Part 27
With this request Lord Gambier promptly complied, manifesting his anxious desire that my project should be put in execution without delay. Several vessels were, therefore, chosen for the purpose; the fire-ships being prepared by the fleet, whilst I worked hard at the explosion vessels, two, at least, of which I determined to conduct personally; not because I deemed myself more competent to conduct them than others, but because, being novel engines of warfare, other officers could not have given that attention to their effect which long deliberation on my part had led me to anticipate, if directed according to the method on which their efficacy depended; it being certain, even from the novelty of such a mode of attack, that the officers and crews of the line-of-battle ships would be impressed with the idea that every fire-ship was an explosion vessel, and that in place of offering opposition, they would, in all probability, be driven ashore in their attempt to escape from such diabolical engines of warfare, and thus become an easy prey. The creation of this terrorism amongst the enemy’s ships was indeed a main feature of the plan, the destruction or intimidation of the guard-boats being secondary, or rather preparatory.
The nature of the explosion vessels will be best understood from the subjoined description of the manner in which one was prepared under my own directions. The floor of the vessel was rendered as firm as possible, by means of logs placed in close contact, into every crevice of which other substances were firmly wedged, so as to afford the greatest amount of resistance to the explosion. On this foundation were placed a large number of spirit and water casks, into which 1500 barrels of powder were emptied. These casks were set on end, and the whole bound round with hempen cables, so as to resemble a gigantic mortar, thus causing the explosion to take an upward course. In addition to the powder casks were placed several hundred shells, and over these again nearly three thousand hand grenades; the whole, by means of wedges and sand, being compressed as nearly as possible into a solid mass.
This was the vessel in which I subsequently led on the attack. A more striking comment on the “red-hot shot,” &c., of which Lord Gambier made so much in one of his letters to the Admiralty, could scarcely be found. Of course, had a red-hot shot from the batteries on Aix reached us—and they were not half a mile distant[44]—nothing could have prevented our being “hoist with our own petard.” I can, however, safely say, that such a catastrophe never entered into my calculations, for the simple reason, that from previous employment on the spot, on several occasions, I well knew there was plenty of room in the channel to keep out of the way of red-hot shot from the Aix batteries, even if, by means of blue lights or other devices, they had discovered us.
The explosion vessels were simply naval mines, the effect of which depended quite as much on their novelty as engines of war, as upon their destructiveness. It was calculated that, independently of any mischief they might do, they would cause such an amount of terror, as to induce the enemy to run their ships ashore as the only way to avoid them and save the crews. This expectation was fully answered, but no adequate attack on the part of the British force following up the effect of the explosion vessels, the stranded ships were permitted to heave off, and thus escaped, for the most part, as will be detailed in the succeeding chapter.
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Footnote 44:
Admiral Allemand had given instructions to the commandant on the Isle d’Aix to use every precaution in case of the anticipated attack.
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CHAP. XXI.
PRESS FOR AN ATTACK.—RESULTS OF DELAY.—THE FRENCH PREPARATIONS.—FRENCH ADMIRAL’S ACCOUNT. INSULT TO THE ENGLISH FLEET.—STATE OF PREPARATIONS. START FOR THE ATTACK.—THE ATTACK.—THE EXPLOSION.—FAILURE OF THE ATTACK.—TERROR OF THE FRENCH.—THE FRENCH AGROUND.—APATHY OF LORD GAMBIER.—THE AIX ROADS.—THE FRENCH FLEET PERMITTED TO ESCAPE.—DRIFT TOWARDS THE ENEMY.—ATTACK THE FRENCH FLEET.—THE CALCUTTA STRIKES.—THE ATTACK.—FAILURE OF FIRESHIPS.—SINGULAR INCIDENT.—SIGNAL OF RECALL.—CAPTAIN SEYMOUR.—LORD GAMBIER’S EVASIVENESS.—AM RECALLED.—REMONSTRATE WITH LORD GAMBIER.—AM SENT HOME.—LORD GAMBIER’S DESPATCH.—THE FRENCH DESPATCH.—DESTRUCTION OF THE BOOM.—THE MEDIATOR.
On the 10th of April, the _Beagle_, having arrived from England with the fireships in company, I pressed Lord Gambier to permit an attack to be made on the same night; but, notwithstanding that the weather was favourable, his lordship saw fit to refuse. My reason for pressing an immediate attack was, that as the enemy could not remain in ignorance of the character of the newly arrived vessels, they might have less time to make additional preparations for their reception.
Notwithstanding the importance of prompt action in this respect, argument was unavailing. His lordship urged that the fireships might be boarded, and the crews murdered, though there was more danger of this from delay than from attacking unawares. There was in reality no danger; but I urged in vain that it was an essential part of my plan personally to embark in an explosion vessel, _preceding_ the fireships, so that in conducting and firing her all risk would fall on myself and the volunteer crew which would accompany me; it not being probable that after the explosion the enemy’s guard-boats would board the fireships which might follow, as every one would certainly be taken for a mine similarly charged. Under that impression, however gallant the enemy, there was little chance of the fireships being boarded.
His lordship replied, that “if I chose to rush on self-destruction that was my own affair, but that it was his duty to take care of the lives of others, and he would not place the crews of the fireships in palpable danger.”
To this I rejoined, that there could not be any danger, for the use of explosion-vessels being new to naval warfare, it was unlikely that, after witnessing the effect of the first explosion, the enemy’s officers and men would board a single fireship. I further told his lordship that my brother, the Hon. Basil Cochrane, and Lieut. Bissel were on board the _Impérieuse_ as my guests, and so well satisfied were both of the little danger to be apprehended that they had volunteered to accompany me. Lord Gambier, however, remained firm, and further remonstrance being useless, I had no alternative but to delay, whilst the French, who quickly became aware of the character of the newly arrived vessels, adopted all necessary precautions.[45]
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Footnote 45:
“Le 10 il arriva 16 batimens, qui me parurent des transports ou brulôts. Je fis dégréer les mâts de perroquets, et caler ceux de hune,” &c.—_Vice-Admiral Allemand’s Despatch, of the 12th of April._
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A most favourable opportunity was thus thrown away. The French admiral, however, lost no time in turning the delay to account, by altering the positions of his fleet, so as to expose it to the smallest possible amount of danger.
The enemy’s ships of the line struck their topmasts, got their topgallant yards on deck, and unbent sails, so as to expose as little inflammable matter aloft as possible; the frigates only being left in sailing trim, ready to act as occasion might require; whilst the boats and launches of the fleet, to the number of seventy-three, were armed and stationed in five divisions for the purpose of boarding and towing off the fireships.[46]
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Footnote 46:
The subjoined was the French force at anchor in Aix roads:—
SHIPS OF THE LINE: _L’Océan_, 120, bearing the flag of Vice-Admiral Allemand; _Foudroyant_, 80, bearing the flag of Rear-Admiral Gourdon; _Cassard_, 74; _Tourville_, 74; _Regulus_, 74; _Patriote_, 74; _Jemappes_, 74; _Tonnerre_, 74; _Aquilon_, 74; _Ville de Varsovie_, 74. Total, 10.
FRIGATES: _Indienne_, _Elbe_, _Pallas_, and _Hortense_. Total, 4.
STORESHIP: _Calcutta_, 56, armed _en flûte_. This vessel had been a British East Indiaman, captured some time before off St. Helena. Total, 15.
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The French admiral, Allemand, disposed his force in the following manner:—The ten sail of the line, which before the arrival of the fireships had been moored in two lines overlapping each other, were formed afresh in a double line, nearly north and south; the outer line comprising five, and the inner six ships, including the _Calcutta_; the inner fine being so anchored as to face the openings between the ships of the outer line, the extremity of which was somewhat more than a mile from the batteries on the Isle of Aix. About half a mile in advance of the whole lay the four frigates, and immediately in front of these was a boom of extraordinary dimensions. As this boom will form an important feature in the narrative, I subjoin the French admiral’s description, first premising that, although there was reason to expect that an obstacle of the kind would have to be encountered, its exact nature was not known till the attack was made[47]:—
“Notre armée étoit sur deux lignes de bataille, endentées, très-serrées, gisant au nord, un quart nord-ouest et sud, un quart sud-est du monde, afin de présenter moins de surface à l’envoi des brûlots.
“Elle étoit flanquée _d’une estacade à quatre cents toises au large, qui avoit huit cents toises de long_, le bout nord étoit à une encablure et demie des roches de l’île.
“Au coucher du soleil il ventoit encore très-gros frais. _Je laissai chaque capitan libre de sa manœuvre pour la sûreté de son vaisseau._
“J’envoyai un officier prévenir le général Bronard, commandant à l’île d’Aix, que l’ennemi, par sa manœuvre, annonçoit vouloir profiter du gros vent et de la marée pour entreprendre un _coup de main_. Il me fit dire qu’il l’attendoit de pied ferme, et qu’il répondoit de la terre.”—_Vice-Admiral Allemand’s Despatch of the 12th of April._
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Footnote 47:
A better proof of the subsequent untruths uttered by the masters of the fleet and the flagship, as to their pretended knowledge of the soundings in the vicinity of the enemy, could not be afforded, than their ignorance of the existence of this boom, which must from its magnitude have occupied a considerable time in its construction, and laying down the necessary moorings.
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The French, no doubt, considered their position secure against fireships, having no expectation of other means of attack; and so it undoubtedly was, from the protection afforded by the boom, which, from its peculiar construction, could neither be destroyed nor burned by fireships—as well as further defended by the guard-boats, which were judged sufficient to divert the course of such fireships as might drift past the boom. Their fleet was anchored so as to expose the smallest possible front; and what added no little to their sense of security was the delay which had taken place on the part of the British admiral without attack of any kind. On such grounds, therefore, they not unreasonably felt confident that, if the fireships failed, as from the judicious preparations made, Admiral Allemand had every reason to anticipate, no attack on the part of the British fleet would follow. In this belief, on altering their position, the French dressed their fleet with flags, and, by way of contempt for their assailants, hung out the English ensign of the _Calcutta_—which, as has been said, was a captured English vessel—under her quarter gallery! The peculiar nature of the insult needs not to be explained—to naval men it is the most atrocious imaginable.
The fortifications on Isle d’Aix, alluded to by Admiral Allemand, were, as Lord Gambier had reported to the Admiralty in his letter of the 11th of March, insignificant, or, as his Lordship at first expressed it, “no obstacle;” a dozen guns being the utmost number mounted on the batteries commanding the roads, though these were afterwards characterised by his Lordship as the “strong works on the Isle of Aix.”[48] The nearest of the batteries on _Oleron_ was out of gunshot, and therefore of no account.
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Footnote 48:
Two ships of the line would have been quite sufficient to silence “the batteries on Aix.”—_Captain Broughton’s Evidence on the Court Martial._
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As narratives of the attack on the French fleet in Basque Roads have been often, though in some of the main points incorrectly, written from the contradictory, and in many instances incomprehensible, evidence on the subsequent court-martial, as compared with the no less contradictory despatches of Lord Gambier, I shall in the following account strictly confine myself to what took place under my own personal conduct and observation.[49]
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Footnote 49:
The British force present in Basque Roads was as follows:—
SHIPS OF THE LINE: _Caledonia_, 120, bearing the flag of Lord Gambier; _Cæsar_, 80, bearing the flag of Rear-Admiral Stopford; _Gibraltar_, 80; _Revenge_, 74; _Donegal_, 74; _Heron_, 74; _Illustrious_, 74; _Valiant_, 74; _Bellona_, 74; _Resolution_, 74; _Theseus_, 74. Total, 11.
FRIGATES: _Indefatigable_, _Impérieuse_, _Aigle_, _Emerald_, _Unicorn_, _Pallas_, and _Mediator_. Total, 7.
GUNBRIG SLOOPS: _Beagle_, _Dotterel_, _Foxhound_, _Lyra_, _Redpole_. Total, 5.
GUN-BRIGS: _Insolent_, _Conflict_, _Contest_, _Encounter_, _Fervent_, and _Growler_. Total, 6.
OTHER VESSELS: _Whiting_, _Nimrod_, _King George_, and 23 fire-ships and explosion vessels. Total, 55.
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On the 11th of April, it blew hard with a high sea. As all preparations were complete, I did not consider the state of the weather a justifiable impediment to the attack, to which Lord Gambier had now consented; so that after nightfall, the officers who volunteered to command the fireships were assembled on board the _Caledonia_, and supplied with instructions according to the plan previously laid down by myself.
The _Impérieuse_ had proceeded to the edge of the Boyart shoal, close to which she anchored with an explosion vessel made fast to her stern, it being my intention, after firing the one of which I was about to take charge, to return to her for the other, to be employed as circumstances might require. At a short distance from the _Impérieuse_ were anchored the frigates _Aigle_, _Unicorn_, and _Pallas_, for the purpose of receiving the crews of the fireships on their return, as well as to support the boats of the fleet assembled alongside the _Cæsar_, to assist the fireships. The boats of the fleet were not, however, for some reason or other, made use of at all.
The enemy had calculated on the impending attack, and, as was afterwards ascertained, by way of precaution against fireships, sent two divisions of their guard-boats, with orders to lie under the boom till two in the morning; but wind and tide being against them, they were compelled to put back, without effecting their orders. Both wind and tide, however, though dead against the French boats, were favourable for the boats of the British fleet, had they been employed as arranged; and they would have been of great use to the less efficient boats of the fireships, some of which, in returning, were nearly swamped. For want of such assistance, as will presently be seen, most of the fireships were kindled too soon, no doubt to save the men the terrible pull back, against a gale of wind and a high sea.
Having myself embarked on board the largest explosion vessel, accompanied by Lieut. Bissel and a volunteer crew of four men only, we led the way to the attack; the _Impérieuse_ afterwards, in accordance with my instructions, signalising the fireships to “proceed on service.”
The night was dark, and as the wind was fair, though blowing hard, we soon neared the estimated position of the advanced French ships, for it was too dark to discern them. Judging our distance, therefore, as well as we could, with regard to the time the fuse was calculated to burn, the crew of four men entered the gig, under the direction of Lieut. Bissel, whilst I kindled the port fires; and then, descending into the boat, urged the men to pull for their lives, which they did with a will, though, as wind and sea were strong against us, without making the progress calculated.
To our consternation, the fuses, which had been constructed to burn fifteen minutes, lasted little more than half that time, when the vessel blew up, filling the air with shells, grenades, and rockets; whilst the downward and lateral force of the explosion raised a solitary mountain of water, from the breaking of which in all directions our little boat narrowly escaped being swamped. In one respect it was, perhaps, fortunate for us that the fuses did not burn the time calculated, as, from the little way we had made against the strong head wind and tide, the rockets and shells from the exploded vessel went over us. Had we been in the line of their descent, at the moment of explosion, our destruction, from the shower of broken shells and other missiles, would have been inevitable.
The explosion vessel did her work well, the effect constituting one of the grandest artificial spectacles imaginable. For a moment, the sky was red with the lurid glare arising from the simultaneous ignition of 1500 barrels of powder. On this gigantic flash subsiding, the air seemed alive with shells, grenades, rockets, and masses of timber, the wreck of the shattered vessel; whilst the water was strewn with spars, shaken out of the enormous boom, on which, according to the subsequent testimony of Captain Proteau, whose frigate lay just within the boom, the vessel had brought up, before she exploded. The sea was convulsed as by an earthquake, rising, as has been said, in a huge wave, on whose crest our boat was lifted like a cork, and as suddenly dropped into a vast trough, out of which, as it closed upon us with a rush of a whirlpool, none expected to emerge. The skill of the boat’s crew, however, overcame the threatened danger, which passed away as suddenly as it had arisen, and in a few minutes nothing but a heavy rolling sea had to be encountered, all having again become silence and darkness.
This danger surmounted, we pulled in the direction of the _Impérieuse_, whose lights could be distinguished at about three miles’ distance. On our way we had the satisfaction of seeing two fireships pass over the spot where the boom had been moored. Shortly afterwards we met the _Mediator_ steering in the direction of the enemy, whose ships of the line were now firing towards the spot where the explosion had taken place, and consequently on their own advanced frigates! which, as was afterwards learned, cut their cables, and shifted their berths to a position in the rear of the larger ships.
On reaching the _Impérieuse_, I found, to my great mortification, that the second explosion vessel, which, by my orders, had been made fast to the frigate’s stern, had been cut away, and thus set adrift: a fireship in flames having come down on her instead of the enemy! The _Impérieuse_ herself had a narrow escape of being burned, and was only saved by veering cable; the fireship which caused the disaster drifting harmlessly away on the Boyart Shoal. This clumsy occurrence completely frustrated the intention with which I had reserved her, viz. for further personal operations amongst the enemy’s fleet, now that the first explosion vessel had cleared the way.
Of all the fireships, upwards of twenty in number, _four only reached the enemy’s position, and not one did any damage_! The way in which they were managed was grievous. The _Impérieuse_, as has been said, lay three miles from the enemy, so that the one which was near setting fire to her became useless at the outset; whilst several others were kindled a mile and a half to windward of this, or four miles and a half from the enemy. Of the remainder, many were at once rendered harmless, from being brought to on the wrong tack. Six passed a mile to windward of the French fleet, and one grounded on Oleron. I could scarcely credit my own vision when I saw the way in which they were handled; most of them being fired and abandoned before they were abreast of the vessels anchored as guides.
The fear of the fireships operated strongly enough, but, notwithstanding the actual effect attributed to them by naval historians, they did no damage whatever. A matter of little consequence, had the British fleet, or even a portion thereof, subsequently taken advantage of the panic created amongst the enemy.
As the fireships began to light up the roads, we could observe the enemy’s fleet in great confusion. Without doubt, taking every fireship for an explosion vessel, and being deceived as to their distance, not only did the French make no attempt to divert them from their course, but some of their ships cut their cables and were seen drifting away broadside on to the wind and tide—whilst others made sail, as the only alternative to escape from what they evidently considered certain destruction from explosive missiles!
Had the commander-in-chief witnessed this scene, he would never again have deemed such extraordinary precaution on his part requisite to guard against fireships being boarded when preceded by explosion vessels. In place of becoming the aggressors, as his Lordship had anticipated, the only care of the enemy was how to get out of the way, even at the risk of running their ships ashore. Unfortunately the commander-in-chief was with the fleet, fourteen miles distant.
At daylight on the morning of the 12th not a spar of the boom was anywhere visible, and with the exception of the _Foudroyant_ and _Cassard_, _the whole of the enemy’s vessels were helplessly aground_. The former of these ships lying out of the sweep of the tide, and being therefore out of danger from the fireships, appeared not to have cut her cable, and the _Cassard_, which had at first done so, again brought up about two cables’ length from the _Foudroyant_.
With these exceptions, every vessel of the enemy’s fleet was ashore. The flag-ship of Admiral Allemand, _L’Océan_, three-decker, drawing the most water, lay outermost on the north-west edge of the Palles Shoal, nearest the deep water, where she was most exposed to attack; whilst all, by the fall of the tide, were lying on their bilge, with their bottoms completely exposed to shot, and therefore beyond the possibility of resistance.
The account given by the captain of the _Indienne_, French frigate, Captain Proteau, of the position of the grounded ships, will not be called in question. It is as follows:—“The _Indienne_ aground on Point Aiguille, near the fort; the _Pallas_ off Barques; the _Elbe_ and _Hortense_ on the Fontenelles; the _Tourville_, _Patriote_, and _Tonnerre_, as seen from the _Indienne_, in a line on the Palles Shoal; the _Calcutta_, _Regulus_, _Jemappes_ on the extremity of that shoal; the _Varsovie_ and _Aquilon_ aground on Charenton; and the _Océan_, three-decker, close to the edge of the Palles.”
We did not reach the _Impérieuse_ till after midnight. At daylight observing seven of the nearest enemy’s ships ashore, amongst which was the admiral’s ship _L’Océan_, and a group of four others lying near her, in a most favourable position for attack, without the possibility of returning it, at 6 A.M. we signalised the admiral to that effect. As the _Impérieuse_ at this time lay just within range of the batteries on Aix, which had commenced to fire upon us, we weighed, and stood in the direction of the fleet, letting go our anchor as soon as the ship was out of range. At 7 A.M. we signalised again, “_All the enemy’s ships, except two, are on shore_;” this signal, as well as the former one, being merely acknowledged by the answering pennant; but, to our surprise, no movement was visible in any part of the fleet indicating an intention to take advantage of the success gained.