Part 7

When the _Thetis_ was first on the coast, the American republic was universally recognised, and it must be admitted that our treatment of its citizens was scarcely in accordance with the national privileges to which the young republic had become entitled. There were, no doubt, many individuals amongst the American people who, caring little for the Federal government, considered it more profitable to break than to keep the laws of nations, by aiding and supporting our enemy, and it was against such that the efforts of the squadron had been chiefly directed; but the way in which the object was carried out was scarcely less an infraction of those international laws which we were professedly enforcing.

The practice of taking English seamen out of American vessels, without regard to the safety of navigating them when thus deprived of their hands, has been already mentioned. To this may be added, the detention of vessels against which nothing contrary to international neutrality could be established, whereby their cargoes became damaged; the compelling them, on suspicion only, to proceed to ports other than those to which they were destined, and generally treating them as though they were engaged in contraband trade.

Of these transactions the Americans had a right to complain; but in other respects their complaints were indefensible; such as that of our not permitting them to send corn and provisions to France, a violation of neutrality into which, after declaration of blockade, none but an inexperienced government could have fallen; though there was perhaps something in the collateral grievance that American ships were not permitted to quit English ports without giving security for the discharge of their cargoes in some other British or neutral port.

It would be wearisome to enter into further details respecting the operations of a squadron so ingloriously employed, or to notice the subordinate part which a junior lieutenant could take in its proceedings. Suffice it to say, that after remaining five years on the North American station, the _Thetis_ returned to England.

CHAP. IV.

SERVICES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.

I JOIN LORD KEITH’S SHIP.—AN UNPLEASANT ALTERCATION, ENDING IN A COURT-MARTIAL.—THE BLOCKADE OF CADIZ.—FRENCH FLEET IN THE OFFING.—PURSUED BY LORD KEITH.—ENEMY’S VESSELS BURNT AT TOULON.—LORD KEITH RECALLED BY LORD ST. VINCENT.—LORD ST. VINCENT RESIGNS THE COMMAND.—LORD KEITH PURSUES THE FRENCH FLEET TO BREST, AND FROM THENCE TO THE MEDITERRANEAN.—STATE OF THE FRENCH MARINE.—LORD KEITH APPOINTS ME TO THE GÉNÉREUX.—BURNING OF THE QUEEN CHARLOTTE.—ACTION WITH PRIVATEERS OFF CABRITTA POINT.—RECOMMENDED FOR PROMOTION.

Towards the close of the autumn of 1798, Lord Keith was appointed to relieve Lord St. Vincent in the command of the Mediterranean fleet, and kindly offered to take me with him as a supernumerary. I therefore embarked, by his lordship’s invitation, in the flag-ship.

We arrived at Gibraltar on the 14th of December, and found Lord St. Vincent residing on shore, his flag flying on board the _Souverain_ sheerhulk.

His lordship’s reception of me was very kind, and on the 24th of December, at Lord Keith’s request, he gave an order for my appointment to the _Barfleur_, to which ship Lord Keith had shifted his flag. This appointment, from a certain dissatisfaction at my having received such a commission after being so short a time at sea, afterwards brought me into trouble.

Lord St. Vincent did not, as was expected, immediately transfer to Lord Keith the command of the Mediterranean fleet, but remained at Gibraltar, giving orders to his lordship to blockade the Spanish fleet in Cadiz.

The first part of the year was spent in this employment, Lord Keith’s force varying from eleven to fifteen sail of the line, but without frigates, though the commander-in-chief had a considerable number under his orders. The omission was the more remarkable, as the blockaded Spanish force numbered upwards of twenty ships of the line, with frigates and smaller vessels in proportion.

The British force, for upwards of four months, was anchored some seven or eight miles from Cadiz, but without rousing the national spirit of the Spaniards, who manifested no disposition to quit their shelter, even though we were compelled from time to time to leave our anchorage for the purpose of procuring water and cattle from the neighbouring coast of Africa. It was during one of these trips in the _Barfleur_ that an absurd affair involved me in serious disaster.

Our first lieutenant, Beaver, was an officer who carried etiquette in the wardroom and on deck almost to despotism. He was laudably particular in all matters visible to the eye of the admiral, but permitted an honest penny to be turned elsewhere by a practice as reprehensible as revolting. On our frequent visits to Tetuan, we purchased and killed bullocks _on board the Barfleur_, for the use of the whole squadron. The reason was, that raw hides, being valuable, could be stowed away in her hold in empty beef-casks, as especial perquisites to certain persons connected with the flagship; a natural result being, that, as the fleshy parts of the hides decomposed, putrid liquor oozed out of the casks, and rendered the hold of the vessel so intolerable, that she acquired the name of “The stinking Scotch ship.”

As junior lieutenant, much of the unpleasantness of this fell to my share, and as I always had a habit of speaking my mind without much reserve, it followed that those interested in the raw hide speculation were not very friendly disposed towards me.

One day, when at Tetuan, having obtained leave to go ashore and amuse myself with shooting wild-fowl, my dress became so covered with mud, as to induce me not to come off with other officers in the pinnace which took me on shore, preferring to wait for the launch, in which the filthy state of my apparel would be less apparent. The launch being delayed longer than had been anticipated, my leave of absence expired shortly before my arrival on board—not without attracting the attention of Lieutenant Beaver, who was looking over the gangway.

Thinking it disrespectful to report myself on the quarter deck in so dirty a condition, I hastened to put on clean uniform, an operation scarcely completed when Lieutenant Beaver came into the wardroom, and in a very harsh tone demanded the reason of my not having reported myself. My reply was, that as he saw me come up the side, he must be aware that my dress was not in a fit condition to appear on the quarter deck, and that it had been necessary to change my clothes before formally reporting myself.

Lieutenant Beaver replied to this explanation in a manner so offensive that it was clear he wanted to surprise me into some act of insubordination. As it would have been impossible to be long cool in opposition to marked invective, I respectfully reminded him that by attacking me in the wardroom he was breaking a rule which he had himself laid down; viz. that “Matters connected with the service were not there to be spoken of.” The remark increased his violence, which, at length, became so marked as to call forth the reply, “Lieutenant Beaver, we will, if you please, talk of this in another place.” He then went on deck, and reported to Captain Elphinstone that in reply to his remarks on a violation of duty, he had received a challenge!

On being sent for to answer the charge, an explanation of what had really taken place was given to Captain Elphinstone, who was kindly desirous that the first lieutenant should accept an apology, and let so disagreeable a matter drop. This was declined on my part, on the ground that, in the conversation which had passed, I had not been in the wrong, and had therefore no apology to make. The effect was, that Beaver demanded a court-martial on me, and this, after manifest reluctance on the part of Lord Keith, was ordered accordingly; the decision of which was an admonition to be “more careful in future”—a clear proof that the court thought great provocation had been given by my accuser, or their opinion would have been more marked.

The Judge-Advocate on this occasion was the admiral’s secretary, one of those who had taken offence about the raw hides before mentioned! After the business of the court was concluded, Lord Keith, who was much vexed with the whole affair, said to me privately: “Now, Lord Cochrane, pray avoid for the future all flippancy towards superior officers.” His secretary overheard and embodied the remark in the sentence of the court-martial; so that shortly afterwards his officiousness or malice formed an impediment to my promotion, though the court had actually awarded no censure.

Lord Keith, who had in vain used every endeavour to induce the Spaniards to risk an engagement, began to get tired of so fruitless an operation as that of watching an enemy at anchor under their batteries, and resolved to try if he could not entice or force them to quit their moorings. With this view, the British force, though then consisting of twelve ships only, without a single frigate to watch the enemy meanwhile, proceeded to water, as usual, at Tetuan, so as to be in readiness for any contingencies that might arise. As the events which followed have been incorrectly represented by naval historians, if not in one instance misrepresented, it is necessary, in order to do justice to Lord Keith, to detail them at some length.

Immediately after our return from Tetuan, the _Childers_ arrived with intelligence that five Spanish sail of the line had got out of Ferrol, and she was followed on the same day by the _Success_ frigate, which had been chased by a French fleet off Oporto. Lord Keith at once despatched the _Childers_ to Gibraltar, to inform Lord St. Vincent, as was understood in the squadron, that he intended, if the French fleet came to Cadiz, to engage them, notwithstanding the disparity of numbers. Lord Keith’s force, by the arrival of three additional ships of the line and one frigate, now amounted to sixteen sail; viz. one 112-gun ship, four 98's, one 90, two 80's, seven 74's, and one frigate, and these were immediately got under weigh and formed in order of battle, standing off and on in front of the harbour.

About 8 A.M. on the 6th of May the French fleet was signalled in the offing, and was made out to consist of thirty-three sail, which with the twenty-two sail of Spaniards in Cadiz made fifty-five, besides frigates, to be encountered by the comparatively small British force. The French fleet was on the larboard tack, and our ships immediately formed on the same tack to receive them. To our surprise they soon afterwards wore and stood away to the south-west; though from our position between them and the Spaniards they had a fair chance of victory had the combined fleets acted in concert. According to Lord Keith’s pithily expressed opinion, we lay between “the devil and the deep sea.”

Yet there was nothing rash. Lord Keith calculated that the Spaniards would not move unless the French succeeded in breaking through the British line, and this he had no doubt of preventing. Besides which, the wind, though not dead on shore, as has been said, was unfavourable for the Spaniards coming out with the necessary rapidity. The great point to be gained was to prevent the junction of the enemies’ fleets, as was doubtless intended; the attempt was however completely frustrated by the bold interposition of Lord Keith, who, strange to say, never received for this signal service the acknowledgment of merit which was his due.

It has been inferred by naval historians that a gale of wind, which was blowing on the first appearance of the French fleet, was the cause of their standing away. A better reason was their disinclination to encounter damage, which they knew would defeat their ultimate object of forming a junction with the Spanish fleet elsewhere.

At daylight on the 7th we were still standing off and on before Cadiz, expecting the enemy to return; when shortly afterwards four of their ships were seen to windward of the British force, which immediately gave chase; but the enemy outstripping us, we returned to the coast, to guard every point by which they might get into Cadiz. Seeing no symptoms of the main body of the French fleet, Lord Keith concluded that the four ships just noticed had been left as a decoy to draw his attention from their real object of running for Toulon, now that they had been foiled in their expectation of carrying with them the Spanish fleet. We accordingly made all sail for Gibraltar.

From the intelligence forwarded by the _Childers_, there was reason to suppose that Lord St. Vincent would have prepared for instant pursuit. To our surprise, the signal was made to anchor and obtain water and provision. Three entire days were consumed in this operation; with what effect as regarded the other ships I do not know, but so far as the _Barfleur_ was concerned, and as far as I know of the other ships, the delay was unnecessary. The fleet was greatly disappointed at being thus detained, as the enemy would thereby reach Toulon without molestation, and for any good which could be effected we might as well remain where we lay.

This impatience was, after a lapse of three days, ended by Lord St. Vincent hoisting his flag on board the _Ville de Paris_; when, reinforced by the _Edgar_, 74, the fleet shaped its course up the Mediterranean.

After we had proceeded as far as the Bay of Rosas, Lord St. Vincent, having communicated with Lord Keith, parted company in the _Ville de Paris_ for Minorca, leaving Lord Keith to pursue the enemy with the remaining ships. We now made straight for Toulon, where we learned from some fishing boats that the enemy’s fleet had embarked spars, cordage, anchors, and other heavy articles for the equipment of their ships of war built or building at Spezzia—and had sailed to the eastward.

After burning some merchant vessels working into Toulon, we again started in chase. It was now of even greater importance to overtake the French fleet, in order to frustrate a double mischief; first, their escape; and secondly, their getting to Spezzia with the materials for so important an addition to their force. With this object the British ships crowded all sail in the direction the enemy had taken, and at length came in sight of their look-out frigates between Corsica and Genoa.

Just as we were upon the point of seeing the fleet also, a fast sailing transport arrived from Lord St. Vincent, with orders to return to Port Mahon; intelligence of the sailing of the French fleet having reached that port, which, Lord St. Vincent feared, might become the object of attack. Lord Keith, however, knowing exactly the position of the enemy, within reach of whom we now virtually were, persevered in the pursuit.

Shortly afterwards another fast sailing transport hove in sight, firing guns for Lord Keith to bring to, which having done, he received peremptory orders to repair immediately to Minorca; Lord St. Vincent still imagining that as the enemy had left Toulon they might catch him in Port Mahon; the fact of their having gone to Spezzia, though known to us, being unknown to him. Compliance with this unseasonable order was therefore compulsory, and Lord Keith made the signal for all captains, when, as reported by those officers, his lordship explained that the bearing up was no act of his, and the captains having returned on board their respective ships, reluctantly changed the course for Minorca, leaving the French fleet to proceed unmolested to Spezzia.

On Lord Keith receiving this order, I never saw a man more irritated. When annoyed, his lordship had a habit of talking aloud to himself. On this occasion, as officer of the watch, I happened to be in close proximity, and thereby became an involuntary listener to some very strong expressions, imputing jealousy on the part of Lord St. Vincent as constituting the motive for recalling him. The actual words of Lord Keith not being meant for the ear of any one, I do not think proper to record them. The above facts are stated as coming within my own personal knowledge, and are here introduced in consequence of blame being cast on Lord Keith to this day by naval historians, who could only derive their authority from _data_ which are certainly untrue—even if official. Had the command been surrendered to Lord Keith on his arrival in the Mediterranean, or had his lordship been permitted promptly to pursue the enemy, they could not have escaped.

The French fleet, after we were compelled to relinquish the chase (when in sight of their look-out frigates), were reported to have landed 1000 men at Savona, and convoyed a supply of wheat to Genoa, as well as having landed their naval stores at Spezzia, not one of which services could have been effected had it not been for the unfortunate delay at Gibraltar and the before-mentioned recall of the pursuing fleet.

Immediately after our departure from Gibraltar, the Spanish fleet quitted Cadiz for the Mediterranean, and as no force remained to watch the Straits, they were enabled to pass with impunity, the whole, after suffering great damage by a gale of wind, succeeded in reaching Carthagena.

On our arrival at Minorca, Lord St. Vincent resumed the command, and proceeded for some distance towards Toulon. On the 2nd of June, his lordship again quitted the fleet for Mahon, in the _Ville de Paris_. On the 14th Lord Keith shifted his flag from the _Barfleur_ to the _Queen Charlotte_, a much finer ship, to which I had the honour to accompany him.

We once more proceeded in quest of the French fleet, and on the 19th the advance ships captured three frigates and two brigs of war on their way from Egypt to Toulon, but learned nothing of the fleet we were in search of. On the 23rd of June, Lord St. Vincent at length resigned the Mediterranean command and sailed for England, so that Lord Keith had no alternative but to return to Port Mahon to make the necessary arrangements.

Scarcely had we come to an anchor when we received intelligence that the French fleet had passed to the westward to join the Spanish fleet at Carthagena!

Without even losing time to fill up with water, every exertion was made for immediate pursuit, and on the 10th we started for Carthagena, but finding the enemy gone, again made sail, and on the 26th reached Tetuan, where we completed our water. On the 29th Lord Keith communicated with Gibraltar, but as nothing was heard of the combined fleets, it was evident they had gone through the Straits in the dark; we therefore followed and examined Cadiz, where they were not. Pursuing our course without effect along the Spanish and Portuguese coasts—on the 8th of August we fell in with a Danish brig off Cape Finisterre, and received from her information that she had two days before passed through the combined French and Spanish fleets. We then directed our course for Brest, hoping to be in time to intercept them, but found that on the day before our arrival they had effected their object, and were then safely moored within the harbour. We now shaped our course for Torbay, and there found the Channel fleet under Sir Alan Gardner—the united force being nearly fifty ships of the line.

On our arrival at Torbay, Lord Keith sent me with despatches on board the commander-in-chief’s ship, where, after executing my commission, it was imperiously demanded by her captain whether I was aware that my coming on board was an infringement of quarantine regulations? Nettled at the over-bearing manner of an uncalled-for reprimand to an inferior officer, my reply was that, having been directed by Lord Keith to deliver his despatches, his lordship’s orders had been executed accordingly; at the same time, however, assuring my interrogator that we had no sickness in the fleet, nor had we been in any contagious localities. From the captain’s manner, it was almost evident that, for being thus plain spoken, he intended to put me under arrest, and I was not sorry to get back to the _Queen Charlotte_; even a show of resistance to an excess of authority being in those days fatal to many an officer’s prospects.

I shall not enter into detail as to what occurred in the Channel; suffice it to say that despite the imposing force lying at Torbay, the combined French and Spanish fleets found no difficulty in getting out of Brest, and that on the 6th of December Lord Keith returned in pursuit to Gibraltar, where he resumed the Mediterranean command, administered by Lord Nelson during his absence.

It is beyond the province of this work to notice the effectual measures taken by Lord Nelson in the Mediterranean during our absence, as they are matters in which I bore no part. But whilst Nelson and Lord Keith had been doing their best there, little appeared to be done at home to check the enemy’s operations.

From Gibraltar we proceeded to Sicily, where we found Lord Nelson surrounded by the _élite_ of Neapolitan society, amongst whom he was justly regarded as a deliverer. It was never my good fortune to serve under his lordship, either at that or any subsequent period. During our stay at Palermo, I had, however, opportunities of personal conversation with him, and from one of his frequent injunctions, “Never mind manœuvres, always go at them,” I subsequently had reason to consider myself indebted for successful attacks under apparently difficult circumstances.

The impression left on my mind during these opportunities of association with Nelson was that of his being an embodiment of dashing courage, which would not take much trouble to circumvent an enemy, but being confronted with one would regard victory so much a matter of course as hardly to deem the chance of defeat worth consideration.

This was in fact the case; for though the enemy’s ships were for the most part superior to ours in build, the discipline and seamanship of their crews was in that day so inferior as to leave little room for doubt of victory on our part. It was probably with the object of improving his crews that Admiral Bruix had risked a run from the Mediterranean to Brest and back, as just now detailed. Had not Lord Keith been delayed at Gibraltar, and afterwards recalled to Minorca, the disparity of numbers on our side would not have been of any great consequence.

Trafalgar itself is an illustration of Nelson’s peculiar clash. It has been remarked that Trafalgar was a rash action, and that had Nelson lost it and lived he would have been brought to a court-martial for the way in which that action was conducted. But such cavillers forget that, from previous experience, he had calculated both the nature and amount of resistance to be expected; such calculation forming as essential a part of his plan of attack as even his own means for making it. The result justified his expectations of victory, which were not only well founded but certain.

The fact is, that many commanders in those days committed the error of overrating the French navy, just as, in the present day, we are nationally falling into the still more dangerous extreme of underrating it. Steam has, indeed, gone far towards equalising seamanship; and the strenuous exertions of the French department of Marine have perhaps rendered discipline in their navy as good as in ours. They moreover keep their trained men, whilst we thoughtlessly turn ours adrift whenever ships are paid off—to be replaced by raw hands in case of emergency!