Part 42

The French began, by firing at a great distance on the headmost of Sir Robert Harland’s division as the ships led up, but not a shot was returned till they were near the enemy. The example was followed, or a similar conduct pursued by the fleet in general, as fast as each ship could close up with the French; and notwithstanding their having been necessarily extended by the chase, they were all soon in battle. As the fleets passed each other very close on the opposite tacks, the cannonade was heavy, and the effect considerable. The action lasted about three hours. As the French in their usual way, directed their fire principally against the rigging, several of the British ships suffered considerably in their masts, yards and sails. The British fire which was principally levelled at the hulls of the enemy, was not deficient in its effect of another kind, the destruction of the seamen. The action being over for the present, admiral Keppel hauled down the signal for battle, till the ships could recover their stations, or get near enough to support each other on the renewal of the action. To call them together for that purpose, he immediately made the signal to form the line of battle a-head, which was considered as commanding the most prompt obedience. Admiral Palliser was at this moment in his proper station; but quitted it and passing Keppel to leeward on the contrary tack, while the latter was advancing to the enemy, never came into the line during the rest of the day. Palliser being totally out of the line, other ships for a-stern, and 5 disabled in their rigging, at a great distance to leeward, the British admiral, about 3 o’clock in the afternoon, could not collect above twelve ships to renew the engagement. The French observing the exposed situation of the British ships which had fallen to leeward to repair their damages, edged away with an evident intention of cutting them off from the rest of the fleet. Adm. Keppel instantly discerned their design and the danger of the ships, and suddenly wore and stood athwart the van of the enemy, in a diagonal line, for their protection. He also dispatched orders to Sir Robert Harland to form his division at a distance astern of the Victory, to cover the rear and keep the enemy in check, till Palliser should, in obedience to the signal, come with his division into his proper station. The protection of the disabled ships being accomplished, and the French continuing to form their line, ranging up to leeward parallel to the centre division, it became the admiral’s immediate object to form his as speedily as possible, in order to bear down upon them and renew the battle. Seeing Palliser still to windward, he sent capt. Windsor of the Fox frigate with express orders to him to bear down into his wake; and to tell him, that he only waited for him and his division to renew the attack. This order not producing the desired effect, the admiral threw out the signal for all ships to come into their stations; and again at seven o’clock, being wearied out with fruitless expectation, he made the signal for each particular ship of Palliser’s division to come into her station in the line; but before they had complied with this signal, night put an end to all further operations.—From a motive of delicacy, no signal was particularly thrown out to the Formidable, Sir Hugh Palliser’s own ship.

The French could have renewed the action during every hour of the afternoon, with apparent advantages, which from the situation of affairs could not possibly have escaped their observation. Their conduct the following night indicated their indisposition to a renewal of it. Three of their best sailing vessels were stationed at proper distances with lights to divert the attention of the British fleet, and to induce a belief that their whole line still kept its position. During this deception the rest of the fleet withdrew in the most silent manner, without lights or other signals than the throwing up of some rockets; and made the best of their way to Brest, where they arrived the next evening. By day-light the French fleet had got at such a distance, that the British admiral concluded, he had not the smallest prospect of coming up with them, and that neither a general nor partial pursuit could answer any beneficial purpose. He therefore left only a proper force to protect the homeward bound trade, and then made the best of his way to Plymouth, as being the nearest port, in order to put the fleet into a proper condition to return in quest of the enemy.

It was observed on the day of action with equal surprise and regret, and by some of the bravest and most experienced British officers, that the French worked and manœuvred their ships, with a degree of seaman-like address and dexterity, which they never before perceived. The event of the day, and the consequent escape of the French fleet were to admiral Keppel intolerably grievous. By his consummate skill, and the most incessant industry, he had gained after four days pursuit of the enemy, one of the fairest opportunities of doing the most signal service to his country, in the most critical exigency, and of raising his own name to the summit of naval renown. He hoped to have made the 27th of July, “a proud day to Great-Britain.” All these mighty advantages and glorious rewards were unaccountably ravished from him, when they appeared within his grasp. In Plymouth, the failure of a complete victory was attributed to Sir Hugh Palliser; whose non-compliance with the admiral’s signals has been ascribed by many to the disabled condition of some of the ships in his division.

The admiral, with wonderful temper, and no less prudence, accommodated his conduct to the necessity of his situation, and made the public security and interest the only objects of his direction. He advanced no charge against Palliser. His public letter was short, general, and barren of information. It stated facts so far as it went, threw no blame upon any body, and commended the bravery of the officers in general, and of Sir Robert Harland and Sir Hugh Palliser in particular. But this approbation is to be applied only to the particular circumstances and immediate time of the action: the subsequent transactions of the afternoon, were in general thrown into the shade; and the causes that prevented a renewal of the engagement left in such obscurity, as has drawn no small share of censure upon Keppel himself.

The French fleet returned to Brest considerably damaged in their hulls, but glorying in an action, wherein they had engaged an equal number of British ships without the loss of a single vessel, as though they had gained a victory. It will be some time before they are fully repaired, through a scarcity of the necessary means.

The Americans have many friends in Holland, who will be ready to assist them when an opportunity offers; but not a-la-mode de Paris. They have not the same inducements with the French to venture on a war with Britain, in favor of the independence of your United States. Dutch policy will keep them from it, that they may enjoy the sweets of a neutrality while others are fighting. They may supply you with a loan; but they will not draw the sword in your behalf. Nothing will bring them to this unless Britain should add to their long catalogue of political errors, that of compelling them to it.

LETTER XIII.

_Roxbury, Nov. 12, 1778._

Lieutenant colonel Ethen Allen was at length exchanged; and congress granted him a brevet commission of colonel, [May 14.] in reward of his fortitude and zeal in the cause of his country.

General Sullivan being sent to command at Providence, gen. Pigot who was at Newport, inferred that there was a design of attacking Rhode-Island whenever an opportunity offered: the latter therefore concluded upon an expedition that might delay or frustrate the event. Lieutenant col. Campbell, with about 500 British and Hessians was sent off in the night of the 24th, passed up the river, and landed from the ships, tenders, and boats before day, between Warren and Poppasquash-point. At day-light [May 25.] they marched in two bodies, one for Warren, and the other for the head of Kickemut-river, where they destroyed about seventy flat-bottomed boats, and set fire to one of the state gallies, which was extinguished without doing much injury. They burnt also a quantity of pitch, tar, plank, &c.—They then fired the meeting-house at Warren, and several dwelling houses; and retreated toward Bristol, where their ships and boats had fallen down to receive them. In Bristol they burnt two and twenty houses, and through mistake, the church instead of the meeting-house. The destruction of houses and places of worship, was afterward attributed chiefly to the licentiousness of the soldiers, who treated both friends and foes with cruelty, plundering houses and robbing women of their shoe-buckles, gold rings and handkerchiefs. They carried off with them a state galley. A few days after, a party of 150 men were sent from Newport, to burn the saw-mills and contiguous houses at Tiverton. They fired an old mill and old house near the place of landing; and then proceeded for the town, to execute the business they were sent upon; but the bridge leading to it being defended by five and twenty men, they could not cross, though they attempted it repeatedly. The advancing season will close these small excursions, by bringing forward more capital operations; and for the counteracting of which the Americans must depend much upon supplies from France.——This reminds me, that on the 28th, a French 50 gun ship, with 350 men, a brig and a schooner, bringing arms and dry goods, arrived in James River, Virginia, from Rochford. Congress the next day, to commemorate the agreeable event which has taken place between France and the United States, resolved that a new continental frigate, built in the Massachusetts, and lately launched, should be called the _Alliance_. Within three weeks after, the command of her was bestowed upon captain Peter Landais.

In the beginning of June the Trident arrived in the Delaware, with the earl of Carlisle, Mr. Eden and governor Johnstone, three of the commissioners for restoring peace between Great-Britain and America. On the 9th Sir Henry Clinton informed gen. Washington of their being at Philadelphia, and requested a passport for doctor Ferguson, their secretary, with a letter from them to congress. The general declined granting a passport, which was unanimously approved by congress. The refusal made it necessary to forward the letter, with the acts, a copy of their commission and other papers, by the common intercourse. They were received by an express from Washington on the 13th, and the letter was read till some offensive language against his most Christian majesty offered, on which the further reading of it was suspended till the 16th, when the reading of that and the other papers was finished. They were referred to a committee, who drew up a letter to be sent by the president, in answer to the letter and papers from the commissioners, which was unanimously agreed to by the delegates on the 17th, and was as follows—“I have received the letter from your excellencies on the 9th instant, with the enclosures, and laid them before congress. Nothing but an earnest desire to spare the further effusion of human blood, could have induced them to read a paper containing expressions so disrespectful to his most Christian majesty, the good and great ally of these states, or to consider propositions so derogatory to the honor of an independent nation. The acts of the British parliament, the commission from your sovereign, and your letter, suppose the people of these states to be subjects to the crown of Great-Britain, and are founded on the idea of dependence, which is utterly inadmissible. I am further directed to inform your excellencies that congress are inclined to peace, notwithstanding the unjust claims from which this war originated, and the savage manner in which it hath been conducted. They will therefore be ready to enter upon the consideration of a treaty of peace and commerce, not inconsistent with treaties already subsisting, when the king of Great-Britain shall demonstrate a sincere disposition for that purpose. The only solid proof of this disposition will be an explicit acknowledgment of the independence of these states, or the withdrawing his fleets and armies.—I have the honor to be, your excellencies most obedient and humble servant.” Before this letter could be received by the commissioners, a movement took place at Philadelphia, which must have completely frustrated all negociation, had the same been even in a train answering to the wishes of the British agents, for it indicated an apprehension of great danger to the royal forces should they continue in the city.”

Mr. Eden brought with him secret orders for the speedy evacuation of Philadelphia; they were so secret as not to be made known either to himself or governor Johnstone. Whether the earl of Carlisle met with the like treatment, is not yet ascertained. It has been publicly asserted, that the orders were dated exactly three weeks before the commissioners sailed from England, which carries the date back to the last of March. On their delivery, Sir Henry Clinton immediately applied himself to the putting of them into execution. By the eighteenth every thing being ready, the British army evacuated the city, at three o’clock in the morning. They proceeded to Gloucester-Point, three miles down the river, and before ten the whole had passed in safety across the Delaware, into New Jersey. At ten they began their march to Haddonfield, which they reached the same day. Your curiosity may make you desirous of knowing in what condition the British left Philadelphia. An American son of liberty, who visited it in the beginning of July, wrote to his friend—“The whole north side of the city, before you enter, is a promiscuous scene of ruin. Upon getting into the city, I was surprised to find it had suffered so little. I question whether it would have fared better, had our own troops been in possession of it, that is, as to the buildings.” The necessary preparations for its evacuation, could not be concealed from general Washington; when the appearance of their intending to march through Jersey became serious, he detached general Maxwell’s brigade, in conjunction with the militia of that state, to impede the progress of the royal troops, so as to give the American army time to come up with them, and to take advantage of any favorable circumstances that might offer. Some time before, gen. Lee having been exchanged, had joined the army at Valley-forge. The evening preceding the evacuation, the principles of the operations proper to be adopted, were taken up and fully discussed by his excellency and the general officers, when it appeared to be the common sentiment, that it would be highly criminal to hazard a general action with the enemy at present, as by it they might lose every advantage which a three years war, combined with many fortunate circumstances, had given to America. The next day his excellency, after observing, “near 11,000 men would be able to march off the ground in a condition for service,” proposed in writing, a set of queries to the several general officers, in order to learn the particular opinion of each, as to “what is to be done?” which was to be returned on paper. The answers were in common the same with the prevailing sentiment of the council on the preceding day. Gen. Mifflin was not of the number consulted. He would have gloried in being present to have taken an active part upon this occasion; but by some secret manœuvres was thrown at a distance. He desired and obtained leave of congress, on the 4th of May, to join the army, and repaired to Valley-forge. Some of the general officers were disgusted at the thought of his returning to his command now the campaign was opening, to share in the honors it might yield, when he had not shared with them in the peculiar distresses of their winter-quarters. When their sentiments came to be known to certain members of congress, measures were taken to produce and perfect the following motion on June 11th, “That gen. Washington be directed to order an enquiry to be made into the conduct of major-general Mifflin, late quarter-master-general, and the other officers who acted under him in that department; and if it shall appear that the extraordinary deficiencies thereof, and the consequent distresses of the army were chargeable to the misconduct of the quarter-master-general, or any of the said officers, that a court-martial be held on the delinquents.” When this enquiry was ordered to be made, he was with the army, and in a fair way of obtaining a just proportion of his countrymen’s confidence. He clearly saw the meaning of the stroke; but the order made it necessary for him to obtain leave of absence for some weeks, to collect materials for his justification.

When intelligence of Sir Henry Clinton’s having evacuated Philadelphia and marched to Haddonfield, reached the American head-quarters, the next measure to be taken by gen. Washington, was apparent. Gen. Greene, by his conduct and industry as quarter-master-general, had effected such a happy change in the line of his department, as enabled his excellency with great facility to move with the whole army and baggage from Valley-forge in pursuit of the enemy. The troops proceeded to and crossed the Delaware at Corriel’s ferry; when a select corps of 600 men were immediately detached under col. Morgan, to reinforce gen. Maxwell. The slow advance of Sir Henry, led his excellency to suspect that he had a design of bringing on a general action, could he draw the Americans into the lower country. This consideration, and a desire of refreshing the troops after the fatigues they had endured from rainy and excessive hot weather, determined the American general to halt about five miles from Princeton. While there he stated to the general officers [June 24.] the following facts—“the enemy’s force is between 9 and 10,000 rank and file—the American army on the ground is 10,684 rank and file, beside the advanced brigade under general Maxwell, of about 1200, and about 1200 militia,” on which he proposed the question, “Will it be advisable to hazard a general action?” The answer was—“Not advisable, but a detachment of 1500 to be immediately sent to act as occasion may serve, on the enemy’s left flank and rear, in conjunction with the other continental troops and militia already hanging about them, and the main body to preserve a relative position, to act as circumstances may require.——Lee, Stirling, Greene, Fayette, Steuben, Poor, Paterson, Woodward, Scott, Portail, Knox.” The detachment was immediately made under general Scott. The same day Sir Henry concluding that gen. Washington, who had alway hitherto avoided a general action, would not now give into it against every dictate of policy, and that the American views were directed against his baggage, in which part he was indeed vulnerable, determined to take the right hand road leading to Sandy-Hook, instead of making for the Rariton, where he suspected general Gates with the northern army might join that under general Washington. Gates arrived at Fishkill about the middle of May, to take the command in that quarter. The troops under him were so few, that he could not answer for the defence of that pass through the highlands, with which he was entrusted; and was persuaded that if the enemy made a sudden and determined push to carry it, the militia would not come in time to save it. On the 17th of June draughts arrived, and militia were hourly expected; after mentioning this in a letter to congress, he exclaims—“Thank heaven for the precious time the enemy have so foolishly lost!” He had no idea of marching for the Rariton; but his cavalry, and a considerable body of infantry, was at this period so posted, as to give the alarm of an attack upon New-York: and he proposed moving the main body of his army to White-Plains, and taking a strong camp in that neighbourhood, to keep up the alarm: which was highly approved of by gen. Washington, and procured his thanks. On the 25th his excellency moved his army to Kingston. Upon receiving intelligence that Sir Henry was prosecuting his route towards Monmouth court-house, he dispatched 1000 select men under brigadier gen. Wayne, and sent the Marquis de la Fayette to take the command of the whole advanced corps, with orders to seize the first fair opportunity of attacking the enemy’s rear. Gen. Lee declined the command, as he was against attacking, on which it was offered to the marquis, who accepted it with pleasure. In the evening of the same day, the whole army marched from Kingston, intending to preserve a proper distance for supporting the advanced corps, and arrived at Cranberry early the next morning. The intense heat of the weather, and a storm coming on, made it impossible to resume the march that day without great injury to the troops. The advanced corps, being in consequence hereof too remote from the main body, and too far upon the right to be supported, the marquis had orders sent him to file off by his left toward English-town, which he executed early in the morning of the 27th. Sir Henry being sensible of the approach of the American army, changed the disposition of his troops, and placed in the rear what were deemed the best, consisting of all the grenadiers, light-infantry and chasseurs of the line; at the same time gen. Knyphausen was requested to take the baggage of the whole army under the charge of his division, which made the first column. Under the head of baggage was comprised, not only all the wheel carriages of every department, but also the bat-horses—a train which, as the country admitted but of one rout for carriages, extended near twelve miles. The alteration made by Sir Henry laid gen. Washington under the necessity of increasing the number of the advanced corps. His excellency embraced this opportunity of gratifying gen. Lee, with the consent of the marquis. Lee observed that his having declined the command of the advanced corps had lessened him in the opinion of officers and soldiers, wished to be appointed afresh. Washington would not consent to remove the marquis; but a reinforcement being wanted, he detached Lee with two brigades to join the marquis at English-town, and of course to take upon him the command of the whole. The main body marched the same day, and encamped within three miles of that place. Morgans corps was left hovering on Sir Henry’s right flank, and the Jersey militia, amounting to about 700, under gen. Dickinson, on his left. The royal army was strongly encamped in the neighbourhood of Monmouth court-house, where they halted till the morning of the 28th. When once arrived at the heights of Middletown, about twelve miles in advance, there would have been no possibility of attempting any thing against them with a prospect of success, the American general therefore determined to attack their rear the moment they moved from their present ground, and communicated his intention to Lee, who was ordered to make the necessary disposition, and to keep his troops in readiness for the shortest notice. The like was done with respect to the troops under his own immediate command.