Part 5
Ever since my arrival in this quarter, I have been endeavoring to collect the best idea I could of the state of things in New-York, in order the better to form a judgment of the probable reinforcement gone to General Howe. On the whole, this is a fact well ascertained, that New-York has been stripped as bare as possible: that in consequence of this, the few troops there, and the inhabitants, are under so strong apprehensions of an attack, as almost to amount to a _panic_; that to supply the deficiency of men, every effort is making to excite the citizens to arms for the defence of the city. For this purpose, the public papers are full of addresses to them, that plainly speak the apprehensions prevailing on the occasion.
Hence I infer, that a formidable force is gone to General Howe. The calculations made by those who have had the best opportunities of judging, carry the number from six to seven thousand. If so, the number gone, and going, to General Washington, is far inferior; five thousand at the utmost. The militia were all detained by General Putnam till it became too late to send them.
The state of things I gave you when I had the pleasure of seeing you, was, to the best of my knowledge, sacredly true. I give you the present information, that you may decide, whether any further succor can with propriety come from you.
The fleet, with the troops on board, sailed out of the Hook on the fifth instant. This circumstance demonstrates, beyond the possibility of doubt, that it is General Howe’s fixed intention to endeavor to hold Philadelphia at all hazards; and removes all danger of any further operations up the North River this winter. Otherwise, Sir Henry Clinton’s movement, at this advanced season, is altogether inexplicable.
If you can with propriety afford any further assistance, the most expeditious manner of conveying it will be to acquaint General Putnam of it, that he may send on the troops with him, to be replaced by them. You, Sir, best know the uses to which the troops with you are to be applied, and will determine accordingly. I am certain it is not His Excellency’s wish to frustrate any plan you may have in view for the benefit of the service, so far as it can possibly be avoided, consistent with a due attention to more important objects.
I am, with respect, Sir, Your most obedient servant, Alex. Hamilton, A. D. C.
To General Gates.
HAMILTON TO WASHINGTON.
Peekskill, Nov. 15, 1777.
Dear Sir:
I arrived at this place last night, and unfortunately find myself unable to proceed any further. Imagining I had gotten the better of my complaint, which confined me at Governor Clinton’s, and anxious to be about attending to the march of the troops, the day before yesterday I crossed the ferry, in order to fall in with General Glover’s brigade, which was on its march from Poughkeepsie to Fishkill. I did not, however, see it myself, but received a letter from Colonel Shepherd, who commands the frigate, informing me he would be last night at Fishkill, and this night at King’s ferry. Wagons, &c., are provided on the other side for his accommodation; so that there need be no delay but what is voluntary; and I believe Colonel Shepherd is as well disposed as could be wished to hasten his march. General Poor’s brigade crossed the ferry the day before yesterday. Two York regiments, Courtland’s and Livingston’s, are with them: they were unwilling to be separated from the brigade, and the brigade from them. General Putnam was unwilling to keep them with him: and if he had consented to do it, the regiments to displace them would not join you six days as soon as these. The troops now remaining with General Putnam will amount to about the number you intended, though they are not exactly the same. He has detached Colonel Charles Webb’s regiment to you. He _says_ the troops with him are not in a condition to march, being destitute of shoes, stockings, and other necessaries: but I believe the true reasons of his being unwilling to pursue the mode pointed out by you, were his aversion to the York troops, and his desire to retain General Parsons with him.
I am, with much respect and esteem, Your Excellency’s most ob’t serv’t, A. Hamilton.
To General Washington.
WASHINGTON TO HAMILTON.
Head-Quarters, November 15, 1777.
Dear Sir:
I have duly received your several favors, from the time you left me to that of the twelfth instant. I approve entirely of all the steps you have taken; and have only to wish, that the exertions of those you have had to deal with, had kept pace with your zeal and good intentions. I hope your health will, before this, have permitted you to push on the rear of the whole reinforcement beyond New Windsor. Some of the enemy’s ships have arrived in the Delaware; but how many have troops on board, I cannot exactly ascertain. The enemy have lately damaged Fort Miflin considerably: but our people keep possession, and seem determined to do so to the last extremity. Our loss in men has been but small. Captain Treat is unfortunately among the killed. I wish you a safe return,
And am, dear Sir, Your most obedient servant, G. Washington.
Lt. Col. Hamilton.
HUGH KNOX TO HAMILTON.
St. Croix, December 10, 1777.
Dear Hamilton:
The fine, impartial, laconic, and highly descriptive account you favored me with of the last year’s campaign, in your letter of March last, excited in me, and many of your other friends here, an earnest desire of further accounts from your pen, of the succeeding fortunes of the Great American War: a war which will, one day, shine more illustriously in the historic page, than any which has happened since the times of Nimrod and the Giants; and deservedly, on account of the goodness of the cause, the grandeur of the object, the eclat of the Generals, the bravery of the troops--and (alas! that I should be obliged to add) of the cruelty and ferocity which has marked the route of your enemies; and the tons of brothers’ blood which have been shed on the unhappy occasion!
I wrote two answers to your obliging letter, both of which I hope have reached you; and in both of which I have urged it upon you, to make and collect such memoirs as the urgency of your affairs will permit you; which may furnish materials for an accurate history of the war, when you shall have leisure to fill up and embellish such a skeleton, with all that elegance and dignity of which your fine pen is capable.
The honorable post you hold under the GREAT General Washington, and so near his person, will give you a peculiar advantage for delineating his character, both in his amiable private virtues, and military abilities. And depend upon it, the very minutiæ of that incomparable man will be read with avidity by posterity. You know me too well, I hope, to suspect me of superstition; yet I feel myself, at times, under a strong impulse to _prophesy_, that _Washington_ was born for the deliverance of America--that that Providence who has raised and trained him up for that very purpose, will watch over his _sacred_ life with a paternal and solicitous care; will shield his head in every day of battle--_will_ give him to see America _free_, _flourishing_, and _happy_--and _will_ adorn his fame, among latest posterity, with a Garland of Laurel, more verdant, blooming, and enviable, than ever adorned the brow of a _Marlborough_!
The bearer of this line (if he should be indeed so fortunate as to put it into your hand) is our worthy friend, Mr. Cornelius Durant, who is possessed of an ardent desire of having the honor of a short interview with General Washington; principally, that he may have it to say, that he has seen and spoken to _the greatest man of this Age_: and, indeed, considering Mr. Durant’s personal worth; his uncommon zeal for, and attachment to, the American cause; the losses he has sustained in attempting to assist her; and his extraordinary admiration of, and love to, the General’s character and person; few men more richly merit this indulgence. If you still exist, and exist near the General’s person (and I have not yet seen your name among the lists of the slain or the disgraced), you can easily procure him this honor--and I trust you will.
We are now blessed with, and certified of, the glorious news of Burgoyne’s surrender to the immortal Gates; another bright star in the Constellation of American Heroes: and we are momently expecting to hear, that General Washington has done something like the same by General Howe! But we yet tremble in suspense--and it is indeed a _painful one_. Probably before this letter goes, we shall hear more of the matter. Our general accounts are favorable: and while the _Chevaux de frize_ are defended, we have no fears about Philadelphia. May this campaign decide the matter!
By the time this reaches you, you will be (if you are at all) in winter quarters; and perhaps may be at leisure to write me a half folio, of which Mr. Durant will take care to write me duplicates or triplicates, for fear of miscarriage.
A piece of mine, entitled “An Address to America, by a friend in a foreign government,” has been sent to the Congress for publication (if approved). I know not yet its fate. It is, at least, an honestly designed and animating piece, but written incorrectly, and in a hurry. If you have seen it, pray give me your sentiments about it; but let it be on a loose paper inclosed in your letter; for the knowledge of my being the author must be a profound secret here.
My wishes are, that the God of Armies may defend and protect you, and cause you happily to survive, and to hand down to posterity the present important scenes. Numbers here esteem you, and would join me in declaring themselves, as I do,
Dear Hamilton, Your ever affectionate friend and servant, Hugh Knox.
CLINTON TO HAMILTON.
Poughkeepsie, 28th December, 1777.
Dear Sir:
I was favored with the receipt of your letter of the 22d instant, some days since, and returned a short answer to it by the express who brought it; but as I have reason to believe you had left Peekskill before he got there, I conclude my letter has not been received. I have not a doubt but that there have been such unjust and dishonorable practices committed on the inhabitants as you mention; nor have I reason to believe they were without the knowledge of the commanding officer of the Department. Complaints have been exhibited to him of cattle, the property of the inhabitants of this State, living near Col. Robinson’s, being drove off by parties of the continental troops, and sold at vendue in New England, without any account being rendered to the proprietors; and, if I am rightly informed, an officer with a party, took sundry articles from Robinson’s, sent them off and sold them in like manner in Connecticut, and has not accounted with the States for the proceeds. Of this I informed General Putnam, and desired that an inquiry might be made into the conduct of the officer commanding the party, to which I was more particularly induced, as I found he had given an order on the Quarter-Master General for the payment of the teams employed in carrying off those effects; but I have reason to believe he has had no regard to my request. Of this I am fully convinced, that the soldiery claim as lawful prize every thing they take within the enemy’s lines, though the property of our best friends, and whatever is taken beyond our advanced posts, by a generous construction, comes within the above predicament. On this principle the several articles taken at and near Robinson’s were sold because the enemy’s shipping were then in the river near that place; and on the same principle indiscriminate plunder might have taken place on both sides of the river as high up as the manor of Livingston. Little good can be expected of an army whose interest it is to suffer a country to be abandoned to the enemy, thereby to justify plundering the inhabitants. Perhaps, and I don’t know that it would be uncharitable to suppose, that it is this trade that makes some people so very fond of little expeditions.
I have long thought to ascertain these facts, and seek redress not only for the parties immediately injured, but the public; but my time has been so fully employed of late about other matters that I have been obliged to neglect it.
* * * * *
May I expect a line from you whenever you have leisure; be assured it will always be most kindly received, though perhaps not quite so punctually answered by
Your most obedient servant, Geo. Clinton.
My respects to Capt. Gibbs and young Livingston.
HAMILTON TO WILLIAM DUER, M. C.
Head-Quarters, 1778.
Dear Sir:
I take the liberty to trouble you with a few hints on a matter of some importance. Baron Steuben, who will be the bearer of this, waits on Congress to have his office[2] arranged upon some decisive and permanent footing. It will not be amiss to be on your guard. The Baron is a gentleman for whom I have a particular esteem; and whose zeal, intelligence, and success, the consequence of both, entitle him to the greatest credit. But I am apprehensive, with all his good qualities, a fondness for power and importance, natural to every man, may lead him to wish for more extensive prerogatives in his department than it will be for the good of the service to grant. I should be sorry to excite any prejudice against him on this account: perhaps I may be mistaken in my conjecture. The caution I give will do no harm if I am: if I am not, it maybe useful. In either case, the Baron deserves to be considered as a valuable man, and treated with all the deference which good policy will warrant.
On the first institution of this office, the General allowed him to exercise more ample powers than would be proper for a continuance. They were necessary in the commencement, to put things in a train with a degree of dispatch which the exigency of our affairs required: but it has been necessary to restrain them, even earlier than was intended. The novelty of the office excited questions about its boundaries; the extent of its operations alarmed the officers of every rank for their own rights. Their jealousies and discontents were rising fast to a height that threatened to overturn the whole plan. It became necessary to apply a remedy. The General has delineated the functions of the Inspectorship in general orders, a copy of which will be sent to Congress. The plan is good, and satisfactory to the army in general.
It may be improved, but it will be unsafe to deviate essentially from it. It is of course the General’s intention, that whatever regulations are adopted by him, should undergo the revision, and receive the sanction, of Congress: but it is indispensable, in the present state of our army, that he should have the power, from time to time, to introduce and authorize the reformations necessary in our system. It is a work which must be done by occasional and gradual steps; and ought to be intrusted to a person on the spot, who is thoroughly acquainted with all our defects, and has judgment sufficient to adopt the progressive remedies they require. The plan established by Congress, on a report of the Board of War when Conway was appointed, appears to me exceptionable in many respects. It makes the Inspector independent of the Commander-in-chief; confers powers which would produce universal opposition in the army; and, by making the previous concurrence of the Board of War requisite to the introduction of every regulation which should be found necessary, opens such a continual source of delay as would defeat the usefulness of the institution. Let the Commander-in-chief introduce, and the legislature afterwards ratify, or reject, as they shall think proper. Perhaps you will not differ much from me, when I suppose, that so far as relates to the Board of War, the former scheme was a _brat of faction_, and therefore ought to be renounced.
There is one thing which the Baron has much at heart, which, in good policy, he can by no means be indulged in: it is the power of enforcing that part of discipline which we understand by subordination, or an obedience to orders. This power can only be properly lodged with the Commander-in-chief, and would inflame the whole army if put into other hands. Each Captain is vested with it in his company; each Colonel in his regiment: each General in his particular command: and the Commander-in-chief in the whole.
When I began this letter, I did not intend to meddle with any other subject than the Inspectorship; but one just comes into my head which appears to me of no small importance. The goodness, or force, of an army, depends as much, perhaps more, on the composition of the corps which form it, as on its collective number. The composition is good or bad, not only according to the quality of the men, but in proportion to the completeness or incompleteness of a corps in respect to numbers. A regiment, for instance, with a full complement of officers, and fifty or sixty men, is not half so good as a company with the same number of men. A Colonel will look upon such a command as unworthy his ambition, and will neglect and despise it: a Captain would pride himself in it, and take all the pains in his power to bring it to perfection. In one case we shall see a total relaxation of discipline, and negligence of every thing that constitutes military excellence: in the other, there will be attention, energy, and every thing that can be wished. Opinion, whether well or ill-founded, is the governing principle of human affairs. A corps much below its establishment, comparing what it is with what it ought to be, loses all confidence in itself; and the whole army loses that confidence and emulation which are essential to success. These, and a thousand other things that will occur to you, make it evident, that the most important advantages attend the having complete corps, and proportional disadvantages the reverse. Ten thousand men, distributed into twenty imperfect regiments, will not have the efficiency of the same number in half the number of regiments. The fact is, with respect to the American army, that the want of discipline, and other defects we labor under, are as much owing to the skeleton state of our regiments as to any other cause. What then?
Have we any prospect of filling our regiments? My opinion is, that we have nearly arrived to our _ne plus ultra_. If so, we ought to reduce the number of corps, and give them that substance and consistency which they want, by incorporating them together, so as to bring them near their establishment. By this measure the army would be infinitely improved; and the State would be saved the expense of maintaining a number of superfluous officers.
In the present condition of our regiments, they are incapable even of performing their common exercises without joining two or more together: an expedient reluctantly submitted to by those officers who see themselves made second in command of a battalion, instead of first, as their commission imports; which happens to every younger Colonel whose regiment is united with that of an elder.
What would be the inconveniencies, while the officers who remain in command, and who might be selected from the others on account of superior merit, would applaud themselves in the preference given them, and rejoice at a change which confers such additional consequence on themselves?
Those who should be excluded by the measure, would return home discontented, and make a noise, which would soon subside and be forgotten among matters of greater moment. To quiet them still more effectually, if it should be thought necessary, they might be put upon half-pay for a certain time.
If, on considering this matter, you should agree with me in sentiment, it were to be wished the scheme could be immediately adopted, while the arrangement now in hand is still unexecuted. If it is made, it will be rather inconvenient, immediately after, to unhinge and throw the whole system again afloat. When you determined on your last arrangement, you did not know what success the different States might have had in draughting and recruiting. It would then have been improper to reduce the number of corps, as proposed. We have now seen their success: we have no prospect of seeing the regiments filled; we should reduce them.
Believe me to be, With great esteem and regard, Dear Sir, your obedient servant, A. Hamilton.
[2] Inspector-General of the Army.
HAMILTON TO GEN. SULLIVAN.
Head-Quarters, 1778.
Sir:
His Excellency has received your two last favors to-day. In the first you hint the want of a reinforcement, but as the intention of your body is chiefly for observation and skirmishing, and not to make any serious stands, it is the less necessary it should be powerful in numbers. It will, however, depend upon circumstances how far it will be expedient to reinforce you; and as soon as any thing can be determined from them, you shall have whatever addition of strength you may stand in need of.
The information contained in your last, of the enemy’s being encamped on the road leading from New Brunswick to Princeton, about the Third Mile Run, is not well founded. We have had parties and officers reconnoitring as far as the Mile Run, and there is no sign of an encampment. They seem to be taking their old position with their right at Amboy, their left at Brunswick; but how long they will remain so it is hard to tell. His Excellency desires you will engage some trusty person at South Amboy, on whom you can depend for faithful and early intelligence of the appearance of shipping in the river, or any preparations for a movement by water, that we may be in time prepared to counteract them.
I am, with regard, Sir, Your most obedient servant, A. Hamilton.
JAY TO HAMILTON.
Albany, 8th May, 1778.
Dear Sir: