Part 43

[June 28.] General Knyphausen moved at day-break: Sir Henry, that he might not press upon him, did not follow till near eight o’clock, with the other division, composed of the 3d, 4th, and 5th brigades of British, two battalions of British grenadiers, the Hessian grenadiers, a battalion of light-infantry, the guards, and the 16th regiment of light-dragoons, a body of troops not easily to be equalled.

About one o’clock in the morning, gen. Lee received a letter from gen. Washington, and in pursuance of the directions it contained, wrote to gen. Dickinson to select some hundreds of his best men, and detach them as nigh to the British rear as he could. These troops were to act as a corps of observation, and to forward the earliest intelligence respecting the enemy. He also ordered col. Morgan to advance with the men under his command so near as to attack them on their first movement: but it was left to him how to act, only he was to take care and not expose his troops, in that manner as to disable him from acting in conjunction with Lee, should there be a necessity for it. Orders were likewise sent to Grayson, as the commanding officer of the two brigades (of Scot and Varnum) consisting of about 600 men, to get them instantly in readiness to march. By daylight they entered English-town; but it was not till between five and six that they marched from thence toward Monmouth court-house, having been detained for want of guides. Nearly at the same time, Lee gave orders to the several detachments and Maxwell’s brigade, to prepare for marching immediately, leaving their packs behind under proper guard: they followed the two just mentioned brigades about seven o’clock. About five Dickinson sent an express to general Washington, informing that the front of the enemy had began their march. His excellency instantly put the army in motion, and sent orders to Lee to move on and attack them, unless there should be _very powerful reasons to the contrary_;[87] and acquainted him that he was marching to support him, and for doing it with the greater expedition and convenience, should make the men disencumber themselves of their packs and blankets. The exceptive clause in the orders rendered them discretionary; they manifested the earnest desire of the commander in chief, that an important blow might be struck which the enemy should feel; but Lee could not consider them as requiring him to risk a general engagement, in direct repugnency to the spirit of those councils of war that had been repeatedly held upon the subject. While Lee was advancing with his column, he sent forward an aid to order Grayson to push on as fast as possible and attack the enemy. Before the aid overtook him, he had passed Freehold meeting-house with the two brigades. The aid delivered Lee’s orders: but gave it as his opinion, that Grayson had better not move on, for that he had been informed that the main body of the enemy was near Monmouth court-house and was thought to be marching to attack them, of which circumstance he supposed Lee was ignorant. The aid on his return fell in with Dickinson, who gave him the same information, and charged him with a message to Lee. Lee conformed to it on its delivery, and gave orders for posting two militia regiments upon a hill for the securing of a particular road, and then pushed forward over a morass or ravine, by the bridge or sauseway, to a height where Dickinson was with a few militia. During his stay on this height, intelligence of the most extraordinary nature was continually brought him. Some asserted, that the enemy had moved off with precipitation, and that it was only a covering party which remained; others averred, that the main force was still on the ground, and filing off in columns to the right and left—one while the enemy’s troops were turning the flanks of the American’s—at another, pushing in front. These opposite reports occasioned Varnum’s brigade, and part of Scott’s, and col. Durgee’s brigade of Lee’s column, to pass and repass the bridge over the morass several times, as it was universally agreed to be by no means warrantable to risk an action, with a ravine in the rear, over which there was only one good passage. While these marchings and counter-marchings took place, the marquis de la Fayette arrived at the head of the main body of Lee’s troops; when the general having reconnoitred a wood, into which it had been reported a battalion or two of the enemy had thrown themselves, and being satisfied that it was groundless, determined to march on, and ascertain with his own eyes, the number, order and disposition of the enemy, and then to conduct himself accordingly. His whole command amounted to about 4000 men, exclusive of Morgan’s corps and the Jersey militia; and consisted of gen. Scott’s detachment, gen. Wayne’s, gen. Maxwell’s brigade, gen. Varnum’s, general Scott’s and col. Jackson’s regiment. When they had nearly passed through the woods, with which the country abounds, and were arrived at a point facing the court-house, and on the edge of a plain about three miles in length and one in breadth, they were formed, but within the skirt of the wood, that the enemy might not discover them. Here they remained while generals Lee and Wayne, and a few others, went out upon the right and rode forward to reconnoitre. From the observations Lee made, and the intelligence he obtained, he concluded that the forces he saw, were no other than the enemy’s covering party, and entertained hopes of an interval between them and the main body, sufficient to afford him the opportunity of cutting them off. That he might perfect this business, Wayne was appointed to command 700 men, to whom were attached two pieces of artillery. Wayne was to attack the covering party in the rear faintly, so as to halt them, but not with vigor lest that should occasion their retreating with celerity to the main body, or drawing from it so powerful a reinforcement as to defeat the principal design.—Mean time Lee was to endeavor, by a short road leading to the left, to gain the front of the party. While marching on this road, one of gen. Washington’s suite came up to procure intelligence. Lee, with a fixed firm tone of voice and countenance which suggested confidence of success, desired him to infrom his excellency, that the enemy did not appear well to understand the roads; that the route he was on cut off two miles; that the rear of the enemy was composed of 1500 or 2000; that he expected to fall in with them, and had great certainty of cutting them off; and that general Wayne and col. Butler were amusing them with a few loose shot while he was performing the route. Wayne’s command was advanced to the right and drawn up. The enemy appeared just in the edge of the wood upon an eminence with their light-dragoons. A few of the American light-horsemen were advanced upon the right, at a very considerable distance. One of Lee’s aids-de-camp observed the queen’s light-dragoons parading as though they meant to charge these American light-horsemen, who had no officer of eminence to head them: he therefore rode up and advised them to let the British dragoons come as near as could be done with safety, and then to retreat off to where gen. Wayne was, and let him receive them. The British horse pursued till they came near the general, when receiving a fire from col. Butler’s regiment, posted on the skirt of a wood, they wheeled and galloped off in great haste to their own body; as they were retiring, the two pieces of artillery fired a few shot at them. Wayne then advanced, and encouraged his men to follow on, and charge the enemy with bayonets. The aid rode back to Lee, who immediately sent him forward to Wayne, with orders that he should only feign an attack, and not push on too precipitately, as that would subvert his plan and disappoint his intentions. Lieut. col. Oswald, who commanded the artillery, supposed that the enemy were retreating, and so passed the morass in front, over a causeway, into a grain field, and began to cannonade. This happened after ten o’clock.—About the same time a part of Lee’s troops issued out of a wood on the left of, and about a mile below the court-house, in small columns, and in an oblique direction with respect to the royal forces, rather toward their right, and within cannon shot.—These were drawn up ready to face the Americans, with their right near a wood, and their left on open ground, covered by their cavalry, and forming an obtuse angle with the court-house. The cavalry filed off to the left, as if with design to attempt something on the right of Lee’s troops, which occasioned an order to the marquis de la Fayette to wheel his column by his right, and to gain and attack the enemy’s left flank. Lee having also ordered to the right the three regiments in Wayne’s detachment, Wesson’s, Stewart’s and Livingston’s, rode toward Oswald’s artillery and reconnoitred the enemy, who appeared in full view, marching back again toward the court-house, and in greater numbers than was expected, so that Lee said, he believed he was mistaken in their strength.

Let us now advert to the manœuvres of Sir Henry Clinton. Soon after he had begun with his column to follow gen. Knyphausen, reconnoitring parties of the Jersey militia appeared on his left flank. The queen’s rangers fell in with, and dispersed some detachments among the woods in the same quarter. His rear-guard having descended from the heights above Freehold into the plain, some American columns appeared likewise descending into it, and began the cannonade on his rear, which was returned by a superior fire. At this instant intelligence was brought to Sir Henry, that the enemy were discovered marching in force on both his flanks. He conjectured that the object of the Americans was the baggage, which at that juncture was engaged in defiles that continued for miles. He conceived that the only means of parrying the apprehended blow, was by facing about, attacking the corps which harrassed his rear, and pressing it so hard as to oblige the detachments to return from his flanks to its assistance. Thinking that the measure might possibly draw on a general action, he sent for a brigade of British, and the 17th light dragoons from Knyphausen’s division, and at the same time gave directions that on their arrival they should take a position for covering his right flank. He then made a disposition, and advanced in a direction toward the right of the Americans.

This happened while Lee was reconnoitring. The American column to the left of him, under gen. Scott, quitted the wood, crossed a morass, and formed in the plain field, about a hundred yards in front of Maxwell, who expected an opportunity to form his brigade by Scott’s moving to the right, as there was a vacancy between the latter and the troops with Lee. These were at that moment moving to the right, and every step they gained came nearer to the royal forces, who were also pushing to the right of the Americans. Lee’s discernment led him immediately to send off one of his aids with orders to Scott, whom he supposed to be in the wood on the other side of the morass, to halt his column in the wood, and continue there till further orders; that there might be no possible misconception, another aid was speedily dispatched with similar orders. Before these could be delivered, Scott had mistaken the movements on his right for a retreat; and apprehended danger to his own column in case of its remaining where he was, notwithstanding his detachment and Maxwell’s brigade, with the other troops to the left, made full two-thirds of Lee’s whole command, and though the enemy appeared to bend their course from the left to the right of the Americans. Under such apprehension, Scott re-crossed the morass, re-entered the wood, and retreated; Maxwell and the others did the like of course. When the first aid reached that part of the wood to which he had been directed, and found that Scott had marched off the ground, he rode back; while returning he met the second aid, and acquainted him with what had taken place; upon their coming to Lee, and communicating their information, the general discovered much surprise, and expressed his disapprobation of Scott’s conduct in strong terms; but immediately upon the intelligence, directed a light-horse officer to carry orders to the marquis de la Fayette to return to the court-house. A general retreat now commenced on the right, till the troops reached Freehold and a neighboring wood. When these were quitted, the British pursued as far as the village, where they halted. Mean while the Americans marched on and passed the next morass in front of Carr’s house, about half a mile from the village. The retreats and advances which took place were attended with cannonadings on each side. The halt of the British, on account of the intense heat of the weather, and their having suffered severely from fatigue, admitted of the Americans halting also for a considerable space, which heat and fatigue had rendered equally necessary for them. But upon the advance of the British from Freehold, and Lee’s discerning that the position he at first meant to occupy with the design of receiving the enemy and baffling their attack, was not suitable; the whole of his command, Scott, Maxwell, and the others having now joined the corps which before formed the right, were ordered to retreat from the neighbourhood of Carr’s house toward a wood and eminence behind the morass they had crossed in the morning, which had been pointed out to him as a desirable and proper spot. Before they had wholly left the ground about Carr’s house, the British cavalry made a sudden and rapid charge upon some parties of the American horse, who were in the rear reconnoitring. It was expected they would have attempted a charge on the whole rear, but they did not venture upon it.

Soon after Lee with his columns issued out of the woods below the court-house into the plain, gen. Washington was advancing with the main body of the army between English-town and Freehold meeting. Expecting from the information brought him, than the van of Lee’s command and the rear of the British would ere long engage, he ordered the right wing under gen. Greene to go to the right to prevent the enemy’s turning his right flank: and then prepared to follow with the left wing directly in Lee’s rear to support him. While this disposition was making, he learned, to his great surprise, from a countryman, that the continental troops were retreating. Though the account was confirmed by two or three persons whom he met on the road, after moving a few paces forward, yet he appeared to discredit it, having not heard any firing except a few cannon a considerable time before. He rode on, and between Freehold meeting and the morass, which he had just crossed, met the retreating troops marching toward the same, as Lee meant that they should re-pass it and then occupy the ground behind it, where he proposed making a stand against the enemy. Washington was exceedingly alarmed at finding the advanced corps falling back upon the main body, without the least notice given him. He desired one of the retreating colonels to march his men over the morass, halt them on the eminence, and refresh them. Seeing Lee at the head of the next column, he rode up to him with a degree of astonishment and indignation, and proposed certain questions that implied censure. Lee felt it, and answered with warmth and unsuitable language. Hard and irritating words passed between them for a short space, when Washington rode on toward the rear of the retreating troops. He had not gone many yards before he met his secretary, who told him that the British army were within fifteen minutes march of that place, which was the first intelligence he received of their pushing on so briskly. He remained there till the extreme rear of the retreating troops got up, when looking about, and judging the ground to be an advantageous spot for giving the enemy the first check, he ordered col. Stewart’s and lieut. col. Ramsay’s battalions to form, and incline to their left, that they might be under cover of a corner of woods, and not be exposed to the enemy’s cannon in front. Lee having been told by one of his aids, that Washington had taken the command, answered, “Then I have nothing further to do;” turned his horse and rode after his excellency in front. Washington on his coming up asked, “Will you command on this ground or not? If you will, I will return to the main body and have them formed upon the next height.” Lee replied, “It is equal to me where I command.” Washington then told him, “I expect you will take proper measures for checking the enemy.” Lee said, “Your orders shall be obeyed, and I will not be the first to leave the field.” Washington then rode to the main army, which was formed with the utmost expedition on the eminence with the morass in front. Immediately upon his riding off a warm cannonade commenced between the British and American artillery on the right of Stewart and Ramsay; between whom and the advanced troops of the British army a heavy fire began soon after in the skirt of the woods before mentioned. The British pressed on close, their light-horse charged upon the right of the Americans, and the latter were obliged to give way in such haste, that the British horse and infantry came out of the wood seemingly mixed with them. The action then commenced between the British and col. Livingston’s regiment together with Varnum’s brigade, which had been drawn up by Lee’s order, and lined the fence that stretched across the open field in front of the bridge over the morass, with the view of covering the retreat of the artillery and the troops advanced with them. The artillery had timely retired to the rear of the fence, and from an eminence discharged several grapes of shot at the British, engaged with Livingston’s and Varnum’s troops; these were soon broken by a charge of the former and retired. The artillery were then ordered off. Prior to the commencement of the last action, Lee sent orders to col. Ogden, who had drawn up in the wood nearest the bridge, to defend that post to the last extremity, thereby to cover the retreat of the whole over the bridge. Lee was one of the last that remained on the field, and brought off the rear of the retreating troops. Upon his addressing general Washington, after passing the morass, with—“Sir, here are my troops, how is it your pleasure that I should dispose of them?” he was ordered to arrange them in the rear of English-town.

The check the British received, gave time to make a disposition of the left wing and second line of the main army in the wood and on the eminence to which Lee had been directed and was retreating. On this were placed some batteries of cannon by lord Stirling, who commanded the left wing, which played upon the British with great effect, and seconded by parties of infantry detached to oppose them, effectually put a stop to their advance. Gen. Greene, who had early filed off to the right, on intelligence of the retreat of the advanced corps, marched up, and took a very advantageous position on the right of Stirling. The British finding themselves warmly opposed in front, attempted to turn the American left flank, but were repulsed. They also made a movement to the American right, with as little success. Greene having advanced a body of troops with artillery to a commanding piece of ground, which not only disappointed their design, but severely infiladed those in the front of the left wing. In addition to this, Wayne advanced with a body of troops, and kept up so severe and well directed a fire, that the British were soon compelled to give way. They retired and took the position about Carr’s house, which Lee had before occupied. Here their flanks were secured by thick woods and morasses, while their front could be approached only through a narrow pass. Washington however, resolved to attack them; and for that purpose ordered gen. Poor, with his own and the Carolina brigade, to move round upon their right, and gen. Woodward to their left; and the artillery to gall them in front; but they were prevented getting within reach before dark. They remained upon the ground which they had been directed to occupy, during the night, with an intention to begin the attack early the next morning, and the main body continued lying upon their arms in the field of action, to be in readiness for supporting them. During the action, Washington animated his forces by his gallant example; and by exposing his person to every danger common to the meanest soldier, taught them to hold nothing too dear for the good of their country. At night he laid down and reposed himself in his cloak, under a tree, in hope, as may be supposed, of a general action the ensuing day; for it appears from several circumstances, that he was all along rather desirous of that event, notwithstanding the prevailing contrary opinion of the general officers whom he consulted. In the mean time Sir Henry Clinton’s troops were employed in removing their wounded; and about twelve o’clock[88] at night, they marched away in such silence, that though Poor lay extremely near them, their retreat was effected without his knowledge. They left behind them four officers and about forty privates, whose wounds were too dangerous to permit their removal.