Part 18
The only danger to be guarded against by the Americans at Ty, and the neighbouring posts, is, gen. Carleton’s attempting to possess himself of them, when Lake Champlain shall be frozen over, so as to be capable of bearing horses, which probably will not be till the middle of January. The troops occupying these posts will not tarry longer than the end of the year: before that there is time enough to procure a sufficient force from the Massachusetts, Connecticut and New-Hampshire, to defend them. And if the weeks, between Sir Guy’s returning to Canada and the frost’s setting in so as to suspend all operations, are duly improved, something considerable may be wrought toward securing the entrance into the northern states. During the summer season, a road has been cut through the woods, for some miles, leading to Mount Independence, and communicating with the one leading to Hubbarton, so that the intercourse between that post and the northern states can be carried on by land, without coming either through Lake George, or by water from Skeensborough. That the road is horridly bad for carriages and horses in many places but not impassable, my own experience convinces me. Teams have travelled them with heavy loads, though not without ropes fastend to each side, and men attending to keep them from falling over, through the unevenness of the ground. But it is astonishing, that loads of tent-poles should be sent scores of miles to pass through these woods to the American camp, instead of being ordered to cut in the neighbourhood, where there was little other than woodland. By some strange fatality, or folly, the Americans conduct their business in a most expensive way, whereas they ought to exercise the greatest œconomy practicable without injuring the common cause. If the fate of war depends upon the expenditure of money, and the ability of the parties to continue the expences, the United States must be a-ground much sooner than Great-Britain, unless the latter practises and continues an equal degree of extravagance and profusion.
Mr. James Lovell, who has at length recovered his liberty by an exchange, was chosen, ten days ago, by the Massachusetts general court, one of their delegates to congress.
LETTER VI.
_Roxbury, April 16, 1777._
Let the present letter begin with mentioning, that the representatives of the freemen of the state of North-Carolina elected and chosen for that purpose, assembled in Congress at Halifax, and after a third reading, ratified their form of goverment, with a declaration of rights prefixed, on the 18th of last December.
When gen. Washington retreated with a handful of men across the Delaware, he trembled for the fate of America, which _nothing but the infatuation of the enemy could have saved_[35]. Though they missed the boats with which they expected to follow him immediately into Pennsylvania, yet Trenton and the neighbourhood could have supplied them with materials, which industry might have soon constructed into sufficient conveniences for the transportation of the troops, over a smooth river, and of no great extent in some places. But they were put into cantonments for the present, forming an extensive chain from Brunswick to the Delaware, and down the banks of the Delaware for several miles, so as to compose a front at the end of the line, which looked over to Philadelphia. Mr. Mercerau was employed by the American general to gain intelligence, and provided a simple youth[36], whose apparent defectiveness in abilities prevented all suspicion, but whose fidelity and attention, with the capacities he possessed, constituted him an excellent spy: he passed from place to place, mixed with the soldiers, and having performed his business, returned with an account where they were cantoned, and in what numbers. Gen. Fermoy was appointed to receive, and communicate the information to the commander in chief: upon the receipt of it, he cried out, “Now is our time to clip their wings while they are so spread.” But before an attempt could be made with a desirable prospect of success, [Dec. 21.] gen. Washington was almost ready to despair, while he contemplated the probable state of his own troops within the compass of ten days. He could not count upon those whose time expired the first of January: and expected, that as soon as the ice was formed, the enemy would pass the Delaware. He found his numbers on enquiry less than he had any conception of; and while he communicated the fact, thus charged his confidant—“For Heaven’s sake keep this to yourself, as the discovery of it may prove fatal to us.” Col. Reed wrote the next day from Bristol, and proposed to the general the making of a diversion, or something more at or about Trenton, and proceeded to say, “If we could possess ourselves again of New Jersey, or any considerable part, the effect would be greater than if we had not left it. Allow me to hope you will consult your own good judgment and spirit, and let not the goodness of your heart subject you to the influence of the opinions of men in every respect your inferiors. Something must be attempted before the sixty days expire which the commissioners have allowed; for, however many may affect to despise it, it is evident a very serious attention is paid to it; and I am confident, that unless some more favorable appearance attends our arms and cause before that time, a very great number of militia officers here, will follow the example of Jersey, and take benefit from it. Our cause is desperate and hopeless if we do not strike some stroke. Our affairs are hastening apace to ruin if we do not retrieve them by some happy event. Delay with us, is near equal to a total defeat. We must not suffer ourselves to be lulled into security and inactivity because the enemy does not cross the river. The love of my country, a wife (formerly miss De Berdt) and four children in the enemy’s hands, the respect and attachment I have to you, the ruin and poverty that must attend me and thousands of others, will plead my excuse for so much freedom.” The general on the 23d answered, “Necessity, dire necessity will—nay, must justify any attempt. Prepare, and in concert with Griffin, attack as many posts as you possibly can with a prospect of success. I have now ample testimony of the enemy’s intentions to attack Philadelphia, as soon as the ice will afford the means of conveyance. Our men are to be provided with three days provision, ready cooked, with which and their blankets they are to march. One hour before day is the time fixed upon for our attempt upon Trenton. If we are successful, which Heaven grant! and other circumstances favor, we may push on. I shall direct every ferry and ford to be well guarded, and not a soul suffered to pass without an officer’s going down with the permit.”
The origin of the present distress was stated in a letter of the same date, from a member of congress to his friend, in these words, “The causes of our present unhappy situation have long been known; the consequences of them were often foretold, and the measures execrated by some of the best friends of America; but an obstinate partiality (in the New-England delegates) to the habits and customs of one part of this continent, has predominated in the public councils, and too little attention has been paid to others. It has been my fate to make an ineffectual opposition to all short enlistments, to colonial appointments of officers, and other measures pregnant with mischiefs; but these things either suited the genius and habits, or squared with the interests of some states that had sufficient influence to prevail; and nothing is now left but to extricate ourselves from difficulties as well as we can.”
Colonel Griffin, unacquainted both with the plan and the time for attacking Trenton, crossed over from Philadelphia into the Jerseys, unknown to general Washington, and being joined with a few of the Jersey militia, proceeded to Mount-Holly, which induced colonel Donop to quit Bordentown; he returned however to his station before the attack upon colonel Rall. The commander in chief would have comprehended in his plan, a diversion for count Donop by general Putnam; but the latter gave such a representation of the militia, of the confusion that prevailed, and of his apprehensions of an insurrection in Philadelphia, in case of his absence, that it was laid aside. The question for independency had been carried in Pennsylvania by a great majority; but that did not lessen the bitterness of those who opposed it, among whom were most of the quakers. These coalesced with the royalists of other denominations, and composed so formidable a party in the city, that it was dangerous, in the present crisis, to withdraw the militia serving in it on the side of the American cause.
The plan was, to have crossed the Delaware in three divisions, one from the neighborhood of Bristol, which miscarried by a strange inattention to the tide and state of the river, so that it was impossible for the horses and cannon to land on the Jersey shore, through the heaps of ice cast upon it with the change of the tide—a second at Trenton ferry, under gen. Erwing; but the quantity of ice was so great, that though he did every thing in his power to effect it, he could not get over; and finding it impossible to embark his artillery, he was obliged to desist—the third and principal, was commanded by gen. Washington, assisted by generals Sullivan and Greene, and col. Knox of the artillery. It was meant to attack early on the morning of the 26th, from the supposition that the festivity of the preceding day would make surprise more easy, and conquest more certain.
On the evening of the 25th, gen. Washington orders the troops, which are about 2400, to parade at the back of M’Kenky’s ferry, that they may begin to cross as soon as it grows dark; for he imagines that he shall throw them all over, with the necessary artillery, by twelve o’clock, and arrive at Trenton, nine miles below, by five. The quantity of ice made in the night, impedes the boats, and it is three before the artillery gets over, and near four before the troops take up their line of march, which makes the general despair of surprising the town, as they cannot reach it before full day-break; but as there is no making a retreat without being discovered and harassed, he determines to push on at all events. Colonel Rall has received information of an intended attack, and that the 25th at night is thought to be the time fixed upon. His men are paraded and his picket is looking out for it. Captain Washington,[37] commanding a scouting party of about fifty foot soldiers, has been in the Jerseys about three days, without effecting any exploit. He therefore concludes upon marching toward Trenton; advances, and attacks the picket. He exchanges a few shot, and then retreats. As he is making for the Delaware, on his return to Pennsylvania, he meets with general Washington’s troops. [Dec. 26.] Conjecturing their design, he is distressed with an apprehension that by the attack he has alarmed the enemy, and put them on their guard. The enemy, on the other hand, conclude from it, after a while, that it is all the attack which is intended; and so retire to their quarters and become secure; many get drunk. General Washington forms his detachment into two divisions; one takes the lower road to Trenton, while the other, with the general, marches along the upper or Pennington[38] road. The upper division arrives at the enemy’s advanced post exactly at 8 o’clock; and in three minutes after, the fire in the lower road announces the arrival of the other division. When the enemy’s picket[39] discovers, in the grey of the morning, the advance of the general’s troops, they suppose it to be only the scouting party returned. The out guards make but a small opposition; though they behave well for their number, keeping up a constant retreating fire behind houses. The main body forms; the Americans press the men hard, and soon get possession of half their artillery. Finding, from the position of their enemy, that they are surrounded, and must inevitably be cut to pieces if they make any further resistance, they agree to lay down their arms, to the number of 23 officers and 886 men.
General Greene and col. Knox (elected by ballot a brigadier the next day, before the news had reached congress) would have persuaded the commander in chief to have pushed on and improved the alarm given to the enemy, to which he was inclined; but the generality of the officers were against it, and his excellency did not then think he could answer going contrary to the judgment of a majority of a council or war. He has since regretted his not seizing the golden opportunity.
Seven of the enemy’s officers were wounded, beside col. Rall mortally. There were about thirty others killed and wounded. The regiments of Rall, Lossberg and Knyphausen, were obliged to surrender. The light-horse, chasseurs, a number of privates, with a few officers, in all to the amount of about 600, escaped by the road leading to Bordentown. The Americans lost about two men; beside two or three frozen to death. Captain Washington, who assisted in securing the artillery, was wounded in both hands. The Americans took in all, 918 prisoners; as many muskets, bayonets and cartouch boxes; 12 drums and 4 colours—an ample compensation for all the sufferings of the preceding night, though they were not trifling. The weather was sleety, snowy and intensely cold, and the road slippery. A more disagreeable, severe, wintry night, is seldom to be met with, even in America.
In the evening gen. Washington repassed the Delaware, carrying with him the prisoners, their artillery and colours—and elevated hopes that this successful attack would draw after it a train of the most beneficial and important consequences. It has excited not less astonishment in the British and auxiliary quarters, than it has done joy in those of the Americans. The Hessians will be no longer terrible; and the spirits of the Americans will rise amazingly. But before this happened, a small party in the neighborhood of Quaker-town had flown to arms, with a resolution not to lay them down more, while they had enemies near them; being provoked to it by the insufferable behavior of some British light-horsemen.
Though gen. Cadwallader did not pass over the Delaware at the time intended, yet the day after the surprise [Dec. 27.] he crossed about two miles above Bristol, with 1500 men, imagining that gen. Washington was still on that side. Receiving intelligence that the enemy had left Mount Holly, he determined upon proceeding to Burlington (even after learning that the successful troops had re-crossed) and upon marching the next day to Bordentown; which was accordingly done, the enemy going off in the utmost confusion on the alarm of his approach. The day he crossed, 500 men were sent from Philadelphia, who passed over to Burlington on the morning of the 28th; in the evening gen. Mifflin sent over 300 more, and soon followed with a further reinforcement of some hundreds, designing to join gen. Cadwallader as soon as possible. Pennsylvania was now roused, and coming in great numbers to the aid of the commander in chief. On the last mentioned day, gen. Greene crossed afresh into the Jerseys with 300 militia. The time for which many of the militia were to serve, was just expiring. In order to prevail with them to continue, they were harangued. Their pride was addressed. They were told that if they withdrew, it would be charged upon them that they were afraid. Application was artfully made to every passion; and not altogether in vain.
[Dec. 29.] General Washington reached Trenton with about 1800 continentals. Twelve hundred of them were released from their enlistment the first of January. Attempts were made to engage them to continue a month or six weeks longer. Ten dollars extra pay was offered; they took the bounty, and near one half went off in a few days after, before the critical moment arrived: It was soon debated whether to order up the Pennsylvania militia from Bordentown, Mount Holly, and elsewhere, to join general Washington. Gen. Knox had prepared Dr. Rush, a member of congress, to assist in effecting the scheme. He was asked in to give his opinion, and declared in favor of ordering them up, which was then done. [Jan. 1, 1777.] The junction of the militia with the continentals (making in the whole about 5000 men) emboldened the latter to remain in their position after hearing that the enemy was advancing toward them. The alarm which had been given, induced the British and auxiliary troops to assemble; and general Grant, with the forces at Brunswick and in that quarter, marched speedily for Princeton. Lord Cornwallis was gone to New-York in his way to Great-Britain; but upon this unexpected turn of affairs, concluded upon deferring his voyage, and returning to the defence of the Jerseys. He pressed on with the greatest expedition; left the fourth brigade, consisting of the 70th, 40th, and 55th regiments, under the command of lieut. col. Mawhood, at Princeton, and the second brigade, under general Leslie, at Maidenhead, and joined the main body by the time they got near Trenton.
Gen. Greene is sent out with a considerable detachment to support a party stationed about a mile off, and to check the march of the enemy; but finds them advancing in such force and so expeditiously, that he is at some difficulty in making a good retreat with the whole of the Americans. Mean while general Washington makes a disposition for an action; which, as the enemy do not come on directly, is afterward varied to prevent their getting in on the American rear. The bridge over Sanpink Creek, is well secured; but can be of little advantage, as the stream is fordable in many places. The American army has between thirty and forty pieces of artillery in front, facing the creek. The fate of the continent seems suspended by a single thread; and the independence of America to hang on the issue of a battle which appears inevitable; and in which the most sanguine son of liberty can scarce flatter himself with the hope of a victory, the enemy being so superior in numbers and discipline. A defeat must be totally ruinous, from the nature of the ground which the Americans occupy.
Sir William Erskine, according to report, advises lord Cornwallis to an immediate attack, saying, “Otherwise Washington, if any general, will make a move to the left of your army: if your lordship does not attack, throw a large body of troops on the road to your left.” The attack is put off till the morning; his lordship might act upon what is said to be a military principle, that the strongest army ought not to attack toward night. Mean while gen. Washington calls a council of war. It is known that they are to be attacked the next day, by the whole collected force of the enemy. The matter of debate is, “Shall we march down on the Jersey side, and cross the Delaware over against Philadelphia, or shall we fight?” Both are thought to be too hazardous. On this gen. Washington says, “What think you of a circuitous march to Princeton?” It is approved, and concluded upon. Providence favors the manœuvre. The weather having been for two days warm, moist and foggy, the ground is become quite soft, and the roads to be passed so deep that it will be extremely difficult, if practicable, to get on with the cattle, carriages and artillery. But while the council is sitting, the wind suddenly changes to the north-west, and it freezes so hard that by the time the troops are ready to move, they pass on as though upon a solid pavement. Such freezings frequently happen in the depth of winter, upon the wind’s coming suddenly about to the north-west. This sudden change of weather gives a plausible pretext for that line of fires which gen. Washington causes to be kindled soon after dark, in the front of his army; and by which he conceals himself from the notice of the enemy, and induces them to believe he is still upon the ground, waiting for them till morning. The stratagem is rendered the more complete by an order given to the men who are entrusted with the business, to keep up the fires in full blaze, till break of day. While the fires are burning, the baggage and three pieces of ordnance are sent off to Burlington for security, and with the design, that if the enemy follow it, the Americans may take advantage of their so doing. The troops march about one o’clock, with great silence and order, and crossing Sanpink Creek, proceed toward and arrive near Princeton a little before day-break. The three British regiments are marching down to Trenton on another road, about a quarter of a mile distant. The centre of the Americans, consisting of the Philadelphia militia, under gen. Mercer, advances to attack them. Col. Mawhood considers it only as a flying party attempting to interrupt his march, and approaches with his 17th regiment so near before he fires, that the colour of their buttons is discerned. He repulses the assailants with great spirit, and they give way in confusion; officers and men seem siezed with a panic, which spreads fast, and indicates an approaching defeat. Gen. Washington perceives the disorder, and penetrates the fatal consequence of being vanquished. The present moment requires an exertion to ward off the danger, however hazardous to his own person. He advances instantly; encourages his troops to make a stand; places himself between them and the British, distant from each other about thirty yards; reins his horse’s head toward the front of the enemy; and boldly faces them while they discharge their pieces; their fire is immediately returned by the Americans, without their adverting to the position of the general, who is providentially preserved from being injured either by foe or friend. The scale is turned, and col. Mawhood soon finds that he is attacked on all sides by a superior force; and that he is cut off from the rest of the brigade. He discovers also, by the continued distant firing, that the fifty-fifth is not in better circumstances. His regiment having used their bayonets with too much severity on the party put to flight by them in the beginning, now pay for it in proportion; near sixty are killed upon the spot, beside the wounded. But the colonel and a number force their way through, and pursue the march to Maidenhead. The fifty-fifth regiment being hard pressed, and finding it impossible to continue its march, makes good its retreat, and returns, by the way of Hillsborough, to Brunswick. The fortieth is but little engaged; those of the men who escape, retire by another road to the same place.