Part 32

M’Henry, expressing, in a letter I have lately received from him, a wish to be appointed official Secretary to the Court of Versailles, or London, I have, by this opportunity, written to Mr. Livingston, and Mr. Madison, speaking of him in warm terms; and wish him success with all my heart.

I am, dear Sir, With great esteem and regard, Your most obedient servant, G. Washington.

Colonel Hamilton.

HAMILTON TO GOV. CLINTON.

Philadelphia, May 14, 1783.

Sir:

The President of Congress will of course have transmitted to your Excellency, the plan lately adopted by Congress for funding the public debt. This plan was framed to accommodate it to the objections of some of the States; but this spirit of accommodation will only serve to render it less efficient, without making it more palatable. The opposition of the State of Rhode Island, for instance, is chiefly founded upon these two considerations: the merchants are opposed to any revenue from trade; and the State, depending almost wholly on commerce, wants to have credit for the amount of the duties.

Persuaded that the plan now proposed will have little more chance of success than a better one; and that, if agreed to by all the States, it will, in a great measure, fail in the execution, it received my negative. My principal objections were,

_Firstly_: That it does not designate the funds (except the impost) on which the whole interest is to arise; and by which (selecting the capital articles of visible property) the collection would have been easy, the funds productive, and necessarily increasing with the increase of the country.

_Secondly_: That the duration of the funds is not coextensive with the debt, but limited to twenty-five years; though there is a moral certainty, that, in that period, the principal will not, by the present provision, be fairly extinguished.

_Thirdly_: That the nomination and appointment of the collectors of the revenue are to reside in each State, instead of, at least the nomination, being in the United States; the consequence of which will be, that those States which have little interest in the funds, by having a small share of the public debt due to their own citizens, will take care to appoint such persons as are least likely to collect the revenue.

The evils resulting from these defects, will be, that in many instances the objects of the revenues will be improperly chosen, and will consist of a multitude of little articles, which will, on experiment, prove insufficient; that for want of a vigorous collection in each State, the revenue will be unproductive in many, and will fall chiefly upon those States which are governed by most liberal principles; that for want of an adequate security, the evidences of the public debt, will not be transferable for any thing like their value; that this not admitting an incorporation of the creditors in the nature of Banks, will deprive the public of the benefit of an increased circulation, and of course will disable the people from paying the taxes for want of a sufficient medium.

I shall be happy to be mistaken in my apprehensions; but the experiment must determine.

I hope our State will consent to the plan proposed; because it is her interest, at all events, to promote the payment of the public debt on Continental funds (independent of the general considerations of union and propriety).

I am much mistaken if the debts due from the United States to the citizens of the State of New-York, do not considerably exceed its proportion of the necessary funds: of course it has an immediate interest that there should be a Continental provision for them. But there are superior motives that ought to operate in every State; the obligations of national faith, honor, and reputation.

Individuals have been already too long sacrificed to public convenience. It will be shocking, and indeed an eternal reproach to this country, if we begin the peaceable enjoyment of our independence by a violation of all the principles of honesty and true policy.

It is worthy of remark, that at least four-fifths of the domestic debt, are due to the citizens of the States (from Pennsylvania inclusively) northward.

I have the honor to be, Sir, Your most obedient servant, A. Hamilton.

P. S. It is particularly interesting that the State should have a representation here. Not only many matters are depending which require a full representation in Congress (and there is now a thin one), but those matters are of a nature so particularly interesting to our State, that we ought not to be without a voice in them. I wish two other gentlemen of the delegation may appear as soon as possible; for it would be very injurious for me to remain much longer here. Having no future views in public life, I owe it to myself, without delay to enter upon the care of my private concerns in earnest.

A. H.

To His Excellency Governor Clinton.

HAMILTON TO GOVERNOR CLINTON.

Philadelphia, June 1, 1783.

Sir:

In my last letter to your Excellency, I took occasion to mention, that it was of great importance to the State, at this time, to have a representation here, as points in which, by its present situation, it is particularly interested, are daily, and will be daily, agitated.

It is also of importance, at this moment, to the United States; (not only from general considerations, but) because we have a very thin representation in Congress, and are frequently unable to transact any of those matters which require nine States. I wish your Excellency would urge a couple of gentlemen to come on, as it becomes highly inconvenient to me to remain here, and as I have staid the full time to be expected.

I observe, with great regret, the intemperate proceedings among the people in different parts of the State, in violation of a treaty, the faithful observance of which so deeply interests the United States.

Surely, the State of New-York, with its capital and its frontier posts (on which its important fur trade depends) in the hands of the British troops, ought to take care that nothing is done to furnish a pretext on the other side, even for delaying, much less for refusing, the execution of the treaty. We may imagine that the situation of Great Britain puts her under a necessity, at all events, of fulfilling her engagements, and cultivating the good will of this country.

This is, no doubt, her true policy; but when we feel that passion makes us depart from the dictates of reason; when we have seen that passion has had so much influence in the conduct of the British Councils, in the whole course of the war; when we recollect, that those who govern them, are men like ourselves, and alike subject to passions and resentments; when we reflect, also, that all the great men in England are not united in the liberal scheme of policy with respect to this country, and that in the anarchy which prevails, there is no knowing to whom the reins of government may be committed; when we recollect how little in a condition we are, to enforce a compliance with our claims; we ought, certainly, to be cautious in what manner we act, especially when we, in particular, have so much at stake; and should not openly provoke a breach of faith on the other side, by setting the example.

An important distinction is not sufficiently attended to. The fifth article is recommendatory; the sixth positive. There is no option, on the part of the particular States, as to any future confiscations, prosecutions, or injuries of any kind, to person, liberty, or property, on account of any thing done in the war. It is matter of discretion in the States, whether they will comply with the recommendations contained in the fifth article; but no part of the sixth can be departed from by them, without a direct breach of public faith, and of the Confederation. The power of making treaties is exclusively lodged in Congress. That power includes whatever is essential to the termination of the war, and to the preservation of the general safety. Indemnity to individuals in similar cases, is a _usual_ stipulation in treaties of peace, of which many precedents are to be produced.

Should it be said, that the associations of the people, without legal authority, do not amount to a breach of the public faith; the answer is, If the government does not repress them, and prevent their having effect, it is as much a breach, as a formal refusal to comply on its part. In the eye of a foreign nation, if our engagements are broken, it is of no moment whether it is for the want of good intention in the government, or for want of power to restrain its subjects.

Suppose a violence committed by an American vessel on the vessel of another nation, upon the high seas, and after complaint made there is no redress given: Is not this a hostility against the injured nation which will justify reprisals?

But if I am not misinformed, there are violations going on in form of law. I am told that indictments continue to be brought under the former confiscation laws: A palpable infraction, if true, of the sixth article of the treaty; to which an immediate stop ought, no doubt, to be put.

It has been said by some men, that the operation of this treaty is suspended till the definitive treaty: A plain subterfuge. Whatever is clearly expressed in the provisional or preliminary treaty, is as binding from the moment it is made, as the definitive treaty; which, in fact, only developes, explains and fixes, more precisely, what may have been too generally expressed in the former.

Suppose the British should now send away, not only the negroes, but all other property, and all the public records in their possession belonging to us, on the pretence above stated: should we not justly accuse them with breaking faith? Is this not already done in the case of the negroes who have been carried away, though founded upon a very different principle, a doubtful construction of the treaty, not a denial of its immediate operation?

In fine, Is it our interest to advance this doctrine, and to countenance the position, that nothing is binding till the definitive treaty, when there are examples of _years_ intervening between the preliminary and definitive treaties?

Sir Guy Carleton, in his correspondence, has appeared to consider the treaty as immediately obligatory: and it has been the policy which I have pursued, to promote the same idea.

I am not, indeed, apprehensive of a renewal of the war, for peace is necessary to Great Britain. I think it also most probable, her disposition to conciliate this country will outweigh the resentments which a breach of our engagements is calculated to inspire. But with a treaty which has exceeded the hopes of the most sanguine; which, in the articles of boundary and the fisheries, is even better than we asked; circumstanced, too, as this country is, with respect to the means of making war; I think it the height of imprudence to run any risk. Great Britain, without recommencing hostilities, may evade parts of the treaty. She may keep possession of the frontier posts; she may obstruct the free enjoyment of the fisheries; she may be indisposed to such extensive concessions, in matters of commerce, as it is our interest to aim at. In all this she would find no opposition from any foreign power: and we are not in a condition to oblige her to any thing. If we imagine that France, obviously embarrassed herself, in her finances, would renew the war to oblige Great Britain to the restoration of frontier posts; or to a compliance with the stipulations respecting the fisheries (especially after a manifest breach of the treaty on our part); we speculate much at random. Observations might be made on the last article, which would prove, that it is not the policy of France to support our interest there. Are we prepared, for the mere gratification of our resentments, to put those great national objects to the hazard; to leave our western frontier in a state of insecurity; to relinquish the fur trade; and to abridge our pretensions to the fisheries? Do we think national character so light a thing, as to be willing to sacrifice the public faith to individual animosity? Let the case be fairly stated: Great Britain and America, two independent nations, at war. The former in possession of considerable posts and districts of territory, belonging to the latter; and also of the means of obstructing certain commercial advantages in which it is deeply interested.

But it is not uncommon, in treaties of peace, for the _uti possidetis_ to take place. Great Britain, however, in the present instance, stipulates to restore all our posts and territories in her possession. She even adds an extent, not within our original claims, more than a compensation for a small part ceded in another quarter. She agrees to re-admit us to a participation in the fisheries. What equivalent do we give for this? Congress are to recommend the restoration of property to those who have adhered to her; and expressly engage, that no future injury shall be done them, in person, liberty, or property. This is the sole condition, on our part, where there is not an immediate reciprocity (the recovery of debts, and liberation of prisoners, being mutual; the former, indeed, only declaring what the rights of private faith, which all civilized nations hold sacred, would have declared without it), and stands as the single equivalent for all the restitutions and concessions to be made by Great Britain. Will it be honest in us to violate this condition, or will it be prudent to put it in competition with all the important matters to be performed on the other side?

Will foreign nations be willing to undertake any thing with us, or for us, when they find that the nature of our governments will allow no dependence to be placed upon our engagements? I have omitted saying any thing of the impolicy of inducing, by our severity, a great number of useful citizens, whose situations do not make them a proper object of resentment, to abandon the country, to form settlements that will hereafter become our rivals, animated with a hatred to us, which will descend to their posterity. Nothing, however, can be more unwise than to contribute, as we are doing, to people the shores and wilderness of Nova Scotia; a colony which, by its position, will become a competitor with us, among other things, in that branch of commerce on which our navigation and navy will essentially depend: I mean the fisheries; in which, I have no doubt, the State of New-York will, hereafter, have a considerable share.

To your Excellency I freely deliver my sentiments, because I am persuaded you cannot be a stranger to the force of these considerations. I fear not even to hazard them to the justice and good sense of those whom I have the honor to represent. I esteem it my duty to do it, because the question is important to the interests of the State, in its relation to the United States.

Those who consult only their passions, might choose to construe what I say, as too favorable to a set of men who have been the enemies of the public liberty: but those for whose esteem I am most concerned, will acquit me of any personal considerations; and will perceive that I only urge the cause of national honor, safety, and advantage. We have assumed an independent station: we ought to feel, and to act, in a manner consistent with the dignity of that station.

I anxiously wish to see every prudent measure taken to prevent those combinations which will certainly disgrace us, if they do not involve us in other calamities. Whatever distinctions are judged necessary to be made, in the cases of those persons who have been in opposition to the common cause, let them be made by legal authority, on a fair construction of the treaty, consistent with national faith and national honor.

Your Excellency will have been informed, that Congress have instructed General Washington to garrison the frontier posts, when surrendered, with the three years’ Continental troops. This is more for the interest of the State, than to have them garrisoned at its particular expense: and I should wish that permanent provision might be made on the same principle. I wait to see whether any Continental peace establishment for garrisons, etc., will take place, before I engage the consent of Congress to a separate provision.

I cannot forbear adding a word on the subject of money. The only reliance we now have for redeeming a large anticipation on the public credit, already made, and making, for the benefit of the army, is on the taxes coming in. The collection, hitherto, is out of all proportion to the demand. It is of vast consequence, at this juncture, that every thing possible should be done to forward it. I forbear entering into details which would be very striking upon this subject. I will only say, that unless there is a serious exertion in the States, public credit must ere long receive another shock very disagreeable in its consequences.

I have the honor to be, With perfect respect, Your Excellency’s Most obedient servant, A. Hamilton.

To His Excellency Governor Clinton.

HAMILTON TO REED.

1783.

Sir:

Having always entertained an esteem for you personally, I could not, without reluctance, yield to impressions that might weaken that sentiment: and it is with pain I find myself drawn, by circumstances, to animadvert upon the late message from the Executive Council to the Assembly of Pennsylvania relative to the mutiny, in a manner which may seem to impeach the candor of those who were the authors of it.

But it will be impossible for persons who have read the report of the committee, and the message of the Council, however inclined to make allowances for the force of involuntary bias, not to conclude, that on one side or the other, the facts have been wilfully discolored. I decline any attempt to set the public opinion right upon this subject; because, after all that can be said, the judgments of men will eventually be determined by personal and party prepossessions. So far as I am concerned, I persuade myself those who are acquainted with me, will place entire confidence in my fairness and veracity. I doubt not your Excellency’s friends will be equally partial to you, and those of the Council to them. But though I should despair of rectifying or fixing the public opinion, by an appeal to the public; and though I have seen too much of the ridicule thrown upon such appeals, from men in official stations, and of the ill effect they have had upon the national character, not to be willing to sacrifice the desire of justifying myself to considerations of prudence and propriety; yet I cannot forbear indulging my feelings so far as to enter into a few explanations with your Excellency; submitting the justness of them to the testimony of your own mind.

As this is a mere private discussion, I address myself to your Excellency in particular; and the rather, as, from the style and manner of the message, I take it for granted you had the principal agency in it: and I shall consider, on the same grounds, the notes in      [20] paper of the      [20], as a comment on the report of the committee by yourself; in aid of the message.

I take up the matter individually, because I mean to treat it on a private footing; and because, though I do not acknowledge any peculiar responsibility, it happened to be my lot, as chairman, principally to conduct the conferences on the part of the committee.

I regard the whole of this business as a most unfortunate one; in which, probably, none of the actors will acquire great credit. I deplore it, as tending to interrupt the harmony between Congress and a respectable, a meritorious member of the Union. Who were right, or who were wrong, is a question of less importance, than how mutual irritations may be best healed. Whatever revives, or continues, the former, is to be regretted. I lament to be under an inducement to discuss circumstances that relate to it in the remotest degree. Nothing but an attack upon the ingenuousness of my conduct, could have called me to it. Its prudence, either collectively or individually, would patiently have been consigned to the lash of censure and criticism, merited or unmerited.

Happily, in the present case, the members of the committee have a strong ground, from which they cannot easily be forced. Apprehensive of misconception, I will not say of misrepresentation, they tried to render it impossible by written documents. The presumption, with impartial minds, cannot fail to be in favor of that side which gave so decisive a proof of its disposition to fairness, as to endeavor to put it out of its own power to misrepresent.

The professed scruples of the Council, cannot be admitted to have any weight. Usage, and the plainest rules of propriety, will dictate, that it never could have wounded the dignity, or delicacy, of the executive of any State, to have given to a committee of Congress, appointed to confer on a subject of moment, a written answer to a request in writing after previous explanations. The fact stated speaks for itself. The consequences show, that the precaution of the committee was well judged; and that it would have been well for the Council to have concurred.

In the present case it might be observed, that there was, in the first instance, a written application from Congress to the Council, in the customary form of resolutions: and though a committee was authorized to confer and explain, a formal and authentic answer might reasonably have been expected by Congress; and, when desired by the committee, should have been understood as desired on their behalf.

There is an awkwardness in reasoning upon self-evident positions; but as the Council have, by their conduct in the first instance, and by their message since, put forward a doubt upon the subject, and made it a point of importance, I shall be excused for examining it a little further. On what could the objection of the Council be founded? They say it had been unusual. Admitting the fact, was the mere novelty of the thing a sufficient reason against it? If there was no apparent inconvenience in making a new precedent; if; on the contrary, there was a manifest convenience in it; ought not such a punctilio to have given way to considerations of utility?

Was it derogatory to the dignity of the Council? Surely, if they communicate in writing with the executive servants of Congress, even those in subordinate stations, as is the practice of every day, and as is indispensable to the prosecution of public business, they might, at less expense of dignity, pursue the same mode with a part of that body itself.

The distinction taken by the Council, in their message to the Assembly, respecting the responsibility of such executive officers, as not applicable to a committee, if it amounts to any thing, proves only this: That such officers ought, in prudence, to take greater precautions for their own justification than a committee of Congress need to do. It is not to be inferred, if a committee of Congress,

## acting ministerially, think it expedient to use circumspection, that

those with whom they are transacting business, can, with propriety, refuse to join with them in that mode which is best adapted to precision and certainty.