Part 30
The contents of your letter is known only to myself; and your prudence will direct what should be done with this.
With great esteem and regard, I am, dear Sir, Your most obedient servant, G. Washington.
To the Hon. Alexander Hamilton, Esq.
HAMILTON TO WASHINGTON.
Philadelphia, March 5, 1783.
Sir:
I had the honor of writing to your Excellency lately on a very confidential subject, and shall be anxious to know, as soon as convenient, whether the letter got safe to hand.
The bearer, Shattuck, thinks he can point out means of apprehending Wells and Knowlton, the two persons whom your Excellency was authorized to have taken into custody. I have desired him to call upon you to disclose the plan.
I will not trouble your Excellency with any observation on the importance of getting hold of those persons.
The surmise that Mr. Arnold, a member of Congress, gave intelligence to them of the design to take them, makes it peculiarly important.
I have the honor to be, Your Excellency’s most ob’t serv’t, A. Hamilton.
To His Excellency General Washington.
WASHINGTON TO HAMILTON.
Newburgh, March 12, 1783.
Dear Sir:
When I wrote to you last, we were in a state of tranquillity; but after the arrival of a certain gentleman, who shall be nameless at present, from Philadelphia, a storm very suddenly arose, with unfavorable prognostics; which, though diverted for a moment, is not yet blown over; nor is it in my power to point to the issue.
The papers which I send officially to Congress, will supersede the necessity of my remarking on the tendency of them. The notification and address, both, appeared at the same instant, on the day preceding the intended meeting. The first of these I got hold of the same afternoon; the other not till next morning.
There is something very mysterious in this business. It appears reports have been propagated in Philadelphia, that dangerous combinations were forming in the army; and this at a time when there was not a syllable of the kind in agitation in camp. It also appears, that upon the arrival in camp of the gentleman above alluded to, such sentiments as these were immediately circulated: That it was universally expected the army would not disband until they had obtained justice; that the public creditors looked up to them for redress of their own grievances; would afford them every aid, and even join them in the field, if necessary; that some members of Congress wished the measure might take effect, in order to compel the public, particularly the delinquent States, to do justice; with many other suggestions of a similar nature.
From this, and a variety of other considerations, it is firmly believed by _some_, the scheme was not only planned, but also digested and matured, in Philadelphia;[19] but my opinion shall be suspended till I have better ground to found one on. The matter was managed with great art; for as soon as the minds of the officers were thought to be prepared for the transaction, the anonymous invitations and addresses to the officers were put in circulation through every State line in the army. I was obliged, therefore, in order to arrest on the spot, the feet that stood wavering on a tremendous precipice, to prevent the officers from being taken by surprise, while the passions were all inflamed, and to rescue them from plunging themselves into a gulf of civil horror from which there might be no receding, to issue the order of the eleventh.
This was done upon the principle that it is easier to divert from a wrong, and point to a right path, than it is to recall the hasty and fatal steps which have been already taken.
It is commonly supposed, if the officers had met agreeably to the anonymous summons, with their feelings all alive, resolutions might have been formed, the consequences of which may be more easily conceived than described. Now they will have leisure to view the matter more calmly, and will act more seriously. It is to be hoped they will be induced to adopt more rational measures, and wait a while longer a settlement of their accounts, the postponing of which appears to be the most plausible, and almost the only article of which designing men can make an improper use, by insinuating (which they really do) that it is done with design that peace may take place, and prevent any adjustment of accounts; which, say they, would inevitably be the case, if the war was to cease to-morrow: or, supposing the best, you would have to dance attendance at public offices, at great distances, perhaps, and equally great expenses, to obtain a settlement, which would be highly injurious, nay, ruinous to you. This is their language.
Let me beseech you, therefore, my good sir, to urge this matter earnestly, and without further delay. The situation of these gentlemen, I do verily believe, is distressing beyond description. It is affirmed to me, that a large part of them have no better prospect before them than a jail, if they are turned loose without liquidation of accounts, and an assurance of that justice to which they are so worthily entitled. To prevail on the delegates of those States, through whose means these difficulties occur, it may, in my opinion, with propriety be suggested to them, if any disastrous consequences should follow, by reason of their delinquency, that they must be answerable to God and their Country for the ineffable horrors which may be occasioned thereby.
I am, dear Sir, Your most obedient servant, G. Washington.
P. S. I have received your letter of the fifth, and have put that matter in train which was mentioned in it.
G. W.
I am this instant informed, that a second address to the officers, distinguished No. 2, is thrown into circulation. The contents evidently prove, that the author is in, or near, camp; and that the following words, erased in the second page of this letter, ought not to have met with this treatment, viz.--“By others, that it is the illegitimate offspring of a person in the army.”
[19] The words, “By others, that it is the illegitimate offspring of a person in the army,” which came in here, are obliterated in the original, but were restored by Washington in the _postscript_.
HAMILTON TO WASHINGTON.
Philadelphia, March 17, 1783.
Sir:
I am duly honored with your Excellency’s letters of the fourth and twelfth instant. It is much to be regretted, though not to be wondered at, that steps of so inflammatory a tendency have been taken in the army. Your Excellency has, in my opinion, acted wisely. The best way is, ever, not to attempt to stem a torrent, but to divert it.
I am happy to find you coincide in opinion with me on the conduct proper to be observed by yourself. I am persuaded, more and more, it is that which is most consistent with your own reputation and the public safety. Our affairs wear a most serious aspect, as well foreign as domestic. Before this gets to hand, your Excellency will probably have seen the provisional articles between Great Britain and these States. It might, at first appearance, be concluded, that these will be the prelude to a general peace; but there are strong reasons to doubt the truth of such a conclusion. Obstacles may arise from different quarters; from the demands of Spain and Holland; from the hope, in France, of greater acquisitions in the East; and, perhaps, still more probably, from the insincerity and duplicity of Lord Shelburne, whose politics, founded in the peculiarity of his situation, as well as in the character of the man, may well be suspected of insidiousness. I am really apprehensive, if peace does not take place, that the negotiations will tend to sow distrust among the allies, and weaken the force of the common league. We have, I fear, men among us, and men in trust, who have a hankering after British connection. We have others whose confidence in France savors of credulity. The intrigues of the former, and the incautiousness of the latter, may be both, though in different degrees, injurious to the American interests, and make it difficult for prudent men to steer a proper course.
There are delicate circumstances, with respect to the late foreign transactions, which I am not at liberty to reveal; but which, joined to our internal weaknesses, disorders, follies, and prejudices, make this country stand upon precarious ground.
Some use, perhaps, may be made of these ideas, to induce moderation in the army. An opinion that their country does not stand upon a secure footing, will operate upon the patriotism of the officers against hazarding any domestic commotions.
When I make these observations, I cannot forbear adding, that if no excesses take place, I shall not be sorry that ill-humors have appeared. I shall not regret importunity, if temperate, from the army.
There are good intentions in the majority of Congress, but there is not sufficient wisdom or decision. There are dangerous prejudices, in the particular States, opposed to those measures which alone can give stability and prosperity to the Union. There is a fatal opposition to Continental views. Necessity alone can work a reform. But how produce that necessity, how apply it, and how keep it within salutary bounds? I fear we have been contending for a shadow.
The affair of accounts I considered as having been put on a satisfactory footing. The particular States have been required to settle till the first of August, ’80; and the Superintendent of Finance has been directed to take measures for settling since that period. I shall immediately see him on the subject.
We have had eight States and a half in favor of a commutation of the half pay for an average of ten years’ purchase; that is, five years’ full pay instead of half pay for life, which, on a calculation of annuities, is nearly an equivalent. I hope this will now shortly take place.
We have made considerable progress in a plan to be recommended to the several States for funding all the public debts, including those of the army; which is certainly the only way to restore public credit, and enable us to continue the war by borrowing abroad, if it should be necessary, to continue it.
I omitted mentioning to your Excellency, that, from European intelligence, there is great reason to believe, at all events, peace or war, New-York will be evacuated in the spring. It will be a pity if any domestic disturbances should change the plans of the British Court.
I have the honor to be, With the greatest respect, Your Excellency’s most ob’t serv’t, A. Hamilton.
P. S. Your Excellency mentions, that it has been surmised, the plan in agitation was formed in Philadelphia; that combinations have been talked of between the public creditors and the army; and that members of Congress had encouraged the idea. This is partly true. I have myself urged, in Congress, the propriety of uniting the influence of the public creditors, and the army, as a part of them, to prevail upon the States to enter into their views. I have expressed the same sentiments out of doors. Several other members of Congress have done the same. The meaning, however, of all this, was simply, that Congress should adopt such a plan as would embrace the relief of all the public creditors, including the army; in order that the personal influence of some, the connections of others, and a sense of justice to the army, as well as the apprehension of ill consequences, might form a mass of influence, in each State, in favor of the measures of Congress. In this view, as I mentioned to your Excellency in a former letter, I thought the discontents of the army might be turned to a good account. I am still of opinion, that their earnest but respectful applications for redress will have a good effect. As to any combination of _force_, it would only be productive of the horrors of a civil war, might end in the ruin of the country, and would certainly end in the ruin of the army.
A. H.
To His Excellency General Washington.
HAMILTON TO WASHINGTON.
Philadelphia, March 24, 1783.
Sir:
Your Excellency will, before this reaches you, have received a letter from the Marquis De La Fayette, informing you, that the preliminaries of peace between all the belligerent powers have been concluded. I congratulate your Excellency on this happy conclusion of your labors. It now only remains to make solid establishments within, to perpetuate our Union, to prevent our being a ball in the hands of European powers, banded against each other at their pleasure; in fine, to make our independence truly a blessing. This, it is to be lamented, will be an arduous work; for, to borrow a figure from mechanics, the centrifugal is much stronger than the centripetal force in these States; the seeds of disunion much more numerous than those of union.
I will add, that your Excellency’s exertions are as essential to accomplish this end, as they have been to establish independence. I will, upon a future occasion, open myself upon this subject.
Your conduct in the affair of the officers is highly pleasing here. The measures of the army are such as I could have wished them, and will add new lustre to their character, as well as strengthen the hands of Congress.
I am, with great truth and respect, Your Excellency’s Most obedient servant, A. Hamilton.
To his Excellency General Washington.
HAMILTON TO WASHINGTON.
Philadelphia, March 25, 1783.
Sir:
I wrote to your Excellency a day or two ago by express. Since that, a committee, appointed on the communications from you, have had a meeting, and find themselves embarrassed. They have requested me to communicate our embarrassments to you in confidence, and to ask your private opinion. The army, by their resolutions, express an expectation that Congress will not disband them previous to a settlement of accounts, and the establishment of funds. Congress may resolve upon the first, but the general opinion is, that they cannot constitutionally declare the second. They have no right, by the Confederation, to _demand_ funds; they can only recommend: and to determine, that the army shall be continued in service till the States grant them, would be to determine, that the whole present army shall be a standing army during peace, unless the States comply with the requisition for funds. This, it is supposed, would excite the alarms and jealousies of the States, and increase, rather than lessen, the opposition to the funding scheme. It is also observed, that the longer the army is kept together, the more the payment of past dues is procrastinated; the abilities of the States being exhausted for their immediate support, and a new debt every day incurred. It is further suggested, that there is danger in keeping the army together, in a state of inactivity, and that a separation of the several lines would facilitate the settlement of accounts, diminish present expense, and avoid the danger of union. It is added, that the officers of each line, being on the spot, might, by their own solicitations, and those of their friends, forward the adoption of funds in the different States.
A proposition will be transmitted to you by Colonel Bland, in the form of a resolution, to be adopted by Congress, framed upon the principles of the foregoing reasoning.
Another proposition is contained in the following resolution:
“That the Commander-in-Chief be informed, it is the intention of Congress to effect the settlement of the accounts of the respective lines previous to their reduction; and that Congress are doing, and will continue to do, every thing in their power towards procuring satisfactory securities for what shall be found due on such settlement.”
The scope of this your Excellency will perceive without comment.
I am to request you will favor me with your sentiments on both the propositions; and, in general, with your ideas of what had best be done with reference to the expectation expressed by the officers; taking into view the situation of Congress. On one side, the army expect they will not be disbanded till accounts are settled and funds established. On the other hand, they have no constitutional power of doing any thing more than to recommend funds, and are persuaded that these will meet with mountains of prejudice in some of the States.
A considerable progress has been made in a plan for funding the public debts; and it is to be hoped it will ere long go forth to the States, with every argument that can give it success.
I have the honor to be, With sincere respect, Your Excellency’s Most obedient servant, A. Hamilton.
To his Excellency General Washington.
HAMILTON TO WASHINGTON.
Philadelphia, March 25, 1783.
Sir:
The inclosed I write more in a public than in a private capacity. Here I write as a citizen, zealous for the true happiness of this country; as a soldier who feels what is due to an army which has suffered every thing, and done much for the safety of America.
I sincerely wish _ingratitude_ was not so natural to the human heart as it is. I sincerely wish there were no seeds of it in those who direct the councils of the United States. But while I urge the army to moderation, and advise your Excellency to take the direction of their discontents, and endeavor to confine them within the bounds of duty, I cannot, as an honest man, conceal from you, that I am afraid their distrusts have too much foundation. Republican jealousy has in it a principle of hostility to an army, whatever be their merits, whatever be their claims to the gratitude of the community. It acknowledges their services with unwillingness, and rewards them with reluctance. I see this temper, though smothered with great care, involuntarily breaking out upon too many occasions. I often feel a mortification, which it would be impolitic to express, that sets my passions at variance with my reason. Too many, I perceive, if they could do it with safety or color, would be glad to elude the just pretensions of the army. I hope this is not the prevailing disposition.
But supposing the country ungrateful, what can the army do? It must submit to its hard fate. To seek redress by its arms would end in its ruin. The army would moulder by its own weight, and for want of the means of keeping together: the soldiery would abandon their officers: there would be no chance of success, without having recourse to means that would reverse our revolution. I make these observations, not that I imagine your Excellency can want motives to continue your influence in the path of moderation; but merely to show why I cannot, myself, enter into the views of coercion which some gentlemen entertain. For I confess, could force avail, I should almost wish to see it employed. I have an indifferent opinion of the honesty of this country, and ill forebodings as to its future system.
Your Excellency will perceive I have written with sensations of chagrin, and will make allowance for coloring: but the general picture is too true. God send us all more wisdom.
I am, with very sincere respect, Your Excellency’s Obedient servant, A. Hamilton.
To his Excellency General Washington.
WASHINGTON TO HAMILTON.
Newburgh, March 31, 1783.
Dear Sir:
I have duly received your favors of the seventeenth and twenty-fourth ultimo. I rejoice, most exceedingly, that there is an end to our warfare; and that such a field is opening to our view, as will, with wisdom to direct the cultivation of it, make us a great, a respectable, and happy people: but it must be improved by other means than State politics and unreasonable jealousies and prejudices; or (it requires not the second sight to see that) we shall be instruments in the hands of our enemies, and those European powers who may be jealous of our greatness in union, to dissolve the Confederation. But to attain this, although the way seems extremely plain, is not so easy.
My wish to see the union of these States established upon liberal and permanent principles, and inclination to contribute my mite in pointing out the defects of the present constitution, are equally great. All my private letters have teemed with these sentiments; and whenever this topic has been the subject of conversation, I have endeavored to diffuse and enforce them; but how far any further essay, by me, might be productive of the wished for end, or appear to arrogate more than belongs to me, depends so much upon popular opinion, and the temper and disposition of people, that it is not easy to decide. I shall be obliged to you, however, for the thoughts which you have promised me on this subject, and as soon as you can make it convenient.
No man in the United States, is, or can be, more deeply impressed with the necessity of a reform in our present Confederation, than myself; no man, perhaps, has felt the bad effects of it more sensibly: for, to the defects thereof; and want of powers in Congress, may justly be ascribed the prolongation of the war, and, consequently, the expenses occasioned by it. More than half the perplexities I have experienced in the course of my command, and almost the whole of the difficulties and distress of the army, have their origin here: but still, the prejudices of some, the designs of others, and the mere machinery of the majority, make address and management necessary, to give weight to opinions which are to combat the doctrines of these different classes of men, in the field of politics.
I would have been more full on this subject, but the bearer (in the clothing department) is waiting. I wish you may understand what I have written.
I am, dear Sir, Your most obedient servant, G. Washington.
To the Hon. Alexander Hamilton.
WASHINGTON TO HAMILTON.
Newburgh, April 4, 1783.
Dear Sir:
The same post which gave me your two letters of the twenty-fifth of March, handed me one from Colonel Bland on the same point.
Observing that both have been written at the desire of a committee of which you are both members, I have made a very full reply to their subject in my letter which is addressed to Colonel Bland; and, supposing it unnecessary to enter into a complete detail to both, I must beg leave to refer you to Colonel Bland’s (a sight of which I have desired him to give you), for a full explanation of my ideas and sentiments.
I read your private letter of the twenty-fifth with pain, and contemplated the picture it had drawn with astonishment and horror: but I will yet hope for the best. The idea of redress, by force, is too chimerical to have had a place in the imagination of any serious mind in this army; but there is no telling what unhappy disturbances may result from distress, and distrust of justice: and as the fears and jealousies of the army are alive, I hope no resolution will be come to, for disbanding or separating the lines, till the accounts are liquidated. You may rely upon it, sir, that unhappy consequences would follow the attempt. The suspicions of the officers are afloat, notwithstanding the resolutions which have passed on both sides. Any act, therefore, which can be construed into an attempt to separate them before the accounts are settled, will convey the most unfavorable ideas of the rectitude of Congress: whether well or ill founded, matters not; the consequences will be the same.