Part 7

Cato had left Sicily, of which he had had the government as prætor, and Curio had taken the command there. The latter went from thence to Africa, where he was opposed by the Pompeian general Varus, and by Juba king of Mauritania, a client of Pompey. This expedition of Curio’s came to a sad end, partly owing to the desertion which broke out among his legions, partly owing to his unskilful generalship, and to various disasters. Curio at last was killed in a battle with Juba, and most of his soldiers were scattered and cut to pieces: some of them made their escape to Sicily. Cæsar had nominated himself dictator; in what form, cannot be made out with certainty, there being much discrepancy in the accounts which we have. He did everything as expeditiously as possible, and he passed several welcome and just laws. Among others was one concerning debts; a thing which is always necessary whenever there is an extraordinary fall in the value of every kind of property, so that a debt in money ceases to be what its nominal value expresses. A commission was appointed, before which all who had land in Italy might have it estimated, and thus made available to pay off their debts. This was often done under such circumstances; and no doubt the statement is also true that the interest was deducted. A number of other enactments were also made to meet the wants of the moment. And now that he had brought his army back to Italy, and considerably strengthened it by forming the troops which had gone over to him into legions, he marched forthwith to Brundusium. It was already about a year since Pompey had left Rome, and had gathered around him all the Romans whom he had been able to gain over: he had moreover an immense host of auxiliaries, and a fleet with which, as Cæsar had nothing to oppose to it, he might have been master of the sea, had not his lieutenants been so wretched. He wintered in Thessalonica, and his army in Macedon: his chief strength lay in his fleet, as the people of Rhodes and other places, and also many of the subject Greek towns still kept up their ships:—even the whole naval power of Egypt was at his disposal. Having collected all this force, he placed it under the command of Bibulus, Cæsar’s colleague in the consulship; and thus he hoped to make the passage by sea impracticable for Cæsar, so that he would have to go by land through Dalmatia, where he would have had to encounter M. Octavius, Pompey’s best general. But in this also, Cæsar tried to strike awe into the enemy, and he succeeded: to reach Illyricum, he was not afraid to use whatever vessels he had, or anything that could only float upon the sea. Bibulus was an able man, personally very praiseworthy, who did not neglect his duty, but he was deficient in that peculiar activity and watchfulness which in such cases are indispensable. One of the distinguishing features of Cæsar is that, whenever the utmost speed was necessary, though his forces were not quite complete, he would, without even a moment’s loss of time, at once strike the blow with whatever he chanced to have at hand; and he would try and gain a firm footing until he had collected the whole of his army. Thus he passed over to Illyricum; and thus he afterwards made his appearance in Egypt without the force which could support him, and later again in Africa: this is one of the marks of a great general, who calculates not only what he risks, but likewise what he can effect by it. Quite unexpectedly, he appeared with a small squadron at Oricum, a town on the farthest borders of Illyricum and Epirus, behind the bay of Acroceraunia; he landed, reduced the place, and immediately set out to attack Apollonia, which opened its gates to him. His name went before him, nor did any one suppose that he had only a few thousand men with him. Near Apollonia, he took up a position; but when an attempt of his against Dyrrachium had failed, Pompey tried to drive him back and to surround him. As Cæsar’s orders to send the troops immediately after him had not been fulfilled, he tried in this dilemma himself to cross, in a twelve-oared boat, over the dangerous, stormy sea; but after having struggled for a whole day against the currents and the waves, he was at last obliged to yield to the storm. Although his commands to follow him were most peremptory, his lieutenant Gabinius, whose heart failed him, disregarded them: he went round the gulf through Dalmatia, where he was afterwards routed by Octavius, and slain. Mark Antony, on the contrary, who ventured to pass over, led the troops most successfully close by Pompey’s fleet; for Bibulus had a short time before fallen ill, and he was now on the point of death. Thus did Antony, with the loss of only a few ships, make his passage to Illyricum. But for all that, Cæsar’s force was far inferior to that of Pompey, who was stationed near Dyrrachium; and yet he advanced against him, and ventured to hem him in by throwing up lines and bastions round Dyrrachium. This was an undertaking which Pompey could very easily let him go on with; for he got his supplies by sea, while Cæsar had no other provisions but those which he could collect by forays into the neighbouring country. Here Cæsar tried to finish the war; but he was unsuccessful, being repulsed with considerable loss in a coup de main against Dyrrachium: Pompey showed determination, and made himself master of part of the lines, so that the blockade had to be given up. The soldiers were so disheartened that day, that Cæsar despaired of the issue: they were certainly in a wretched plight, as they had to feed on grass and roots. Grass means here as much as salad: the poor in the south very often eat such herbs with vinegar and oil, which indeed the soldiers had to do without. Cæsar afterwards said, that he would have been routed on that day; and that Pompey would have conquered, if he had known how to make use of his victory. But Pompey had grown sluggish, and he had lost the faculty of doing anything to justify the pretensions which he put forth. After this rebuff, Cæsar was unable to go on with the war there any more; and so he ventured upon an expedition which, had it failed, would quite as much have been classed among fool-hardy freaks as the march of Charles XII. to Pultawa. Leaving Pompey in his rear, he betook himself to a country where he had nothing to rely upon, but every inch of ground to conquer: he broke up from Dyrrachium. No doubt Pompey expected that he would now turn towards Illyricum, and there unite himself with the troops of his party: but far from doing this, he went to the high mountain ranges between Epirus and Thessaly, and without stopping, to Gomphi, near the pass from Janina to Thessaly, and took it by storm. By this means, he restored the confidence of his soldiers, as they refreshed themselves with the booty. The panic caused by the destruction of this town, opened to him the whole of Thessaly. Pompey, who had such a superior force of soldiers, ought now to have gone to Italy; and the more so, as those legions of Cæsar’s which had been formed of the troops which had gone over to him in Spain, had partly become mutinous again, while Cæsar, with the fleet which he had, could never have reached Italy. But those who were about Pompey, were now so full of joy at Cæsar’s having got into a trap by going into countries from which he had no way out, that they went after him. Terror, however, paved the way for Cæsar: he was quite comfortably off in luxurious Thessaly, and having everything in plenty, he was enabled to recover himself. He took up his position near the rich town of Pharsalus, where for some days the two armies were facing each other, and manœuvring: he again got into a very bad plight, as he was in want of provisions, and Pompey’s cavalry was much stronger than his own. Here again it was now the opinion of the cautious, that Cæsar’s army should be allowed to wear itself out more and more by the distress in which it was; and this was the opinion of Pompey himself. But his followers were so childishly intoxicated with their hopes of victory, that they looked upon this judicious advice as disgraceful. The senators, who knew nothing whatever of war, deliberated with regard to the battle, how they would after the victory divide the advantages among themselves; and growing warm, they quarrelled together about who was to have the pontificate and the other offices of Cæsar, and also the estates of his

## partisans about to be proscribed. Cæsar was very anxious for a speedy

decision, being most confident of victory; for he despised Pompey, such as he was then, and all his officers, They, on their side, deemed it a shame to delay the battle; and they forced it on in such haste, that Cæsar had hardly time to call back three legions which he had sent out to forage.

Of this battle there are very different accounts, the best of which of course is that of Cæsar himself; but we may believe Asinius Pollio that the numbers which he gives are exaggerated. We may take it for granted, that Cæsar had no more than twenty-two thousand infantry against forty thousand infantry of Pompey, who had also an immense number of Greeks and Asiatics as _auxilia_: these, however, were of no use whatever, being somewhat ashamed to display their incapacity on a field where Romans were arrayed against each other. In cavalry also, Pompey was far superior to Cæsar in numbers; but the latter had Gallic and German horse, whilst Pompey had young Roman volunteers, who perhaps faced an enemy for the first time, and were like children against a host of veterans. The story of the _faciem feri, miles!_ is not to be taken literally. Cæsar had also trained his infantry to stand the shock of the cavalry, and the onset of the Pompeians was repulsed by the cohorts; he then made the Gallic and German cavalry charge the enemy, which decided the battle: they broke Pompey’s left wing, so that his right, which until then had fought with considerable success, was likewise forced to retire. All fled into the camp, and there these foolish men believed that the day was now over. But when they saw that the foe did not stop at all to plunder, and that in close order they were attacking the camp, the greatest confusion and rout ensued; Pompey started up like a madman, and calling out, “Not even here will they leave us quiet!” ran away. All dispersed, no one thinking of rallying so much as one cohort. The booty was immense, as the camp of Pompey was found to be furnished with Asiatic luxury; the tents were bowers, fitted up with carpets and costly furniture. The Gauls and Germans gladly availed themselves of the opportunity to revenge themselves on the Romans: but Cæsar had already issued an order during the battle, that no one should be hurt who did not flee nor offer any resistance; and thus most of them threw away their arms, and whole cohorts surrendered. It is known from Foggini’s Kalendarium, that the battle was fought on the tenth of August,[12] according to the calendar of that time: this cannot indeed be the real day, which at all events ought to be dated in June.

Pompey fled to Larissa, and having got on board a ship, arrived at Mitylene, where his wife Cornelia was staying: his intention was to go to Cilicia and Cyprus, and from thence to the Parthians, a most shameful resolution! This, however, was opposed by his friends, and he saw no other plan, but to flee to Egypt. The right thing would have been to have gone to his fleet which was still untouched, and with it to maintain Africa; but his spirit was quite broken, and he determined to apply to the king of Egypt. Ptolemy Auletes, whom Gabinius had restored with Pompey’s connivance, was dead: as he was under obligations to Pompey, he had sent him a fleet, which, however, had now returned home after the battle. He had left two daughters, Cleopatra and Arsinoë, and two sons, who were younger: one of these had somewhat passed boyhood, while the other was still a child. The elder of the sons was by his will, according to the custom of incest which was rife among those Macedonian kings of Alexandria, to marry his eldest sister Cleopatra, and to rule with her in common; but being very imperious, and wanting to have everything for himself, he expelled her, and war broke out. She fled to Syria; and on the borders of Syria and Egypt, near Mount Casius, Ptolemy also, with his guardians Pothinus and Achillas was encamped. Pompey’s unlucky star brought him to this very coast. On this, L. Septimius, who had been left by Gabinius as commander in Egypt, advised Ptolemy to murder Pompey, and by this sacrifice to bribe Cæsar to give him the crown of Egypt. Such advice was quite to the taste of those Alexandrian rulers. L. Septimius was sent with a boat to go out and receive Pompey. Though all his companions had their suspicions roused, and he himself felt uneasy, yet Pompey was so entirely without a will of his own, and so stupified, that after all he chose to go into the boat: there he was stabbed, and his corpse was cast unburied on the strand.

Cæsar, continuing his pursuit without stopping, hastened with a few followers to Egypt; another great piece of daring! On his arrival, they brought him the head and ring of Pompey: history has not forgotten his tears. I will not deny that this death saved him from some anxiety; for how could he have made peace with Pompey?—the war could not end in any other way, but with his destruction;—yet for all that, judging from the disposition of Cæsar’s heart, I believe that his tears were sincere. He buried Pompey: to have erected a monument would have looked like a farce; but his family raised a small, humble monument over him. The name of the Pompeii still existed to the time of Tiberius; then it disappears. The emperor Hadrian found the statue taken away, and set up in a neighbouring temple, the monument itself being nearly buried in the sand; and he had it restored. An epigram on the subject, consisting of two distichs, is one of the most beautiful left us from antiquity: it is certainly genuine, although the second half has been called in question.

Marmoreo tumulo Licinus[13] jacet, at Cato nullo, Pompeius parvo: credimus esse Deos? Saxa premunt Licinum, levat altum fama Catonem, Pompeium tituli: credimus esse Deos.

Cæsar now went to Alexandria whither his troops were to follow him; but his orders could not be carried across to Rhodes, as in the Mediterranean the Etesian gales blow from the north-west for about fifty or sixty days, until the dogdays, and the ships could not work their way against the wind. In the meanwhile, Cæsar had to stay in Alexandria among the most insolent and licentious populace in the world, one in which the vices of the east and the west were combined: the Macedonian Greek population had been mostly exterminated in the reign of Ptolemy Physcon, and the Alexandrine-Egyptians only remained, who were a detestable race. This rabble now became bold: as Cæsar had only so few with him, the eunuch Pothinus, the regent at that time, resolved to overpower him. Cæsar was in possession of the royal palace, where he entrenched himself as Ferdinand Cortez did in Mexico. An insurrection broke out; and the palace was set fire to, on which occasion the library of Ptolemy Philadelphus was burnt: the struggle in the streets was terrific. The account of how Cæsar then maintained himself,—making head against the immense danger which assailed him; destroying the entrance to the harbour to the dismay of the Alexandrians; taking the island of Pharos, and holding his ground there until he got reinforcements;—is given by Hirtius in a most graphic and attractive style. At last, Cæsar succeeded in making himself master of Alexandria, and the elder Ptolemy was accidentally drowned in the Nile: in short, the Alexandrians surrendered, and Cæsar, glad to have done with the war, declared Cleopatra queen, by whose arts he had been enslaved, and bestowed upon her the whole of the country.

Having now learned that Pharnaces king of Bosporus had invaded Pontus, and defeated Domitius, one of his legates; he hastened thither, attacked the enemy on the very day that he came up, without even allowing his troops to rest, and the Asiatics were routed and scattered. It was then that he wrote to Rome the celebrated “_Veni, vidi, vici._”

Cæsar now, for the first time since his departure from Brundusium, returned to Rome; and there he set many things to rights. He paid great regard to his adherents, and also appointed a provisional government, which was much wanted; for his party was a medley of all sorts of people, who aimed at the most different ends and objects, and during his absence had undertaken the most contradictory things. In the meanwhile, the insurrection of Milo, Cælius Rufus, and Dolabella, had taken place, and been quickly put down: of this I shall say more further on.

He did not wait long at Rome. Servility proffered him the next extravagant honours; the whole power of the state was given him. Yet it must be said that men’s minds were very favourably disposed towards him on account of his unexpected mildness, whereas Pompey, had he been victorious, would undoubtedly have shed seas of blood. As far as he possibly could, he protected every one of the opposite party; and he also told the chief men about him, that each of them had free leave to rescue one of the proscribed, and all such were reinstated in their honours: with respect to their property, however, these had much to suffer, as it was not in his power to put a stop to all the robberies of his partisans. A great number indeed, still remained in exile; yet by degrees he let them all return.—The honours granted him by the senate, were bestowed three different times: I shall treat of them collectively when we come to his last stay in Rome.

While he was still at Rome, he had to deal with a most dangerous commotion among his troops, who were eagerly waiting for their triumph. His favourite legion, the tenth, which he had left behind in Italy that he might take it with him to Africa, broke out in open mutiny; and the veterans demanded, not only the payment of their arrears, but also the money and allotments of land which had been promised them. Sallust, whom Cæsar had sent to them, was ill-treated, and some senators were slain: the danger therefore was great. Cæsar had then the courage to let them come to Rome: he ordered them to lay aside their _pila_, but to keep their swords; and now he fearlessly made his appearance in the midst of them. When he harangued them in the Forum, his intrepidity, and the confidence which he showed in them, made such an impression on them, that they became quite tame. He treated them with contempt, addressed them as Quirites, and announced to them that he dismissed them: he would, however, allow those who wished to share the honour of the campaign to enlist. Upon this, all those who before had been loudly clamouring for their dismissal, almost with one voice entreated him to let them continue in his service.

He again went with a small army to Africa, where Cato and Q. Scipio, the father-in-law of Pompey, Afranius and Petreius, stood forth as the leaders of the whole party. Cato had not been present at the battle of Pharsalus: he had gone from Dyrrachium to Corcyra, and from thence to Cyrene. Here he got together a number of scattered Romans; but his army was much more distinguished for the rank, than for the bravery of its soldiers. Cyrene had hardly the honour of being a Roman province; there he was quite cut off from the rest of the world: he therefore made one of the most dreadful of forced marches, through the African desert all round the Syrtes, by Tripolis to the province of Africa. He was offered the chief command of the army, which was a respectable one; but he declined it, and only kept the command of Utica. Allied with him was Juba of Numidia, who ruled over the greater part of Jugurtha’s empire: in Mauritania, Bogud was king. In the latter country, there was also a Roman adventurer, P. Sitius of Nuceria, a remarkable character, and a man of great energy: he had formed a regiment of stray fugitives and deserters, which had gotten king Bogud the victory against Juba, and the ascendency in Africa. (I have treated of this Sitius in my edition of Fronto.) He attached himself to Cæsar, who promised to restore him to his civil rights; and he made war upon Juba, while Cæsar established himself in Tunis. The latter, having gradually received the reinforcements for which he was waiting, marched likewise against his foes. The campaign lasted several months without being decided, until Cæsar took his position near Thapsus, a peninsula with a fortified town. The enemy under Petreius, Afranius, Scipio, and Juba, occupied the isthmus, surrounding him with overwhelming numbers, and thus cutting him off from the mainland. But Cæsar broke through, first defeated the Romans, and then Juba, on the same day, and scattered their hosts. As soon as the battle was won, the soldiers went over to him in throngs: Juba was so utterly done for, that he fled from his kingdom. All was lost: Juba and Petreius took away each other’s life; Cato remained behind in Utica with a Roman garrison.