lord Gambier had, no doubt, correctly described them.

I then briefly recapitulated to his lordship the outline of my plan, which, if seconded by the fleet, must certainly result in the total destruction of the French squadron. His lordship appeared very much gratified by the communication, and after praising its novelty and completeness, frankly expressed his entire confidence in the result, requesting me to put the substance of my suggestion in writing, so that he might at once lay it before the Board of Admiralty, which was then sitting.

The request was immediately complied with, and the letter placed in the hands of Lord Mulgrave, who shortly afterwards personally communicated to me his own satisfaction, and the entire concurrence of the Board in my plan. His lordship at the same time asked me “if I would undertake to put it in execution?”

I told him that “for reasons before assigned I would rather not do so, as being a junior officer, it would excite against me a great amount of jealousy. Besides which, Lord Gambier might consider it presumptuous on my part to undertake what he had not hesitated to describe as ‘hazardous, if not desperate.’ It was, moreover, by no means certain that Lord Gambier would be satisfied to put my plans in execution, as it was not impossible that he might deem them still more ‘desperate’ and ‘horrible’ than those to which he had already objected. I, however, assured his lordship that the plans were at the service of the Admiralty, and Lord Gambier also, irrespective of any share in their execution to which I might be considered entitled.”

“But,” objected his lordship, “all the officers who have been consulted deem an attack with fire-ships impracticable, and after such an expression of opinion, it is not likely they would be offended by the conduct of fire-ships being given to another officer who approved of their use.”

My answer was, “that the plan submitted to his lordship was not an attack with fire-ships alone, and when its details became known to the service, it would be seen that there was no risk of failure whatever, if made with a fair wind and flowing tide. On the contrary, its success on inspection must be evident to any experienced officer, who would see that as the enemy’s squadron could not escape up the Charente, their destruction would not only be certain, but, in fact, easy. The batteries on Isle d’Aix were scarcely worth notice, not so much from their dilapidated condition, though that was rightly estimated in Lord Gambier’s letter, as from there being plenty of room to steer clear of them, as well as from the ease with which the enemy’s ships might be brought between the fortifications and the ships attacking; the channel being sufficient for this purpose, as well as for their passage without any exposure to shot likely to be detrimental. As all this would be apparent to the officers of the fleet whenever the plan submitted should be communicated to them, I must emphatically repeat my objection to undertake its execution, not only on this ground, but for the additional reason that my health had been so much shattered by recent exertions as to require repose.

Lord Mulgrave did not deny the reasonableness of my objections, admitting that “although he did not believe Lord Gambier would feel hurt at my undertaking to put my own plan in execution, other officers might not be well pleased that its superintendence should be committed to a junior officer. On this ground he would reconsider the matter, and endeavour to find some one else to put it in execution.

I then took leave of Lord Mulgrave, who, next day, again sent for me, when he said, “My lord, you must go. The Board cannot listen to further refusal or delay. Rejoin your frigate at once. I will make you all right with Lord Gambier. Your own confidence in the result has, I must confess, taken me by surprise, but it has increased my belief that all you anticipate will be accomplished. Make yourself easy about the jealous feeling of senior officers; I will so manage it with Lord Gambier that the _amour propre_ of the fleet shall be satisfied.”

On this I requested a short time for final consideration, and before its expiration sent a letter to his lordship again declining the command; but at the same time informing him that it had ever been a maxim with me not to shrink from duty to my country under any circumstances, however disadvantageous to myself, and that if officers my seniors could not be found to put the project in execution, I would then waive further objection.

The immediate result was the following letter from Lord Mulgrave, who, contrary to the tenour of mine, had construed it into an unqualified acceptance of the command.

[Private.]

“Admiralty, March 25, 1809.

“MY DEAR LORD,—The letter I have just received from your lordship is truly characteristic of the whole tenour of your professional life. If your health will admit of your undertaking the important service referred to, I am fully persuaded that I cannot so well commit it to any other hands.

“I have the honour to be, with the highest esteem, “Your lordship’s most faithful servant, “MULGRAVE.

“The Lord Cochrane.”

“P.S. I think the sooner you go to Plymouth the better. You will there receive an order to join Lord Gambier, to whom a secret letter will be written, directing him to employ your Lordship on the service which we have settled against the Rochefort fleet.”

I have been thus minute in detailing the circumstances connected with my acceptance of a command so unusual, because it has been said, and for anything that has appeared to the contrary, may still be considered, that I thrust myself into the position, which, as my own foresight had anticipated, became eventually a very serious one for me, as bringing upon my head an amount of enmity, such as even my own misgivings had not considered possible.

Having made the requisite suggestions to Lord Mulgrave relative to the contents and mode of fitting up the explosion vessels, the fire-ships to be employed being of the usual description, I returned on board the _Impérieuse_ at Plymouth, there to await further orders from the Admiralty.

Such was the despatch used, that by the 19th of March the Board was in a position to apprise Lord Gambier of the steps taken, by the following letter addressed to his lordship by the Board of Admiralty.

“Admiralty Office, March 19th, 1809.

“MY LORD,—I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint your lordship, that they have ordered twelve transports to be fitted as fire-ships, and to proceed and join you off Rochefort; and that Mr. Congreve (afterwards Sir W. Congreve) is under orders to proceed to your lordship in a coppered transport (the _Cleveland_), containing a large assortment of rockets, and supplied with a detachment of marine artillery, instructed in the use of them, and placed under Mr. Congreve’s orders.

“That the vessels named in the margin (_Etna_, _Thunder_, _Vesuvius_, _Hound_, and _Fury_), are likewise under orders to fit for sea with all possible expedition, and to join you as soon as they may be ready. That all preparations are making with a view to enable your lordship to make an attack upon the French fleet at their anchorage off Isle d’Aix, if practicable; and I am further commanded to signify their Lordships’ directions to you, to take into your consideration the possibility of making an attack upon the enemy, either conjointly with your line-of-battle ships, frigates, and small craft, fire-ships, bombs, and rockets—or separately by any of the above-named means.

“It is their Lordships’ further direction, that you state to me for their information, whether any further augmentation of force of any description is in your opinion necessary to enable you to perform this service with full effect, that it may be prepared and forwarded to you without a moment’s delay—their Lordships having come to a determination to leave no means untried to destroy the enemy’s squadron.

(Signed) “W. W. POLE.

“The Right Hon. Lord Gambier.”

Lord Gambier’s reply to this intimation, that on the receipt of the above-mentioned appliances he would be expected to attack the French squadron, was, that “_if the Board_ deemed an attack practicable, he would obey any orders with which they might honour him, however great might be the loss of men and ships.” A plain declaration that he _still declined to take upon himself the responsibility of attack_.

It will be necessary to bear this fact in mind, as after the attack was made, Lord Gambier, in his first despatch to the Admiralty, gave me credit for everything but the success of my plan, and in his second despatch _omitted my name altogether as having had anything to do with either planning or executing it!!!_ and in the vote of thanks subsequently given to his lordship in parliament, the officers under my orders were thanked, but no mention whatever was made of me, either as having conducted, or even taken any part in the attack, the whole merit of which was ascribed to Lord Gambier, who was never nearer than nine miles to the scene of action, as will subsequently appear.

Lord Gambier’s answer to the previous letter from the Board is, however, so material to the right understanding of the events which followed, that it will be better to subjoin the whole of it.

“_Caledonia_, in Basque Roads, “March 26th, 1809.

“SIR,—In obedience to their Lordships’ directions to me, contained in your letter of the 19th instant, I beg leave to state that it is advisable that I should be furnished with six gun-brigs in addition to those I may be able to collect of such as are under my command; at present there are only two at this anchorage. I shall, however, order the _Insolent_ and _Contest_ to join me from Quiberon Bay; and I should hope that the _Martial_ and _Fervent_ will shortly return from Plymouth.

“It is proper I should state for their Lordships’ information, the position in which the French fleet is at present anchored under the Isle d’Aix, that their Lordships may be able to form a judgment of the success that may be expected to attend an attack upon the enemy’s fleet, in either of the modes directed by their Lordships in your letter above-mentioned.

“The enemy’s ships are anchored in two lines, very near each other, in a direction due south from the Isle d’Aix, and the ships in each line not further apart than their own length; by which it appears, as I imagined, that the space for their anchorage is so confined by the shoaliness of the water, as not to admit of ships to run in and anchor clear of each other. The most distant ships of their two lines are within point-blank shot of the works on the Isle d’Aix; such ships, therefore, _as might attack the enemy would be exposed to be raked by red-hot shot, &c. from the island, and should the ships be disabled in their masts, they must remain within range of the enemy’s fire until they are destroyed_—there not being sufficient depth of water to allow them to move to the southward out of distance.

“The enemy having taken up their position apparently with the view not only to be protected by _the strong works on the Isle d’Aix_, but also to have the entrance of the Charente open to them, that in case of being attacked by fire-ships and other engines of the kind, they can run up the river beyond the reach of them. The tide and wind that are favourable to convey this kind of annoyance to the enemy, serve equally to carry them up the river.

“With respect to the attempt that may be made to destroy the enemy’s ships with shells, &c., I am not competent to give an opinion until it is ascertained whether the booms can be placed within the reach of their mortars from the enemy’s ships, without being exposed to the fire of the Isle d’Aix.

“I beg leave to add that, _if their Lordships_ are of opinion that an attack on the enemy’s ships by those of the fleet under my command is practicable, I am ready to obey any orders they may be pleased to honour me with, _however great the risk may be of the loss of men and ships_.

“I have the honour, &c. “GAMBIER.

“The Hon. W. W. Pole.”

I have marked some passages of this singular letter in italics, for the purpose of showing their important bearing on subsequent events. On the 11th Lord Gambier had informed the Board of Admiralty—as to my own personal knowledge was the fact—that “the advanced work on the Isle d’Aix was _no obstacle to bombardment_.” “Now,” says his lordship, “_the ships attacking would, from the fire of this fort, be exposed to be raked by red-hot shot, and if disabled in their masts, must be destroyed_.” In the former letter his lordship stated that the fort was “_injured in its foundations_, and in no state of progress.” It is now characterised as “_the strong works_” on _the_ Isle d’Aix.

That there was really little damage to be feared from these fortifications, either to ships or bombs, was afterwards corroborated by the fact, that when a partial attack only was reluctantly made, neither suffered from their fire, the result proving that these works had from the first been rightly characterised by Lord Gambier as “_forming no obstacle_,” though magnified into “strong works.”