Part 45

The troops under gen. Sullivan now demand our attention. When they had landed, they possessed themselves of the heights near the north end of the island. They suffered no less than the ships by the tempest. The wind blew most violently, attended with a flood of rain through the whole day of the 12th, and increased so at night that not a marquee or tent could stand; several of the soldiers perished by the severity of the storm, many horses died, the greatest part of the ammunition delivered to the troops was damaged, and the condition of the army was deplorable. On the 14th, the storm was over, and the weather clear and fine. The garrison having enjoyed better accommodations, and greater security than the Americans, Sir Robert Pigot had a fair opportunity of attacking the latter while dispirited and worn down by the painful scenes from which they had just immerged. Gen. Greene and some British officers are of opinion, that a bold and vigorous onset under these cirsumstances would have been highly proper and successful. But as nothing of this kind happened the day was spent by the Americans in drying their clothes, &c. and getting in order for an advance. The next morning they marched at six o’clock, and took post about two miles from the British lines. By the 20th they had opened two four gun batteries; but their approaches were slow. About two o’clock in the afternoon the French fleet was discovered standing for Newport. At seven gen. Greene and the marquis de la Fayette went on board the Languedoc, to consult upon measures proper to be pursued for the success of the expedition in which they were engaged. They urged d’Estaing to return with his fleet into Newport harbor. He was apparently inclined to a compliance: but all the captains and principal officers on board were rather unfriendly to him. He being a land officer, they thought it an affront to their understandings, and a piece of injustice done to their merits and services, to have him appointed to the command over their heads. They therefore crossed him in every measure, that looked like giving him any kind of reputation, in order if possible, to bring him into disgrace. His instructions from the court of France were to go to Boston, if the fleet met with any misfortune, or if there appeared a superior British fleet upon the cost. The count had met with a misfortune, the Cæsar which had steered for Boston was missing, and a superior British fleet was expected. All the officers insisted upon his following the instructions, and entered into a formal protest against prosecuting the expedition any further. About twelve o’clock at night of the 21st, Greene and the marquis returned, and made a report of what had passed. The next day letters went on board from generals Sullivan and Hancock; as also a protest dated—Camp before Newport, Aug. 22, 1778—and signed by John Sullivan, N. Greene, John Hancock, J. Glover, Ezek. Cornell, Wm. Whipple, John Tyler, Soloman Lovell, Jon. Fitconel. They protested in a solemn manner against the count’s taking the fleet to Boston, as derogatory to the honor of France, contrary to the intention of his most Christian majesty and the interest of his nation, and destructive in the highest degree to the welfare of the United States of America, and highly injurious to the alliance formed between the two nations. One of the reasons assigned for the protest was, that the army and stores collected for the reduction of the island would be liable to be lost, by an opportunity’s being given to the enemy to cut off the communication with the main, and totally to prevent the retreat of the army. The best apology that can be made for this protest is, that it was designedly as a finesse to induce the captains of the French fleet to consent to its returning into the harbour of Newport. But it had not this effect and met with a spirited answer from the count, who sailed on the same day for Boston. Sullivan was so chagrined at the departure of the fleet, that contrary to all policy, he gave out in general orders on the 24th, “The generel cannot help lamenting the sudden and unexpected departure of the French fleet, as he finds it has a tendency to discourage some who placed great dependence upon the assistance of it, though he can by no means suppose the army or any part of it endangered by this movement. He yet hopes the event will prove America able to procure that by her own arms, which her allies refuse to assist in obtaining.” Two days after, in new orders, he endeavoured to smooth off the reflection contained in it, by declaring that he meant not to insinuated that the departure of the French fleet was owing to a fixed determination not to assist in the enterprise, and would not wish to give the least colour to ungenerous and illiberal minds to make such unfair interpretations. Count d’Estaing, when arrived in Boston port, wrote to congress on the 26th, and in his letter mentioned—the embarrassments of the king’s squadron as well on account of water as provisions, how his hopes were deceived with regard to these two articles, which were growing more and more important—that it was necessary for him to confine all his attention to the preservation of the squadron, and restoring it to a condition to act—that he was no longer at liberty to depend on deceitful expectations of watering and getting provisions. He justified his repairing to Boston from the situation of his ships, the advices of a squadron from Europe, the ignorance of what was become of lord Howe’s fleet, and the advantage that his lordship would have had for attacking him had he returned into Newport. He also expressed his displeasure at the protest.

It appears unreasonable to censure the count for repairing to Boston, when all his officers insisted so upon the measure; though, had he returned into Newport, the garrison would most probably have capitulated before Howe could have succoured them. Upon the fleet’s sailing for Boston, it was said—“There never was a prospect so favorable, blasted by such a shameful desertion.” A universal clamor prevailed against the French nation and letters were sent to Boston containing the most bitter invectives, tending to prejudice the inhabitants against d’Estaing and all his officers, to counteract which the cooler and more judicious part of the community employed their good offices. Between two and three thousand volunteers returned in the course of twenty-four hours, and others continued to go off, and even many of the militia, so that in three days Sullivan’s army was greatly decreased; it was soon little more in number than that of the enemy. An attempt to carry their works by storm, would have been too hazardous, had all the volunteers and militia remained, for the bulk of the troops had never been in action: the necessity of a retreat was therefore apparent (as soon as there was a certainty of the French fleet’s being gone) though in the morning of the 23d, the Americans had opened batteries consisting in the whole of 17 pieces of heavy artillery, 2 ten inch mortars and three five and a half inch howitzers. Greene was against retreating hastily, lest the appearance of timidity and inferiority should bring out the enemy upon them: but he and Glover prepared for an expeditious retreat, in case Clinton should arrive with a reinforcement, that so no damage might ensue from the delay. By the 26th all the spare heavy artillery and baggage were sent off the island; and on the 28th at night, between nine and ten o’clock, the army began to move to the north end. It had been that day resolved in a council of war, to remove thither, fortify the camp, secure a communication with the main, and hold the ground, till it could be known whether the French fleet would soon return to their assistance. The marquis de la Fayette, by request of the general officers, set off for Boston to request their speedy return. The count could not consent to the return of the fleet, but made a spirited offer of leading the troops under his command from Boston, and of co-operating against Rhode-Island. The march of Sullivan’s army was conducted with great order and regularity, and the troops arrived on their ground about three in the morning, with all the baggage, stores, &c. About seven, [Aug. 29.] they were alarmed by a brisk fire of musketry in their front, between their advanced corps of infantry and the enemy, who had pushed out after them upon discovering the retreat. Sullivan asked the opinion of the generals upon the occasion, and Greene advised to march and meet them, for he truly supposed that they were come out in small detachments which might be cut to pieces; and further apprehended that by advancing in force upon the western road, they might possibly head that part of the enemy which marched down upon the eastern, and so unexpectedly possess themselves of Newport.—Had this measure been adopted, the Americans would probably have gained very great advantages, as the whole of the enemy’s force on the western road consisted only of the Hessian chasseurs and the Anspach regiments of Voit and Seaboth under gen. Lossberg. On the east road was gen. Smith with the 22d and 43d regiments, and the flank companies of the 38th and 54th. To the latter were opposed col. Henry B. Livingston and his light troops; to the former lieut. col. Laurens with his. The enemy’s superiority in numbers obliged each to give way, but a retreating fire was kept up with the greatest order. The advanced corps being reinforced, they gave the enemy a check, make a gallant resistance, and at length repulsed them. But the British commander sending reinforcements to both Lossberg and Smith, the Americans were obliged to retire nigh to the front line of the main army, which was drawn up in order of battle. The British advanced very near to the American left, but were repulsed by Glover, and retired to Quaker-hill. The royal troops soon availed themselves of two heights on Sullivan’s right; where they placed several pieces of artillery, and began about nine o’clock, a severe cannonade on a redoubt, an advanced post on his right, which was returned with double force. Skirmishing continued between the advanced parties until near ten; when two British sloops of war and other armed vessels, having gained his right flank and began a fire, their associates on land bent their force that way, and endeavored to turn Sullivans’s right, under cover of the ships, and to take his advanced redoubt; which brought on a warm and brisk fire of musketry between the contending parties, that was kept up by each side’s throwing in reinforcements, till the action became in some degree general, and near 1200 Americans were engaged. The last of these that were sent forward, got up just in time to prevent the success of the enemy, who were making their third effort to take the redoubt; but they were broken, and retreated to the heights in great confusion, leaving on the field many of their killed and wounded. After the retreat, the field of battle could not be approached by either party without being exposed to the cannon of the other army. The heat of the action was from two till near three o’clock in the afternoon. The firing of artillery continued through the day; the musketry, with intermission, six hours. The Americans make their loss in killed 30, in wounded 132, and in missing 44. The British account makes their killed 38, wounded 210, and missing 12. General Greene, in a letter to the commander in chief, said, “Our troops behaved with great spirit, and the brigade of militia under general Lovell advanced with great resolution and in good order, and stood the fire of the enemy with great firmness. Lieut. col. Livingston, col. Jackson, and col. H. B. Livingston, did themselves great honor in the transactions of the day; but it is not in my power to do justice to col. Laurens, who acted both the general and partizan. His command of regular troops was small, but he did every thing possible to be done by their numbers.” The brigade under general Lovell belonged to the Massachusetts. Greene, who commanded in the attack, did himself the highest honor by the judgment and bravery he exhibited. He attended strictly to the action the whole time, watching the movements of the enemy, and where to throw in the necessary reinforcements. Gen. Sullivan the next morning received advice that lord Howe had again sailed; that a fleet was off Block-Island; and that d’Estaing could not come so soon as he expected; on which it was concluded to evacuate Rhode-Island. The sentries of both armies being within 400 yards of each other, the greatest attention was requisite. To cover the design of retreating, a number of tents were brought forward [Aug. 30.] and pitched in sight of the enemy, and the whole army employed in fortifying the camp. At the same time the heavy baggage and stores were falling back and crossed through the bay. At dark the tents were struck, the light baggage and troops passed down, and by twelve o’clock the main army had crossed. It was about that time when the marquis de la Fayette arrived from Boston. He was most sensibly mortified that he was not in the action. That he might not be out of the way in case of one, he had rode from the island to Boston, near 70 miles distant, in seven hours, and returned in six and a half. He got back, time enough to bring off the pickets and other parties that covered the retreat of the army, which he did in excellent order; not a man was left behind, nor the smallest article lost. The honor arising from so good a retreat, though great, did not compensate for the sore disappointment gen. Sullivan met with when in full expectation of taking Newport. The place must have fallen had not count d’Estaing left the harbour, or had he returned after chasing lord Howe to a considerable distance. The glory of vanquishing a British squadron, and of obtaining a triumph over a first rate naval officer, and a country against which he had a personal animosity (though in prospect only) tempted him as may be thought into a situation that proved the ruin of the principal object in view when he steered from before Sandy-Hook for Newport, and agreed upon a co-operation with Sullivan’s army. The fleet off Block-Island was bound for Rhode-Island, and had on board Sir Henry Clinton, with about 4000 troops. Sir Henry hoped to have effected a landing, so as to have made Sullivan’s retreat very precarious, but the latter was completed the night before his arrival. [Sept. 1.] The day after, lord Howe, who had changed his course upon hearing that d’Estaing had left Rhode-Island, arrived off the entrance of Boston port in the evening. Upon observing the position of the French fleet, and deeming every attempt against them ineligible, he left the Boston coast the next morning; but this appearance in and standing up the bay to the entrance of the port, spread a prodigious alarm. Sir Henry being disappointed, returned for New-York; but off New-London left the fleet, with directions to gen. Grey to proceed to Bedford and the neighborhood, where several American privateers resorted, and a number of captured ships lay. They reached the place of destination on the fifth of September; the troops were immediately landed, and between six in the evening and twelve the following day, destroyed about 70 sail of shipping, beside a number of small craft. They also burnt the magazine, wharfs, stores, ware-houses, vessels on the stocks, all the dwelling-houses at M’Pherson’s wharf, and the principal part of the houses at the head of the river, together with the mills and some houses on the east side of the river. Bedford, or as it is frequently called Dartmouth, suffered to the amount of near £.20,000 sterling in rateable property, viz. buildings. The other articles destroyed were worth a much more considerable sum. The troops proceeded from thence to Martha’s Vineyard, where they destroyed a few vessels, and made a requisition of the militia arms, the public money, three hundred oxen, and 10,000 sheep, which was complied with. The last contribution was a most desirable one, and afforded a grateful repast to thousands upon being safely conveyed to New-York.

Here let me close our account of military operations, with an extract from gen. Washington’s letter of August the 20th, and then attend to the negociations of the British commissioners, and the acts of congress, His excellency thuse expressed himself—“It is not a little pleasing, nor less wonderful to comtemplate, that after two years manœuvreing and undergoing the strangest vicissitudes, that perhaps ever attended any one contest since the creation, both armies are brought back to the very point they set out from, and the offending party in the beginning, is now reduced to the use of the spade and pick-axe for defence. The hand of Providence has been so conspicuous in all this, that he must be worse than an infidel that lacks faith, and more than wicked that has not gratitude enough to acknowledge his obligations.”

Governor Johnstone, meaning to avail himself of former connections, endeavored to commence or renew a private correspondence, with several members of congress, and other persons of consideration. In his letters to them, he used a freedom with the authority under which he acted, not customary with those intrusted with delegated power, and gave such a degree of approbation to the conduct of the Americans in the past resistance which they had made, as is seldom granted by negociators to their opponents. In a letter to Joseph Reed, esq. of April the 11th, he said—“The man who can be instrumantal in bringing us all to act once more in harmony, and to unite together the various powers which this contest has drawn fourth, will deserve more from the king and people, from patriotism, humanity and all the tender ties that are effected by the quarrel and reconciliation, than ever was yet bestowed on human kind.” On the 16th of June, he wrote to Robert Morris, esq.—“I believe the men who have conducted the affairs of America uncapable of being influenced by improper motives; but in all such transactions there is risk, and I think, that whoever ventures should be secured: at the same time, that honor and emolument should naturally follow the fortune of those who have steered the vessel in the storm, and brought her safely to port. I think Washington and the president have a right to every favor that grateful nations can bestow, if they could once more unite our interest, and spare the miseries and devastations of war.” On Sunday the 21st of June, Mr. Reed received a written massage from Mrs. Ferguson, expressing a desire to see him on business which could not be committed to writing. On his attending in the evening, agreeable to her appointment, after some previous conversation, she enlarged upon the great talents and amiable qualities of governor Johnstone, and added, that in several conversations with her, he had expressed the most favorable sentiments of Mr. Reed; that it was particularly wished to engage his interest to promote the objects of the British commissioners, viz. a re-union of the two countries, if consistent with his principles and judgment; and that in such case it could not be deemed unbecoming or improper in the British government to take a favorable notice of such conduct; and that in this instance Mr. Reed might have ten thousand pounds sterling, and any office in the colonies in his majesty’s gift. Mr. Reed, finding an answer was expected, replied—“_I am not worth purchasing, but such as I am, the king of Great-Britain is not rich enough to do it._” However right the principles might be, on which this insinuating scheme of conciliation was adopted, its effects were untoward. On the ninth of July congress ordered—“That all letters received by members of congress from any of the British commissioners or their agents, or from any subject of the king of Great-Britain, of a public nature, be laid before congress.” The above letters being communicated, and Mr. Reed making a declaration [Aug. 11.] of what has been above related, congress resolved that the same “cannot but be considered as direct attempts to corrupt and bribe the congress—that as congress feel, so they ought to demonstrate, the highest and most pointed indignation against such daring and attrocious attempts to corrupt their integrity—and that it is incompatible with the honor of congress to hold any manner of correspondence or intercourse with the said George Johnstone, esq. especially to negociate with him upon affairs in which the cause of liberty is concerned.” Their proceedings in this business were expressed in the form of a declaration, a copy of which was ordered to be signed by the president, and sent by a flag to the commissioners at New-York. This declaration drew out an exceeding angry and vehement one from the gentleman in question, in which the immediate operations of passion were rather too apparent. The tone of his publications accorded but badly with the high and flattering eulogiums which he had so lately bestowed on the Americans in those very letters which were the subject of the present contest. It was dated the 26th of August, and transmitted to congress, together with a declaration of the same date from lord Carlisle, Sir Henry Clinton and Mr. Eden, which went to a total and solemn disavowal, so far as related to the present subject, of their having had any knowledge, directly or indirectly, of those matters specified by congress. The declarations were accompanied by a requisition from the three last named commissioners respecting the troops lately serving under gen. Burgoyne, in which they offered to ratify the convention, and required permission for the embarkation of the troops. But congress resolved, [Sept. 4.] “That no ratification of the convention, which may be tendered in consequence of powers, which only reach that case by construction and implication, or which may subject whatever is transacted relative to it to the future approbation or disapprobation of the parliament of Great-Britain, can be accepted by congress.”