Part 12

[Aug. 26.] Gen. Howe having fully settled a plan of surprise, gen. de Heister, with his Hessians, takes post at Flatbush in the evening, and composes the centre. About nine o’clock the same night, the principal army, containing much the greater part of the British forces, under the command of generals Clinton, earl Percy, and lord Cornwallis, march, in order to gain the road leading round the easterly end of the hills to Jamaica, and so to turn the left of the Americans. Col. Miles, whose duty it is to guard this road, suffers the British to march not less than six miles till they are near two miles in the rear of the guards before he discovers and gives notice of their approach. [Aug. 27.] Gen. Clinton arrives within half a mile of the road about two hours before day break, halts and settles his disposition for the attack. One of his patrols falls in with a patrol of American officers on horseback, who are trepanned, and made prisoners. Sullivan, though in expectation that they will bring him intelligence, neglects sending out a fresh patrol on finding himself disappointed. Clinton learning from the officers, that the Americans have not occupied the road, detaches a battalion of light-infantry to secure it; and advancing with his corps upon the appearance of day, possesses himself of the heights over which the road passes.

General Grant with the left wing advances along the coast by the west road, near the narrows. About midnight, the guard consisting all of New-Yorkers and Pennsylvanians, perceiving that there is danger at hand, flee without firing a gun, and bring to gen. Parsons, who commands them, the account of the enemy’s advancing in great numbers by that road. Grants movement is to divert the attention of the Americans from the left, where the main attack is to be made by Clinton. Parsons perceives by fair day-light, that the British are got through the wood, and are descending on the north side. He takes twenty of his fugitive guard, being all he can collect, and posts them on a height in front of the British, about half a mile distant which halts their column, and gives time for lord _Stirling_ to come up with his forces, amounting to about 1500, who possesses himself of a hill about two miles from camp.

The engagement begins, soon after day-break, by the Hessians from Flatbush, under gen. Heister, and by gen. Grant on the coast; and a warm cannonade with a brisk fire of small arms, is eagerly supported on both sides for some considerable time. The Americans opposing gen. Heister, are the first who are apprized of the march of the British troops under gen. Clinton. They accordingly retreat in large bodies, and in tolerable order to recover their camp; but are soon intercepted by the right wing under gen. Clinton; who having halted and refreshed his forces after passing the heights, continues his march, and getting into the rear of the left of the Americans, about half past eight o’clock, attacks them with his light-infantry and light dragoons, while quitting the heights to return to their lines. They are driven back, and again meet the Hessians. Thus they are alternately chased and intercepted. In these desperate circumstances, some of their regiments, overpowered and out-numbered as they are, force their way to camp, through all the dangers with which they are pressed. The Americans under lord Stirling, consisting of col. Miles’s two battalions, col. Atlee’s, col. Smallwood’s and col. Hatch’s regiments, and who are engaged with gen. Grant, behave with great bravery and resolution, charging the enemy and maintaining their posts from about eight in the morning till two in the afternoon; but are so late in their knowledge of what passes elsewhere, that their retreat is intercepted by some of the British troops, who, beside turning the hills and the American left, have traversed the whole extent of country in their rear. Several break through the enemy’s line, and get into the woods. Gen. Parsons, with a small party, escapes by doing it. Numbers throw themselves into the marsh at Gowan’s Cove; some are drowned, others perish in the mud; a considerable body however, escapes by this way to the lines. The nature of the country, and the variety of the ground occasion a continuance and extension of small engagements, pursuits and slaughter, which last for many hours before the scene closes.

The British troops displayed great valor and activity on this occasion so impetuous was their ardor, that it was with difficulty that they could be restrained, by gen. Howe’s orders, from attacking the American lines. They would probably have entered them, had not the works been completed the night before the action, by closing an opening on the right, and placing an abbatis before it. The _Americans_ were most completely surprised and effectually entrapped. Col. Smallwood’s Maryland regiment suffered extremely, and was almost cut to pieces. It lost two hundred and fifty-nine men. The loss was much regretted on account of their being young men of the best families in the country. All who were engaged in the actions of the day, did not display the same courage; nor was it to be expected from such raw troops. Many escaped from the want of discipline; for they broke at the sight of danger, and saved themselves through flight, whereas otherwise they must have been killed or taken. Large bodies however were captured. Generals Sullivan, lord Stirling and Udell, beside 3 colonels, 4 lieutenant-colonels, 3 majors, 18 captains, 43 lieutenants, 11 ensigns, an adjutant, 3 surgeons and 2 volunteers, were made prisoners, together with 1006 privates, in all 1097. As among the prisoners the wounded were included, an allowance between 4 and 500 for killed, drowned, perished in the woods, the mud and the like, must be reckoned sufficiently large. Only six brass ordnance were taken. The loss of the British, in killed and wounded, did not exceed 318; of whom only 61 were slain. The Hessians had 2 rank and file killed, and 23 privates and 3 officers wounded.

The brilliant success of the operations on Long-Island, may fascinate the judgment and crown the head of gen. Howe with laurels; but there are some sensible American officers, who judge that by commencing them in that quarter, he completely put into the hands of general Washington the only chance which offered for the defence of New-York; and that, if gen. Greene had not been prevented by sickness from continuing in command, all the passes or roads would have been so secured and defended, as that the royal army, in attempting or gaining them, would have been so crippled, as to have been arrested with regard to all future successful operations. Gen. Sullivan was too inattentive and confident. Though in the midst of royalists, he suffered them to go backward and forward just as they pleased. One of the American chaplains, fearing that the British would make a circuitous march, and take to the Jamaica road, asked him whether he had guarded that pass sufficiently, and received for answer, “Yes, so that an angel cannot force it.”

It may be thought by many, that if general Howe, instead of commencing his operations on Long-Island, had run up the _North-River_, and landed above _New-York_, he would either have compelled gen. Washington to a sudden evacuation of the city, with the loss of nearly all the stores of the army; or to have fought, though very unequal in numbers and troops; or to have surrendered for want of provision. That such a movement might have been made, wind and tide favoring, without any particular danger of a failure, had been established by the safe passage of the Phœnix and Rose up and down the river.

The victorious army encamped in front of the American works in the evening; and on the 28th at night, broke ground in form, about 4 or 500 yards distant from a redoubt which covered the left of the Americans. The same day gen. _Mifflin_ crossed over from New-York with 1000 men; at night he made an offer to gen. _Washington_ of going the rounds, which was accepted. He observed the approaches of the enemy, and the forwardness of their batteries; and was convinced that no time was to be lost. The next morning [Aug. 29.] he conversed with the general upon the subject, and said, “You must either fight or retreat immediately. What is your strength?” The general answered, “nine thousand.” The other replied, “It is not sufficient, we must therefore retreat.” They were both agreed as to the calling of a council of war; and gen. Mifflin was to propose a retreat. But as he was to make that proposal, lest his own character should suffer, he stipulated, that if a retreat should be agreed upon, he would command the rear; and if an action, the van. When the council was held, these reasons, among others, were mentioned for removing the army to New-York, viz.—“The heavy rains which have fallen two days and nights, with but little intermission, have injured the arms and spoiled a great part of the ammunition, and the soldiers, being without cover and obliged to lie in their lines, are worn out.”——“From the time the enemy moved from Flatbush, several large ships have attempted to get up, as supposed, into the East-River, to cut off our communication, by which the whole army would be destroyed, but the wind being north-east, they have not been able to effect it.”——“The troops are become dispirited by their incessant duty and watching.” It was unanimously agreed to quit. Col. Glover, who belonged to Marblehead, was called upon with the whole of his regiment fit for duty, to take the command of the vessels and flat-bottomed boats. Most of the men were formerly employed in the fishery, and so peculiarly well qualified for the service.—The colonel went over himself from New-York, to give directions; and about seven o’clock at night, officers and men went to work with a spirit and resolution peculiar to that corps. The embarkation of the troops was committed to gen. M’Dougall. He was upon the spot at Brooklye ferry, at eight o’clock, the hour fixed for the commencement of this important movement. To his great mortification he found that the militia had not yet embarked. The getting them over protracted the time till between ten and eleven o’clock. Meanwhile, about nine, the tide of ebb made, and the wind blew strong at north-east, which adding to the rapidity of the tide, rendered it impossible to effect the retreat in the course of the night, with only that number of row boats which they could command, and the state of the wind and tide put it out of the power of col. Glover’s men to make any use of the sail boats. Gen. M’Dougall sent colonel Grayson, one of the commander in chief’s aids, to report to his excellency their embarrassed situation; and gave it as his opinion, that the retreat was impracticable that night. The colonel returned soon after, not being able to find the commander in chief, on which the general went on with the embarkation, under all these discouragements. But about eleven the wind died away, and soon after sprung up at south-west, and blew fresh, which rendered the sail boats of use, and at the same time made the passage from the island to the city, direct, easy and expeditious. Providence further interposed in favor of the retreating army, by sending a thick fog about two o’clock in the morning [Aug. 30.] which hung over Long-Island, while on New-York side it was clear. During the embarkation, colonel Scammell was sent to gen. Mifflin with orders for a particular regiment to march down to the ferry; the colonel mistook the orders, and instead of a regiment understood the whole covering party, and delivered them accordingly. On that gen. Mifflin quitted the lines, and came down to the place of embarkation, to the great astonishment of gen. Washington, who with surprise enquired into the reason of such conduct. The mistake being cleared up, gen. Mifflin returned to the lines, after they had been abandoned about three-quarters of an hour, without its being discovered by the enemy, because of the fog. The fog and wind continued to favor the retreat, till the whole army, 9000 in number, with all the field artillery, such heavy ordnance as was of most value, ammunition, provision, cattle, horses, carts, &c. were safe over. The water was so remarkably smooth as to admit of the row boats being loaded within a few inches of the gunwale. Gen. Washington, though often entreated, would not leave the island till Mifflin, with his covering party, left the lines, at about six o’clock. The enemy were so nigh that they were heard at work with their pick-axes and shovels. In about half an hour after the lines were finally abandoned, the fog cleared off, and the British were seen taking possession of the American works. Four boats were on the river, three half-way over, full of troops; the fourth, within reach of the enemy’s fire upon the shore, was compelled to return; she had only three men in her, who tarried behind to plunder. The river is a mile or more across; and yet the retreat was effected in less than thirteen hours, a great part of which time it rained hard.

Had it not been for the providential shifting of the wind, not more than half the army could possibly have crossed, and the remainder, with a number of general officers, and all the heavy ordnance at least, must inevitably have fallen into the enemy’s hand. Had it not been also for that heavenly messenger, the fog, to cover tho first desertion of the lines, and the several proceedings of the Americans after day-break, they must have sustained considerable losses. The fog resembled a thick small mist, so that you could see but a little way before you. It was very unusual also to have a fog at that time of the year. My informer, a citizen of New-York, could not recollect his having known any at that season, within the space of twenty or thirty years.

Governor’s-Island, on which were two regiments, was evacuated likewise, with the loss of only one man’s arm, by a cannon shot from the ships. The Americans finished the removal of their military stores from thence [Sept. 2.] and took every thing off but a few pieces of cannon, notwithstanding the ships of war lay within a quarter of a mile of some part of it.[17]

Since the affair of Long-Island, endeavors have been used to keep up the spirits of the people, by puffing accounts of the extraordinary bravery of the troops, and the destruction they made of the enemy. But that matters are not very promising, appears from a letter of gen. Mercer, who commands the flying camp, dated September the 4th, wherein he writes, “Gen. Washington has not, so far as I have seen, 5000 men to be depended on for the service of a campaign, and I have not 1000. Both our armies are composed of raw militia, perpetually fluctuating between the camp and their farms; poorly armed, and still worse disciplined. These are not a match for, were their numbers equal to, veteran troops, well fitted and urged on by able officers. Numbers and discipline must prevail at last. Giving soldiers, or even the lower orders of mankind, the choice of officers, will for ever mar the discipline of armies.” The wretched choice of officers in the Massachusetts, is complained of in a letter of this purport to a gentleman of that state—“I can account for the strange military appointments in your state, on no other principle, than that your people mean to guard against the danger of an army, by making it contemptible. Without officers we shall never have soldiers. They are sinking the state in the eyes of the whole continent. At the end of a campaign we find butchers, bakers, sutlers, and a large tribe of contractors, with fortunes made at the public expence, while a young officer of merit, on twenty-six dollars a month, is a beggar. A man of honor and spirit cannot herd with company unworthy of him; yet there is no one beneath a field officer, whose pay gives him a right to company above a shoe-black. The great number of southern officers now in York, who are but little used to the equality which prevails in New-England, are continually resenting the littleness of their pay.” A third gentleman tells a member of congress—“I cannot agree with you on the frequent calling out of the militia. They are uneasy, restless, and discontented. They leave their business in a most perplexing situation when called out suddenly, and must be very great sufferers in their private property. Their minds are always at home, in their shops, or on their farms. This renders them low spirited; a dejection fast seizes them; sickness and death are the consequences. The only purpose a militia can serve, under present regulations, is, on some sudden invasion, to assemble and repel the enemy, and return to their business again.”

The account will shock your humanity; and yet you must be told, that since the conquest of Long-Island, the American captives, in several instances, were tied up to be fired at by the royal troops, openly and without censure.[18]

You will not wish a detention of this letter, that the intelligence from New-York may be brought down to a later period, it shall therefore be closed with an account of the troops to the northward, and of some proceedings in the Massachusetts.

The return of the troops serving in Canada, under gen. Sullivan, was 7006. When gen. Gates first joined them, the small-pox raged; not a cannot was mounted; the vessels were lumbered with stores; the men were dispirited with defeat and fatigue; in short, the whole was a scene variegated with every distress and disappointment which can conspire to ruin an army. Gen. Sullivan left it the 12th of July; when he first joined it in Canada, it was torn to pieces by sickness and unaccountable occurrences; its present security is thought to be owing to him; and therefore the field officers addressed him when leaving them; and said, “It is to you, Sir, the public are indebted for the preservation of their property in Canada. It is to you we owe our safety thus far. Your humanity will call forth the silent tear and grateful ejaculation of the sick; your universal impartiality will force the applause of the wearied soldier.”

With the losses sustained at Quebec, Three Rivers, the Cedars, the consequent retreat from Canada, together with the deaths and desertions which have happened since the first of April, the northern army has been diminished upward of 5000, exclusive of 3000 sick. Till these were separated, and sent off to Fort George, at the head of Lake George, where the general hospital has been established, the camp itself had the appearance of a general hospital rather than an army. The small-pox had infected every thing belonging to it, the cloths, the blankets, the air, the very ground the men walked on. Gen. Gates exerted all his powers to prevent this pestilence from fixing at Skeensborough, to which place the militia ordered to reinforce him, were directed to repair. The army is now at Crown-Point, for a council of general officers unanimously determined to retire from thence, and take post at the strong ground opposite to the east point of Tyconderoga. By the end of the month affairs began to wear a less gloomy aspect. The fleet upon Lake Champlain increased rapidly. The militia began to come to Skeensborough. On the 6th of August the general was joined by 600 from New-Hampshire; but many, both officers and soldiers, were detained on their march by inoculating, contrary to orders, through fear of being infected with the small-pox in the natural way. While the army was in Canada, regularity was dispensed with, or neglected; and the ruin of affairs there was ascribed by some members of congress to the want of regular returns. Who was general, who quarter-master, who pay-master, who commissary, were important secrets, which all their penetration was never able to discover. Gates has sent them a return, the most systematical they have seen. The utmost exertions are applied in building galleys and gondolas, to continue a naval superiority upon the lake, whereby to prevent Sir Guy Carleton’s penetrating into the United States by way of Ty. The post opposite to it, occupied by the army, has been called Mount Independence, since the declaration of independence reached them; for that was received with the usual applause.

[Sept. 2.] The Massachusetts house of representatives have, in an address to congress, requested that they would form a confederation. [Sept. 14.] They have also chosen gen. Lincoln to command the militia ordered to New-York. An attempt which is now making, to fix by an act of the general court, the price of various articles, may be well intended by the generality. The characters of many who are for the measure, are too fair to admit the suspicion of a bad intention. But the measure will at length prove ineffectual for the good meant to be answered by it, and be productive of great evil. The most conscientious and patriotic will be injured, while the crafty and unprincipled make their advantage of it. Prices of provision, and divers other articles, like water, will find their own level; and be high or low, according to the quantity of stock in hand, and the demand that there is for them. But warm theorists will not be easily convinced by any other arguments than those which result from experiments.

LETTER V.

_Roxbury, Dec. 20, 1776._