Part 24

The articles arriving, together with a body of Anspachers, and a number of British and German recruits, he passed over to the Jerseys, and marched from Brunswick on the night of the 13th, and took the field. But he was not attended with that number of provincials which was expected. “Mr. Oliver Delancey, reputed the most likely man in New-York to induce the loyalists of that province to join the king’s troops, was appointed a brigadier general, and authorised to raise three battalions, to consist of 1500 privates. Every possible effort was used by him and gov. Tryon, not only in the districts possessed by the king’s troops, but by employing persons to go through the country, and invite the well-affected to come in. Several of the officers, anxious to complete their corps, sought for recruits among the prisoners, and ventured to hold out to them the temptations of pay, liberty and pardon. Notwithstanding all these efforts and encouragements, gen. Delancey raised only 597 men.”—Mr. Courtland Skinner, who is acknowledged to possess considerable influence in Jerseys, was also appointed a brigadier general, and authorized to raise five battalions, to consist of 2500 privates.—The same efforts were made as for the raising of Delancey’s corps, but Skinner’s number amounted only to 517.”[48] No sooner had gen. Howe taken the field, but the Jersey militia turned out in a very spirited manner, as though determined, in conjunction with the continentals, to harrass and oppose the royal army on their march through the country. The gen. came out as light as he could, leaving all his baggage, provisions, (except enough to subsist the troops two or three days at a time) boats and bridges at Brunswick; which, in the judgment of general Washington, forcibly contracted the idea of an expedition toward the Delaware. Every appearance coincided to confirm the opinion, that Howe intended in the first place a stroke at his army. The American general reasoned thus: “Had their design in the first instance been to cross the Delaware, they would probably have made a strict rapid march toward it, and not have halted, as they have done to awaken our attention, and give us time to make every preparation for obstructing them[49].”——Of the sudden retreat of the royal army. The general wrote on the 20th, “The enemy decamped the night before last, and have returned to their former position. It appears to have been in consequence of a sudden resolution, as they had raised a chain of redoubts from Somerset to Brunswick. What may have determined them to change their plan is hard to tell. Whether alarmed at the animation among the people—disappointed in the movements they may have expected us to make, thence concluding their design impracticable—or whether they may have an operation in view in some other quarter, the event must show.”——Howe’s front extended to Somerset Court-house, about nine miles; his rear remained at Middle-Bush, half way between that and Brunswick. Washington was encamped upon his right flank (as he marched) at the distance of about five miles. His troops were so disposed under Sullivan and himself, as to have been capable of giving a pretty successful opposition. When the royal army retreated back to Brunswick, they burnt and destroyed the farm houses upon the road. Their cruelties to the inhabitants were inexpressible, they ruined and defaced every public edifice, particularly those dedicated to the Deity. They removed their baggage to Amboy, for which place they set out on the 22d. The evening before, several pieces of information, and a variety of circumstances, made it evident to the American general, that a move was in agitation, and it was the prevailing opinion that it would be the next morning. The general therefore detached three brigades under gen. Greene, to fall upon the rear and kept the main body paraded to support them, if necessary. A party of col. Morgans’ light-infantry attacked, and drove the Hessian picket about sun-rise. The enemy, upon the appearance of Wayne’s brigade, and Morgan’s regiment opposite Brunswick, immediately crossed the bridge to the east side of the river, and threw themselves into redoubts. The Americans advanced briskly upon them, upon which they quitted the redoubts without making opposition, and retired by the Amboy road. In the pursuit, col. Morgan’s riflemen exchanged several sharp fires with the enemy which did considerable execution. From intelligence through various channels, there was reason to believe, that their loss was considerable and fell chiefly on the grenadiers and light infantry, who formed their covering party. Gen. Howe arrived at New-York on Sunday afternoon the whole of which day was employed in removing the wounded soldiers from the docks to the hospitals there, said to amount to some hundreds.[50] One of the American generals humorously wrote concerning Sir William Howe’s returning to Brunswick by night—“Gen. Howe remained five days, and then sneaks off by night, and it is well he did—for had he went by day, we could have done nothing, but have looked at him.”

Lieut. col. Palfrey, formerly an aid-de-camp to gen. Washington, and now pay-master-general, wrote to his friend, “I was at Brunswick just after the enemy had left it. Never let the British troops upbraid the Americans with want of cleanliness, for such dog kennels as their huts were my eyes never beheld. Mr. Burton’s house, where lord Cornwallis resided, stunk so I could not bear to enter it. The houses were torn to pieces, and the inhabitants as well as the soldiers have suffered greatly for want of provisions.”

[June 24.] Gen. Washington, upon the enemy’s retreat to Amboy, with the advice of his general officers, moved the whole army to Quibble-town, that he might be nearer to the royal forces, and might act according to circumstances. The British general, after sending over from Amboy to Staten-Island, the heavy baggage and all the encumbrances of the army, ordered a number of the troops to follow; with an intention of deceiving the Americans into an opinion, that they had nothing more to apprehend from that quarter. The troops returned the evening of the 25th, and the next morning, the general advanced unexpectedly with his whole army, in two columns, from Amboy. Gen. Washington conjectured, that so sudden a movement, was designed either to bring on a general engagement, upon terms disadvantageous to the Americans; or to cut off their parties, and lord Stirling’s division, which had been sent down to support them: or to possess the heights and passes in the mountains on the left of the continental army. The two last were adjudged to be the first object of Howe’s attention, as his march was rapid againt these parties, and indicated a strong disposition to gain the passes. Upon this gen. Washington judged it absolutely neccessary to move his force from the low ground to occupy the heights before the enemy, which was affected with much dispatch. The enemy fell in with some of the light parties, and a part of lord Stirling’s division. His lordship was in no hurry to retreat, but preferred engaging for a while, wherein he made a wrong choice, for he had nearly been cut off, by the right column under lord Cornwallis. He lost three field pieces, but the loss of men was trifling. The enemy’s loss in the several skirmishes of the day, was thought to be more considerable than that of the Americans. The royal army continued the pursuit as far as Westfield; but the woods and intense heat of the weather prevented its effect. When the American general had gained the passes, he detached a body of light troops to watch their motions, and afterward ordered Morgan’s riflemen to join the service. The British remained till the next day about three in the afternoon, and then returned to Rahway and the day following to Amboy. On the 30th, at ten o’clock in the morning, the troops began to cross over to Staten-Island, and the rear guard passed at two in the afternoon, without the least appearance of an enemy. Thus they evacuated the Jerseys, to enter upon new conquests, in hope of reducing the United States to unconditional submission. Unless they can hold, when they have conquered, they will never accomplish the business assigned them by the British ministry.

Let us leave gen. Howe engaged in embarking his army from Staten-Island, and preparing for some grand expedition; that we may attend to the affairs of the northern department.

Gen. Scuyler presented a memorial to congress explaining the expressions in his letter which had given them offence. They resolved, on the 8th of May, that the explanation was satisfactory, and that now they entertained the same favourable sentiments concerning him, which they entertained before that letter was received. This seems to have been designedly preparative to what followed a fortnight after, when it was resolved, “That Albany, Tyconderoga, Fort Stanwix and their dependencies, be henceforth considered as forming the northern department—that major-general Scuyler be directed forthwith to proceed to the northern department, to take the command there.” It was said that he was the only single man who could keep the New-York subjects united against the common enemy, and that his presence was absolutely necessary for their immediate succour and service, as well as that of the United States, closely connected therewith. The New-England delegates, the president excepted, opposed his being directed to take the command, as it superseded general Gates. But they were obliged to yield to numbers, at a time when unluckily some men were absent, who would otherwise have turned the scale. The choice of general Scuyler caused great boasting, though there were only five states out of eleven in favor of the measure, and others were either against it, or could not vote for want of the requisite number of delegates, or their being equally divided. There is what numbers deem a New-York party in congress, whose proceedings have in some instances been mysterious. An absolute order for relinquishing the western lines and Tyconderoga, was pushed for before the choice of Scuyler, but did not prevail; however it was resolved, that general Gates should be empowered to abandon Tyconderoga at pleasure.

It was incumbent on the states of New-Hampshire, Massachusetts in particular, and Connecticut, to furnish the troops necessary for the defence of the northern posts; but a strange remissness prevailed, greatly from an expectation that Tyconderoga would not be attacked. The Massachusetts general court learning that this was the opinion of the commander in chief, neglected forwarding their quota of men. Reports (occasioned probably by the arts of the enemy) were spread, that the troops in Canada were to join gen. Howe. Members of congress were deceived by them, so that gen. Gates, after he had taken the command, wrote that he had the strongest assurances from congress, that the king’s troops were all ordered round, by the river St. Lawrence, to New-York, leaving only a sufficient number to garrison their forts. Gates estimated, that for the defence of Ty and its dependencies, 11,700 continentals, beside the aid of the militia, would be wanted. Scuyler afterward estimated them at 10,000, but then he thought the lines at Mount Independence not one half so extensive as he found them.

The British operations against this department, were taken out of the hands of Sir Guy Carleton, and committed to the charge of gen. Burgoyne. The force alotted to them, consisting of British and German troops, amounted to more than 7000 men, exclusive of the artillery corps. Of these the Germans, mostly Brunswickers, exceeded 3200. Arms and accoutrements were amply provided to supply those royalists who were expected to join the army as soon as it penetrated the frontiers of the United States. A powerful brass train of artillery was furnished, probably the finest, and the most excellent supplied as to officers and private men, that had ever been alotted to second the operations of any army not exceeding the present in number. Beside the regular forces, several tribes of Indians were induced to come into the field. It has been generally supposed, that Carleton’s scruples upon the point of employing them, were by no means acceptable to ministry. They were considered as a principal number of the force destined to the prosecution of the northern war; and the governor of Canada was accordingly enjoined to use his utmost influence in bringing them forward in support of it. In the execution of the proposed operations, gen. Burgoyne was seconded by able and excellent officers, gen. Philips, of the artillery, generals Frazer, Powel and Hamilton, with the Brunswick generals Baron Reidesel and gen. Specht. The army was, in every respect, in the best condition; the troops were in the highest spirits, admirably disciplined, and uncommonly healthy. Colonel St. Leger was detached by way of Oswego, to make a diversion on the Mohawk river. He had 220 men, from the eighth and thirty-fourth regiments, Sir John Johnson’s corps of New-Yorkers, lately raised, some Hannau chasseurs, a company of Canadians and a party of Indians, beside the expectation of being joined by a much larger number. His force did not propably exceed 800 men. The main army, under gen. Burgoyne, proceeded up Lake Champlain, landed, and encamped at no great distance from Crown-Point, where he met the Indians in congress, and afterward, in compliance with their customs, gave them a war feast. He made a speech to them [June 21.] calculated to excite their ardor in the common cause, and at the same time to repress their barbarity. He enjoined it upon them, that they should only kill those who opposed them in arms; that old men, women, children and prisoners, should be held sacred from the knife or hatchet, even in the heat of actual conflict; that they should only scalp those whom they had slain in fair opposition; but that under no pretence should they scalp the wounded, or even dying, much less kill persons in that condition. They were promised a compensation for prisoners, but informed that they should be called to account for scalps. Four days before this speech, gen. Scuyler arrived at Ty; but did not find the post in so good a state of defence as he expected. He imagined that the proposed obstructions (which had been ordered by congress the last December, and which had been backed by his order given in February, and repeated the fifth of June) would have been completed, or at least considerably more advanced. That they were carried on with no more dispatch, was imputed greatly to the late arrival of such troops as could not be brought to work in spirit; to artificers not coming by the time they were ordered, and to a want of working cattle. Gen. St. Clair would before this have called in the militia, but for the state of his magazine; which made him apprehend, that should they come in fast, they might eat him out before the arrival either of the enemy or a supply.

[June 29.] General Burgoyne issued out a proclamation, meant to spread terror among the Americans who avowedly professed themselves the friends of congressional measures; and especially to excite in them a fear of the Indians, whose number was magnified, and eagerness to be let loose on their prey, described with uncommon energy. Protection and security, clogged with conditions, were held out to the peaceable, who continued in their habitations. All the outrages of war, arrayed in their most terrific forms, were denounced against those who persevered in their hostility. But the people at large were so far from being frightened, that they diverted themselves with the proclamation, as a complete model of pomposity.

General St. Clair hoped that the enemy would have assaulted him; and depended on that for rendering his small garrison serviceable to his country, as he was persuaded that his troops were brave, and in case of an assault, would have given a good account of the assailants. But the moment he was informed of Burgoyne’s numbers, and saw that a regular siege was meant, he was certain that the effectual defence of the posts was impossible. The old French lines at Ty, had been strengthened with additional works. There were other posts with works and blockhouses toward Lake George. Opposite Ty, on the eastern shore of the inlet by which the waters from Lake George empty themselves into Lake Champlain, a high circular hill, alias Mount Independence, was strongly fortified. These two posts were joined by a floating bridge, below which a slight boom was thrown across the lake, and large cassoons were sunk above, but this arduous work for obstructing the navigation, was not completed. Instead of a full complement of troops to man the extensive lines and defend the numerous works, the whole force consisted only of 2546 continentals, beside 900 militia, badly equipped and worse armed, particularly in the article of bayonets, which not above one in ten had. The smallness of the garrison would not admit of their possessing themselves of Sugar-hill, alias Mount Defiance, which by its height and proximity, had such an entire command both of Ty and Mount Independence, that an enemy might from thence have counted their very numbers, and enfiladed every part of their works, as had been discovered months before, upon trial, when a cannon had been drawn up and fired from the top of it.

[July 2.] On the near approach of the right wing of the royal army upon the Tyconderoga side, the Americans abandoned their works toward Lake George, and left gen. Philips to possess the advantageous post of Mount Hope, without making any resistance, which must have been ineffectual, and could have answered no good purpose. That apparent supineness and want of vigor with which they were chargeable, was not occasioned by cowardice or incapacity, but actual imbecility. Gen. Burgoyne’s troops proceeded with much expedition in the construction of their works, the bringing up of artillery, stores and provisions, and the establishment of their posts. But what gave the greatest alarm, was the very rapid progress they made in clearing a road and getting artillery on Sugar-hill. When once they had erected a battery on this height, only a few hours more would have been required to have invested the Americans on all sides, which might have been effected by occupying the ground on the east side of Lake Champlain, below Mount Independence, where the pass from the lake to East-Creek is very narrow. The same reason which prevented gen. St. Clair’s calling in the militia when the royal army was at a distance, prevailed when they drew nearer. Having received intelligence by spies, that in 24 hours the investiture would be completed, when he should be cut off from all possibility of succour, gen. Scuyler, not having force sufficient at Fort Edward to relieve him, he determined to evacuate his posts, though he knew it would produce such astonishment as had not happened since the commencement of the war. If he was sensible at the time, that should he remain there, he would save his character but lose the army; whereas did he go off, he should save the army but lose his character, and did he courageously conclude upon sacrificing the last to the cause in which he was engaged, he deserves the warmest commendations. A council of war was called, and it was unanimously concluded upon to evacuate as soon as possible. The general, by evacuating, intended to throw his troops between the country and the royal army, that the militia might have a body to collect to, whereas Burgoyne would otherwise be at liberty to pursue his operations without any obstacle. Proper measures were immediately taken for effecting the evacuation. Orders were given to the troops to take with them, before they left the ground 8 days provisions, sufficient to have carried them to the North-River had they pursued the route intended. The general meant to push for Skeensborough, and there to have met the 200 boats and 5 armed gallies, on board of which were embarked at night as much cannon, stores and provisions as time would permit. The officer in the Jersey redoubt was to continue firing his connon every half hour, toward the battery the enemy were erecting opposite to him till further orders, that there might be no suspicion of the manœuvres going forward. All the connon that could not be removed were to be spiked up, and many were. The knocking off of the trunnions was omitted, as it might alarm the enemy. Previous to the striking the tents every light was to be put out. Though the evacuation was resolved upon about three in the afternoon, it could not be carried into execution till night; and it was at a season when the nights were at the shortest, and when it was moon light. The necessity of keeping the matter a secret until the very moment prevented any preparatory steps to expedite the business. Hence difficulties arose, which occasioned some irregularities in the different embarkations and made it impossible to prevent all disorder. But for want of gen. Fermoy’s circulating proper orders in season to his brigade, and of due attention on his part, every thing appeared in the greatest confusion on Mount Independence.

[July 6.] At two o’clock in the morning St. Clair left Tyconderoga. About three, the troops were put into motion for the evacuation of the Mount, but Fermoy having set fire to his house (contrary to positive orders) the whole Mount was enlightened by it, so that the enemy had an opportunity of seeing every movement, which damped the spirits of the Americans, and induced them to push off in a disorderly manner. Colonel Francis brought off the rear guard in good order about four o’clock. Many regiments after a while recovered from their confusion through the exertion of St. Clair. Upon the army’s arriving at Hubbardton they were halted for near two hours.—The rear guard was increased by many who at first did not belong to it, but were picked up, through an inability of keeping up with their regiments. Most of the stragglers and rear guard having joined, the army was again put in motion. The rear guard was here given to col. Warner, with orders to follow as soon as the whole came up, and to halt about a mile and a half short of the main body (which was to continue that night at Charlestown, about six miles from Hubbardton) and to march in the morning by four and join it. Charlestown is thirty miles from Ty, and twelve from Skeensborough. Col. Warner, with the rear-guard and stragglers, amounting to near 1200, determined to remain at Hubbardton that night, because the men were much fatigued. In the morning the general paraded the army, and waited near two hours for the rear-guard.