Part 13

I cannot help laying before you a few of my thoughts, which lately have engrossed my whole attention, on the review of our changeable government at West Point. However, I hope you will make no other use of them but such as may be of advantage; and whatever may be improper, or improperly stated, impute to my inability only: and there you will please to let it rest, and take in good part what I shall say, as it proceeds from a zeal of affection to you, and from a regard to the cause I am engaged in. On this consideration you will excuse me, if any where I should seem to exceed those bounds which custom has prescribed to subalterns, when they treat of any thing, or adopt modes, to their superiors.

A continual change of commanding officers, or commandants, is, in my humble opinion, injurious to this post, and hurtful to the military duty, so absolutely requisite to be performed, and preserved in a garrison. As there is no nation at war which pursues the like mode excepting us; I am therefore induced, not only from this consideration, but from weighty experience during my station at this post, to offer an opinion of its impropriety, and bad consequences. The visible ill it creates; the damage to innumerable things; the irregularity it continually causes; and lastly, the total loss of the many thousands which have been, and daily are, expended on this national fabric, which inevitably must fall to pieces, unless an officer is fixed to this post (and who ought to be a competent judge of fortifications, and a military man), are matters which, I think, demand consideration.

A Town-Major, and a good Barrack-Master, are as necessary here, as the necessaries of life are. The former to regulate the duty and to keep up discipline in this jurisdiction: the latter to take care of the buildings, which must otherwise be destroyed. The next thing which falls to our attention, is the public provision, which has been, and daily is, exposed here to be lost, to be stolen, and to be damaged, for want of sufficient shelter and proper repositories. The troops have suffered, and still suffer, from these and other causes. They have been cheated in weights, in measure, and in their scanty allowance of fatigue rum; which I can attest, by being appointed, after my having represented the matter to General M’Dougall, to inspect into some of those abuses. Notwithstanding the many thousands of boards which came here, there are not sufficient for barracks, bunks, etc. For as fast as one thing is built up, another is torn down again. There is not, in all this garrison, a proper guard-house for the conveniency of soldiers, nor for the security of the criminals. No powder magazine, nor a store for the reception and reserve of the implements of war. In short, the whole appears, at present, under the care of ungovernable and undisciplined militia, like a wild Tartar’s camp, instead of that shining fortification all America thinks not only an insurmountable barrier against the incursion of its enemy, but likewise an easy defence in case of an unforeseen disaster of its army.

However, to return to my subject. The importance of those heads already mentioned, and their connection with those preceding, will, I hope, obtain your pardon for the digression into which they have led me; and to your discretion I shall leave what I state.

In a letter I wrote to General Knox some time last winter, among many things I had to say concerning the ordnance and myself, I made this remark, to wit: “That relieving of an officer from a garrison, is not like a relief in the field: for an officer who knows himself to be relieved, will leave many things undone for the next to do; which I have seen, heard, and experienced. Beside, after once every thing is to rights, the men then ought to desist from labor, and exercise the guns. But new commanding officers have chiefly new systems of defence, which add labor to labor, and nothing will be formed systematically.”

I have already stated these and more things minutely to the general officers here, who all agreed in their validity and propriety. But they, being all liable to immediate removal, there cannot be any thing formed into a permanent and regular system. Moreover, I have been informed, that owing to the mismanagement of their predecessors, they were obliged, after they had taken the command, to hunt for materials in order to build their own systems; and to issue orders upon orders, to acquaint themselves with those persons who have, as it were, in keeping, the several branches which flow into this department.

And let me once more, in confidence, assure you, that I suffer incessant pain from the sad state this garrison is in. To rectify defects, my dear sir, when roused to arms, can never be attainable. Therefore let me beg you to assist in adopting some plan which may be soldierly, for the good of the service: which, however, can be done in no other manner, but such as I have hinted to you. For let General Arnold have all the sagacity imaginable, it will take him some time to get himself well acquainted with the position and defence of this post; especially as there is not one single Continental officer left here who can in any way assist him. Every thing seems new here; and the very engineer is transferred from hence, on whom he, in some measure, could have depended for information, with regard to the weakest and strongest parts of this fortress. And I have not yet told you the one hundredth part of what I have to say upon some of these subjects; but I shall finish with prognosticating, that should ever capriciousness hold sway here, it may prove fatal to this post.

I am, with due respect, Sir, Your most humble servant, S. Bauman, Major of Artillery.

DE MARBOIS TO HAMILTON.

Philadelphia, 21 Aout, 1780.

Je viens de recevoir mon cher Colonel votre lettre du 17 de ce mois. Vous m’y parlez de mes Frères comme si vous étiez sûr qu’ils sont en effet prisonniers. Avez-vous sur cet article plus de connaissance que je n’en ai, on m’avez-vous déjà écrit à ce sujet quelque lettre qui ne me serait point parvenue. Je vais écrire à M. de Ternay à ce sujet, mais en attendant je vous prie de vouloir bien me communiquer tous les éclaircissements que vous aurez pu vous procurer, et d’être persuadé que rien ne me touche plus que de leur procurer de soulagement s’ils sont en effet entre les mains de l’ennemi.

Si vous avez quelques nouvelles dernières touchant l’embarcation que M. le Général Clinton prépare, je vous prie de vouloir bien m’en instruire, cet article étant de la plus grande importance pour nous. Je vous embrasse de tout mon cœur.

De Marbois.

Col. Hamilton.

WILLIAMS TO HAMILTON.

Hillsborough, August 30, 1780.

Dear Hamilton:

About the twenty-third instant, I wrote my friend Harrison from Salisbury, giving him a very hasty particular account of the defeat of General Gates’s army at Sutton’s, near Campden, the sixteenth instant. We were truly unfortunate, and completely routed. The infamous cowardice of the militia of Virginia and North Carolina, gave the enemy every advantage over our few regular troops, whose firm opposition and gallant behavior have gained them the applause, as well of our successful foes, as of our runaway friends. If I mentioned to Col. Harrison the loss of two howitzers, I was mistaken. We had eight pieces of light artillery, with six ammunition wagons, which, with the greatest part of our baggage, were lost.

Our retreat was the most mortifying that could have happened. Those who escaped the dangers of the field, knew not where to find protection: the wounded found no relief from the inhabitants, who were immediately in arms against us; and many of our fugitive officers and men were disarmed by those faithless villains, who had flattered us with promises of joining us against the enemy. The tories are now assembling in different parts of the country; and there is actually a sort of

## partisan war waged between them and the whigs of this country.

The greatest part of our baggage was plundered by those who first left the field. The enemy took a part; and much of what escaped them, has been pillaged by the inhabitants on the retreat. The wagon horses have been stolen, and frequently taken from the drivers; and some of those desperate rascals have been daring enough to fire upon parties of our regular troops many miles from the place of action.

General Gates used the utmost expedition in getting from the lost field to this place. As this step is unaccountable to me, you must expect to know the reason another time, and from better authority. An unfortunate General usually loses the confidence of his army; and this is much the case with us at present. However, I suppose every thing necessary will be done, in justification of the steps that have been taken, and then all will be understood. Beside my ignorance, there is another reason for my silence on this subject. The General is extremely mortified at the disappointment his hopes have met with; and I think it ungenerous to oppress dejected spirits by a premature censure.

The legislature of this State is now sitting at this place, and devising means of defending the country. The General has exhibited estimates (he informs me) of the supplies wanting to carry on the campaign, both to the legislature of this State, and to Virginia; and hopes they will be furnished. The officers of North Carolina talk confidently of re-embodying a great number of militia. General Stephens had collected about eight hundred of the Virginia militia at this place since the action. But I am sorry to add, at least half that number have deserted. The Maryland Division, including the Delaware regiment, will, I hope, muster six hundred when all are collected. Part are now here: a party are with General Smallwood at Ellis’s Ferry, Adkin river; and a small party with Major Anderson, who General Smallwood left some time at Charlotte, to receive the fugitives as they arrived. But this is the place of general rendezvous.

From the best accounts I can get, Lord Cornwallis had with him, on the day of battle, the seventy-first, sixty-third, thirty-third, and twenty-third British regiments; a corps of Hessians, Tarlton’s legion, and some new levies, amounting to about three thousand men. Our numbers were very little greater; and our force will not be imagined so great, by those who are informed of our long march in a barren country, with very little other subsistence than a short allowance of fresh beef, green corn, apples, and peaches.

As soon as I recover from a relaxation of spirits, which is all my present complaint, I will write you again, and inform you that we are resolved not to despair, but bear our fortunes like veterans in the South; while you, like heroes in the North, win and wear the laurels of the present campaign. Present my most respectful compliments to the General, whom I love; to all my friends at head quarters and in camp. Not a man among you have been generous enough to write a single sentence to

Your sincere friend and servant, O. H. Williams.

I mentioned the surprise of General Sumpter’s party, which happened the sixteenth instant, in my last.

HAMILTON TO JAMES DUANE.

Liberty Pole, September 8, 1780.

Dear Sir:

Agreeably to your request, and my promise, I sit down to give you my ideas of the defects of our present system, and the changes necessary to save us from ruin. They may, perhaps, be the reveries of a projector, rather than the sober views of a politician. You will judge of them, and make what use you please of them.

The fundamental defect is a want of power in Congress. It is hardly worth while to show in what this consists, as it seems to be universally acknowledged; or to point out how it has happened, as the only question is how to remedy it. It may, however, be said, that it has originated from three causes; an excess of the spirit of liberty, which has made the particular States show a jealousy of all power not in their own hands; and this jealousy has led them to exercise a right of judging in the last resort of the measures recommended by Congress, and of acting according to their own opinions of their propriety, or necessity; a diffidence, in Congress, of their own powers, by which they have been timid and indecisive in their resolutions: constantly making concessions to the States, till they have scarcely left themselves the shadow of power; a want of sufficient means at their disposal to answer the public exigencies, and of vigor to draw forth those means; which have occasioned them to depend on the States individually, to fulfil their engagements with the army; the consequence of which, has been to ruin their influence and credit with the army, to establish its dependence on each State separately, rather than _on them_, that is, rather than on the whole collectively.

It may be pleaded, that Congress had never any definite powers granted them, and, of course, could exercise none, could do nothing more than recommend. The manner in which Congress was appointed, would warrant, and the public good required, that they should have considered themselves as vested with full power _to preserve the republic from harm_. They have done many of the highest acts of sovereignty, which were always cheerfully submitted to: The declaration of independence; the declaration of war: the levying of an army; creating a navy; emitting money; making alliances with foreign powers; appointing a dictator, etc., etc. All these implications of a complete sovereignty were never disputed, and ought to have been a standard for the whole conduct of administration. Undefined powers are discretionary powers, limited only by the object for which they were given; in the present case, the independence and freedom of America. The Confederation made no difference; for as it has not been generally adopted, it had no operation. But from what I recollect of it, Congress have even descended from the authority which the spirit of that act gives them; while the particular States have no further attended to it, than as it suited their pretensions and convenience. It would take too much time to enter into particular instances, each of which separately might appear inconsiderable; but united, are of serious import. I only mean to remark, not to censure.

But the Confederation itself is defective, and requires to be altered. It is neither fit for war nor peace. The idea of an uncontrollable sovereignty, in each State, over its internal police, will defeat the other powers given to Congress, and make our union feeble and precarious. There are instances without number, where Acts, necessary for the general good, and which rise out of the powers given to Congress, must interfere with the internal police of the States; and there are as many instances in which the particular States, by arrangements of internal police, can effectually, though indirectly, counteract the arrangements of Congress. You have already had examples of this, for which I refer you to your own memory.

The Confederation gives the States, individually, too much influence in the affairs of the army. They should have nothing to do with it. The entire formation and disposal of our military forces, ought to belong to Congress. It is an essential cement of the union: and it ought to be the policy of Congress, to destroy all ideas of State attachments in the army, and make it look up wholly to them. For this purpose, all appointments, promotions, and provisions, whatsoever, ought to be made by them. It may be apprehended that this may be dangerous to liberty. But nothing appears more evident to me, than that we run much greater risk of having a weak and disunited federal government, than one which will be able to usurp upon the rights of the people.

Already some of the lines of the army would obey their States in opposition to Congress, notwithstanding the pains we have taken to preserve the unity of the army. If any thing would hinder this, it would be the personal influence of the General; a melancholy and mortifying consideration.

The forms of our State constitutions, must always give them great weight in our affairs, and will make it too difficult to bend them to the pursuit of a common interest; too easy to oppose whatever they do not like: and to form partial combinations subversive of the general one. There is a wide difference between our situation, and that of an empire under one simple form of government, distributed into counties, provinces, or districts, which have no legislatures, but merely magistratical bodies, to execute the laws of a common sovereign. Here the danger is, that the sovereign will have too much power, and oppress the parts of which it is composed. In our case, that of an empire composed of confederated States; each with a government completely organized within itself, having all the means to draw its subjects to a close dependence on itself; the danger is directly the reverse. It is, that the common sovereign will not have power sufficient to unite the different members together, and direct the common forces to the interest and happiness of the whole.

The leagues among the old Grecian republics are a proof of this. They were continually at war with each other; and, for want of union, fell a prey to their neighbors. They frequently held general councils; but their resolutions were no further observed, than as they suited the interests and inclinations of all the parties; and, at length, they sunk entirely into contempt.

The Swiss Cantons are another proof of the doctrine. They have had wars with each other, which would have been fatal to them, had not the different powers, in their neighborhood, been too jealous of one another, and too equally matched, to suffer either to take advantage of their quarrels. That they have remained so long united at all, is to be attributed to their weakness, to their poverty, and to the causes just mentioned. These ties will not exist in America; a little time hence, some of the States will be powerful empires; and we are so remote from other nations, that we shall have all the leisure and opportunity we can wish, to cut each other’s throats.

The Germanic corps might also be cited as an example in favor of the position.

The United Provinces may be thought to be one against it. But the family of the Stadtholders, whose authority is interwoven with the whole Government, has been a strong link of union between them. Their physical necessities, and the habits founded upon them, have contributed to it.

Each province is too inconsiderable, by itself, to undertake any thing. An analysis of their present constitutions, would show that they have many ties which would not exist in ours; and that they are by no means a proper model for us.

Our own experience should satisfy us. We have felt the difficulty of drawing out the resources of the country, and inducing the States to combine in equal exertions for the common cause.

The ill success of our last attempt is striking. Some have done a great deal; others little, or scarcely any thing. The disputes about boundaries, etc., testify how flattering a prospect we have of future tranquillity, if we do not frame, in time, a confederacy capable of deciding the differences, and compelling the obedience of the respective members.

The Confederation, too, gives the power of the purse too entirely to the State Legislatures. It should provide perpetual funds, in the disposal of Congress, by a land tax, poll tax, or the like. All imposts upon commerce ought to be laid by Congress, and appropriated to their use. For, without certain revenues, a Government can have no power. That power which holds the purse-strings absolutely, must rule. This seems to be a medium which, without making Congress altogether independent, will tend to give reality to its authority.

Another defect in our system, is want of method and energy in the administration. This has partly resulted from the other defect; but in a great degree from prejudice, and the want of a proper executive. Congress have kept the power too much in their own hands, and have meddled too much with details of every sort. Congress is, properly, a deliberative corps; and it forgets itself when it attempts to play the executive. It is impossible such a body, numerous as it is, constantly fluctuating, can ever act with sufficient decision, or with system. Two-thirds of the members, one half the time, cannot know what has gone before them, or what connection the subject in hand has to what has been transacted on former occasions. The members who have been more permanent, will only give information that promotes the side they espouse in the present case; and will as often mislead as enlighten. The variety of business must distract; and the proneness of every assembly to debate, must at all times delay.

Lately, Congress, convinced of these inconveniences, have gone into the measure of appointing Boards. But this is, in my opinion, a bad plan.

A single man, in each department of the administration, would be greatly preferable. It would give us a chance of more knowledge, more

## activity, more responsibility, and, of course, more zeal and attention.

Boards partake of a part of the inconveniences of larger assemblies. Their decisions are slower, their energy less, their responsibility more diffused. They will not have the same abilities and knowledge as an administration by single men. Men of the first pretensions will not so readily engage in them; because they will be less conspicuous, of less importance, have less opportunity of distinguishing themselves. The members of Boards will take less pains to inform themselves and arrive to eminence, because they have fewer motives to do it. All these reasons conspire to give a preference to the plan of vesting the great executive departments of the State in the hands of individuals. As these men will be, of course, at all times under the direction of Congress, we shall blend the advantages of a Monarchy and Republic in our constitution.

A question has been made, whether single men could be found to undertake these offices. I think they could; because there would be then every thing to excite the ambition of candidates. But, in order to this, Congress, by their manner of appointing them, and the line of duty marked out, must show that they are in earnest in making these officers, officers of real trust and importance.

I fear a little vanity has stood in the way of these arrangements, as though they would lessen the importance of Congress, and leave them nothing to do. But they would have precisely the same rights and powers as heretofore, happily disencumbered of the detail. They would have to inspect the conduct of their ministers, deliberate upon their plans, originate others for the public good; only observing this rule: that they ought to consult their ministers, and get all the information and advice they could from them, before they entered into any new measures, or made changes in the old.