Part 28
Reflecting that, from the distance of the British force from the stranded enemy’s ships, viz. from twelve to fourteen miles, the Commander-in-chief could not clearly be acquainted with their helpless condition, I directed the signal to be run up, “_The enemy’s ships can be destroyed_;” this also meeting with the same cool acknowledgment of the answering pennant.
Not knowing what to make of such a reply, another signal was hoisted, “_Half the fleet can destroy the enemy_.” This signal was again acknowledged by the answering pennant, the whole fleet still remaining motionless as before. On this I made several telegraph signals, one of which was probably regarded as impertinent, viz. “_The frigates alone can destroy the enemy_,” though it was true enough, their ships aground being perfectly helpless. To my astonishment the answering pennant was still the only reply vouchsafed!
Eight and nine o’clock passed without any indication of movement on the part of the fleet, though the tide was now fast rising, so that any ships sent to the attack of the stranded vessels would have had the flood-tide to go in and the ebb to return, after having accomplished their destruction; whilst it was evident that if not attacked, the same flood-tide would enable the French ships aground to float and escape, with which view some were heaving their guns and stores over board. On ascertaining this, I again signalised, “_The enemy is preparing to heave off_;” and entertaining no doubt that the Commander-in-chief would not permit such a catastrophe, the _Impérieuse_ dropped her anchor close to the Boyart Shoal, in readiness for any service that might be required.
As much has been said respecting the alleged narrowness of the channel leading to Aix Roads, by way of excuse for the British fleet not having followed up the advantage gained by the panic created on the previous night, from terror of the explosion vessels, I may here mention, that on our coming to an anchor, a fort on Isle d’Oleron commenced firing shells at us. As not one of these reached us, the French gunners adopted the expedient of loading their mortars to the muzzle, this being evident from the fact that they now discharged them by means of portfires, the men gaining a place of security before the mortars exploded. Not a shell, even thus fired, reached our position, a clear proof that had the British fleet come to the attack, it could have been in no danger from Oleron, though even these distant batteries were afterwards brought forward as an obstacle, in default of stronger argument.
At 11 A.M. the British fleet weighed, and stood towards Aix Roads. By this time the _Océan_, three-decker, and nearest ships aground were busily employed in heaving off, with a view of making sail for the Charente!! The advance of our fleet had been too long delayed; nevertheless, as the bulk of the enemy’s ships were still aground, good service might have been rendered. To our amazement, the British fleet, after approaching within seven or eight miles of the grounded ships, _again came to anchor about three and a half miles distant from Aix_, i. e. just out of range.
There was no mistaking; the admiral’s intention in again bringing the fleet to an anchor. Notwithstanding that the enemy had been four hours at our mercy, and to a considerable extent was still so, it was now evident that _no attack was intended_[50], and that every enemy’s ship would be permitted to float away unmolested and unassailed! I frankly admit that this was too much to be endured. The words of Lord Mulgrave rang in my ears, “_The Admiralty is bent on destroying that fleet before it can get out to the West Indies._”
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Footnote 50:
Lord Gambier afterwards admitted, that as the object of their destruction seemed to be attained, there was no occasion to risk any part of the fleet!!!
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The motive of Lord Gambier in bringing the ships to an anchor being beyond doubt, I made up my mind, if possible, to force him into action by attacking the enemy with the _Impérieuse_, whatever might be the consequence. It was, however, a step not to be taken without consideration, and for some time I hesitated to carry out this resolution, in the hope that a portion, at least, of the British fleet would again weigh and stand in.
Noon passed. The _Océan_, three-decker, had now got afloat, and the group of four others on shore near her, seeing the British fleet anchor, proceeded with additional energy to heave off. From her position the three-decker, lying as she did on the edge of the shoal, nearest the deep water, ought to have been the easiest prize of the whole; for whilst she lay on her bilge, close to the most accessible part of the channel, even a single gunboat might have so riddled her bottom as to have prevented her from floating off with the rising tide!
The surprise of the enemy at seeing the fleet anchor was probably greater than my own. Before that, they had been making great exertions to lighten and heave off, but no sooner had the fleet brought up, than, seeing the possibility of escape, they strained every nerve to hasten the operation.
In place of the fleet, or even the frigates, a single bomb, which, being armed with a 13-inch mortar, could project her shells to a great distance, without being exposed to danger from shot, was ordered in to shell the ships aground. On my asking her commander, “_what attack was going to be made on the enemy by the fleet?_” he replied, that “he knew nothing further than that he was ordered to bombard the ships ashore.” This was proof enough that no intention of attacking with the fleet, or any part of it, existed.
In despair, lest the ships still aground should also effect their escape, at 1 P.M. I ordered the anchor of the _Impérieuse_ to be hove atrip, and thus we drifted stern foremost towards the enemy. I say “_drifted_,” for I did not venture to make sail, lest the movement might be seen from the flagship, and a signal of recall should defeat my purpose of making an attack with the _Impérieuse_; the object of this being to _compel_ the commander-in-chief to send vessels to our assistance, in which case I knew their captains would at once attack the ships which had not been allowed to heave off and escape.
Had this means not been resorted to, _not a single enemy’s ship would have been destroyed_, for all could have hove off almost without damage, and that, to all appearance, without the slightest attempt at molestation on the part of the British fleet. It was better to risk the frigate, or even my commission, than to suffer such a disgraceful termination to the expectations of the Admiralty, after having driven ashore the enemy’s fleet; and therefore we drifted by the wind and tide slowly past the fortifications on Isle d’Aix, about which the commander-in-chief had expressed so many fears in his last letter to the Board; but though they fired at us with every gun that could be brought to bear, the distance was too great to inflict damage.
Proceeding thus till 1.30 P.M., and then suddenly making sail after the nearest of the enemy’s vessels escaping, at 1.40 P.M. the signal was run up to the peak of the _Impérieuse_, “_Enemy superior to chasing ship, but inferior to the fleet._” No attention being paid to this signal, at 1.45 P.M. I again signalled, “_In want of assistance_,” which was true enough, being in a single frigate, close to several enemy’s ships of the line.
As this signal, according to the code then in use, was coupled with the one signifying “_In distress_,” the signal officer on board the flagship thus interpreted it to the commander-in-chief; a circumstance which will require brief explanation.
In order to divert our attention from the vessels we were pursuing, these having thrown their guns overboard, the _Calcutta_, which was still aground, broadside on, began firing at us. Before proceeding further, it became, therefore, necessary to attack her, and at 1.50 we shortened sail, and returned the fire. At 2 the _Impérieuse_ came to an anchor in five fathoms; and veering to half a cable, kept fast the spring, firing upon the _Calcutta_ with our broadside, and at the same time upon the _Aquilon_ and _Ville de Varsovie_ with our forecastle and bow guns, both these ships being aground stern on, in an opposite direction.
This proceeding—though there could be no doubt of our being “_In want of assistance_,” seeing that our single frigate, unaided, was engaging three line-of-battle ships—did not look much like being “_In distress_,” as the signal officer of the _Caledonia_ had interpreted the signal; the nature of which could not, however, have deceived the commander-in-chief, who must have witnessed the circumstances under which the signal had been made by the _Impérieuse_.
After engaging the _Calcutta_ for some time, and simultaneously firing into the sterns of the two grounded line-of-battle ships, we had at length the satisfaction of observing several ships sent to our assistance, viz. _Emerald_, _Unicorn_, _Indefatigable_, _Valiant_, _Revenge_, _Pallas_, and _Aigle_. On seeing this, the captain and crew of the _Calcutta_ abandoned their vessel, of which the boats of the _Impérieuse_ took possession before the vessels sent to our “assistance” came down.
On the subsequent court-martial, it was declared that the _Calcutta_ did not strike to the _Impérieuse_, but to the ships sent to her assistance. This was deliberately untrue; as proved beyond question by the fact that the French government ordered a court-martial on the captain of the _Calcutta_, Lafon, and condemned him to be shot, clearly _for having abandoned his ship to inferior force_. The French did not shoot any of the other captains for abandoning their ships, and would not have shot Captain Lafon for fighting his vessel as long as he could, and then abandoning her to two line-of-battle ships and five frigates. On the contrary, they would have highly rewarded him, for saving his crew against such odds. There cannot be a stronger proof, if proof in addition to my word be wanted, that Captain Lafon abandoned the _Calcutta_ to the _Impérieuse_, and not to the line-of-battle ships which came up afterwards, as was subsequently asserted.
On the arrival of the two line-of-battle ships and the frigates, the _Impérieuse_ hailed them to anchor, or they would run aground on the Palles Shoal, on the very edge of which the _Impérieuse_ had taken up her berth. They anchored immediately and commenced firing on the _Calcutta_, _Aquilon_, and _Ville de Varsovie_. On this I signalled the _Revenge_ and others to desist from firing, as the _Calcutta_ had already struck to the _Impérieuse_, and we had at that time a boat’s crew on board her.
On this they desisted, and turned their fire wholly on the other two vessels. At 3.30 P.M. the _Impérieuse_ ceased firing, the crew being thoroughly exhausted by fatigue; whilst I was so much so, as to be almost unable to stand. My reason, however, for ordering the _Impérieuse_ to cease firing was, that the ships sent to our assistance were more than sufficient to destroy the enemy which remained, and had they been sent in time—not to our “_assistance_,” but for the more legitimate object of attacking the grounded ships—they would have been abundantly sufficient, had they not been recalled, to have destroyed all those that got away.[51]
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Footnote 51:
The _Valiant_ line-of-battle ship even signalled to this effect, as appears from the log of the _Caledonia_, Lord Gambier’s flagship. _Valiant_ signalled to flag, “_No doubt five more may be destroyed to-night._” The reply was a signal of recall.
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At 5.30 P.M. the _Aquilon_ and _Ville de Varsovie_ struck.
Shortly afterwards, the _Calcutta_ was set on fire, and in half an hour was burning furiously. At 6.0 P.M. the crew of the _Tonnerre_, which was not attacked, set fire to her, escaping in their boats. At 7.0 the _Tonnerre_ blew up, and at 9.0 the _Calcutta_ also, with an effect, from the large quantity of ammunition on board, almost equalling that of the explosion-vessels the night before. The _Calcutta_ was the storeship of the French fleet.
It has been said, that my having rushed single-handed amongst the enemy’s ships, and then hoisted the signal “_In want of assistance_,” was unjustifiable, as forcing the commander-in-chief to attack against his judgment. My answer to this is, that the expectations entertained by the Admiralty of destroying the enemy’s fleet would not have been in any way carried out, had not this means been adopted; because, as has been said, not a ship belonging to the enemy would have sustained even the slightest damage from the measures of the commander-in-chief.
The fire-ships entrusted to my command had failed, not from any fault of mine, but of those who were entrusted with them. It was, then, a question with me, whether I should disappoint the expectations of my country; be set down as a _charlatan_ by the Admiralty, whose hopes had been raised by my plan; have my future prospects destroyed; or force on an action which some had induced an easy commander-in-chief to believe impracticable.
Some proof has been given of the jealousy of a portion of the fleet towards me. Another instance of this occurred even after the two line-of-battle ships and the frigates came down. Perceiving that the shot from two sloops, or rather brigs, ordered to protect the _Etna_ bomb, did not reach the enemy, from the long range at which she had anchored, I made the signal for them to close. As no signal was at hand to express brigs only, to the exclusion of frigates or larger vessels, I endeavoured to explain my meaning that the signal was intended for the brigs, by firing towards them from the main-deck of the _Impérieuse_, the object of this being to _avoid giving offence_ to my senior officers in command of the frigates and line-of-battle ships now present. The signal “_to close_” in the same defective code expressing also “_to close the Admiral_,” it was construed by my seniors into an insult to them, as arrogating to myself the position of chief-in-command, which was simply absurd; as, being my seniors, I had no power to order them, nor was I so ignorant of my duty as wantonly to usurp the functions of the commander-in-chief. Yet this at the time gave great offence, though afterwards satisfactorily explained, to Lord Gambier.
I may here mention a singular incident which occurred some time after the _Aquilon_ and _Ville de Varsovie_ had struck, and after their officers and crews had been removed on board the British ships. The captain of the _Aquilon_ having informed me that he had left his personal effects behind, I volunteered to take him on board in my boat and procure them. As we left the _Aquilon_ a shot from a heated gun on board one of the vessels to which the French had set fire—the _Tonnerre_, if I recollect rightly—struck the stern sheets of the boat on which both he and I were sitting, and lacerated the lower part of the gallant officer’s body so severely that he shortly afterwards expired.
Before daybreak on the following morning the officer of the watch called me, and reported that three lights were hoisted in the squadron outside. This proved to be a signal, afterwards reported to have been made by Admiral Stopford, for the recall of the ships that had been sent in on the previous evening! In obedience to this signal, they, at 4 A.M., got under weigh, having previously kindled the French line-of-battle ships _Aquilon_ and _Ville de Varsovie_; an act for which there was not the slightest necessity, as they could easily have been got off. Fatigued, and mentally harassed as I was, I had neither time nor opportunity to protest against this wanton destruction; besides which, not knowing that the magazines of the burning ships had been drowned, my attention was directed to the preservation of the _Impérieuse_, which was in close proximity.
The two ships _Foudroyant_ and _Cassard_, had cut their cables and made sail, when on the previous evening the British fleet stood towards Aix Roads, but afterwards so unaccountably came to an anchor. On seeing this they shortened sail, but run aground in the middle of the channel leading to the Charente.
It being clear to me that these ships were not in a fighting condition, I determined, notwithstanding the recall of the British vessels, to remain and attack them; considering the signal of recall to be addressed only to the ships sent to our assistance, which, in obedience to that signal, were working out of the inner anchorage without any attempt to destroy other ships which were clearly at their mercy. As they were passing out I hailed the _Indefatigable_, and asked the captain if he would go on one quarter of the three-decker (_l’Océan_), whilst the _Impérieuse_ engaged the other? The reply was that “he would not, and that they _were going out to join the fleet_.”
To his infinite credit, Captain Seymour, of the _Pallas_ (the present distinguished admiral, Sir George Seymour), hailed us to know “if he should remain with the _Impérieuse_?” he being evidently as reluctant as myself to give up advantages so manifest. I replied, that if no orders had been given him to the contrary, I should be obliged to him so to do; whereupon the _Pallas_ anchored, and four brigs, the _Beagle_, _Growler_, _Conflict_, and _Encounter_, followed her example.
We now commenced clearing the decks for further action, throwing overboard a boat which had been shot to pieces. The carpenters were then set to stop shot holes in the sides and decks, and the seamen to repair the rigging, and shift the fore-topmast, which had been shot through. The brave, but unfortunate, captain of the _Calcutta_ had, in our short action, inflicted on us an amount of damage which the forts on Aix and Oleron had in vain attempted to effect; neither the one nor the other having once touched us.
Whilst the refitting of the frigate was going on, I ordered our only bomb, the _Etna_, protected by the brigs, to fire on the enemy’s Vice- and Rear-Admiral’s ships, as well as on the _Foudroyant_ and _Cassard_, which, having thrown all overboard, were now pressing sail to get up the Charente, thus taking on myself to commence the action anew, _after the auxiliary line-of-battle ships and frigates had retired_!
To my regret, a signal of recall was immediately hoisted on board the _Caledonia_! To this I replied by another, “_The enemy can be destroyed_;” of which no notice was taken. Shortly afterwards a boat brought me the following letter from Lord Gambier:—
“_Caledonia_, 13th of April.
“MY DEAR LORD,—_You have done your part so admirably that I will not suffer you to tarnish it by attempting impossibilities_[52], which I think, as well as those captains who have come from you, any further effort to destroy those ships would be. You must, therefore, join as soon as you can, with the bombs, &c., as I wish for some information, which you allude to, before I close my despatches.
“Yours, my dear Lord, most sincerely, “GAMBIER.
“Capt. Lord Cochrane.
“_P.S._—I have ordered _three brigs and two rocket-vessels to join you_, with which, and the bomb, you may make an attempt on the ship that is aground on the Palles, or towards Ile Madame, but I do not think you will succeed; and I am anxious that you should come to me, as I wish to send you to England as soon as possible. You must, therefore, come as soon as the tide turns.”
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Footnote 52:
In spite of this and other declarations arising from acts personally witnessed, though at many miles’ distance, yet still within ken of the telescope, Lord Gambier, on his court-martial, stated that “I had done little beyond mischief!!”
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I felt deep regret at what must be considered as the evasions of this letter. First, Lord Gambier ordered me to come out of the anchorage and join the fleet! but evidently not choosing to take upon himself the responsibility of ordering me out, in opposition to my own views, he told me he would send some brigs with which I might attack vessels which his own neglect had permitted to escape up the Charente! and thirdly, I was ordered, to come out as soon as the tide turned!
As the commander-in-chief’s letter was thus indecisive, I chose to construe it as giving me the option of remaining, and returned his lordship the following answer:—
“_Impérieuse_, 13th April.
“MY LORD,—I have just had the honour to receive your Lordship’s letter. We _can_ destroy the ships that are on shore, which I hope your Lordship will approve of.
“I have the honour, &c. “COCHRANE.
“The Right Hon. Lord Gambier.”
At daylight on the 14th the enemy were still in the same condition, but with a number of chasse-marées quietly taking out their stores. Three of them were getting out their guns, evidently in expectation of certain destruction from the small vessels which remained after the line-of-battle ships and heavy frigates were recalled; and, had we been permitted to attack them _even now_, their destruction would have been inevitable.
In place of this the recall signal was once more hoisted on board the _Caledonia_, to which I replied by the interrogatory signal “_Shall we unmoor?_” considering that his lordship would understand the signal as a request to be permitted to resume the attack. I did not repeat the signal that the enemy could be destroyed, because, having conveyed to him by letter my opinion on that subject the day before, I thought a repetition of that opinion unnecessary,—the more so, as, from the enemy heaving overboard them guns, its soundness was more than ever confirmed.
In place of being ordered to attack, as from his lordship’s previous letter I had every reason to expect, the recall signal was repeated, and shortly afterwards came the following letter:—
“_Caledonia_, 13th (14th) April.
“MY DEAR LORD,—It is necessary I should have some communication with you before I close my despatches to the Admiralty. _I have, therefore, ordered Captain Wolfe to relieve you_ in the services you are engaged in. I wish you to join me as soon as possible, that you may convey Sir Harry Neale to England, who will be charged with my despatches, or you may return to carry on the service where you are. I expect two bombs to arrive every moment, they will be useful in it.
Yours, my dear Lord, most sincerely, “GAMBIER.
“Capt. Lord Cochrane.”
Here was a repetition of the same thing. I was ordered away from the attack, to “convey Sir H. Neale to England,” or I “might return to carry on the service where I was,” viz. after the enemy had got clear off, _and after being formally superseded in the service to which the Board of Admiralty had appointed me, by a senior officer whom I could not again supersede_!!!