Part 29
There was, however, no evading Lord Gambier’s letter this time without positive disobedience to orders, and that was not lightly to be risked, even with the Board’s instructions to back me. I therefore returned to the _Caledonia_, and at once told Lord Gambier that the extraordinary hesitation which had been displayed in attacking ships helplessly on shore, could only have arisen from my being employed in the attack, in preference to senior officers. I begged his lordship, by way of preventing the ill-feeling of the fleet from becoming detrimental to the honour of the service, to set me altogether aside, and send in Admiral Stopford, with the frigates or other vessels, as with regard to him there could be no ill-feeling; further declaring my confidence that from Admiral Stopford’s zeal for the service, he would, being backed by his officers, accomplish results more creditable than anything that had yet been done. I apologised for the freedom I used, stating that I took the liberty as a friend, for it would be impossible, as matters stood, to prevent a noise being made in England.
His lordship appeared much displeased; and making no remark, I repeated, “My Lord, you have before desired me to ‘speak candidly to you,’ and I have now used that freedom.”
Lord Gambier then replied, “_If you throw blame upon what has been done, it will appear like arrogantly claiming all the merit to yourself._”
I assured his lordship that I had no such intention, for that no merit was due, and told him that I had no wish to carry the despatches, or to go to London with Sir Harry Neale on the occasion, my object being alone that which had been entrusted to me by the Admiralty, viz. to destroy the vessels of the enemy.
His lordship, however, cut the matter short by giving me written orders immediately to convey Sir Harry Neale to England with despatches. In obedience to this order we quitted Basque Roads for Plymouth on the following morning.
These matters are officially on record, and therefore do not admit of dispute. I will not comment further upon them, but will leave them to the judgment of posterity. I will even go further, and acquit Lord Gambier of all blame up to this period, except that of an easy disposition, which yielded to the advice of officers interested in my failure, that calm judgment which should characterise a commander-in-chief, and which, had it been exercised, would have rendered, as Napoleon afterwards said, the whole French fleet an easy prey.
As much misrepresentation was made at the time relative to the damage inflicted by the explosion-vessel under my immediate command, and as the same misrepresentation has been adopted by all English historians, it will be necessary particularly to advert to this. As mere assertion on my part may be deemed egotistical, if not partial, I will adduce the testimony of Captain Proteau, who commanded the enemy’s frigate _Indienne_, and was _close to the boom_ at the time it was destroyed by the explosion-vessel. The point here alluded to is the statement of the commander of the _Mediator_, that HIS VESSEL BROKE THE BOOM BY HER WEIGHT!! and Lord Gambier, without any personal knowledge of the fact, was thereby led to endorse his statement.
The captain of the _Indienne_, on the other hand, states that when the explosion-vessel blew up she was “_at the boom_,” or, nautically speaking, “_brought up by the boom_.” His words, are “_flottant à l’estacade_.”
It will be best, however, to extract the passage entire:—
“Nous distinguâmes, à 9 heures et demie, sous notre boussoir de tribord, un corps _flottant à l’estacade_. L’explosion s’en fit tout-à-coup, et vomit quantité de fusées artificielles, grenades et obus, qui éclatèrent en l’air sans nous faire le moindre mal, cependant nous n’en étions qu’à une demie encâblure.”—_Captain Proteau’s Journal._
As the _Indienne_ was only half a cable’s length from the boom when the explosion took place, the testimony of her captain on this point ought to be decisive.
Lord Gambier stated in his despatch, and afterwards in his defence, that the explosion-vessel blew up at half-past nine, whilst at three-quarters past nine (_a quarter of an hour later_), the _Mediator_ and other vessels came up, and were fired on by the French ships!
Lord Gambier, being himself more than a dozen miles from the scene of action, made this statement on the authority of Captain Wooldridge, who commanded the _Mediator_, and who reiterated in his evidence on the court-martial the statement he had previously made to Lord Gambier, viz. that _his ship_, and not the explosion-vessel, broke the boom: of the truth of which statement the nautical reader shall judge on professional grounds.
Admiral Allemand, who commanded in Aix Roads, thus describes, in his despatch to the French Government, the boom which had been laid down by his directions:—“Elle (the French fleet) étoit flanquée _d’une estacade à quatre cents toises au large, qui avoit huits cents toises de long_.”
The boom formed two sides of a triangle, with the apex towards the British fleet, thus,—
. . . 400 toise. . . 400 toises. . . . . . . 800 toises.
That is to say, each wing of the boom was more than half a mile long, and the distance between the extremities of the base was nearly a mile. This formidable obstacle was composed of large spars, bound by chains, and moored along its whole double line with heavy anchors at appropriate intervals, forming the most stupendous structure of the kind on record.
The statement of Captain Wooldridge to Lord Gambier, therefore, amounts to this,—that his ship, the _Mediator_, an Indiaman of 800 tons, broke up a double boom, each side of which was upwards of half a mile in length; tore up, by pressure on one point only, a double line of heavy anchors more than a mile in extent; and snapped many miles of iron chains and lashings connecting the spars together!!!—though her contact could not have been more than a few feet, the collision necessarily taking place on one wing of the boom only. This was Captain Wooldridge’s own version to Lord Gambier. To the nautical reader it is unnecessary to write one word of comment; so much so, indeed, that I will not insult the common sense even of the unprofessional reader by any attempt at further explanation.
Yet this statement was made by Captain Wooldridge, not only to Lord Gambier but to the officers composing the subsequent court-martial; more strangely still, it was _accepted by those officers_, though every one present must have known that the _Mediator_ would either have been brought up on her first contact with the boom, or, if she were weighty enough to overcome the obstacle, must have passed over it, by pressing it beneath her bow into the water.
It was not even pretended by those on board the _Mediator_ that any shock was felt! a pretty clear proof that, when she passed over the place where the boom _had been_, no such obstacle existed. That a vessel could have broken up a boom of such magnitude is too absurd for reflection. Nor, had not this version of the matter appeared in every naval history since 1809, should I have deemed a statement so truly incredible worthy of notice.[53]
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Footnote 53:
The _Mediator’_s log, now amongst the Admiralty records, is conclusive on the point. It is carried up to midnight on the 11th, two hours and a half after notifying that the ship was set on fire at 9.30 P.M., but _does not say a word about breaking or even feeling a shock from any boom_.
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Even the explosion-vessel did not break the boom by actual contact. It was the combined effect of the explosion upon the boom and upon the surface of the sea that shook it to pieces. The huge waves caused by the explosion lifted the boom along its entire length, and the strain so loosened the chains which bound the spars together, that the latter floated out of the fastenings, and were carried away with the tide, the chains sinking as a matter of course. It is certain that at daylight the next morning not a vestige of this formidable boom was to be seen; no one pretended to have seen so much as a single spar of it; though, had the _Mediator_ broken through it, as falsely alleged, the whole length of the boom, except the part ruptured, must necessarily have remained at anchor!!
CHAP. XXII.
ARRIVAL IN ENGLAND.
INTENDED VOTE OF THANKS TO LORD GAMBIER.—RESOLVE TO OPPOSE IT.—INTERVIEW WITH LORD MULGRAVE.—LORD GAMBIER DEMANDS A COURT-MARTIAL.—HE IS DIRECTED TO MAKE A FRESH REPORT OF THE ACTION IN BASQUE ROADS.—INJUSTICE OF THIS SECOND DESPATCH.—ATTEMPT TO ENTRAP ME INTO THE POSITION OF PROSECUTOR.—COMPOSITION AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE COURT-MARTIAL.—THE ADMIRAL’S POINTS OF JUSTIFICATION.—DISPOSED OF BY CAPTAIN BROUGHTON’S EVIDENCE, AND BY THAT OF CAPTAINS MALCOLM, NEWCOMBE, AND SEYMOUR.—SIR HARRY NEALE’S EVIDENCE STOPPED BY ADMIRAL YOUNG.
On the 26th of April, His Majesty was pleased to confer on me the Knighthood of the Order of the Bath.
Soon after Lord Gambier’s arrival in England, Lord Mulgrave informed me that a vote of thanks to the commander-in-chief would be proposed in the House of Commons. Whereupon I told Lord Mulgrave that it was my duty to apprise him that in my capacity as one of the members for Westminster, I would oppose the motion, on the ground that the commander-in-chief had not only done nothing to merit a vote of thanks, but had neglected to destroy the French fleet in Aix Roads, when it was clearly in his power to do so.
Lord Mulgrave entreated me not to persist in this determination, as such a course would not only prove injurious to the Government, but highly detrimental to myself, by raising up against me a host of enemies. The public, said his lordship, was satisfied with what had been done, and gave me full credit for my share therein, so that as I should be included in the vote of thanks, the recognition of Lord Gambier’s services could do me no harm.
I told his lordship that, speaking as a member of the House of Commons, I did not recognise Lord Gambier’s services at all, for that none had been rendered; and as for any thanks to myself, I would rather be without them, feeling conscious that I had not been enabled satisfactorily to carry out the earnest wishes of the Admiralty by the destruction of the enemy’s fleet, as impressed on me by his lordship before accepting the command with which I had been entrusted. I nevertheless begged his lordship to consider that in my professional capacity as a naval officer, I neither did offer nor had offered, any opinion whatever on Lord Gambier’s conduct, but that my position as member of Parliament for Westminster forbade my acquiescence in a public misrepresentation.
Lord Mulgrave replied, that I was even now accusing Lord Gambier in my professional capacity; the public would not draw the distinction between my professional and parliamentary conduct. I expressed my regret for the public want of discrimination, but told his lordship that this would not alter my determination.
Soon after this conversation Lord Mulgrave sent for me, and again entreated me, for my own sake, to reconsider my resolution, saying that he had reported our former conversation to the Government, which was highly dissatisfied therewith. His lordship further assured me that he was anxious about the matter on my account, as the course intimated would certainly bring me under high displeasure. To this I replied, that the displeasure of the Government would not for a moment influence my Parliamentary conduct, for which I held myself answerable to my constituents.
His lordship then said, “If you are on service, you cannot be in your place in Parliament. Now, my lord, I will make you a proposal. I will put under your orders three frigates, with _carte blanche_ to do whatever you please on the enemy’s coasts in the Mediterranean. I will further get you permission to go to Sicily, and embark on board your squadron my own regiment, which is stationed there. You know how to make use of such advantages.”
I thanked Lord Mulgrave for the offer, at the same time expressing my gratitude for his anxiety to preserve me from the evils of acting contrary to the wishes of the Government; but told his lordship that, were I to accept this offer, the country would regard my acquiescence as a bribe to hold my peace, whilst I could not regard it in any other light. Self-respect must, therefore, be my excuse for declining the proposal.
The anxiety of the then Government was, no doubt, to convert what had been effected in Aix Roads into political capital, as a victory which merited the thanks of parliament. My tacit aquiescence in the object of Government would have subjected me, and rightly, to a total loss of political confidence in the estimation of those with whom I acted. No man with the slightest pretensions to personal honesty or political consistency could, therefore, have decided otherwise than I did, even with the kind warning of Lord Mulgrave, that evil consequences to myself would follow—a prediction subsequently verified to the letter.
The upshot of the matter was, that on Lord Mulgrave communicating my determination to Lord Gambier, the latter demanded a court-martial.
As soon as my fixed resolution of opposing the vote of thanks became known to the Government, the Board of Admiralty directed Lord Gambier to make a _fresh report_ of the action in Basque Roads! requiring his lordship to call upon various officers for further reports as to the part they took therein!
Accordingly, on the 10th of May, Lord Gambier forwarded _a new despatch_ to the Admiralty, _in which my services were altogether passed over!!!_ notwithstanding that, in Lord Gambier’s previous report, he had written as follows:—“I cannot speak in sufficient terms of admiration and applause of the vigorous and gallant attack made by Lord Cochrane upon the French line-of-battle ships which were on shore; as well as of his judicious manner of approaching them, and placing his ship in a position most advantageous to annoy the enemy and preserve his own ship, which could not be exceeded by any feat of valour hitherto achieved by the British navy.”
Still more singularly, in the second despatch, which is too long for insertion[54], Lord Gambier inadvertently confirms the fact that _no attack on the French fleet would have been made at all_, had it not been for my having commenced an attack with the _Impérieuse_ alone, which movement, as has been said, was executed literally _by stealth_, under the fear that the signal of recall would be hoisted by the commander-in-chief!
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Footnote 54:
The letter in question will be found at p. 7 of “Minutes of a Court-Martial on Lord Gambier, taken in short-hand by W. B. Gurney,” and, as therein stated, revised by his lordship.
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It having, for reasons described in a former chapter, become imperative on Lord Gambier to send us assistance, he, nevertheless, construed this into an _intention_ on his part to attack the enemy. “_Observing the Impérieuse to advance, and the time of flood nearly done running, the Indefatigable_, &c. &c. were ordered to the attack!” It is not very probable that, had Lord Gambier intended an attack, he would have let the flood-tide go by, without taking advantage of it in a channel which was afterwards declared unsafe from want of water!
This passage alone of Lord Gambier’s second despatch ought to have decided the result of any court-martial. The Board of Admiralty would not, however, see anything inculpatory of their former colleague; but, on the 29th of May, ordered me, through their secretary, to become the accuser of the commander-in-chief; “I am commanded by their Lordships to signify their directions that you state fully to me, for their information, the grounds on which your lordship objects to the vote of thanks being moved to Lord Gambier, to the end that them Lordships’ objections may be of a nature to justify the suspension of the intended motion in Parliament, or to call for any further information.”—(Signed) “W. W. POLE.”
This command was manifestly intended to entrap me into the position of Lord Gambier’s prosecutor, and was, moreover, an improper interference with my Parliamentary capacity, in which alone I had declared my intention to oppose an uncalled-for vote of thanks to the commander-in-chief. I therefore wrote to the Secretary of the Admiralty the subjoined reply.
“Portman Square, 30th May, 1809.
“SIR,—I have to request that you will submit to their Lordships that I shall, at all times, entertain a due sense of the honour they will confer by any directions they may be pleased to give me; that in pursuing the object of these directions, my exertions will invariably go hand in hand with my duty; and that, to satisfy their Lordships’ minds in the present instance, I beg leave to state that the log and signal log-books of the fleet in Basque Roads contain all particulars, and furnish premises whence accurate conclusions may be drawn; that, as these books are authentic public documents, and as I cannot myself refer to them, anything I could offer to their Lordships on the subject would be altogether superfluous, and would appear presumptuous interruptions to their Lordships’ judgment, which will, doubtless, always found itself upon those grounds only that cannot be disputed.
“I have, &c. &c. “COCHRANE.
“The Hon. W. W. Pole, Secretary to the Admiralty.”
This reply, though plain, was respectful; but, as I had afterwards good reason to know, was deemed very offensive; the result being that, _after two months’ delay_ to enable Lord Gambier to get up his defence, a court-martial was assembled on the 26th of July, on board the _Gladiator_, at Portsmouth, the court being composed of the following members:—
PRESIDENT—Sir Roger Curtis, Port-Admiral.
ADMIRALS—Young, Stanhope, Campbell, Douglas, Duckworth, and Sutton.
CAPTAINS—Irwin, Dickson, Hall, and Dunn.
It may perhaps be asked in what way a court-martial on Lord Gambier can so far concern me as to occupy a prominent place in this autobiography? The reply is, that, notwithstanding my repudiation, I was regarded at the court-martial as his accuser, though not permitted to be present so as to cross-examine witnesses; the whole proceeding being conducted in my absence, rather as a prosecution against me than Lord Gambier; and that the result was injurious to myself, as Lord Mulgrave had predicted, involving the punishment of not being employed with my frigate at Flushing, there to put in execution plans for the certain destruction of the French fleet in the Scheldt; so that, in order to punish me, the enemy’s fleet was suffered to remain in security, when it might easily have been destroyed.
The reader must not imagine that I am about to inflict on him the evidence of a nine days’ trial; but without some extracts therefrom, it is impossible to comprehend the matter. Let him bear in mind that Lord Gambier relied for justification on three points:—1st, That, had he sent in the fleet, its safety would have been endangered by the fortifications of Aix (which he had previously spoken of as being dismantled); 2nd, Want of water to navigate the fleet in safety; and 3rdly, From the fire of the enemy’s vessels driven ashore (though lightened of their guns and stores).
CAPTAIN BROUGHTON (of the _Illustrious_).—“I was in Basque Roads, in the _Amelia_, on the 17th of March, and when within gunshot of the Isle of Aix observed the fortifications as being under repair, from the quantity of rubbish thrown up. I thought the fortifications on the island were not so strong as we supposed, and so reported to Lord Gambier. This was on the 1st of April. I did not notice any furnaces for heating red-hot shot. We were just out of gunshot,—_they fired at us from both sides, but none reached us_.”
In reply to the question, “whether everything was done that could be done to effect the destruction of the enemy’s ships?” Captain Broughton said:—
“It would have been more advantageous if the line-of-battle ships, frigates, and small vessels had _gone in at half-flood_, about 11 o’clock. There were _nine sail ashore_, and if the British ships had been ordered in, it would have been more advantageous. There were only _two_ of the enemy’s ships at anchor, and the _fleet_, had it gone in, would have been exposed to _their_ fire; but I conceived they were panic-struck, and on the appearance of a force might have been induced to cut their cables, and escape up the river. A ship or two might have been placed, in my opinion, against the batteries on the southern part of Isle d’Aix so as to take off their fire, and _silence them_. I told Sir Henry Neale, on board the _Caledonia_, when the signal was made for all captains in the mooring, that ‘_they were attackable from the confused way in which the French ships were at the time_;’ viz. from having run ashore in the night, in order to escape from the fire-ships, which they imagined would explode.
“As the wind was north-westerly and northerly, ships might have found safe anchorage in what is called, in my French chart, le Grand Trousse, where there is thirty or forty feet of water _out of range of shot or shells in any direction_. When we first came into Basque Roads, if the charts were to be believed, _there appeared to be water enough in that position. I do not know anything of any shoal water. I sounded from the wreck of the Varsovie to that anchorage, and found no shoal there_. Two ships of the line would have been sufficient to have silenced the batteries on Aix, and five or six of the least draught of water to attack the enemy’s ships. The discomfited French squadron would have made very little resistance. The loss would have been very little, as few of their ships were in a situation to fight their guns.”
Here a distinguished officer shows that two ships could have silenced the batteries; that, in case of damage, there was plenty of water for them to retire to out of reach; and that the French ships, being ashore, could not use their guns.
CAPTAIN PULTENEY MALCOLM (of the _Donegal_).—“I saw the enemy’s three-decker on shore. Till about noon she was heeling over considerably, and appeared to me to be _heaving her guns overboard_. She got off about two o’clock; _all the ships got off, except those that were destroyed_. Had it appeared to me that there was no other chance of destroying those ships but by such an attack, I CERTAINLY THINK IT OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN MADE. _Had they been attacked by the British ships, in my opinion they could not have been warped off from the shore, as it was necessary so to do, to lay out anchors to heave them off._”
_Question._—“Would you, had you commanded the British fleet, have sent in ships to attack the enemy’s ships on shore?”
_Answer._—“The moment the two ships quitted their defensive position, the risk was then small, and OF COURSE I WOULD HAVE SENT THEM IN INSTANTLY.”
This evidence is pretty decisive, but its plain tendency was attempted to be neutralised by the question whether there would have been _risk of damage_, had the British fleet been sent in to attack the enemy’s ships when ashore! The great point of defence throughout was risk to the ships, as though the chief use of ships of war was to save them from injury.
CAPTAIN F. NEWCOMBE (of the _Beagle_).—“Can you state any instance of neglect, misconduct, or inattention in the proceedings of the Commander-in-chief, between the 11th and the 18th?”