Part 25

When general Frazer perceived in the morning, that the Americans were retiring, he commenced a pursuit with his brigade, consisting of the light troops, grenadiers and some other corps. General Reidesel, with most of the Brunswickers, was ordered by the British commander to join in the pursuit, either to support Frazer or to act separately. The latter continued the pursuit through the day; and receiving intelligence that St. Clair’s rear was at no great distance, ordered his troops to lie that night on their arms. In the morning he came up with the Americans, commanded by colonel Warner, who had beside his own, the regiments of colonels Francis and Hale. The British advanced boldly [July 7.] and the two bodies formed within about sixty yards of each other. Frazer began the attack about seven o’clock, expecting every moment to be joined by Reidesel, and apprehending that if he delayed, the enemy would escape. Hale being apprized of the danger, never brought his regiment to the charge, but fled; so that Warner could bring into action no more than about seven hundred men. The conflict was bloody. Francis fell fighting with great bravery. Warner, officers and soldiers, behaved with much resolution and gallantry, so that the British broke and gave way, but soon formed again, and running on the Americans with their bayonets,[51] the latter were put into no small confusion, which was increased by the critical arrival of gen. Reidesel with the foremost of his column, consisting of the chasseur company, and eighty grenadiers and light infantry, who were immediately led into action. They now fled on all sides. Gen. St. Clair heard when the firing began, and would have supported Warner; but the troops that were nearest, two militia regiments, would not obey order, and the others were at too great a distance. Hale, who had attempted to get off by flight, fell in with an inconsiderable party of British, and surrendered himself, with a number of his men prisoners. The Americans lost 324 in killed, wounded and prisoners. Among the last were 12 officers. The royal troops, including British and Germans, had not less than 183 killed and wounded. They had three officers killed and twelve wounded.[52] While St. Clair was at Castleton, an officer of one of the gallies arrived with information that the British were pursuing in force toward Skeensborough and would reach it before he could get there. This determined him to change his route, and to strike into the woods on his left, lest he should be intercepted at Fort Anne. Two New-England regiments of militia, Leonard’s and Well’s discovered such a plundering disposition on their march, and behaved so disorderly during the whole retreat, that two days after leaving Castleton be was obliged to dismiss them from the army with disgrace.[53] General Burgoyne confiding in Frazer’s abilities to conduct the pursuit of the Americans by land, turned has attention to the pursuit by water. The boom and the other obstructions of the navigation, not having been completed were soon cut through; so that the gun-boats, the Royal George and the Inflexible frigates had passed by nine o’clock in the morning. Several regiments embarked on board the vessels, and the pursuit was supported with such vigor, that by three in the afternoon, the foremost brigade of gun-boats were engaged with the enemy’s gallies near Skeensborough falls. Upon the approach of the frigates, opposition ceased, two of the gallies were taken, and the other three blown up. The Americans not being in sufficient force to make an effectual stand, set fire to the works, fort, mills and batteaux; and escaped as they could up Wood Creek to Fort Anne, where they were joined by others, ordered thither by gen. Scuyler, who lay at Fort Edward. On the day of the engagement at Hubbardton, the general was obliged to strip the men at the last fort, to send to the troops at the former; by which his own were left without lead for some days, except a mere trifle from Albany, obtained by stripping the windows. At this period he had not above seven hundred continentals, and not above twice the number of militia; and could not furnish small cannon sufficient for a couple of little schooners on Lake George. Lieut. col. Hill was detached by gen. Burgoyne from Skeensborough with the ninth regiment, to take post near Fort Anne, and watch the motions of the Americans. The next morning [July 8.] at half past ten, they attacked him in front, with a heavy and well-directed fire. A large body passed the creek on the left, and fired from a thick wood across the creek on the left flank of the regiment; they then began to recross the creek, and attack it in the rear. It took post on the top of a hill on the right to prevent being surrounded. No sooner had it taken post, than they made a vigorous attack, which continued for upward of two hours, and would certainly have carried their point, had it not been for some Indians, who arrived and gave the Indian war-whoop, which was answered by the regiment with three cheers, after which the Americans soon gave way.[54] They then fired the fort, and retreated to Fort Edward. The artillery lost by the evacuation of the northern posts, and taken or destroyed in the armed vessels at Skeensborough, was prodigious, amounting to no less than 128 pieces serviceable and unserviceable. The loss of flour, biscuit, pork and beef was also very considerable.

Gen. St. Clair joined gen. Scuyler at Fort Edward on the twelfth, after a fatiguing march, in which the army suffered much from bad weather and want of provisions. Three days after, their whole strengh did not exceed 4400 men, including militia. The day following the affair at Fort Anne, Scuyler ordered a brigade of militia to begin, as near the fort as possible, to fall trees; to take up the bridges, and burn the covering and timber; and to make the utmost obstructions. [July 16.] A continental brigade was directed to assist in destrying and completely stopping the roads. The same day gen. Scuyler took out of a canteen with a false bottom, a letter written by Mr. Levius to gen. Sullivan. Scuyler prepared an answer designedly worded so as to deceive and perplex Burgoyne; which he signed Canteen, communicated to several gentlemen, and then forwarded. The British general when it was received, could not tell what to make of it. He was puzzled for two or three days, and at a loss whether to proceed or retreat; the latter was so completely enigmatical.[55]

Happily for the Americans, the British general continued for several days, with the army partly at Skeensborough, and partly spread in the adjoining country, waiting the arrival of tents, baggage and provision. In which time no labor was spared in opening roads for advancing toward Scuyler, and in clearing Wood Creek of all impediments laid in the way, in order to open a passage for the batteaux. Like exertions were used at Ty, in carrying gun-boats, provision vessels and batteaux over land into Lake George. By reason of the route which the general took, he did not arrive at Hudson’s-River, and fix his head-quarters near Fort Edward, till the 30th of July. Fort Edward is no more than the ruins of a former fort, and of no consequence to any party. It could afford no cover to general Scuyler, and only gave a name to the place where it was situated. The general left it several days before Burgoyne gained its neighborhood. He gave this state of his army on the 27th, at Moses’ Creek, in an official letter—“It consists of about 2700 continental troops—of militia from the state of Connecticut—one major—one captain—two lieutenants—two ensigns—one adjutant—one quarter-master—six sergeants—one drummer—six sick—and three rank and file fit for duty—the rest, after remaining three or four days, deserted us—Of those from the county of Berkshire (in the Massachusetts) who consisted of upward of 1200, half of which were to have remained, somewhat more than 200 are left, the remainder having also deserted—Of colonel Mosely’s regiment, from the county of Hampshire (Massachusetts) about ten or twelve are left, the rest having deserted—Of colonel Porter’s regiment, of the county of Hampshire, about 200 left—Of the militia of the county of Albany, 1050 are left, being forty-six more than half of what were upon the ground when it was resolved to let half return to their habitations.” He added, “That torpor, criminal indifference and want of spirit which so generally prevails, is more dangerous than all the efforts of the enemy. Nor is that jealousy and spirit of detraction which so unhappily prevails, of small detriment to our cause.” The next day he wrote from Saratoga, twenty miles below Fort Edward and thirty-seven above Albany, “Every effort of the enemy would be in vain, if our exertions equalled our abilities, if our virtue was not sinking under that infamous venality which pervades throughout, and threatens us with ruin.”

The desertions above mentioned, were not to the enemy, but to their own homes; Scuyler was, for some reasons, a very unacceptable commander to the New-England militia. They were in general disgusted with, and would not serve under him. There were no desertions to the royal army worth noticing, which argues there were no lurking seeds of disaffection to the American cause.

Had the British commander returned immediately to Ty, and advanced from thence in the most expeditious manner, with a few light field-pieces, instead of suffering any delay, in order to his dragging along with him a heavy train of artillery, he might have been at Albany by the time he got to Hudson’s-River.[56] Your correspondent, the fifth of October, the last year, breakfasted with general Gates, at Ty; sailed in company up Lake George (about 35 miles long) with their horses in batteaux; landed, stayed a while, and reached Fort Edward (about 9 miles from Fort George) at night, a little after eight. From Ty to Lake George is rather more than two miles. The two small schooners on the lake, could have made no long resistance against a brigade of gun-boats. Fort George was well adapted to keep off Indians and small parties, but not to stop the royal army. The Americans there, instead of defending the fort or opposing the landing of the army, would undoubtedly have retreated to gen. Scuyler, at Fort Edward. The latter felt himself so weak, that by the first of August he drew back from Saratoga to Stillwater (25 miles north of Albany) from whence he wrote on the 4th, “We have not above 4000 continental troops; if men, one third of which are negros, boys and men too aged for the field, or indeed any other service, can be called troops. The states from whence these troops came, can determine why such boys, negroes and aged men were sent. A great part of the army took the field in a manner naked, without blankets, ill armed, and very deficient in accoutrements. Too many of our officers would be a disgrace to the most contemptible troops that were ever collected; and have so little sense of honor that cashiering them seems no punishment. They have stood by and suffered the most scandalous depredations to be committed on the poor, distressed, ruined and flying inhabitants.” He had also about fifteen hundred militia.

The evacuation of Tyconderoga and Mount Independence, surprised gen. Washington, and spread astonishment and terror through the New-England states. The general was led to believe that the garrison was much stronger. The Massachusetts general court were faulty in not having seasonably forwarded their quota of troops, agreeable to the requisition of congress. The apprehensions of the Massachusetts people were the greater, as their military friends with gen. Washington’s army, informed them that the expedition which Sir William Howe had undertaken, and for which he was embarking his troops from Staten-Island, was meant against Boston. But amid all the disasters which had happened, and the consequent terrors, no sort of disposition to comply with British propositions, appeared in any quarter. Notwithstanding the success that had attended the northern army, and the military storm that was gathering at Sandy-Hook, and no one state knowing where it would fall, yet each discovered a determination to remain independent. The American commander in chief received information that the common report among the sailors and soldiers was, that the fleet was going to the Delaware; but as Howe’s conduct was to him puzzling beyond measure, so were the informations he obtained. One time the ships were standing up toward the North-River. In a little while they were going up the Sound; and in an hour after, they were sailing out of the Hook. Before their sailing, a spirited adventure took place on the side of Rhode-Island, which not only fully retaliated the surprisal of general Lee, but procured an indemnification of his person. Lieutenant colonel Barton, of a militia regiment belonging to that state, with several other officers and volunteers, to the number of forty, passed by night [July 10.] from Warwick Neck to Rhode-Island, and though they had a passage of ten miles by water, eluded the watchfulness of the ships of war and guard-boats which surrounded the island. They conducted their enterprize with such silence and dexterity, that they surprised general Prescot in his quarters, about one mile from the water side, and five from Newport, and brought him, with one of his aids-de-camp, safe to the continent, which they had nearly reached before there was any alarm among the enemy. This adventure, which with impartial judges must outweigh col. Harcourt’s capture of gen. Lee, produced much exultation on the one side, and much regret on the other, from the influence it would necessarily have on Lee’s destination. But more than a month before, congress had received information that Lee was treated by gen. Howe with kindness, generosity and tenderness, which had led them to desire that col. Campbell and the five Hessian officers should be treated in a similar manner, consistent with the confinement and safe custody of their persons. They resolved, within a few days after hearing of Prescot’s being taken, that an elegant sword should be provided and presented to colonel Barton.

The British fleet and army which lay at Sandy-Hook, were destined for the reduction of Pennsylvania, particularly of Philadelphia, in pursuance of a plan which had been settled between Sir William Howe and lord George Germain; but did not sail till the 23d of July. The land force consisted of thirty-six British and Hessian battalions, including the light-infantry and grenadiers, with a powerful artillery, a New-York corps called the queen’s rangers, and a regiment of light-horse, estimated altogether, at about 16,000. The fleet consisted of 267 sail. General Washington, upon the fleet’s sailing, marched his army toward Pennsylvania, and halted it at Corriel’s ferry, Howel’s ferry, and Trenton. He wrote from Corriel’s ferry on the 30th——“Howe’s (in a manner) abandoning Burgoyne, is so unaccountable a matter, that till I am fully assured it is so, I cannot help casting my eyes continually behind me.” He mentioned his halting the army till the fleet should appear in the Delaware, and put the matter out of doubt; and that he had ordered gen. Sullivan’s division to halt at Morristown, that it might march southward or northward, upon the first advice of the enemy’s throwing any force up the North-River.

General Washington’s perplexity for some days, cannot be so well conceived of as by extracts from his own letters; read then, and judge for yourself. “July 31. The enemy’s fleet arrived at the Capes of Delaware yesterday, therefore order the two brigades thrown over the river, to march immediately.” “Chester, August 1. I had proceeded thus far to look out for a proper place to arrange the army, when I received the provoking account, that the enemy’s fleet left the Capes yesterday, and steered eastward. I shall return with the utmost expedition to the North-River; a sudden stroke is certainly intended by this manœuvre. Call in every man of the militia to strengthen the highland posts.” “August 1. The enemy’s fleet put to sea yesterday morning at eight o’clock, and were out of sight three hours when the express came away. It appears gen. Howe has been practising a deep feint to draw our whole force to this point. Counter-march your division, and proceed with all possible expedition to Peek’s-kill.” “August 3. The conduct of the enemy is difficult and distressing to be understood.” “August 11. On the seventh the enemy was off Sinepuxent Inlet, about 16 leagues to the southward of the Capes of Delaware, on which I have halted for further intelligence.” “August 22. The enemy’s fleet have entered Chesapeake. There is not now the least danger of Howe’s going to New-England; forward this account to governor Trumbull, to be by him sent on to the eastward.”

Sir William Howe, while off the Capes, received that information which led him to judge it most advisable to proceed to Chesapeake-Bay instead of going up the Delaware. Such information could not relate to the measures taken for rendering the navigation of the river impracticable. These measures were matters of so great notoriety, that he must have been strangely deficient in procuring intelligence, if he did not know them before he left the Hook. Beside, the obstructions in the river did not reach so low down as either Newcasle or Wilmington; as high as either of which places the fleet might have come with safety; and had he landed at the first of them, he would have been within 36 miles of Philadelphia, and fourteen miles nearer than the Head of Elk. The information most probably related to gen. Washington’s having marched the continental army within a certain distance of Philadelphia; and perhaps, to a prospect of his being joined by a number of disaffected Americans in the states of Maryland and Delaware, upon his going up the Chesapeak and landing in Maryland. Be that as it may, through unfavourable winds he did not enter the Chesapeak till the 16th of August; and the difficulty of the navigation made it the 25th, before the army landed at Elk ferry. One part advanced to the Head of Elk, the other continued at the landing place to protect and forward the artillery, stores and necessary provisions. The day Sir William entered the Chesapeak, he received from lord George Germain, a letter of May the 18th, wherein was given him the first intimation, that any support whatever would be expected from him in favor of the northern expedition under gen. Burgoyne, in words to this purpose—“I trust that whatever you may meditate, it will be executed in time to co-operate with the army ordered to proceed from Canada.” Gen. Washington upon advice of the British army’s having landed, marched toward the Brandywine river, with his troops, amounting in the whole to 11,000 present and fit for duty, including 1800 of the Pennsylvania militia. Gen. Greene attended with gen. Weedon, was sent to reconnoitre and find out an eligible spot for their encampment. He pitched upon one at the Cross Roads, near six miles distant from the royal army, which he judged suitable, as the Americans would there have an open country behind them, from whence they could draw assistance, and would have opportunities of skirmishing with the enemy before they were organized and provided with teams and horses, &c. for marching; and as Howe’s troops would be a long while cramped before they could get what was wanting in order to their proceeding. He wrote to the commander in chief, acquainting him with the spot he had chosen. But the information was received too late: a council of war had determined the same day it was transmitted, to take a position upon Red-Clay Neck, about half way between Wilmington and Christianna, alias Christeen, with their left upon Christeen-neck, and their right extending toward, Chad’s Ford. When the reason for it, that it would prevent the enemy’s passing on for Philadelphia, was assigned to gen. Greene, he maintained, that they would not think of Philadelphia, till they had beaten the American army; and upon his observing the position which had been taken, he condemned it as being greatly hazardous, and such as must be abandoned, should the enemy when organized advance toward them. The Americans however, spent much time and labour in strengthening the post.

Let us break off here to mention some of the congressional proceedings. In the beginning of June, they approved general Washington’s conduct as to the cartel for exchange of prisoners, and his reasoning upon the subject. The general had acquainted Sir William Howe, that he did “not hold himself bound either by the spirit of the agreement, or by the principles of justice, to account for those prisoners, who, from the rigor and severity of their treatment, were in so emaciated and languishing a state at the time they came out, as to render their death almost certain and inevitable, and which, in many instances, happened while they were returning to their homes, and in many others after their arrival.” He said to him “You must be sensible that our engagement, as well as all others of the kind, though in letter it expresses only an equality of rank and number, as the rule of exchange, yet it necessarily implies a regard to the general principles of mutual compensation and advantage. This is inherent in its nature, is the voice of reason, and no stipulation as to the condition in which prisoners should be returned, was requisite. Humanity dictated, that their treatment should be such as their health and comfort demanded. Nor is this the language of humanity alone—justice declares the same. The object of every cartel, or similar agreement, is the benefit of the prisoners themselves, and that of the contending powers—on this footing it equally exacts, that they should be well treated, as that they should be exchanged: the reverse is therefore an evident infraction, and ought to subject the party, on whom it is chargeable, to all the damages and ill consequences resulting from it.”[57]

[June 14.] Congress “resolved, That the flag of the Thirteen United States be thirteen stripes, alternate red and white; that the union be thirteen stars, white in a blue field, representing a new constellation.” [June 20.] “Resolved, That a corps of invalids be formed, consisting of eight companies, each company to have one captain, two lieutenants, two ensigns, five sergeants, six corporals, two drummers, two fifers and a hundred men. This corps to be employed in garrison and for guards in cities and other places, as also to serve as a military school for young gentlemen, previous to their being appointed to marching regiments.” Lewis Nicola, esq. was immediately after elected colonel of the said corps.

The inhabitants of the New-Hampshire grants having set up an independent government, presented a petition to congress, praying that they might be considered as a free and independent state, and that delegates from them might be admitted to seats in congress. [June 30.] Their petition was dismissed. But though it was dismissed, the petitioners have not dissolved their government, but are resolutely determined to continue a free and independent state.